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Abstract 
This study seeks to examine the precise way it may be said that God takes risks 
in creating and governing this world. In order to articulate this model of 
providence various texts of scripture are studied which have either been 
overlooked or interpreted differently in discussions of divine providence. These 
texts reveal a deity who enters·· into genuine give-and-take relations with 
creatures, a God who is genuinely responsive and who may be said to take risks 
in that God does not get everything he desires in these relationships. 
Furthermore, the traditional texts used to defend the '!2.-:!"iR.k view of providence 
are examined and shown that they do not_, in f<Lct, te<>-Ch the idea that God is the 
:•·-----··-
ca_u."E! _of E!v_e_rythinc;r. whic:h h<>-ppens in the world s.uch that the divine will is never 
thwa:ict;ed. in .. the .. le<>-~.t <:l,etail. The biblical teaching of God in reciprocal 
relations with his creatures is then discussed in theological and philosophical 
terms. The nature of God is here ·understood as loving, wise, faithful yet_free, 
almighty, competent and resourceful. These ideas are explicated in light of the 
more traditional theological/philosophical understanding of God. Finally, some 
of the implications of this relational model of God are examined to see the ways 
in which it may be said that God takes risks and whose will may be thwarted. The 
crucial watershed in this regard is whether or not there is any conditionality 
in the godhead. The no-risk view denies, while the risk model affirms, that some 
aspects of God's will, knowledge, and actions are contingent. In order to grasp 
the differences between the two models the doctrines and practices involved in 
salvation, the problem of evil, prayer and guidance are examined to see what each 
model says about them. It is claimed that· .the relational or risk model is 
superior to the no-risk model both in terms of theoretical coherence and the 
practice of the Christian life. 
Key Wordsi Divine providence; divine sovereignty; evil; human freedom; 
omniscience; omnipotence; love; foreknowledge; risk; prayer; contingency; divine 
will; divine plan; divine-human relationship. 
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Chapter one: Introduct1on 
The police car, lights flashing and siren roaring, sped past me as I was driving 
home. When I reached the stop sign at the corner I could see several police cars 
and an ambulance up ahead at the scene of an accident. Since I worked for the 
local newspaper as a photographer I decided to take some pictures of the 
accident. When I reached the scene I could see a semi-truck blocking the road, 
a motorcycle laying on its side, and a white sheet covering something near the 
truck. Everyone just stared at me which I thought was strange until someone came 
up to me and sa_id, "You don't want to take any pictures here, that is your 
brother Dick under the wheels of that truck." The next few minutes are a blur in 
my memory but I do recall that when I got home I went to my room and put this 
question to God: "God, why did you kill my brother?" As I look back on this 
question I am fascinated that I asked it since I was a nominal Methodist at the 
time and I did not believe that God caused everything which happened. Perhaps I 
had picked up from the broader culture the belief that God was the cause behind 
everything 1 including all tragedies. In years to come many a Christian would 
attempt to provide me with "good" reasons why God ordained my brother's death. 
Such discussions have spurred my reflection on divine providence for over twenty 
years. 
The belief that God is the ultimate cosmic explanation for each and every thing, 
including all bad things we experience, is quite widespread, at least in North 
America. At the funeral service for the death of a young child whose parents were 
close friends of mine, the pastor said, "God must have had a good reason for 
taking her home.n Of course, "taking her homen is a euphemism for God killing 
her. In a little while the euphemism wore off and the parents inquired as to why 
God killed their daughter. Several weeks later when I was visiting these friends 
they put. the question to me: "Why did God kill our baby girl?" They were angry 
with God but did not feel safe to cry out in lament at church for they were told 
that God's ways are best and it is sin to question God. In answer to their 
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question I sought to provide them with a different model of God--the one 
explained in this thesis. But the point I wish to make here is that there is a 
fair amount of anger and even hatred towards God both in and outside the church. 
Anger directed at a particular model of God. 
After talks had broken off between Iraq and the United Nations over the invasion 
of Kuwait, then Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, said, 11 War is now in 
God's hands." When former president of the United States, Gerald Ford, heard this 
statement he remarked, "I wish it were, I'd feel a lot better about it." Is it 
the case that de. Cuellar's remark manifests, while Ford's comment lacks, faith 
in divine providence? Not at all. But it might be the case that they reveal 
different understandings of providence. The two major models of divine providence 
are the no-risk and risk views. According to the no-risk understanding no event 
ever happens except that God specifically selected it to happen. Nothing is too 
insignificant for God's meticulous and exhaustive control. Each and every death1 
civil war, famine, wedding, peaceful settlement, or birth happens because God 
specifically intends it to happen so God never takes any risks that things will 
turn out differently than God desires. According to the risk model of providence 
God has established certain boundaries within which creatures operate but God 
sovereignly decides not to control each and every event. Some things go contrary 
to what God intends and things may not turn out completely as God desires. Hence, 
God takes risks in creating this sort of world. It is commonplace for some 
theologians to claim that only the no-risk model affirms divine sovereignty. That 
is, they believe that divine sovereignty, by definition, means exhaustive control 
of all things. However, this claim is questioned in this research. We should not 
dictate the sort of providence God must exercise. Instead, we should look to see 
what sort()f_sovereignty God has freely chosen to practice. Providence refers to 
the way God has chosen to relate to us and provide for our well being. 
Consequently, God may or may not have chosen to exercise no-risk sovereignty. We 
have to observe what God has chosen to do in history. 
'l 
';;' 
' 
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Yet, it is probably the case that most Western theists have thought that God does 
not take any risks in governing the world. After all, if God is a God of order 
then there is no room for a God who, in the words of Einstein's famous phrase, 
"plays dice with the world." Yet, views are changing in science, philosophy, and 
theology from a deity who is the "will-to-power" to a God who is the "will-to-
conununity, 11 a God who desires to be in relationship to all his creatures and who 
desires a personal relationship with humans. The task of this thesis is to give 
a coherent account of what is involved in the divine-human relationship and to 
explicate, from within this view, the ways in which divine providence is risk-
taking. The sensibilities of many people will be shocked by the notion that God 
is a risk-taker for the metaphor goes against the grain of what we have become 
accustomed to think regarding divine providence. Theorists on metaphor, however, 
hold that a good metaphor is supposed to challenge conventional ways of looking 
at things and suggest an alternate perspective. Metaphors disclose a way of 
viewing life and relationships yet metaphors may also conceal things from us. 
When certain metaphors, such as God as kingr reign for so long in theology we 
risk being conditioned to overlook aspects of our relationship with God. When 
this happens we need new "iconoclastic 11 metaphors which reveal to us something 
that was missing. It is my contention that the metaphor "God the risk-taker" does 
........____, _____ _, ' ----··--- -
this in that it opens up new ways of understanding what is at stake--even for 
God--in divine providence. Things which may have been overlooked in the biblical 
record by exegetes as well as in our theology and liturgy. 
It should be pointed out that thinking of God as risk-taker only makes sense 
within a particular theological model: a personal God who enters into genuine 
give-and-take relations with his creatures. Neither an impersonal deity nor a 
personal deity who meticulously controls every event takes risks. In order to 
articulate the heuristic value for the Christian life of God the risk-taker a 
model of·God as a personal being who enters into personal relationships with us 
must be established. In order to explicate the model, of a God involved in 
personal relationships who takes risks with his world several tasks must be 
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accomplished. These tasks are done in the various chapters of the thesis. Chapter 
two will discuss various methodological matters important for assessing the 
success of the proposal. The next two chapters will examine the Old and New 
Testament material supporting this model. These chapters look at biblical texts 
which are commonly ignored or radically reinterpreted in order to remove the 
element of risk from divine providence. Focus will be on the nature of God and 
the divine project this God has undertaken. Chapter five seeks to develop, in 
light of the biblical material, the nature of the God who undertakes the project 
of entering into reciprocal relations with the creatures. The attributes of God 
should not be arrived at <lignum Deo (what it is dignified for God to be) but, 
rather, by looking at the particular sort of project God is seeking to 
accomplish. When this is done it becomes clear that the classical attributes of 
God need some revising. The final chapter spells out the p:actical implications 
of this model of God for the Christian life. Comparing and contrasting different 
views is one way of clarifying positions. To this end the risk and no-risk models 
of divine sovereignty are compared regarding several key areas of providence: 
salvation, suffering and evil, prayer, and guidance. It will be argued that it 
makes a significant difference for the devotional life which view of providence 
one affirms. Moreover, issues such as whether or not the divine will may be 
thwarted in any respect and whether God's plan for the world is a blueprint or 
only concerns general overall strategies will be explored. 
At this juncture I would like to make a number of qualifications. To begin, this 
thesis is constructive. That is, it attempts to develop a particular theological 
model rather than critique a standard position. Although there will be times for 
critique that is not the primary goal. Second, I am not writing a general 
treatise on the doctrine of providence covering all the topics normally examined 
in such works. Rather, it is al/examination of providence through the lens of 
·\ 
divine risk-taking. Consequently, those aspects of providence which are studied 
are done so to see what should be said concerning a risk-taking God. Third, I 
have no delusions that this study will settle all the questions for I am all too 
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aware of the work which remains to be done. Fourth, though this work will touch 
repeatedly on the subject of theodicy, it is not a book about the problem of 
evil. Instead, it is about a personal God who enters into genuine give-and-take 
relations with us. From this particular model of God implications may be drawn 
out for the problem of evil. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the help provided by Terence Fretheim, Mike 
Holmes, William Hasker and David Basinger who were kind ·enough to read various 
chapters and give me their responses. Also, thanks goes to Dean Fredrikson, my 
colleague and dialogue partner on this topic for over fifteen years. Last, but 
certainly not least, is Adria KBnig who has given me guidance and sometimes 
spirited debate in order to improve this thesis. I am truly thankful to God for 
the opportunity to work with these scholars and complete my doctorate. 
Chapter TM>: 2'be Nature of the Task 
2.1 Metaphors and Models 
The working out of a theological project is done within a framework of beliefs 
regarding methodology, epistemology and language. This chapter discusses these 
sundry issues in order to inform · the reader regarding some of the broader 
theological context in which the present study is done. The first topic of 
discussion is about language. In this thesis metaphors matter for it is through 
various metaphors that we understand and relate to God. 1 By use of metaphors we 
organize and give meaning to all of our experience, they are basic to all thought 
and language. They are •reality depicting• in that what we understand to be real 
is filtered through them.' They help us make sense of things with which we are 
initially unfamiliar by making comparisons. When we assert that Elvis is the king 
of rock and roll we make a comparison between kingship and this particular 
singer's relation to other rock and roll singers. When we assert that God is king 
of the earth we also make a comparison between kingship and God's relation to the 
world. Metaphors have the peculiar quality of saying that something both "is" and 
"is not," that is, in a certain respect what is asserted is correct but it is not 
the whole story. 3 Saying God is a rock tells us something about God but not all 
that needs saying for we need a number of metaphors to describe God and God's 
relationship to us. Yet, metaphors--'even those about God--are reality depicting 
in that they tell us of a real relationship between God and the world .. If we 
claim that metaphors depict nothing about God or portray no genuine relationship 
then we have severed God from the world and we are locked into silence about God. 
1Helpful on the application of metaphors to God is Terence E. Fretheim, The 
Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective, Overtures to Biblical Theology 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 1-12. 
'See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980) and Janet M. Soskice, Metaphor and Religious 
Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). On the primacy of metaphor 
for developing a post-critical philosophy see Jerry H. Gill, On Knowing God: New 
Directions for the Future of Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981). 
3See Sallie McFague's two works: Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in 
Religious Language (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) and Models of God: Theology for 
an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987). 
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Theological models, whether in science or religion, embody a key metaphor or 
cluster of metaphors which guide our reflection and application to life. Certain 
metaphors function in a comprehensive way in that they come to "control" or 
"orient" our thought and life about particular subjects and so may be called key 
models. 4 Key models or •root metaphors• offer sustained and systematic 
reflection upon a topic in order to give coherence and meaning to our experience. 
They also shape the way we live since key models seek to provide comprehensive 
life applications. Different key models give rise to different theologies.' Many 
of our theological disputes arise because we look at the •evidence" through 
different models. For instance, the model of God as the immutable king is 
employed by classical theism to view the biblical texts on divine repentance as 
anthropomorphisms so that God never actually changes his mind.' The metaphor of 
divine immutability also shapes the way one practices the Christian life (e. g'., 
prayer). The model of a personal God who takes risks understands divine 
repentance and prayer differently. Models make a difference in how the biblical 
text is read as well as in how we live out our faith. 
2.2 Criteria 
Any theological model must meet three criteria in order to qualify for having 
"public intelligibility. "7 Intelligibility or rationality is a communal rather 
'The term is borrowed from Vincent Brtimmer's The Model of Love: A Study in 
Philosophical Theology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 20. The 
following discussion is indebted to him. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason Within the 
Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976), calls these •control 
beliefs." 
5See my "God as Personal," ed. Clark Pinnock, The Grace of God. The Will of 
Man (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1989), 165-180. Also helpful on models in 
theology are: Hans Kung, Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View, 
tr. Peter Heinegg (New York: Doubleday, 1988) and John Goldingay, Models For 
Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994). 
6For more on this see 3.12. 
7ExC:ellent discussions of these and additional criteria may be found in 
Christoph Schwabe!, God: Action and Revelation (Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok 
Pharos, .1992), 132-152, Brtimmer, Model of Love, 22-9, and David L. Wolfe, 
Epistemology: The Justification of Belief, Contours of Christian Philosophy 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1982), 43.-69. Schwebel and Wolfe are 
particularly helpful in situating the criteria into the larger "practical" 
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than merely a private affair, so I include the word public. In order to be 
"rational" a model must meet the rules of intelligibility established by the 
cornmuni ty in which one advances the proposal. There are three criteria for 
evaluating a theological key model. The first criterion is consonance with 
tradition. Since it is theologians who develop theological models and theologians 
are socially located in particular traditions, any proposed model must reach a 
significant degree of harmony with the authoritative sources of that tradition. 
In the case of Christian theology the primary standard, or the norming norm, is 
the Bible and especially the gospel of Jesus. If the model does not resonate with 
scripture overall along with the person and work of Jesus in particular it 
cannot, with integrity, be called Christian. Moreover, all theologians belong to 
particular traditions of interpretation of scripture. We are Roman Catholic or 
Orthodox or Protestant, not to mention the various subtraditions in each of theSe 
communities. Any theological model not only has to resonate with scripture, it 
must also find a place within the religious tradition of the audience to whom the 
proposal is being made. 8 The problems we select to address, the evidence we 
cite, the interpretation we give to the evidence, and the rhetoric we use to 
communicate our proposals owe a great debt to the communities to which we belong. 
This does not rule out reforms, even significant ones, within our traditions, 
however, for they are not static. From time to time barnacles and other 
accrustations need to be and are removed if the tradition is to make better 
headway in the world. Yet, any new proposal must have a fair degree of continuity 
with the intentions, functions and material content of the doctrinal positions 
of the tradition if it is to find a hearing. 
project of making sense of life. overall, my general epistemological approach is 
known as "critical realism." Critical realism seeks to overcome the dual myths 
of pure objectivity and pure subjectivity by noting that all understanding 
involves both elements. On this see Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 
185-226 ,' and Arthur F. Holmes, Contours of a World View (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1983), 145-152. 
'See the stimulating work by David S. Cunningham, Faithful Persuasion: In 
Aid of a Rhetoric of Christian Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1991). 
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The second criterion is conceptual intelligibility. In order for the model to 
make sense the set of concepts entailed must be unpacked to see whether they are 
internally consistent, coherent with other beliefs we affirm, comprehensive in 
covering the range of relevant considerations, and communicable to others. If 
a concept is contradictory it fails a key test for public intelligibility for 
what is contradictory is not meaningful. Furthermore, if concepts integral to the 
model are mutually inconsistent it calls the coherence of the model into 
question. 9 A model with too many internal tensions lacks cohesiveness. Regarding 
comprehensiveness, theological models highlight certain aspects of the faith 
while overlooking others. The more comprehensive a model is in covering the range 
of relevant considerations the more satisfactory it will be. Brilmmer puts it well 
when he says, "a systematic theologian is required to develop a suggested 
theological key model derived from the cumulative tradition, coherently and 
comprehensively, in order to see what it entails for the whole conceptual scheme 
of the faith: which elements of the tradition will be highlighted and which will 
be filtered out or overlooked?" 10 I would add that a proposed model may afford 
fresh insights into cherished aspects of the faith as well as relieve certain 
tensions regarding the faith inherent in a different model. All models have costs 
in that they have strengths and weaknesses. The determination of what is "too 
costly" is influenced by the particular lenses through which the evaluator is 
looking. Thus, what may be considered a strength by one person may be viewed as 
a weakness by another. Concerning communicability, it may be said that all 
rationality presupposes conununities of language users and people committed to the 
project of sense-making. Rationality is never a merely private affair for the 
standards of rationality are dependent upon the traditions of specific 
communities. In Christendom, if you wish to communicate rationally to others then 
you must do so with logical consistency and coherence or you forfeit the right 
9For a detailed examination of the "coherence" condition see Richard 
Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, Revised ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 11-50. 
ioBrfunmer, Model of Love, 25. 
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to claim public intelligibility for your model. 
The third criterion is adequacy for the demands of life. The proposed model must 
be relevant to the real life situations faced by the community. The theological 
model needs to help us in our relationships to God, others, the creation, and 
ourselves. It must be found useful in enhancing such activities as prayer, 
• 
comforting the suffering, and acting responsibly in the world. Not only must the 
model be judged as to whether it is adequate on the corporate level, it must also 
be evaluated on the individual level. Though all of us are situated within 
specific communities we, nevertheless, have our own personal experiences and 
identities which shape our evaluation of any particular model concerning its 
adequacy for helping us cope with life. Hence, everyone will not necessarily 
evaluate the model in the same way. Yet, the fact remains that theological models 
have to demonstrate their value in the lives of the people of faith. 
This thesis attempts to address the model of divine providence as risk-taking in 
light of these three criteria. To this end use is made of biblical, systematic 
and philosophical theology. Chapters three and four seek to demonstrate 
consonance between the risk model of providence and the Bible. It is important 
for theologians not merely to reflect on the Bible but to actually examine in 
detail particular biblical texts. Historical theology--tracing what the tradition 
has said on the subject--is also important but, having already done that work 
elsewhere, I shall not repeat it here." Yet, it should be noted that the no-
risk model has a head start of some several hundred years. Hence, theologians 
employing it have had ample time to respond to questions of interpretations of 
various biblical texts and questions pertaining to the nature of God and the 
Christian life. It cannot be expected that the risk view of providence will be 
able to immediately handle all the questions thrown at it. Nevertheless, this 
thesis represents a sustained attempt to develop and substantiate the risk model 
11See my, "Historical Considerations," Clark Pinnock, et. al. The Openness 
of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994). 
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of providence. For some time now there has been a new wave of critical 
reappraisal and responsible reconstruction regarding the doctrine of God. Old 
views of God are either dying or are seriously ill, in need of healing. This 
study is an attempt to bring healing to certain aspects of the God of classical 
theism. 12 Chapter five and parts of the other chapters utilize philosophical 
theology in order to show the conceptual intelligibility of this model by looking 
at its internal coherence and answering questions regarding certain "problems" 
this view might be thought to engender. Finally, chapter six draws upon 
systematic theology to probe how this model affects other important doctrines and 
to see whether the model of a risk-taking God is adequate to the demands of the 
life of faith. It is important that all three disciplines function together since 
biblical scholars may be unaware of theological or philosophical paradigms 
through which they view the text and theologians and philosophers may be unaware 
of what the biblical texts actually say about the matter upon which they are 
reflecting. 
It will be argued that the no-risk model of God has, in~ respects, strayed 
from its scriptural moorings, fallen into incoherence, and failed to meet the 
demands of the practice of faith. The project here undertaken will develop the 
model of God as risk-taker and explore the implications of such a model for the 
life of faith." Yet, because the arguments put forth are all situated within 
12 ! am not alone in this undertaking. something that surprised me as the 
study unfolded was the number of Reformed (Dutch Reformed in particular) thinkers 
who support the risk model. Things are certainly changing in Reformed theology! 
"Any new proposal will be viewed with skepticism by some: Could so many 
theologians and philosophers have been wrong? Whether they were wrong on this 
issue remains to be seen. That they have been wrong on many other issues is 
historically clear. After all, certain 11 clear" passages of scripture were used 
in the past to justify a geocentric solar system, deny women any relief from the 
pain of childbirth, justify persecution of the Jews, and legitimize slavery of 
blacks. It is fascinating that until the late 1800's most Christian theologians 
used the Bible to sanction slavery and that, in America, many southern clergy 
took up ·arms against the 11 infidel 11 northern clergy because they believed the 
Yankee Christians were rejecting the clear truth of the Bible! In this case the 
southern. Christians were the biblical conservatives while their northern 
counterparts were the liberals. See Kevin Giles, "The Biblical Argument for 
Slavery: Can the Bible Mislead? A Case Study in Hermeneutics," Evangelical 
Quarterly 66, no. 1 (Jan. 1994): 3-17. 
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a contextual web of belief, those who do not share my larger web of belief are 
not likely to agree with my conclusions. Moreover, I make no pretentions of 
••proving" my case. Rather, this thesis is an attempt to offer, what may be 
called, a cumulative case in support of divine risk-taking. It is not the only 
model a Christian may be rationally· justified in holding. But I do believe it is 
superior to the no-risk model of providence in having greater fidelity to the 
biblical story, a more coherent view of the nature of God, and better 
understandings of the life-application issues such as evil, prayer, guidance and 
a personal relationship with God. 
2.3 Anthropomorphism 
The metaphors and models we use to speak about God and God's relationship to the 
world are all anthropomorphic. There is simply no getting around this. Some have 
found this situation quite troubling. It is quite commonplace for people to 
assert that God is so transcendent that we cannot know what God is truly like. 
When human traits such as having eyes, feelings or changes of mind are attributed 
to God the charge of impropriety is raised. We cannot, it is claimed, bring God 
down to our level and impose human logic and language upon God for God is utterly 
transcendent. Did not the prophet Isaiah chide his contemporaries for making 
idols of the incomparable God. He says of God, "to whom would you liken me and 
make me equal, and compare me, as though we were alike?" (46:5, cf. 40:18, 25). 
Later he says, "for my thoughts are not your thoughts, nor are your ways my ways, 
says the LORD. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways 
higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts" (55:8-9). This text has 
become the classic text among theologians and philosophers to affirm the absolute 
transcendence of God. The Isaiah passages along with other biblical texts 
declaring that God is "not a human being" (Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29; Hosea 11:9) 
are often understood as biblical warrant for the disparagement of 
anthropomorphism. 
Philosophers have long criticized the ascription of human characteristics to 
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deity. Not long after Isaiah the Greek thinker, Xenophanes, railed against 
anthropomorphic deities saying that "if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and 
could paint with their hands, and produce works of art as men do, horses would 
paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen. "14 In the 
Eighteenth century David Hume, arguing against "natural religion," has one of his 
characters say that he is scandalized by the anthropomorphic character of natural 
theology's arguments for God. It is degrading to the deity to assume that the 
divine mind is just like a human mind. 11 [S] o near an approach we never surely can 
make to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. [W] e are guilty of the 
grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the whole 
universe. "15 In the Nineteenth century Ludwig Feuerbach launched a trenchant 
critique against all anthropomorphism by claiming that Christendom had created 
a God in its own image. He says that humans create God by making God into our 
antithesis: "God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man 
imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man 
sinful. 11 i 6 According to Feuerbach, this God is a purely human creation, a 
genuine anthropomorphism so that the attributes of the divine nature are really 
attributes of human nature. Hence, theology is merely anthropology. 
Since this thesis makes much use of anthropomorphism it is important to respond 
to these objections. First, as Karl Barth points out, the Bible does teach the 
hiddeness and incomprehensibility of God. God is not knowable unless God makes 
himself known and even then we do not possess a complete understanding of God. 
But Barth goes on to say that this hiddeness is not due to the inadequacy of 
human language and thought for talk of God, nor because of any metaphysical 
distinction between the abstract and the sensual. Instead, the 
14Cited in W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: The Classical Mind, 
second ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970), 19. 
15David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith 
(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merril, 1947), 156. 
16Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot, (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), 33. 
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incomprehensibility of God is based on the creator/creature distinction which 
comes to us from divine revelation. 17 Moreover, an additional reason for divine 
incomprehensibility is due to the personal nature of God for persons are not 
capable of being fully circumscribed by definition and language. 18 
Second, Fretheim notes that there are two ironies involved with the depreciation 
of anthropomorphism by theologians. 19 First, it is a distinctive of Israelite 
religion, in contrast to the other ancient Near Eastern religions, that 
anthropomorphic metaphors predominate. 20 If we dismiss them we lose much of the 
Hebrew Bible. Also, it is ironic that Christians would disparage anthropomorphism 
since Jesus is the conswnmate anthropomorphism! Moreover, the charge may be 
reversed: God's concern for justice and love is not anthropomorphism, rather our 
concern for justice and love is a theomorphism! 21 Humans are created in the 
image of God so the human must be seen as a theomorphism. This is the stance of 
the Christian faith. 
Third, yet humans as sinners are not theomorphic for we fail to love, seek 
justice and forgive. This is precisely what Isaiah meant by "my thoughts are not 
your thoughts nor are your ways my ways. 11 Unfortunately, this text has for so 
long been understood as a philosophical timeless truth--God is ontologically and 
epistemologically wholly beyond us--that it is commonplace for contemporary 
theologians, as diverse as Gordon Kaufman, John Macquarrie, J .. I. Packer and 
Geoffrey Bromiley, to use this verse as a g-eneral principle espousing human 
17Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957), 2.1, 179-254. 
18See Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 302. 
19Fretheim, Suffering of God 1 6. 
'°See the studies by Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets, in 2 vols. (New 
York: Ha:r;per and Row, 1962), 2. 48-58, and Adrio Konig, Here Am I: A Believer's 
Reflection on God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 59-109. 
21See Heschel, The Prophets, 2.51-2, and Fretheim, Suffering of God, 11. 
• 
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inability to understand the divine nature and activities. 22 But Isaiah is not 
establishing axioms about transcendence. Rather, he is informing his people that 
they may feel safe in returning to Yahweh, despite their previous idolatry, 
because Yahweh is a God who pardons and shows mercy on sinners. He implores the 
Israelites to return to Yahweh becau·se Yahweh is not like us humans--he forgives! 
(see Hosea 11:8-9). It is because God's character is different from human 
sinfulness that God seeks genuine reconciliation and healing for their wounded 
relationship. This and similar texts refer to character differences between God 
and humans not ontological and epistemological differences. For Isaiah, God is 
incomparable to humans in that he loves those we would not. Hence, the real 
paradox is not between God as the absolute and God as anthropomorphic but between 
God's grace and human sin. 23 
Neither can other biblical texts be used to support the teaching of an abstract 
transcendence and immutability. Numbers 23:19 refers to God's steadfast loyalty 
to the people he brought out of Egypt--he will not change his mind and curse his 
people no matter what religious rites the prophet Balaam performs. In 1 Samuel 
15:29 Samuel declares that God will not take back his decision to remove Saul's 
kingship. God will not change his mind about this matter. These texts pertain to 
specific divine decisions based on particular human situations. They do not 
describe an abstract transcendence. 
The fourth point is that the term anthropomorphism may have a narrow or broader 
meaning. The narrow sense refers to speaking of God having human characteristics 
such as emotions or eyes. Anthropomorphism may be used more broadly in the sense 
22See Gordon Kaufman, Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 120 n. 4, 302; John Macquarrie, God-
Talk: An Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967), p. 213; J. I. Packer, Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God (Chicago: 
Inter-varsity Press, 1967) I P·· 24; and Geoffrey Bromiley, 11 Providence" in G. 
Bromiley ed. International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, 
MI: EerclI!\ans, 1986), 3.1021. 
23 See Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1 286-7, .and G. C. Berkouwer, The 
Providence of God, tr. Lewis Smedes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952), 209-.~ 
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that all our language about God is human language. Whether we use abstract or 
concrete terms for God, we are being anthropomorphic since we are drawing our 
ideas from human experience. 24 When humans use language it is human language 
we use to speak about anything--from God to black holes. Even terms such as 
infinite, actus purus, omnipotence and Being Itself are anthropomorphic in that 
they are human words, metaphors applied to God. Consequently, if we are to talk 
of God then our choice is between using anthropomorphisms or being locked in the 
frozen silence of absolute ineffability. 
The biblical writers repeatedly use a wide array of anthropomorphisms for God. 
God is said to hear, speak, see, and smell. God is faithful, wise, longsuffering 
and loving. God plans, chooses and acts. God suffers grief and joy, sorrow and 
delight. God is depicted in the familiar human roles of father, mother, husband, 
shepherd and king. God is also theriomorphized as lion, lamb and vulture and 
physiomorphized as fire, wind and fountain of water. 25 Nonetheless, all of these 
descriptions are by human authors and so they are anthropomorphic in the sense 
of using human language to refer to God. Finally, these anthropomorphisms are 
vitally important for they depict God in relation to us and cannot be rejected 
unless one desires to deny God's covenantal relationship with us. 
''See Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1 pp. 222 and 265, Eberhard Jilngel, God as 
the Mystery of the World, tr. Darrell Gruder (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983), 
258-260 and Berkouwer, Providence, 73. 
25For more on these see Gary Alan Long, "Dead or Alive?: Literality and God-
Metaphors in the Hebrew Bible, 1' Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 62, 
no. 2, (Summer, 1994): 521-3 and G. W. Bromiley, "Anthropomorphism," 
International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, 1.136-7. Nelly Stienstra, YHWH is the 
Husband of His People: Analysis of a Biblical Metaphor with Special Reference to 
Translation (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1993), pp. 55-9, distinguishes 
between literal and metaphorical anthropomorphisms. Metaphorical 
anthropomorphisms depict God in roles which he obviously cannot perform literally 
such as being the husband or father of Israel. The biblical writers understood 
that they were speaking metaphorically in such cases about the kind of 
relation.ship between God and Israel. Literal anthropomorphisms occur primarily 
in Genesis and Exodus where God is depicted as walking and calling out to Adam 
(Gen. 3), visiting Abraham as one. of three men and declaring that he has come 
down to investigate the outcry from Sodom to see just what is the case (Gen. 18), 
wrestling with Jacob (Gen. 32), and standing in front of Moses, Aaron and the 
elders who actually "see God" (Ex. 24:9-11). 
17 
The main point I wish to make thus far is that we cannot escape anthropomorphism 
when speaking of God any more than we can escape it when speaking of our dogs or 
computers. Human words are all we have to speak about anything and we shall have 
to content ourselves with this situation. The choice before us, argued the 
ancient skeptic, Carneades, is that any notion of God will either be 
anthropomorphic or meaningless. 26 If, he says, we claim that God is infinite, 
unlimited and immovable then we do not have a being which we can know and so it 
is a meaningless concept. If we think of God as personal, living and interacting 
with us then we are speaking anthropomorphically. 
2.4 A Shared Context 
Speaking of God anthropomorphically will be seen as legitimate if we have a 
proper understanding of where we stand in order to talk about God. Adrio Konig 
points us in the right direction when he says, "we have no knowledge of God other 
than in and through his participation in our history." 27 Aquinas said that "we 
come to know and name God from creatures" meaning that all of our knowledge of 
God arises from within the created order." Many centuries earlier Hillary of 
Poi tiers said, "we must believe God's word concerning Himself, and humbly accept 
such insight as He vouchsafes to give. [We must believe] in Him as He is, and 
this in the only possible way, by thinking of Him in the aspect in which He 
presents Himself to us. 1129 In a quite straightforward manner Hillary says that 
the Bible, with all its anthropomorphism, nevertheless presents God as he truly 
26See Charles Hartshorne and William Reese eds., Philosophers Speak of God 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 416. 
27KOnig, Here Am I, 111. 
28Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ed. Anton c. Pegis, 2 vols. (New York: Random 
House, 1945), l, q. 13, a. 1. 
"Hillary of Poitiers, On the Trinity (4.14), .in Philip Schaff ed. Nicene 
and Post-Nicene Fathers, second series, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983) , 9. 75. 
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is. 30 If the Bible gives a correct view of God then this implies that God knows 
how to use human language and concepts such that they are adequate for 
understanding that which God desires us to understand. In order for this to be 
the case we must presuppose a shared context between God and the creation. 31 By 
context I mean our language, histbry and spatio-temporal world. This is our 
context and the biblical revelation asserts that God shares that context with us 
by being in relation to us. In relating to us God conununicates and acts in the 
created order--our context. 
The creation is different from God, but no more different than God intended it 
to be. 32 If that is the case then the only way of knowing just how different we 
are from God is by God revealing that to us. According to the Bible God is a 
distinct ontological other from us: God is not the world. Yet, we come to know 
this from God's relationship to us in the world. Fretheim remarks that "at least 
since the creation of the heavens and the earth, God has been related to the 
world from within its structures of time as well as those of space." 33 What we 
know of God is through his relationship to the creation; his involvement with us 
in our context. We can know that God existed apart from the world even though we 
only come to know that from within the world. We know nothing of God apart from 
God's relationship to the world. Does this mean that God has no being apart from 
the creation? No! It only means that~ have no knowledge of God apart from the 
way he has created us and revealed himself to us. Brian Hebblethwaite says, "If 
God creates a temporally structured universe·, then, whatever his own eternal 
30Language serves as an intermediary for God and if it represents God then 
we must think (de dicto) of God sharing some of the same characteristics of 
reference as we experience. When I say the words of the Bible depict what God is 
really like I do not mean that my knowledge of God is direct or complete. But I 
do want to say that we have no basis for claiming that the true being of God 
(theologia) is any different from the revealed God (oikonomia) . 
31The notion of a shared context is insightfully discussed by Frank G. 
Kirkpatrick, Together Bound: God, History and the Religious Community (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994). 
32! Owe this insight to my coileague Dean Fredrikson. 
33Fretheim, Suffering of God, 40. 
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being may be he must relate himself to his creation in a manner appropriate to 
its given nature, i. e. temporally. "34 Although the possibility exists that 
God's eternal being may be different from the way God relates to us, we have no 
way of knowing it is different and no reason to say it is different unless we 
wish to deny God's revelation to us in history. We know nothing of a God 
unrelated to us. 
Does this imply that God is literally like us? John Macquarrie observes that all 
talk of God, whether in terms of symbols, metaphors or models, ultimately returns 
to some core likeness between God and the creatures or it lapses into 
agnosticism. 35 Does this mean that God shares some of the same {univocal) 
predicates with creatures or only similar (analogous) ones?36 It would seem that 
even those who defend the doctrine of analogy presuppose that in ~ respects 
similarities between God and us are uni vocal. 37 Even Aquinas held that the 
"universal" terms, such as being, good and living, are not used metaphorically 
for God but "absolutely, II "properly" and "literally. " 38 Even those who practice 
negative theology apply such predicates as incorporeality and immutability in a 
literal way to God. Thinkers as diverse as John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, 
George Berkeley, William Alston, Richard Swinburne, Thomas Tracy and Paul Helm 
34Brian Hebblethwaite, "Some Reflections on Predestination, Providence and 
Divine Foreknowledge," Religious Studies 15 (1979): 436 (italics mine). 
"Macquarrie, God-Talk, 220-1. 
36Eric Mascall, a proponent of analogy, seems to suggest that there is an 
infinite difference between the analogates when speaking of God and humanity. If 
so, then the doctrine of analogy fails to give us any knowledge of God. See 
Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 40-1. Jungel, God as the Mystery, 260-1 claims that 
the doctrine of analogy was developed to abrogate the scandal of 
anthropomorphism. Vincent Briimmer, Speaking of a Personal God: An Essay in 
Philosophical Theology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 43-51, 
provides some further substantive criticisms of the doctrine of analogy. 
"Douglas Kelly chides me for taking some of the biblical descriptions of 
God uni vocally. What an irony that a conservative evangelical theologian 
criticizes me for taking the Bible seriously! Kelly, however, seems to believe 
that te~s such as "infinite" and 11 uncreated being" are used univocally of God. 
See his "Afraid of Infinitude," Christianity Today 39, no. 1 (Jan. 1995): 32-3. 
38Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1, q. 13, a. 3 . 
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all agree that there must be a "hard literal core" or 11 univocal core" to our talk 
about God. 39 There must be some properties which, when used of God, are used in 
the same sense as when we use them of things in the created order or we will be 
back in the cave of agnosticism. If God shares the same context with us, as the 
biblical revelation presupposes, then we have a basis for our hard literal core. 
What sort of terms qualify as part of this hard literal core? The most basic one, 
according to the biblical portrait, is God as personal. God is portrayed as a 
being who relates with other beings; who loves, su.ffers, intends, enacts 
intentions, responds to others, etc. Minimally, we see God as a personal agent. 
When God is said to be a husband, father and friend, these metaphors are 
dependent upon the literalness of God being a personal agent. 40 Apart from 
personhood they make no sense. Saying God is personal is to affirm 
anthropomorphism. If God is a personal agent, then there is a shared context and 
anthropomorphism is inescapable. The fear of some, at this point, is that if we 
cannot escape anthropomorphic language for God then we will create God in our own 
image. But this need not be the case. Frederick Ferre points out that 
anthropomorphism should not be equated with anthropocentrism (the former is 
inescapable while the latter is not). 41 Moreover, there are numerous safeguards 
in the biblical literature to help keep us from such idolatry. 
39Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 51-87. Swinburne cites Scotus and 
Ockham on pp. 74-6. George Berkeley, Alciphron, 4.21 in Ed. Mary Calkins, 
Berkeley: Essay, Principles, Dialogues (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929); 
William Alston, "Can We Speak Literally of God?" Divine Nature and Human Language 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 39-63; Thomas Tracy, God, Action 
and Embodiment (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984), 152; Paul Helm, "The Role of 
Logic in Biblical Interpretation, " in Earl Radmacher and Robert Preus eds., 
Hermeneutics, Inerrancy and the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984), 853. 
40Moreover, there is something that is literally true of God's relationship 
with us communicated by the richness of the metaphors. Metaphors embrace and do 
not rule' out literalness in the sense that they do tell us something about that 
which we are speaking. However, affirming univocity does not commit us to the 
11 picture_theory" of meaning where.one word refers to one empirical referent. 
41Frederick Ferre, "In Praise of Anthropomorphism," in Robert Scharlemann 
and Gilbert Ogutu eds. God in Language (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 182-193. 
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Finally, it must be noted, Jesus is the consummate anthropomorphism: 11 the Logos 
became flesh and blood and tabernacled among us" (John 1:14); the person who has 
witnessed Jesus has seen the Father (John 14:9); Jesus is the "exact 
representation of the divine nature" (Heb. 1:3) in whom "deity dwelled in bodily 
form" (Col. 1:15-20, 2:9). If the incarnation is true and Jesus experienced full 
human life, then God relates to the world in precisely the same way we do. We do 
not have to rely on the doctrine of analogy since Jesus is the consummate 
revelation of God in human form. The divine self-disclosure in Jesus puts an end 
to the claim that being in the form of a human is contrary to the divine nature. 
To overturn this we would need a priori knowledge that the divine nature is 
completely unlike human nature which would render an incarnation impossible. 
2.5 Two Objections 
2.5.1 God as Wholly Other 
The history of Western thought is replete with people who have heaped scorn on 
the notion of God sharing the same context with us and the "scandal of 
anthropomorphism 1' this entails. Instead, these thinkers argue God is infinite and 
wholly other than we are. The Pre-Socratic philosopher, Anaximander, said that 
the ultimate metaphysical principle necessary to make sense of our lives cannot 
be found within the realm of existence. Instead, we must posit what he called the 
"unlimited" which is totally beyond anything we know. It is utterly ineffable for 
the unlimited has no predicates. Plato believed we have to ground our rationality 
in something other than our existence. He dismisses the stories which the Greek 
poets wrote of the gods as being anthropomorphic and searches instead for that 
which is perfect, timeless and immutable. This he finds in the realm of the Forms 
which exist outside our spatio-temporal world. 42 Aristotle posited a God: a 
consciousness thinking on itself which exits beyond the conditions of time. These 
thinkers· set the stage in the Western tradition for saying both that "God" is 
42Whether Plato believed we could know the essence of the Forms is a matter 
of debate. Middle Platonism said this was impossible by reason but was possible 
by mystical encounter. 
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wholly other and that we must posit such an idea because it serves a vital role 
in our metaphysics. Hence, assuming the existence of an ultimate metaphysical 
principle, or 11 God," is necessary for thought even though the essence of this 
principle is wholly beyond our understanding. 
The Jewish thinker, Philo of Alexandria, places Plato's Forms in the mind of the 
Jewish God. Nevertheless, he affirms that we cannot know God's essence or say 
anything about it since to say something is to define it and to define is to 
limit. Since God is unlimited we are consigned to silence. Philo seeks to escape 
this transcendental agnosticism by saying that though we could not speak of the 
divine being itself we can speak of its existence since we see the effects it 
produces as a cause of the world. A good number of pagan and Christian thinkers 
have followed Philo in saying that we cannot know the essence of God--who God 
really is. 43 The philosophical and theological attack on anthropomorphism 
centers on the thesis that we cannot know the essence of God. 
Jumping ahead to the modern era, Immanuel Kant held that the noumenal realm is 
beyond our knowing so God is unknowable. But like the classical tradition, Kant 
says we must posit the existence of the nournenal realm as a ground for certain 
practices in life ("God" remains useful for us). God is wholly other than we can 
know but we must assume a transcendental ideal (the unconditioned condition} in 
order to explain our own existence. Gordon Kaufman uses the word "God" as the 
symbol for the ultimate mystery behind human existence." He speaks of the "real 
God" which is completely ineffable and the "available God" which is a human 
construct via our theological imagination. Although we are cut off from knowing 
anything about this mystery we are forced to construct models of God in order to 
give meaning to our lives. Kaufman believes God is infinite and so all human 
"se·e Jilngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 232-245. 
44See his In the Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993); Theological Imaaination: Constructing the 
Concept of God (Philadelphia: Westminster press, .1981); and God the Problem 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) . 
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language is inappropriate. Thus, he heaps ridicule on any anthropomorphic 
conception of God--especially personalistic ones. According to John Hick, God is 
outside all human experience and language so we cannot talk about God for to do 
so implies that God is an object within human experience. 45 The finite cannot 
contain the infinite so no human thought or words are able to grasp the being of 
God. There is simply no way of knowing what God really is, whether personal or 
impersonal. Thus, says Hick, the major religious traditions are all attempts to 
express the infinite mystery behind the human phenomena we call religious 
experience. A common thread running through all these thinkers is the belief that 
there is an infinite qualitative difference separating divinity from humanity. 
The appeal to God's absolute infinity argues that thinking of God as personal in 
a literal way overlooks the fact that the word 11 personal 11 when used for God Is 
actually a finite symbol for the infinite which lies beyond the personal. 
Depicting God in personal symbols, as in the Bible, limits God. J. N. Findlay 
charges that it is "wholly anomalous to worship anything limited in any thinkable 
manner. "46 To say that we can only speak of God within our boundaries is to 
commit ourselves to belief in a "finite" God. 
There are, however, some major problems with claiming God is infinite and wholly 
other. To begin, the assertion that God is unlike anything in the world may be 
understood in at least two different senses. Thomas Morris observes that it could 
mean either (A) God is not completely like anything in the world, or (B) God is 
completely unlike everything in the world. 47 It is one thing to assert that God 
does not share all properties with anything else, but it is quite another matter 
to say God does not share any properties with anything else. Clearly, I am 
45John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Hum.an Responses to the 
Transcendent (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1989). 
46Cited in Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 46. 
47Thomas Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 20. 
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rejecting this latter notion. 
Furthermore, if "infinite" means without any predicates from within the spatio-
temporal realm then we are committed to agnosticism about anything transcendent. 
Since all of our thought and language occur within this realm we are cut off from 
that which is beyond it. S¢ren Kierkegaard understood that our "understanding 
cannot even think the absolutely different. "48 If nthe finite cannot contain 
the infinite" then all revelation of God in history, any incarnation and all 
knowledge of God within the spatio-temporal realm are ruled out. Hick and 
Kaufman, of cour_se, are more than willing to make such concessions. Yet they 
still desire to claim that "God 11 or "the Real" exists. But Feuerbach' s criticisms 
are devastating at this point when he says that what is completely ineffable 
lacks predicates and what has no predicates has no existence: "the distinction 
between what God is in himself, and what he is for me destroys the peace of 
religion, and is. . an untenable distinction. I cannot know whether God is 
something else in himself or for himself than he is for me."" If the 
qualitative difference between God and humanity is infinite then there is no 
correspondence between God and his revelation, which makes it nonsensical to 
speak of "revelation" at all. so Thus, it would seem that those who affirm that 
God shares no properties with anything in the created order are committed to 
silence concerning anything transcendental (despite their continued talk of 
it!) . 51 
Moreover, how do those who claim that the finite cannot contain the infinite 
48S¢ren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard Hong & Edna Hong 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 45. 
'
9Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, 16. 
50See Briimmer, Speaking of a Personal God, 41 and Stephen Davis, Logic and 
the Nature of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983), 142. 
51Hwne, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 158, asserts that those who 
maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of God do. not differ from skeptics or 
atheists. 
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know this to be the case? It is logically possible that the transcendent is 
beyond human knowing1 but how does the person affirming this know that it is? 
When McFague claims that all human language •applies properly only to our 
existence, not God's" how does she know this is the case? 52 Is she somehow able 
to discover the real nature of trariscendence and inform the rest of us that we 
cannot speak about it properly? Such people claim both that something is 
unknowable and that they know something about the unknowable. If someone says, 
"human language and logic do not apply to God," on what basis can this possibly 
be affirmed? The answer traditionally given is: on the basis of a preconceived 
idea of God whereby we begin with a definition of God derived from what is 
"fitting" for God to be. In the Western tradition it has been judged fitting for 
God to be outside the spatio-temporal realm and beyond all human speaking and 
knowing. The problem with this tactic is that the conclusion is affirmed 
precisely on the basis of human language and logic! That is, we are using human 
language to speak about something so transcendent and unrelated to us that it is 
totally ineffable. But if this is so, then how can we say or know anything, 
including the existence, of this something since existence and transcendence are 
human thoughts? Tillich sought to evade this difficulty by saying that God did 
not exist, but was rather "Being Itself." This tactic fails, however, for the 
term Being Itself is still within the realm of human language and logic and so 
seeks to communicate something about the transcendent. 
What these thinkers are attempting to arrive· at is a concept of the ultimate 
metaphysical principle which transcends all concepts. Kierkegaard scornfully 
described this quest as "the ultimate paradox of thought: to want to discover 
something that thought itself cannot think." 53 Kirkpatrick correctly says, "an 
idea or concept of that which transcends all concepts is a contradiction in 
52McFague, Models of God, 39. · 
"Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 37. 
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terms. "54 Vincent Brilmmer asks, "if !!.2!!§t of our concepts are applicable to God, 
how can we indicate who it is that we consider to be indescribable? 1155 According 
to Kaufman and Hick, it would seem that we cannot and so Feuerbach's question 
returns: how do they know this something exists at all outside of their own 
mental constructs? 56 
Why would anyone posit something like divine transcendence outside the boundaries 
of human language and thought? Perhaps the most common answer is that many 
people believe that we need a transcendent ground to our existence. Hence, it is 
the enterprise of providing a "sufficient reason 11 for our existence. 57 In this 
schema the idea of "God" is a functional concept fulfilling a felt human need: 
God is the tree supplying the lumber for our transcendental building projects. 
Of course, our assuming it does not mean it exits or does not exist. We are nOt 
able to escape our context to establish transcendence. 
Can it be appropriate to speak of God being limited (i. e. with qualities and 
predicates) in any way? Yes. Feuerbach correctly says, "To the truly religious 
man, God is not a being without qualities, because to him he is a positive, real 
being. . The denial of determinate, positive predicates [to God]. is 
simply a subtle, disguised atheism. Dread of limitation is dread of 
existence. A God who is injured by determinate qualities has not the 
"Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 23. He adds, 47, that our speculation about 
the otologically transcendent tells us more about ourselves than about whether 
it really exists. Mathematicians have attempted to arrive at the set of all 
sets. See Timothy J. Pennings, "Infinity and the Absolute: Insights into our 
World, Our Faith and Ourselves,• Christian Scholars Review, 23, no. 2 (Dec. 
1993): 159-180. 
55Brilinmer, Speaking of a Personal God, 38. 
"on· the subjectivism of Hick see Paul R. Eddy, "Religious Pluralism and the 
Divine: Another Look at John Hick's Nee-Kantian Proposal," Religious Studies, 30 
(1994): 467-478. 
57Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 31, is correct that the 11 principle of 
sufficient reason 11 is the motive behind this move. 
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courage and the strength to exist. 1158 Moreover, all of our thought and language 
assumes limitation. If we say that God is not the world, but is other than the 
world, then God is limited for God is not everything which exists. To be an 
"other" is to already experience limitation. Any statement about God is a 
limitation for it implies one predicate rather than another." If we say that 
God is personal, then God is limited to not being impersonal. Anything we say 
about God, or God says to us, involves limitations. Either God is unlimited and 
thus unknowable or knowable and thus has some limits. Consequently, the issue is 
not whether we must think of God under limitations, but which ones. Those in 
agreement with Findlay's claim that we should not worship something with any 
limitations will perhaps find Yahweh--the God of the Bible--disappointing. 60 
It is commonplace for theologians to claim that biblical anthropomorphisms are 
11 accommodations 11 on God's part to our limited abilities to understand. But how 
is this known? It seems by first postulating a most perfect infinite being 
(diqnum Deo) and then looking at the biblical revelation. Since the biblical 
depiction of God does not measure up to this supreme _being, the doctrine of 
divine accommodation is enacted to protect the Bible from charges of falsehood. 
I do not wish to deny the possibility that God has understandings which may be 
beyond us. But lurking behind the notion of divine accommodation seems to be the 
idea that some people know for a fact that there is a divine language which God 
is unable to use when addressing us. Since God must use our cultural-linguistic 
context it is seen as impossible for God to communicate with us who God really 
is. The one asserting this must first demonstrate knowledge that God cannot do 
this, that it is impossible for God to be involved with us. I do not believe it 
possible to substantiate such a claim. 
58Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, 14-15. 
"For more on divine limitation see chapter 6 (6.1.6). 
'°See David Clines, "Yahweh and the God of Christian Theology," Theology 83 
(1980): 323-330. 
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As creator, there is a fundamental creator/creation distinction which enables us 
to say that God "transcends" space, time and the other aspects of the boundaries 
of created being in the sense that God establishes the parameters for our 
existence. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo implies that God is ontologically 
distinct from the creation and not identical with it. So, in a sense, we may say 
that God is "outside 11 the world since God is not a creature. This does not, 
however, mean that God is beyond being for this sort of talk is self-refuting 
since it never escapes the language of being. 61 But our knowledge of God as 
creator comes from 11 inside 11 the world. We do not reach from the inside to the 
outside. God reaches us as an insider. Our knowledge and language cannot go 
beyond the parameters God established for us as creatures. We cannot think and 
speak of God other than as a being in relation to us. Those who claim that God 
is completely transcendent in the sense of being outside our boundaries a~e 
claiming more than is proper. Any statement we make about God and any statement 
God makes to us will be from within the conditions God established at creation. 
All this is to say that the assertion "God is infinite" (totally unlike us) is 
not a meaningful assertion and arguments based on it should be viewed 
skeptically. 62 
2.5.2 The Appeal to Antinomies 
The second major objection to my view of the divine-human relationship occurring 
within a shared context arises from theologians who claim that this position 
ignores the role of paradox and antinomy in· theological discourse. Reformed 
evangelicals, for instance, tend to claim not that everything about God is beyond 
us, but only that ~ aspects of deity or the God-human relationship transcend 
human intelligibility. For purposes of discussion I will distinguish between 
paradox, mystery and antinomies. Paradoxes are puzzling remarks which go against 
our normal way of thinking and mysteries are statements which are beyond our 
61See Keith Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God (New York: 
Pilgrim, ·1982), 62. 
62 See Pennings, "Infinity and the Absolute, 11 178-9. 
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ability to fully comprehend. Yet neither of these are nonsense or self-
contradictory. Antinornies, however, are statements which are either self-
contradictory or inconsistent when taken together with other claims. Evangelical 
theologian J. I. Packer cites as examples of this sort: the trinity as three in 
one; the incarnation where the infinite becomes finite or the eternal becomes 
temporal; and the sovereignty of God and human responsibility." Antinomies are 
on the order of square circles and colorless red cars. Packer says that the 
biblical revelation contains several claims which simply cannot be reconciled in 
this world. 64 Donald Carson agrees: "for us mortals there are no rational, 
logical solutions to the sovereignty-responsibility tension. 1165 
These theologians claim1 however, that although antinomies are contradictions for 
us, they are not for God. They hold that doctrines such as divine sovereignty-
human responsibility are only apparently contradictory. That is, they may be 
genuinely contradictory for us but they certainly are not contradictory for God. 
It is sometimes said that human logic depends on time and space (the boundaries) 
so our logic cannot be applied to the way God operates because God is outside of 
space and time. Even though we are unable to reconcile these truths, God knows 
how to do so. After citing the "my thoughts are not your thoughts• of Isaiah 
55: 8, Packer says of the biblical antinomies, "we may be sure that they all find 
their reconciliation in the mind and counsel of God, and we may hope that in 
63 Packer, HParadox in Theology," in eds. Sinclair Ferguson, David Wright and 
Packer, New Dictionarv of Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1988), 
p. 491. Perhaps another example, occurs in 1 Samuel 15 where Samuel declares that 
"Yahweh changed his mind about Saul being king" (15:11 and 35) and also says that 
God "will not change his mind" (15:29). But this is only an antinomy for those 
who believe it impossible for God to change his mind. For those who believe God 
can and does change his mind verse 29 means that God is not going to change his 
mind in this particular situation regarding Saul. 
64Pa'cker, Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God, 24. 
65Donald Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical 
Perspectives in Tension, second edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1994), p. 218. 
Though Carson goes on to say that he does not believe the two are actually self-
contradictory. But if not, then where is the problem? 
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heaven we shall understand them. 1166 
Several points may be made in response to the appeal to antinomy. 67 Although the 
appeal to mystery and paradox are justified, the appeal to antinomy is 
illegitimate for several reasons. Tei begin, there is the problem of claiming that 
an.antinomy is only an apparent contradiction. When logicians say that something 
is apparently contradictory they mean that it only looks, but is not actually, 
inconsistent for the statements in question can be sho\.<111 not to be contradictory. 
If the doctrine of the trinity is either a genuine contradiction or not 
contradictory at all, then it is not appropriate to call it an "apparent" 
contradiction. 68 
Moreover, the suggestion that certain doctrines are genuine contradictions fOr 
us but not for God is illegitimate since the claim is unknowable. Unless God 
informs us that such is the case we have no way of knowing. At this point Packer 
and Carson claim that God has, in fact, told us about such antinomies in 
scripture. For example, they hold that the Bible teaches both exhaustive divine 
control over all events and that humans remain morally responsible. 
Though most Christians understand the Bible to teach divine sovereignty and human 
responsibility, they do not understand the Bible to define sovereignty or 
responsibility in ways that entail a contradiction. In order for there to be an 
antinomy the terms have to be understood in a Certain way. Sovereignty has to be 
"Packer, Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God, 24. One wonders why we 
shall be able to understand them in heaven. Will we then escape the boundaries? 
Will God grant us a different logic? These are possibilities but what reason do 
we have to expect them? 
67For further discussion see David Basinger, "Biblical Paradox: Does 
Revelation Challenge Logic? Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 30, 
no. 2 (Jtine 1987): 205-213 and Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 61-6. 
68Thomas M,orris argues that the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation are 
.not, in fact, contradictory. See his The Logic of. God Incarnate (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1986). 
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defined as meticulous divine control of every single event including human 
actions, and hum.an freedom must be defined in "libertarian" (indeterministic) 
terms as the ability to do otherwise than even God desires. Only with something 
like these definitions will we arrive at a genuine antinomy. Carson and (I 
believe) Packer affirm exhaustive divine sovereignty but they do not agree with 
this definition of human freedom. Instead, they opt for 11 cornpatibilism" where we 
are free so long as we act on our desires. Consequently, divine determinism and 
human responsibility are compatible. But if so, then there is no antinomy because 
meticulous divine sovereignty is reconcilable by human logic to a compatibilistic 
understanding of .human freedom. Moreover, many theists accept libertarian freedom 
but understand the biblical teaching on divine sovereignty as "general 
providence" rather than meticulous providence. 69 Hence, we have a difference of 
interpretation of scripture, but neither view entails an antinomy. 
Furthermore, even if there are antinomies in scripture where does it say in 
scripture that such antinomies are not genuinely contradictory for God? How, for 
instance, does Packer know that the trinity or the divine sovereignty-human 
freedom antinomies are not illogical for God also? On what basis does he claim 
to know that God's logic is different from ours? It may well be, but how does he 
know? The appeal to Isaiah 55:8-9 will not work for, as Helm notes, it is "to be 
understood as referring to the power of divine grace, not to a logic-transcending 
omnipotence. 1170 
A final point against the antinomy objection is that it seeks to escape from the 
rules surrounding intelligibility. What philosophers call contradiction, some 
69David Ciocchi's, "Reconciling Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom," 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 37, no. 3 (Sept. 1994): 395-412, 
correctly points out another problem with the appeal to antinomy: if the antinomy 
is "intelligible" then there can be no reason to affirm that a logical 
reconciliation is impossible. Unfortunately, although he acknowledges different 
understandings of human freedom, he fails to take seriously other views of divine 
sovereignty. He simply assumes his meticulous providence view is the biblical 
view. 
70Helm, 11 The Role of Logic in Biblical Interpretation, " 843. 
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theologians refer to euphemistically as antinomy or logical paradox. In doing 
theology we simply have to "play by the rules" of the game and one of these rules 
is that our discourse must make sense. Interestingly, theologians who claim the 
right to be inconsistent expect us to make sense of what they are saying. My 
position here does not rule out paradox and mystery (as defined above) or 
metaphors and riddles. My position simply excludes discourse about that which 
lies outside the boundaries of what we can know and experience--that is, 
nonsense. Davis agrees: "Like it or not, we are stuck with these limited minds 
of ours; if we want to be rational we have no choice but to reject what we judge 
to be incoherent. "71 If theology and talk about God is supposed to be 
intelligible and intelligibility is defined, in part, by logical consistency then 
antinomies are excluded from theological discourse. 72 
To be rational in the practice of theology is to enter the domain of public 
criteria for intelligibility. The exclusion of contradictions from theological 
discourse is not an idiosyncratic one, but a public one imposed by the community. 
To be intelligible we have to be able to communicate with one another and this 
means that we must operate within the boundaries in which God created us. We 
simply have no other choice but to think and speak within these limits. If we 
lapse into contradiction or incoherence then we violate some of the conditions 
of the public criteria by which theology is considered meaningful. I have no 
desire to be a rationalist, placing logic above God. There may be realities which 
are incomprehensible to us, which lie completely outside our abilities to 
understand them. However, if God desires to communicate meaningfully with us then 
he will have to do so within the conditions of his own creation and one of these 
conditions is that intelligibility excludes antinomies. 
''Stephen Davis, Logic and the Nature of God, 16. 
72Some evangelicals reject the use of antinomies. See, for example, Carl F. 
H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority: God Who Speaks and Shows (Waco, TX: 
Word, 1976), 225-244 and Arthur Holmes, All Truth i.s God's Truth (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 87-90. 
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2.6 Conclusion to Chapter Two 
The appeals to antinomy as well as to God as wholly other or infinite fail to 
take seriously enough the conditions of our createdness. They are attempts to 
escape from these limitations and say something meaningful about that which lies 
beyond our boundaries. Apart from revelation we cannot know that anything exists 
beyond our boundaries and if, by revelation, we are informed of a transcendent 
existence we can only understand it by use of our conditions. The quest to get 
outside our boundaries is an old one attempted by both pagans and Christians 
alike. But if we take our status as creatures seriously then we shall have to 
content ourselves with waiting for God's own self-revelation and with 
understanding this revelation within the conditions of our existence. In other 
words, we must understand the God-human relationship as taking place within a 
shared context and so the use of metaphors and anthropomorphic language (in tne 
broad sense) is necessary. Any theological model must be set forth under these 
conditions. 
The Bible portrays God as a personal agent in a literal sense and this implies 
a shared context for both God and human agents. Consequently, we cannot escape 
the realm of anthropomorphism. This does not render God less worthy of worship 
or diminish his majesty for the only God not of our own making is the God who 
comes to us in Jesus. In Jesus we understand that God adopts human language and 
experience to communicate with us. The purpose of this thesis is not to reduce 
God to the limits of human understanding but to propose from within the 
boundaries of our createdness a model of the divine-human relationship that opens 
new vistas for our understanding of God and deepens our appreciation of the 
freedom, love, wisdom and power of God. God has undertaken a project and it is 
only from within this project in which God is related to us that we know God at 
all. If God decides to disclose himself to us as a personal being who enters into 
relationship with us, who has purposes, emotions and desires, and who suffers 
with us, then we ought to rejoice in this anthropomorphic portrait and accept it 
as disclosing to us the very nature of God. The personal God who undertakes the 
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project of creation in order to achieve certain ends and who enters into this 
project in a decisive way in Jesus is a God who is not afraid of 
anthropomorphism. 
Chapter 3: Old Testament Materials for a Relational View of Providence Involving 
Risk 
3.1 :Cntroduction 
It is commonplace that many people develop a risk-free view of providence from 
scripture. In this model God has a controlling relationship with the world such 
that all works out just as God desired. Yahweh is the king over the whole earth 
who reigns over the nations (Psalm 47:7-8). God is the potter and we are but 
clay in his hands (Is. 29:16; Jer. 18:1-6; Rom. 9:21). God makes the rain to fall 
on the just and the unjust (Mt. 5:45), feeds the birds of the fields (Mt. 6:26) 
and ensures that none of them dies without his will (Mt. 10:29). The metaphors 
of king and ~~l:l:_<lr have been extremely influential in shaping the theological 
understanding of providence and the socio-economic setting (particularly 
feudalism) of the theologians has shaped the interpretation of these metaphors 
towards an emphasis on divine control with the resulting loss of any reciprocal 
relations between creator and creature. 1 
Granted the popularity of the traditional view, can a biblical case be made for 
a truly relational model of providence which entails risks for God? Is there 
material in the scripture, which has either been ignored or interpreted in favor 
of a risk-free view (due to preunderstandings) that would support an open model 
of God's relationship with his creatures? The purpose of the next two chapters 
is to explain the nature of the divine project--what God is working towards and 
how God goes about accomplishing this goal. It ·is claimed that there is more than 
sufficient biblical data teaching that God does not exercise meticulous 
providence in such a way that the success of his project is a foregone 
conclusion. Rather, God works with his creatures in flexible ways seeking to 
obtain the goals he has for them. God genuinely enters into dynamic give-and-take 
relationships with humans, loving them, providing for them, but not forcing his 
1See Anna Case-Winters, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and 
Contemporary Challenges (Louisville, KY: Westminster/Knox, 1990), and my "God as 
Personal," ed. Clark Pinnock, The Grace of God, the Will of Man (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Zondervan, 1989), 167-78. 
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will on them through overwhelming power. Instead, God works through the power of 
love. Due to space limitations it is not possible here to be exhaustive in 
covering the biblical material. Numerous texts will be discussed in order to 
substantiate the claim that the risk model enjoys biblical support. I will 
follow, somewhat, the order of the biblical narrative itself, though not 
necessarily a chronological order, developing selected texts in detail so that 
the reader gains a "feel" for what is actually going on in the narrative. 
Before beginning it should be noted that to date only a small number of Old 
Testament and very few New Testament scholars have addressed the topic from a 
tr~~!.':'3lat~_onal, _ p~_rs_p_ec_~iv..:_. The reasons for this are not hard to come by. 
First, theological presuppositions color the way scholars approach the biblical 
text. Vincent Brfunmer comments that "Western thought has suffered from ~a 
systematic blind spot for relations. "2 Moreover, despite Abraham Heschel's works 
on God's relatedness to his creatures, many Old Testament scholars continue to 
work within the thought patterns of earlier theologies. 3 Furthermore, the 
discipline of biblical theology itself is, since the 1960' s, in a state of 
unsettledness, with no agreed upon methodology or purpose. In the current climate 
biblical scholars are hesitant to make theological claims from the text. 
Nevertheless, there are several important studies by biblical scholars 
(especially those on the function of prayer and divine suffering) which address 
the issue of genuine reciprocity in divine-human relationships. I will draw upon 
them, freely adding my own material, to support the contention that God creates 
a world where he sovereignly decides to experience genuine give-and-take 
relations with his creatures. In freedom, God chooses not to control everything 
and so takes risks in his providence! 
"---·---- -· 
2Viricent Brlimmer, The Model of Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993) , 33. 
3 See Samuel E. Balentine, Prayer in the Hebrew Bible: The Drama of Divine-
Human Dialogue, Overtures to Biblical Theology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 
1993)' 225-259. 
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3.2 The Creation and its Divinely Established conditions 
The doctrine of creation sets the stage for the doctrine of providence so it is 
important here to take it into account. Broadly speaking, there are two main ways 
in which the biblical materials on creation (not just Gen. 1-2) are understood: 
God as the creator of all that exists and God as the victor over chaos.' Both 
of these ideas have important insights for our study of providence. The notion 
that everything except God has a beginning has led, in the history of the church, 
to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing). Although I affirm 
creatio ex nihilo I agree with most modern studies of Genesis 1 that this 
doctrine cannot be derived from this text (see 2 Mace. 7:28; Rom. 4:17; Heb. 
11: 3). Genesis one can, however, legitimately be understood to refer to an 
absolute beginning in which God is prior to all else. 5 
Several implications follow from this understanding. First, just as we cannot, 
in principle, penetrate to grasp that which was prior to the 11 big bang" so we 
cannot, in principle, fathom God apart from our relationship as creatures. We 
ought not speculate about what it means to be God. Instead, we must see what God 
actually decides to do in relation to the creation in order to know what it means 
to be God. God defines God. Second, the creation is due to divine grace. God did 
not have to create, it is the divine wisdom in freedom which brings into 
existence something which is not God. Since the creation is not necessary, but 
contingent~ one cannot simply draw conclusions about the creator from the nature 
'Douglas A. Knight identifies six different cosmogonies in the Hebrew Bible 
and compares them with others in the ancient Near East in his "Cosmogony and 
Order in the Hebrew Tradition," eds. Robin Lovin and Frank Reynolds, Cosmogony 
and Ethical Order: New Studies in Comparative Ethics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 133-157. 
'On.the variety of interpretations and the validity of this understanding 
see Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17, The New International 
Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), pp. 103-117, 
Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15, Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, TX: Word, 1987), 
pp. 11-17, 36-8, and Bruce Waltke, "The Creation Account in Gen. 1:1-3," 
Bibliotheca Sacra 132 (1975): 25-36, 136-144, 216-228, 327-342. 
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of the creation without further ado. 6 Third, God works within limits since for 
God to say yes to creating this particular world means that God had to say no to 
other possible worlds. A single positive choice implies a self-chosen limitation 
with the negation of other options. God has sovereignly decided to create and 
work with this particular world rather than others. Fourth, God is the sovereign 
creator for there is no opposition to his act of creating. Yet, we must be 
careful of basing a doctrine of providence on this aspect of creation since it 
is an open question (at this stage in our reading of the biblical text) whether 
God can and will sovereignly create beings over which he does not exercise total 
control. 7 We must wait to see what God actually decided to create. 
The other main way of understanding the creation texts is under the theme of 
"conflict and victory" or creatio contra nihilum {creation versus 
nothing/chaos) . 8 This position notes that Genesis 1 does not actually say that 
God created everything (e. g. darkness) and that other creation texts (e. g. Ps. 
74:12-7; 104), refer to the time when Yahweh subjugated the powers of chaos 
(Rahab, the sea, etc.) and established order.' These beings stand opposed to 
Yahweh's way. According to Levenson, these powers of chaos are subjugated to 
6See Wolfhart Pann.enberg, Basic Questions in Theology, 2 vols. trans. George 
H. Kehm (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), 2: 138, 171. 
7A danger of equating the omnipotent power of God's creative act with an 
omnipotent rule of providence is that it may mislead us into concluding that 
omnipotence must always get its way, never encountering any serious opposition 
to the divine rule. This results in a reading of the Old Testament which 
downplays the fragility of creation and its vulnerability to what we experience 
as chaos. One might come away with the impression from Genesis 1 that, because 
of God's almightiness, everything works out exactly as God desires; which is why 
one must read 11 the rest of the story." 
8See Jon D. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama 
of Divine Omnipotence, updated ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994) and Adria Konig, New and Greater Things: Re-evaluating the Biblical Message 
on Creation, trans. D .. Roy Briggs (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1988). 
Both authors say that the Hebrew Bible affirms both views, but Konig does more 
with ex nihilo. Both writers agree that there is no such thing as an absolute 
nothing in Hebrew thought. 
'Even the evangelical Waltke, "The Creation Account" (p. 338), admits that 
Gen. 1 does not teach ex nihilo or that God created these forces. 
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Yahweh t'.irough conflict. Although they are not allowed to retain control they do 
acquire control from time to time and so pose a threat to Yahweh's sovereign 
will. The "confinement of chaos rather than its elimination is the essence of 
creation, and the survival of ordered reality hangs only upon God's 
vigilance.n 10 The emphasis of the creation story is not on God's absolute 
sovereignty but on God 1 s 11 rna,stery" over his opponent_s .. 11 The chaos forces were 
.~- --- - - -
confined at creation but they, from time to time, mount a challenge against God 
so God has to subdue them again and again. Some take this view to imply an 
initial dualism where Ya~~eh is lim~_teP. py cha_os. 12 But, as Levenson points out, 
though the Hebrew Bible sometimes affirms that God created chaos and othertimes 
denies this, it is clear that Yahweh has the ability to overcome these forces--
even if he does not always do so . 13 There is "no limited God here, no God 
stymied by invincible evil. "14 
Both of these understandings of creation, however, share some important 
affirmations. In each view God freely creates an envirorunent and sovereignly 
establishes boundaries which are "good" (i. e. what God desires for our benefit). 
In each God brings beings into existence and then names them. Such acts testify 
10Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, p. 17. 
11See Bernhard W. Anderson, "The Kingdom, the Power, and the Glory, 11 
Theology Today, 53, no. 1 (April, 1966): 6-8. 
12Both Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil and Konig, New and 
Greater Things, maintain that it was not th€ concern of biblical writers to 
discuss the abstract issue of origins. Rather, says KOnig, conflict texts provide 
comfort and hope for Israelites who are suffering (p. 77). If God overcame chaos 
in the past then God can do it again. He rejects as "contrived" (without any 
stated reasons) the view that God created the chaotic forces which subsequently 
disobeyed him (p. 120). Yet, on pages 72 and 77 it seems to me that Konig allows 
for this very reading when he says that certain biblical writers would naturally 
have assumed that God created these forces which, after creation, became inimical 
towards God. Konig fears, rightfully, that important insights are lost when the 
conflict texts are ignored and ex nihilo is made the biblical view. I believe, 
however that ex nihilo may be affirmed regarding the question of origins without 
discarding the significance of the conflict and victory motif. 
13Levenson believes that the priestly sources sanitized the myth of the 
Chaoskampf but could not completely rid the Hebrew Bible of •snippets" which 
refer to it. 
14Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, p. 24. 
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to Yahweh's lordship and relationality (to name something is to respond to it). 
In both God stands against that which works to undo us. God is "for us" and our 
well-being is dependent upon Yahweh's faithfulness. In both there is hope for the 
future despite our present experiences of suffering. If God has brought new 
things out of nothing or has conquered chaos in the past then we may have 
confidence in God for establishing new and greater things (e. g. the new heaven 
and earth) and triumphing over the forces of death and disorder in the future. 15 
Understood in this way the doctrine of creation provides the b,~ckdrop for -~~nuine 
drama as the biblical story unfolds. As creator, God established an environment 
for various types of creatures with boundaries set around the forces of chaos 
which bring disorder, injustice and affliction. As creator, God is not finished 
being creative for he continues to introduce new things into history. The stage 
is thus set for what Levenson calls the "dramatic enactment: the absolute power 
of God realizing itself in achievement and relationship. 1116 
The second main point regarding the doctrine of creation concerns the strong 
distinction as well as significant relationship between God and his creatures. 
God is distinguished from the creatures: God is a distinct other from them. God 
creates a world different from himself, yet no more different than he desires. 11 
The world is neither divine nor made from slain gods as in some of the ancient 
Near Eastern myths (e. g. Enuma Elish) . 18 Nevertheless, between God and his 
creatures there exists a dynamic relationship. In creation, Yahweh is the king 
15KOnig' s, New and Greater Things, is very helpful in connecting the 
doctrines of creation and redemption. For a study of how the concept of order in 
the creation and the threat of disorder was expressed in Israel's faith see Rolf 
Knierim, 11 Cosmos and History in Israel's Theology, II Horizons in Biblical Theology 
3 (1981): 59-123. 
16Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, p. xvi. 
17I 9we this formulation to my colleague Dean Fredrikson. 
18For an instructive comparison of these . stories see Nahum Sarna, 
Understanding Genesis (New York: Schocken, 1970), 1-18. 
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enacting a covenant with his vassal." By virtue of being the creator, Yahweh 
has prior claim upon the creation. It is not free simply to do whatever it wants. 
Rather, it is to acknowledge its lord and follow his instructions. As will be 
seen, however, despite Yahweh's almighty power in creating and his claim as king 
upon the creation, the unfolding of the intended relationship is not guaranteed, 
but it is, given God's resourcefulness, a live option~ 
Third, God establishes structures within the creation over which humans have no 
control without thereby eliminating all freedom and development. 20 Regarding 
these structures. there is no a priori way of knowing them (contra Platonism). }f 
we want to know how the world works, then we must look to see how it functions 
rather than speculating about how the universe ought to be structured according 
to some humanly manufactured ideal. If the creation and the structures it 
contains are the result of divine freedom then we cannot deduce from first 
principles the way the world ought to be. Emil Brunner is correct when he says, 
"never can thought of itself build up the idea of a contingent, non-necessary, 
freely-posited world. • 21 Moreover 1 if we want to know what sort of relationship 
comes about between the creator and the creatures, we must look to revelation to 
see what exactly God has decided to do. For, again, no preconceived notions of 
creator or omnipotence or the most perfect being inform us what sort of 
relationship God actually chose to have with his creation. 22 God sovereignly 
19For this interesting comparison see Levenson, Creation and the Persistence 
of Evil, pp. 140-8 and Konig, New and Greater Things, pp. 31, 76. 
''One may say that God creates order out of chaos even though not all chaos 
is removed. On how God both brings order out of chaos and chaos out of order see 
D. J. Bartholomew, God of Chance (London: SCM, 1984). 
21Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. Olive Wyon 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1949), p. 147. 
22Thomas Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), pp. 28-45, believes that 
perfect ·being theology when buttressed by creational theology and biblical 
theology can arrive at the best concept of God. He acknowledges that "the method 
of perfect being theology needs a revelational control. But it's also true that 
perfect being theology itself can act as an interpretive constraint on how we 
. read the Bible" (p. 43). We should not, he says, ascribe to God "any limitations 
which imply imperfection (p. 85, emphasis his). In my opinion, the classical 
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establishes the conditions of the creation and what sort of relationship he will 
have with it. We cannot deduce our understanding of providence from some notion 
of God. Rather, we must look to see how God has actually decided to exercise 
providence. Furthermore, God retains his freedom so that the exercise of 
providence does not have to be uniform or unchanging. 23 Only revelation informs 
us whether providence remains always the same or whether it is subject to 
changes. 
What sorts of conditions and relationships does God establish with the creation? 
God creates beings which are not God and places them in relationship with one 
another. Various sorts of life forms are created which occupy different mediums 
(air, oceans and land). This is what God desired for he says it is •good." 
Particular attention is given to the role of human beings in this creation. They 
are part of the creation but are given the special demarcation of being in the 
image of God (Gen. 1:26). Moreover, it is only with the creation of humans that 
-----·--·-"~--, 
a divine consultation ensues: "let us make. 1124 Fretheim comments that the "let 
us" language refers to a divine consul•tation: 11 the creation of humankind results 
from a dialogical act--an inner-divine communication--rather than a monological 
one. " 25 From the beginning God (even if viewed as king) is one involved in 
dialogue rather than monologue. Humans are fashioned after the image of this 
dialogical God who enters into genuine reciprocal relations with his creatures. 
philosophical conception of God has far too of ten been allowed to overturn the 
biblical text in favor of what we deem it fitting for God to be (theoprepes) . See 
my "Historical Considerations" in Clark Pinnock et. al. The Openness of God: A 
Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1994), pp. 59-100. 
23The doctrines of static perfection and uniformity of divine action have 
wreaked havoc on the doctrine of providence. 
240n the variety of interpretations of this phrase see Hamilton, Genesis, 
132-4. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, p. 5, believes it refers 
to the divine assembly mentioned elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible where it "played 
an active role and made fresh proposals to God, who nonetheless retained the 
final say.• 
25Terence Fretheim, The Book of Genesis, The New Interpreter's Bible 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1994), vol. 1, 335. 
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11 There are some twenty images of God the creator in these two chapters which, 
when seen in interaction with one another, provide for a more relational model 
of creation than has been traditionally presented. 1126 
Take the image of God, for instance, however "image" is defined it at least 
involves humanity in two sets of relationships: with God and other creatures. 27 
It is God who decides how similar to himself hwnans will be and what sort of 
relationship God will have with them. Hwnanity may be understood to be in 
relationship with God since God places the responsibility of caring for the world 
in the hands of hwnanity. The divine mandate implies that God is the one 
ultimately responsible for dominion for it is his to give. Dominion is not the 
right of humanity but the result of a divine gift. Consequently, hwnans are 
understood to be distinct others from God who exist in relationship to God. This 
relationship involves both a:!-_fJ, and resi:oI1sibility. God graciously provides an 
environment for the sustenance of the hwnans and calls them into the care of that 
gift. Moreover, not only does God chose to share existence, but the fact that God 
delegates responsibility implies that God is willing to share power with humans. 
---·- - ·- .... 
God sovereignly decides that not everything will be up to God._, Some important 
~---··-
things are left in the hands of humanity as God's co-creators. For instance the 
naming of the animals is left in the hands of hwnanity. Just as God creates names 
for things so humans are allowed to create names for things. God grants to 
humanity something of his own creative power: God is not a power-hoarding deity. 
There is freedom for humans to be creative within the 11 rules of the game" God has 
established. The structure is not so rigid as to eliminate all movement and 
newness for either humans or God. 28 The creation was never intended by God to 
26Fretheim, "Creator, Creature, and Co-Creation in Genesis 1-2," Word and 
World supplement 1 (1992): 13. This is a very helpful study on God entering into 
responsive relationships with his creatures. 
270n' the interpretation of the image of God see Victor Hamilton, Genesis, 
134-40. 145-7. 
28Jean-Jacques suurmond, Word and Spirit at Play: Towards a Charismatic 
Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), maintains that both hwnans and God 
are at "play• within the boundaries God has created. 
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remain completely unchanged. After all, even God says that some "good" things 
were yet to be created--namely woman (2:18). 
In stunmary1 the creation stories depict divine providence as creating an 
environment for the sustenance of the creatures, granting divine blessing upon 
them, establishing communities of relationships and bestowing tasks to be 
accomplished. The divine sovereignty has decreed that it should be this way 
rather than one of exhaustive divine control. God creates significant others and 
gives them "space 11 to operate. 
3.3 Freedom Within Limits 
Though God grants the creatures space to be genuine others, God desires that this 
freedom be used within limits. God establishes boundaries for humanity outside 
of which it is not good for them to be. God provides a garden for Adam's 
aesthetic enjoyment and physical nourishment (2:9) and in this garden are the 
tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. A command is given 
that he may eat from all the trees except the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil. Humans are not to decide on their own, apart from God, what is good--what 
is in their own best interests~ God establishes the boundaries for creaturliness. 
If we break through these limits we reject the divine wisdom, implying that God 
does not have our best interests at heart. We are not created to live our lives 
separate from God, but in trusting confidence that God loves us and gives his 
commandments ... for our good. We honor God and keep the creation heading in the 
direction God intends when we acknowledge our creaturely limits. 
Significantly, God does not grant the htunans permission to trust God or not trust 
him as though our trust in God was optional. Levenson remarks: "for all the 
language of choice that characterizes covenant texts, the Hebrew Bible never 
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re~ards the choice to decline covenant as legitimate. "29 God says, trust me, do 
not eat of this particular tree. A negative consequence is stipulated if they do: 
they will die (definitely not a "live option"). With the possibility of death an 
element is introduced which is not intended by God's act of creation. The command 
and threat of punishment imply the possibility that God's intention for the 
creatures may fail. 30 A meticulous providence where everything proceeds just as 
God wants has a very difficult time accounting for this (without impugning God's 
goodness). God desires to bless humanity through a life of loving trust 
manifested in obedience in the care for the creation and abstaining from seeking 
to get outside our limits. 31 At this point God expects humans to trust God and 
believe he has their best interests in mind. God, in freedom, establishes the 
context in which a loving and trusting relationship between himself and the 
humans can develop. God expects that it will and there is no reason to suspect, 
at this point in the narrative, that any other possibility will come about. A 
break in the relationship does not seem plausible considering all the good God 
has done. Yet, a possibility has been introduced by God's commandment. God now 
places an inevitable decision before the humans. This may be understood as the 
earliest reference to the biblical theme of testing: will they be faithful to 
live within the boundaries of their creaturliness? 32 Here we have the sovereign 
29Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, p. 141. He argues that the 
common notion that the covenant was between two parties who are equally free to 
assent and dissent is the product of Western political thought for both Adam and 
Israel already owe their freedom to God (pp. 146-7). 
30At this point I suggest a Joban reading. In the book of Job, God and Satan 
enter into a sort of wager whether Job worships God for who God is. God is 
confident that Job will succeed. An important difference exists, however, between 
these two stories. Job is tested to see whether he will trust God if everything 
he values is taken away. In Genesis, Adam is tested with full blessing of God's 
created goodness surrounding him. So, it would seem, Adam's trust in God is 
virtually assured. 
31John Sailhamer emphasizes that these verses are about trusting God and 
suggests that in v. 15 God placed them in the garden to "worship and obey" rather 
than to till the garden. See his Genesis, ed. Frank Gaebelein, The Expositor's 
Bible Coinmentary, 12 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990), 2.45. 
32For an interesting discussion utilizing testing to argue for a theodicy 
without blame see Mark S. McLeod, "Religious Plurality and Realist Christianity: 
Idolatry and the Testing of One's Faith," Faith and.Philosophy 11, no. 2 (April, 
1994): 224-241. McLeod follows Marilyn McCord Adams in arguing that Genesis 3 
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risk! 
God sovereignly places humans in an environment for their good and expects them 
to respond appropriately. In this sovereignty God grants humanity space to be a 
significant other in relation to God. God provides some relational distance as 
he does not smother them with his presence. By commanding them to trust and obey 
God also acknowledges the possibility of mistrust and sin. Up to this point 
Genesis has been silent regarding any opposition to God. Now, God, in making 
creatures ~~-? should love him, but may oppose him, places the risk out in the 
open. Yet, there. is no reason to expect anything except love in return to the 
loving providence of God for God has, so to speak, stacked the deck in his favor. 
3.4 The :rmplausibla Happens 
In Genesis three the t_otally unexpected happens: the naked humans are exposed to 
a temptation which calls the divine wisdom into question. The issue at stake is 
whether the divine providence has granted humanity all that is good for them or 
whether God is keeping back something which would be truly beneficial. The 
conduit through whom the temptation arises comes from one of God's creatures, the 
serpent. There is no dualism in this text where something co-eternal with God 
opposes God. Instead, it is from within God's own creation that beings, distinct 
from God, seek to establish even more distance from God than God ordained. 
The serpent poses a question about what God has said: "Did God say, 'You shall 
not eat from any tree in the garden'?" (3:1). It is striking that the serpent 
does not use the expression "Lord God~ as does the surrounding narrative of 
- ·~-----·----
Genesis 2-4. Wenham sees in this 11 a suggestion of the serpent's distance from 
God. God is just the remote creator, not Yahweh, Israel's covenant partner. 1133 
involves the sin of the failure to live within our boundaries (an ontological 
concept) .rather than a sin committed in full knowledge of good and evil (a moral 
concept). 
33Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 73. 
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The serpent desires a dialogue about the words of God. Already, we see that God's 
work and words are open to being discussed and if open to being discussed, then 
open to question and if open to question, then open to being accepted or 
rejected. It is through this opening in the created order that the serpent seeks 
an advantage. Douglas John Hall comrrients: "Here is the little opening in the tent 
of creation through which the camel's nose of sin may enter. 1134 
The woman answers the serpent that they are permitted to eat from the trees in 
the garden except one. That one, she claims, cannot even be touched lest one die. 
Moreover1 she adopts the serpent's expression, •God" instead of Lord God. The 
woman has opened herself to probing God's command and the serpent takes advantage 
of that openness by suggesting a different possible future from the one God had 
proclaimed. Whereas God had said they would die upon eating from the tree of tfie 
knowledge of good and evil, the serpent says they will not die. Instead, he 
suggests the half truth that they will have a sort of divine wisdom regarding 
good and evil. In other words, the serpent claims that God has been holding back 
something good from his creatures. Does God have their best interests in mind? 
This interchange demonstrates that God has made the world in such as way that it 
is possible to question the divine wisdom: God leaves enough space for trust to 
develop, but this also allows enough space for doubt. God leaves room in his 
universe for him to be challenged by his creatures. Why does not God either make 
the conditions such that challenges are impossible or annihilate the challenge 
as soon as it originates? The answer, I suggest, is that God has entered into an 
enterprise whereby he seeks the highest good of his creatures and out of which 
he desires to solicit the love of his creatures in freedom. 
Returning to the narrative, the serpent's claim that their eyes would be opened 
is proved correct, but not in the way they anticipated. In 3:22 God confirms that 
34Douglas John Hall, God and Human Suffering: .An Exercise in the Theology 
of the Cross (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1986), 71. 
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the serpent was right. The humans have gained new 11 wisdom• pertaining to good and 
evil. Unfortunately, in the process the harmonious relationships which God had 
established for the humans are rent asunder. Both the God-human and interhuman 
relationships are alienated. For instance 1 when God questions Adam, the man 
responds with a tacit accusation at ~od: it is your fault for creating this woman 
(3:12). It is clear that both the man and the woman call into question the divine 
wisdoln, claiming that God's providence is not very good. Only God has a 
perspective that understands the created order as a whole and the needs of each 
part. But this is rejected in their act of mistrust. Their eyes are opened and 
they do see the world differently. It is not, however, what God intended. 
In rejecting the divine wisdom the possible but implausible happened. 35 There 
was no good reason to reject God's blessing and provision. There was every reason 
in the world to trust the wisdom of the creator for the well being of the 
creature. There is never a good reason to sin, only rationalizations. When God 
inquires of the humans why they have done this only lame excuses are brought 
forth. After all, what sensical explanation could be given for rejecting divine 
grace? Sin is fundamentally irrational, there is no cause for it given the 
goodness of God's creation. In light of this Paul Fiddes suggests that human sin 
was 11 sornething strange to God 11 in that it was not planned and God now has to 
adjust his project in response to this horrible turn of events. 36 
Sin is deceptive (Rom. 7:11; Heb. 3:13) and the serpent utilized this when he 
told another half truth claiming they would not die (i. e. physical death). God 
had declared emphatically that they would die on the day they ate from the tree 
of the knowledge of good and evil. Again, the narrator has the serpent being 
35 I prefer this to Barth's "impossible possibility." I do not find such 
language illuminating. 
36Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 220. Fiddes is responding to those who claim that God could not be 
"taken by surpri_se" or have to adjust his plans in any way. If human sin was 
plafinea-b:1r--God -then one is forced to hold that_ it is somehow a necessary 
instrument for the moral growth of humans. 
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shown correct and God wrong--sort of. The promised punishment of 2:17 has given 
rise to several different understandings, but only the two most promising will 
be discussed. 37 Death could have a broader meaning whereby the humans 
experienced a b~.eakdown in rel~tionships and so, in a sense, "died. 11 Sin is then 
punished through its distorting effects upon all that humans enter into. The 
threatened "death" may also have its more straightforward sense of immediate 
physical death, that is, the death penalty. It often has this meaning in the Old 
Testament when the threat is from God or a king. 38 If it is interpreted as 
immediate physical death, then God does not follow through with the threat but, 
instead, expels them from the garden. If so, then we have the first instance in 
the Bible of what will become a major theme: divine relenting from negative 
consequences in favor of mercy. God had threatened to terminate the relationship 
if the humans failed to trust God. But when God faces the sin he cannot bring 
himself to fulfill this threat. A dire consequence is enforced, expulsion, but 
God chooses not to end the relationship. Though I prefer the second 
interpretation, on either one it is clear that God does not walk away from his 
creation once opposition arises. God continues to work with his creatures showing 
grace in the face of sin. God is faithful to his commitment to create and the 
risks entailed in that commitment. 
That God remains faithful to his creatures is manifested in several ways. To 
begin, although there will be an ongoing struggle with sin (symbolized by the 
serpent), humanity will eventually triumph by.crushing its head (3:15). This is 
probably not a messianic prophecy, but it does suggest some hope for the 
future. 39 Second, God provides for their inadequate attempt to cover their 
37It does not mean •you shall become mortal 11 for they were already mortal. 
Nor does it mean they were "doomed" to die. For discussion of the meaning of 
death in this passage see Fretheim, Genesis, 352, Hamilton, Genesis 172-4 and 
Wenham, Genesis, 67-8, 73-5, 88-9. 
38See Hamilton, Genesis, 173. 
39This interpretation fits with the context since the next two speeches to 
the woman and the man both contain judgment and promised blessings. Eve will have 
pain, but be blessed with children. Adam will suffer toil, but will be blessed 
\ 
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nakedness by providing more durable clothing for them (3:21). God does not leave 
them exposed under sin but, rather, seeks to modify the situation so that they 
may cope with their new perspective on the world. Furthermore, God sends them out 
of the garden, but, as we learn from the rest of the story, God goes with them. 
He does not abandon them. Finally, God cares for them in that he does not want 
them to eat from the tree of life and live forever in sin. The realm of sinful 
estranged relationships, has already shown itself and it will not be a blessing 
if the humans partake of the tree of life and have never-ending existence in this 
state. In this case, God is still working for the best interests of the humans 
and these divine actions may be understood as attempts to restore their trust in 
the divine wisdom and provision. Is God a fool? Will his attempts at restoration 
succeed? Only the history of God's activity in history and the human response to 
it will tell. 
3.5 God Suffers on Account of Bis Sinful Creatures But Will Not Abandon Them 
Despite God's continued efforts to work with his creatures, sin becomes ever more 
pervasive. Whereas in Genesis 1:31 God "saw" everything that he had made was very 
good, in 6:5 we are told that God "saw" that humanity was very wicked. Whereas 
God formed humans into life (2:7) humans form their thoughts towards evil. It is 
emphatically asserted that "every inclination of the thoughts of their hearts was 
only evil continually" (6:5). Clearly, "creation has miscarried. 1140 God takes 
full responsibility for creating these beings who have turned towards sin and it 
is just this responsibility which brings such grief to God (6:6). God regrets his 
decision to go ahead with the creation given these tragic developments. He is 
extremely disappointed at how things are turning out. Despite all the blessings 
God has provided, humanity turns away from the divine love. This pains God in his 
very heart. The narrator says that human hearts are continuously evil while the 
with food. Hence, the speech to the serpent probably does also. On this see 
Hamilton, Genesis, 198-200. On the issue of a protoevanqelium see the discussion 
and bibliography in Wenham, Genesis, 79-81. 
'°Konig, New and Greater Things, 77. 
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divine heart suffers the pain of rejection. God is open to and affected by what 
he has made. God forbears with the sin of humanity but it takes its toll on the 
divine life. The cost to God is great in terms of personal suffering. 41 God 
cares and caring leads to pain when it sees the beloved destroying herself. 
Philip Yancy suggests that in Geriesis "God learns how to be a parent" and 
regarding God's heart being filled with pain he says, "behind that one statement 
stands all the shock and grief God felt as a parent."" Fretheim concurs: "God 
appears, not as an angry and vengeful judge, but as a grieving and pained parent, 
distressed at what has happened." 43 
God is involved in the situation and it affects him deeply. Whatever God decides 
he will never be the same again. God now knows what it is to experience grief. 
It has entered into the very heart of God. The divine decision is to erase the 
creatures he has made for he is sorry that he made them (6:7). The flood could 
reverse God's act of creation for if God destroys it all then God seems to be 
giving up on his project. At first the judgment sounds as though nothing will be 
left "but Noah found favor in the sight of the Lord" (6:8). This time God "saw" 
someone in whom he could take pride, someone who was going in the direction God 
intended. Consequently, God does not give up hope, he will continue his project 
through Noah's family. In Noah God finds a possibility for the future: a future 
yet open despite the pervasiveness of sin. 
After the judgment God renews his commitment to Noah and the entire human family 
from him, saying that he will never again flood the earth and providing a sign 
41In fundamental opposition to this interpretation is Richard Creel, Divine 
Impassibility, (Cambridge:.Cambridge University Press, 1986), f41-6, who holds ~) 
that' a mature lover does not grieve if he is rejected by the free choice of \ 
another. For him,· God is emotionally impassible and remains perfectly happy ' 
whether we choose for or against his kingdom. 
42Philip Yancy, Disappointment With God: Three Questions No One Asks Aloud 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1988), 63-4. It should be noted that Yancy 
qualifies the divine learning to mean the taking on of new experiences since he 
affirms divine foreknowledge. 
43Fretheim, Genesis, 3 89. 
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as a promise (9:11-12) . 44 God makes a covenant with his creation that though 
there may be future judgments never again will virtually everything be 
annihilated. The sign of the rainbow is given by God as a reminder to himself 
that he will never again trod this path (9:15). It is perhaps the case that 
though human evil caused God great pain, the destruction of what he had made 
caused him even greater suffering. Make no mistake, it was a righteous judgment. 
Nevertheless, God decides to try different courses of action in the future." 
3.6 The Divina Purpose: Creating a Relationship of Trust 
In the life of Abraham we witness the development of a relationship between God 
and Abraham. Abraham's faith in God matures by fits and starts and God's 
confidence in Abraham grows. The divine goal of developing people who love and 
trust him comes to fruition in this patriarch. 
God calls Abraham to leave his homeland and travel to a place not yet revealed 
so that God may grant him land, posterity and a blessing to the nations (Gen 
12:1-3). The land of promise is not a safe land for while there he experiences 
famine as well as war with some raiders. God had promised to bless Abraham but 
all he has seen thus far is famine, strife and war. He does not yet possess any 
of the land nor does he have any children. God appears to Abraham in a vision 
informing him that his reward shall be very great (15:1). For the first time in 
the story we have dialogue between Abraham and God. God has made promises to 
Abram but it is only through the dialogue and AbrClham' s petition--making his 
requests known to God--that the promise shall come about. Prayer is important for 
God's activity in the world. According to Abraham Heschel God is not at home 
"It has been suggested that the sign of the rainbow symbolizes an archery 
bow pointing toward God. If so, then this is self-imprecatory on God's part. See 
J. Richard Middleton and Brian J. Walsh, Truth is Stranger than it Used to be: 
Biblical·Faith in a Postmodern Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 
148. 
"YHWH actually changes his mind twice in this story, once to destroy and 
then to never again destroy (6:5 and 8:21) and both reversals are based on the 
§fill!§. data: humans are sinful. 
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where his will is defied. Thus, "to pray means to bring God back into the world. 
to expand his presence. . . His being immanent in the world depends on 
us. "46 Abraham boldly puts his question to God: You promised me children, but 
I have none. Are you going to do anything about this? (15:2-3). God responds by 
specifying that children will come forth from Abraham's body and promises 
innumerable descendants. Abraham's response is one of faith: he believes God that 
he will have a son. This expression of trust and confidence in God is precisely 
what God is looking for in people and so God proclaims that Abraham is in proper 
relationship to.God (15:6). 
The dialogue continues with God reiterating the promise of the land to which 
Abraham inquires what assurance God will give him that he will posses it (15:8). 
A trusting relationship with God coexists with questions. God does not consid~r 
these questions impertinent or a display of deficient faith." On the contrary, 
God answers his questions. Moreover, to this last question God puts his own life 
on the line by passing through the sacrificed animals (15:9-21). In his 
relationship with Abraham God proclaims, in effect, "may I be cut in two if I 
fail in my promises to you." This act of self-imprecation reveals just how 
committed God is to Abraham. God is willing to become vulnerable for the sake of 
his promise. God's way into the future for the blessing of the human race is 
bound up with this man. 
In this vision God gives assurance to Abraham.that God will be faithful to his 
promise. Nevertheless, God forewarns Abraham that rough times are ahead for his 
descendants (15:13-16). It should be noted, however, that God does not here speak 
with precision about who will cause them trouble and the timing is ambiguously 
stated." Apparently, God wants Abraham to know that difficult times lay ahead, 
46A.· Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Giroux, 1966), 258. 
47Se€ Hamilton, Genesis, 429. 
48 See Fretheim, Genesis, 446-7, 449. 
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but God will be faithful to his promise long after Abraham has departed from the 
scene. 
In chapter sixteen Sarah comes to the conclusion that the divine promise is not 
going to come through her so she gives her maid, Hagar, to Abraham in order to 
have a son. Some interpret this as a lack of faith on the part of Abraham and 
Sarah: human scheming instead of faithful waiting on divine providence. But this 
reflects a misunderstanding of how providence works. God has not told them 
through whom the child will come so why should they not use the brains God gave 
them? Moreover, the facts that it is God who names the boy (16:11) and that the 
divine promise to Hagar, "I will greatly multiply your descendants so that they 
shall be too many to count" (16:10) uses the same language God had given Abraham, 
should lead one to rightfully conclude that Sarah was correct and the promis~d 
son shall be Ishmael. There was nothing improper or faithless in their decision. 
Genesis acknowledges that God works through human planing." 
In chapter seventeen God continues to clarify his will, saying that the promised 
line shall come through Sarah. Abraham's response is two fold (17:17-8). First, 
he considers what God has to work with: both he and Sarah well past the child 
bearing years. Second, he petitions God that God go with what is already 
available: Ishmael. Abraham would rather stick with what he has than risk some 
new venture. God reassures him that Ishmael shall be blessed, but makes it clear 
that God will establish his covenant with the· son Sarah shall bear. When Sarah 
hears of this she considers it a pipe dream (18:12) and the Lord responds by 
asking whether anything is too difficult for God to perform (18:14). This 
statement should not be abstracted into some sort of philosophical principle. The 
point of the question is that God expects them to have faith that God can perform 
what he has promised. True, God works with what is available in any given 
49See Fretheim, Genesis, 451-2. 
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situation, but humans are not to delimit the divine possibilities. 50 If God says 
it is yet possible for them to have children, then it is possible. 
Abraham waited a long time for God to clarify and then deliver what was promised. 
Through all this he has matured in his faith. In light of this the reader is 
shocked to read that God puts Abraham to the test (chapter 22) to see whether he 
has faith. 51 Although the reader is informed at the beginning that this is a 
test, Abraham is not. For him, the command to offer Isaac up as a sacrifice could 
mean that God has repudiated his promise. But Abraham has grown in his faith. God 
has overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles in giving him Isaac and so he now 
trusts that God will provide a way into the future, fulfilling his promise, 
despite this baffling command. That he has confidence in God is manifested in his 
statement to the servants that he and Isaac would return to them (v. 5) and his 
answer to Isaac that God would provide the offering (v. 8). The long journey 
provides opportunity for second thoughts and one wonders whether Abraham will 
follow through. Abraham continues on and just as he prepares to follow through 
on God's instructions, God prevents him from doing so. God had desired to see 
whether Abraham trusted him and it is now clear to God that he does: "for now I 
know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from 
me" (22:12). 
God's intention is not the death of Isaac but the testing of Abraham's faith 
(22:1). The test is genuine, not a fake. Brueggemann says that this test "is not 
a game with God; God genuinely does not know. .The flow of the narrative 
accomplishes something in the awareness of God. He did not know. Now he 
knows. 1152 The statement by God, •now I know," raises serious theological 
50see Walter Brueggemann, Genesis, Interpretation (Atlanta: John Knox, 
1982). 159. 
51Fo+ a thorough and enlighte~ing discussion of this chapter see Fretheim, 
Genesis, 494-501. 
52Brueggemann, Genesis, 187. 
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problems regarding divine foreknowledge. 53 Because of this many commentators 
either pass over this verse in silence or dismiss it as mere anthropomorphism. 
It is often suggested that the test was for Abraham's benefit, not God's. That 
this is not the case is made clear that the only one in the story said to learn 
anything from the test is God! Ab·raham no doubt did learn something in his 
relationship with God but that is not the point of the text. If one presupposes 
exhaustive divine foreknowledge, then the text is at least worded poorly, if not 
outright false." 
If the test is genuine for both God and Abraham, then what is the reason for it? 
The answer is to be found in God's desire to bless all the nations of the earth 
(Gen. 12:3). God needs to know if Abraham is the sort of person on whom God can 
count. Will he be faithful or must God find someone else through whom to achieve 
his purpose? God has been faithful, will Abraham be faithful? Will God have to 
modify his plans with Abraham? In 15:8 Abraham had asked God for assurance. Now 
it is God seeking assurance from Abraham. God had unilaterally made promises to 
Abraham, yet there was a conditional element for God wanted Abraham's obedience 
in order to bring about the promise (18:19) It is clear that God's purposes 
require a faithful and trusting Abraham. There is risk involved for both God and 
Abraham. God takes the risk that Abraham will exercise trust. Abraham takes the 
risk that God will provide a way into the future. Abraham's confidence in God 
proves to be well placed for God does provide an offering. 
After the test God renews his promises of land, descendants and blessing to all 
people (22:15-18). Moreover, God twice says that he will do this because Abraham 
has been faithful. These remarks continue to discomfit commentators due to later 
"on the Talmudic and medieval discussion of this verse see Seymour Feldman, 
"The Binding of Isaac: A Test-Case of Divine Foreknowledge," ed. Tamar Rudavsky, 
Divine Oritniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish. and 
Christian Perspectives (Boston: D. Reidel, 1985), 105-133. 
54In a chapter 5 I will seek to demonstrate that one view of divine 
foreknowledge--incrementally obtained--would interpret the text in the same way 
I have here (see 5.5). 
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theological debates about merit. Abraham's obedience does not here merit the 
divine blessing for that had already been given. Rather, as Moberly remarks: "a 
promise which previously was grounded solely in the will and purpose of Yahweh 
is transformed so that it is now grounded ~ in the will of Yahweh and in the 
obedience of Abraham. "55 God will work in the world but not apart from people 
of faith. Human faith and action make a difference to God in the fulfillment of 
his plans. In choosing to be dependent upon human beings for some things, God 
takes the risk of being either delighted or disappointed in what transpires. 
3.7 God May Be Prevailed Upon 
God has bound himself to his creation. God makes himself available to his people. 
In being available God provides access that people may call upon him. Abraham 
prevailed upon God in attempting to alleviate the destruction of Sodom (Gerl. 
18:22-33). In this narrative God takes the initiative and, in the visitation of 
the three men, provides the opportunity by which Abraham may bring his case 
before God. The divine decision was yet open and God invited Abraham into the 
decision making process. God chooses not to exercise judgment without the human 
input of this man he trusts. In cases such as this it becomes clear that God 
considers others as having something significant to say. Because God desires a 
genuine relationship he is open to his creatures, especially through prayer. 
Prayer serves, says Balentine, "as a microcosm of one of the Hebrew Bible's most 
important theological claims: the relatedness of God and humanity.' 56 Fretheim 
adds that "prayer has to do with that which "brings the human and the divine 
factors into the fullest possible power-sharing effectiveness."" Through these 
prayers we see that God sovereignly chooses not to govern the world without our 
input. Whether it is wise for God to do is another matter. 
55R. w. L. Moberly, "The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah," Vetus 
Testamentum 38 no. 3 (1988): 320. 
"Balentine, Prayer in the Hebrew Bible, 38. 
57Terence Fretheim, 
World for God," ed. Paul 
1988)' 57. 
"Prayer in the Old Testament: Creating Space in the 
Sponheim, A Primer on Prayer (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
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In a fascinating and mysterious text Jacob also prevails with God. 58 In Genesis 
32 Jacob is returning to his ancestral home in deep fear of what Esau will do to 
him and his family. When Jacob is alone a man encounters him and they wrestle all 
night long, neither gaining the advantage. Towards daybreak the adversary 
requests that Jacob let him go. By now Jacob has guessed this person's identity 
and so refuses to let go until he is blessed. Jacob's request is granted. He is 
blessed and given a new name, Israel: he who strives with God. Afterwards, Jacob 
acknowledges that he has been with God in a rather extraordinary way. Jacob had 
wrestled with God and prevailed. God did not overwhelm him with superhuman power 
but entered into the match in such a way as to ensure a "fair fight." God wants 
to see what Jacob is made of. Apparently, Jacob is made of stout stuff for God 
cannot get away and so asks Jacob to release him. Jacob refuses to do so until 
God blesses him. In this we understand that Jacob is not the superior for tle 
seeks the blessing from the superior. Jacob understands that God is a God of 
blessing. A God who is favorably disposed towards him, despite, I might add, the 
fact that Jacob is a scoundrel. Moreover, it was God who took the initiative to 
engage Jacob. Jacob could not have wrestled with God had God not desired it. God 
is truly gracious in making himself available to both esteemed characters such 
as Abraham and scoundrels such as Jacob. 
3.8 Joseph, a Risk-Free Model? 
The story of Joseph being sold into slavery and his eventual rise to rulership 
in Egypt commonly serves in discussions of providence as the paradigm. Actually, 
it is not the story but a particular interpretation of Joseph's remarks to his 
brothers in Genesis 45:4-9 which has become normative for understanding 
providence as risk-free. As a result many of the texts discussed in this chapter 
are either ignored or dismissed as mere anthropomorphism. I acknowledge that a 
"See Fretheim, Genesis, 565-570 and Balentine, Prayer in the Hebrew Bible, '\ 
64-71. S6me scholars see in this story, and others, a 11 demonic 11 side of God. See, 
for instance, Jack Miles, God: A Biography (New York: Knopf, 1995). For a careful 
refutation of this theory regarding Gen. 32 and other texts see Fredrik 
Lindstrom, God and the Origin of Evil: A Contextual Analysis of Alleged Monistic 
Evidence in the Old Testament, trans. Frederick H. Cryer (Sweden: CWK Gleerup, 
1983) . 
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risk-free reading of the text is possible where God so arranges all the details 
in such a way that Joseph inevitably rises to leadership and so saves his family 
and the Egyptians from famine. 59 
Fretheim, however, points out sever.al problems with a risk-free reading of the 
Joseph narrative. 6° First, the text explicitly ascribes responsibility for 
selling Joseph into Egypt to the brothers (37:28; 45:4-5). Second, Joseph's I' 
remarks in chapter 45 should be read in light of his more reflective comments in \ 
( 
I 50:19-21. There Joseph tells his brothers that they committed evil in selling 
him. They sinned against him (42:22). It is problematic, to say the least, to 
\ ascribe sin and evil to God. The text says that the brothers want to kill him but 
one of them persuades the others not to and has a plan for rescuing Joseph. So 
much in the story is dependent upon the brothers decisions and God's activity 1s 
in response to their actions. Finally, in 50:20 Joseph suggests that what they 
intended for evil, God intended for good. In other words, God has brought 
something good out of their evil actions. God was not determining everything in 
Joseph's life but God did remain "with" him (39:2) . 61 The divine presence does 
not mean the removal of famines, sibling hatreds, or being sold into slavery. It\' 
does mean that God will be working from within the situations to redeem them. 
How should Joseph's remarks that God "sent" him to Egypt and made him ruler of 
Egypt (45:5, 7, 9) be understood? First of all it should be remembered that 
Joseph has used language like this before. In 43:23 he says that God gave the 
money back to his brothers even though Joseph admits that he had the money put 
in their sacks (see 42:25, 28). Furthermore, the remarks of 45:5, 7 and 9 occur 
"Yet even the risk model affirms that God can unilaterally intervene in 
human affairs--if he so decides. 
6°Fr~theim, Genesis, 646. 
61For a helpful discussion of .God being "with" the biblical characters see 
Donald E. Gowan, Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in the Form of a 
Commentary (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, .1994), 54-75. He points out 
that this expression usually occurs in times of danger. 
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at a tense time in the dialogue. Joseph's brothers are emotionally wrung out with 
anxiety and are fearful for their lives due the ruse Joseph has played on them. 
Moreover, Joseph is brought to tears in the presence of his brothers, desiring 
reconciliation. Now is not the time for condemning words. Rather, he desires to 
vanquish his brother's fears. Although he acknowledges that they sold him into 
Egypt he suggests that everyone look on the bright side--what God has done 
through this. Their lives and those of the Egyptians have been spared the 
devastating effects of the famine. Joseph plays down the human factors in how 
this has come about and elevates the divine factor in order to allay their fears. 
After things have settled down and reconciliation is assured, Joseph says to them 
that what they intended for evil, God intended for good that many people would 
live (50:20). It is the glory of God to be able to bring good out of evil human 1! {<. 
- .. -~·-------· .,,,-._ - -~-
actions. But nothing in the text demands the interpretation that God actualiy 
desired the sinful acts. The text does not say that God caused or necessitated /r 
I 
the events. In fact, the text is remarkably silent regarding any divine activity 
until Joseph's speeches. Up till now, the events could have been understood 
without reference to divine activity at all. In fact, compared to the other 
patriarchal stories God is strangely absent and Joseph never invokes God! In 
retrospect, Joseph identifies God in his life working to preserve the lives of 
others. 
3. 9 God Works With What is Available 
The book of Exodus begins with God working behind the scenes (much like the 
Joseph narrative) making use of the opportunities which arise through human 
agency. The king of Egypt, fearful of the growth of the Hebrew minority, embarks 
on a plan to reduce their numbers. He first afflicts them with "toil that breaks" 
(1:13), making their lives bitter with forced labor. When that does not succeed 
he orders the Hebrew midwives to kill the baby boys when born. The midwives, 
however,· 'fear God" and so foil Pharaoh's scheme. God makes use of the faith of 
these lowly woman to limit the evil of the mighty king. Finally, Pharaoh 
commands the baby boys to be thrown into the Nile river. Why the Nile? Most 
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likely because it was considered the divine source of life for Egypt. Pharaoh may 
be thinking: "give them to the god of the Nile and let him be the judge whether 
they live or die. 11 If so, then we have the beginning of a contest between Yahweh 
and the gods of Egypt to see who is truly providential. 
The story then focusses on one Hebrew boy and his deliverance. Again, God works 
through women. One Hebrew woman does not want her baby drowned so she places him 
in an "ark 11 and has her daughter stand guard by it. This mother does not 11 leave 
everything in the hands of God!" Indeed, she takes active steps to insure the 
well being of her child. No doubt many Hebrew babies were drowned or eaten by 
animals in the Nile. This mother does all she can to prevent that from happening 
to her son. Again, God is not mentioned but as we know from the rest of the story 
God makes use of the actions of this mother and daughter to eventually brirtg 
deliverance to the Hebrew people. 
While the Hebrew daughter is standing guard a daughter of Pharaoh comes to bathe 
at the spot where the basket has been placed. Did the Hebrew mother know this? 
It seems she is gambling on the Egyptian princess taking mercy on her son. 62 The 
princess, unlike her father, takes "pity" on the boy. She hires the boy's mother 
to nurse him and takes him into her own home to raise him as her son (2:9-10). 
Again, it is women who intervene to counterdict Pharaoh's decree. God will 
utilize the decisions of the Hebrew mother as well as Pharaoh's daughter in order 
to work against the evil king. But everything is not here being worked out 
according to some divine blueprint. That would be reading into the story and 
raise an insufferable objection: that God wanted the oppression and the death of 
the Hebrew boys so that he could save .QD& of them. The narrator does not ascribe 
any role regarding these matters to God in these first two chapters. Instead, the 
focus has been on human activity. But, as will become clear later in the 
narrative, God makes use of the actions of these women to bring deliverance. 
"See Roy L. Honeycutt, Exodus, Broadman Bible Commentary vol. 1 (Nashville: 
Broadman, 1969), 325. 
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Consequently, God takes a risk since these people could have failed--they could 
have acted differently and let the boys die. If so, God would have to find 
another means of liberating his people and the story of Exodus would be different 
from what it is. 
It can be difficult to read these first two chapters of Exodus without having the 
'"rest of the story 11 in mind. Knowing that everything works out in the end, it may 
be tempting to read a divine blueprint into the narrative--where everything 
happens exactly as God desires. Since everything turns out "good" in the end we 
tend to forget that terrible suffering occurred and many Hebrew babies died. Why 
did God not prevent the oppression in the first place? Why do we read of the 
deliverance of only one Hebrew boy? Why not give Pharaoh a brain aneurism to 
prevent his horrible decree? After all, later on in Exodus God will bring about 
the miraculous. Why not here? The only answer I have for these troubling 
questions is that God works with what is available in the situation and even 
miracles depend upon the context. God ha.s <:hosen_n9t to ride. r9_u_\;Jh_sl:l()d ()VE!r.]lis 
creatures but to work through the resources available in seeking redemption. That 
~-----. 
God is concerned is made clear in 2:23-5 where the cries of the Hebrew people 
make an impact on God. The cries for help stimulate God and with the death of the 
king of Egypt, new possibilities are opened for God which leads to the call of 
Moses. 
In Exodus 3 we learn that God wants to work through Moses in order to deliver the 
Israelites. In the presence of the divine holiness Moses, however, disagrees with 
God, raising five excuses why he is not the right man for the job. At the 
beginning of the dialogue it is not a foregone conclusion that Moses will work 
with God. The divine presence does not ensure that God will get his way. As the 
dialogue progresses God seeks to answer each of Moses' concerns. Moses first 
remarks about his own inadequacy to which God replies that he will be with him 
(a repeated theme in the patriarchal narratives). Moses, however, is not 
comforted for he next requests that God reveal his name. In the ancient Near East 
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it was commonly thought that knowing the name of someone--even a god--gave one 
a degree of power over that person. On this basis Moses calculates that God will 
not reveal the di vine name to him. 63 The revelation of the di vine name ( 3: 15) 
implies a certain intimacy in relationship which will allow Moses to prevail upon 
God. In other words, God makes himself available and vulnerable." God grants 
this request to Moses, repeats his concern for the Israelites and proceeds to 
inform Moses what will happen in Egypt. He instructs Moses to gather the elders 
of Israel together and inform them of what God has disclosed. Moreover, Moses is 
told that the elders will believe what Moses says. He is then instructed to take 
the elders with him to Pharaoh and request a time for sacrifice to Yahweh. 
Finally, God informs him that only after a struggle will the people be released. 
This lengthy divine speech is usually understood to imply foreknowledge of tne 
future whereby God discloses precisely what will happen in advance. In light of 
what actually happens, however, not all of these statements come to pass exactly 
as "predicted." First, the elders are never said to appear before Pharaoh. 
Instead, Aaron takes their place (5:1). The reason why Aaron takes their place 
is stated in 4:14 where God concedes to Moses' self-appraisal of being a poor 
public speaker. God's original plan was for Moses to be the negotiator. But God 
goes to •plan B 11 in order to help Moses, demonstrating divine flexibility in his 
plans and willingness to adjust to human requests. Second, whereas God had said 
the elders would believe Moses, Moses asks: "what if you are wrong about this? 11 
(4:1). Brevard Childs remarks that some commentator's have attempted to avoid the 
force of Moses' question. 65 Walter Brueggemann correctly notes that Moses' 
statement that they will not listen to his voice "is a direct refutation of the 
63 See H. L. Ellison, Exodus, Daily Study Bible (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1982) ' 20. 
64See Terence Fretheim, Exodus, Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox, 
1991)' 65. 
"Brevard Childs, The Book of Exodus, Old Testament Library (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1974), 77. 
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assurance given by God in 3:18." "Instead of telling Moses that he has a false 
understanding of divine foreknowledge, God provides Moses with three signs for 
the purpose of convincing the elders that Yahweh has appeared to Moses. 
Apparently, God thinks Moses• point a legitimate one for he gives him the signs 
saying, "that they may believe you" (4:5). Attempts to escape this conclusion by 
claiming that the signs were solely for Moses' benefit ignore the fact that three 
times God says the signs are for the purpose of convincing the elders (4:5, 8, 
9). Moreover, God concedes the possibility that Moses is right when God 
acknowledges that the first wonder may not compel belief. A reason is given for 
the second sign: "it shall come about that if they will not believe you or heed 
the witness of the first sign, they may believe the witness of the last sign" 
(4:8). Furthermore, God grants a third sign to be used if the elders do not 
believe the first two signs. "If 11 language implies a somewhat uncertain 
future." In other words, God admits to Moses that he does not know for certain 
how things will go but graciously gives Moses special help to achieve the divine 
purpose. 
What can be said of all this? First, God does not rebuff Moses for questioning 
the divine word. God takes his question seriously and is open to challenge. 
Second, we should understand that some of God's unconditional utterances about 
the future are open to being recast in light of new situations. If this is the 
case then there is no contradiction between 3:18 and 4:8-9, one saying that they 
will listen and the other saying they may not. ·God may make remarks about future 
human actions which are highly probable, though not certain. 
The divine statement that Pharaoh would not let the people go without a struggle 
is based on his knowledge of the king's stubborn nature. It is not an inviolable 
"Walter Brueggemann, The Book of Exodus, New Interpreter's Bible, vol. 1 
(Nashvil1e, TN: Abingdon, 1994), 716. 
"See Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective, 
Overtures to Biblical Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 47-9. 
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future where Pharaoh is without choice. It may be objected that the hardening of 
Pharaoh's heart implies that he can only do what God determines he will do. In 
which case God does not work with the resources available, rather, God simply 
decides the way things shall go. The hardening of Pharaoh's heart is commonly 
cited in discussions of divine sovereignty to demonstrate that God is in full 
control of even oppressive and disastrous situations. 
The text will not support, however, such a view of sovereignty. 68 When we hear 
the word harden in reference to God we normally think in terms of complete 
control. But the three Hebrew terms used in the text (kabed, hazag and gashah) 
have the general meaning of to make something strong or heavy or to encourage 
{reinforce) someone. 69 The other occurrences of these words in the Old Testament 
do not carry deterministic overtones. 70 If it is deterministic then one wonders 
why God must harden his heart more than once. "It is important to note, 11 says 
Fretheim, "that an act of hardening does not make one totally or permanently 
impervious to outside influence; it does not turn the heart off and on like a 
faucet." 71 After all, God hardened the hearts of Pharaoh's servants (10:1) yet 
they understand the destruction taking place and plead with Pharaoh to let the 
Hebrews go and serve Yahweh (10:7). Divine hardening does not remove their 
decision making capacities or their ability to take a different course of action. 
That the divine strengthening still leaves Pharaoh with alternatives is indicated 
by the conditional language employed in 8:2; 9:2 and 10:4. God proclaims that 
particular judgments are coming if Pharaoh does not release the people. If, 
680n the nature of divine sovereignty in Exodus see Terence Fretheim, 
"Suffering God and Sovereign God in Exodus: A Collision of Images," Horizons in 
Biblical Theology 11 no. 2 (Dec. 1989) :31-56. 
"For bibliography on hardening see Walter Kaiser, Towards an Old Testament 
Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1983), 253. 
70See Roger T. Forster and V. Paul Marston, God's Strategy in Human History 
(Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 1983), 155-77. 
71Fretheim, Exodus, 97. The following discussion is indebted to Fretheim's 
excellent study (pp. 96-103). 
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however, Pharaoh is so under divine control that he cannot let them go then the 
use of 11 if 11 by God does not make sense. By uttering a conditional God is saying 
to Pharaoh that he does not have to persist in his intransigence, he may repent. 
If, however, God is controlling Pharaoh such that Pharaoh cannot do otherwise, 
then God's speech is deceitful. 
The narrative asserts the stated purpose of God is to be glorified and that the 
Egyptians would "know that I am Yahweh" (7:5, 17; 8:10, 22; 9:14; 14:4, 8). 
Gowan, following Zinunerli, argues that this formula means more than intellectual 
awareness of a fact; it means to become oriented towards Yahweh in one 1 s life. 72 
God intends to bring about changes in the life of Pharaoh and the Egyptians, not 
just with Israel. It hardly glorifies God if Pharaoh is not a genuine opponent, 
a puppet for God to manipulate. God and Pharaoh are involved in a real conflic~, 
one that is not settled by overwhelming divine power. 
Moreover, Pharaoh repeatedly hardens his own heart before God ever hardens it. 
God is intensifying what Pharaoh has already decided upon. Pharaoh is steadfast 
in his course of action and God strengthens his resolve. But why, it may be 
asked, would God do such a thing, especially when Pharaoh is on the verge of 
letting the people go? I think that God is trying to push Pharaoh out of his 
comfort zone and even further away from God in the attempt to get Pharaoh to come 
to his senses and repent. 73 Pharaoh has positioned himself in a sinful state 
where he is satisfied but God "gives him over.,. to further judgment. God ups the 
ante in the increasing destruction of the Egyptian economy. Furthermore, the 
plagues are, I believe, directed against the Egyptian pantheon--showing the utter 
futility of the patron deities to protect Egypt." Pharaoh is pushed by God to 
72Gowan, Theology in Exodus, 137. 
"on· the divine hardening of people for redemptive purposes see Abraham J. 
Heschel, The Prophets, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 1.191-2. 
74See Ex. 12:12, Nahum Sarna, Exploring Exodus (New York: Schocken, 1987), 
.78-80 and John J. Davis, Moses and the Gods of Eqypt.(Winona Lake, IN: BMH Books, 
1971)' 86-129. 
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decide: either stick with his old deities and remain steadfast in his oppression 
in which case he will suffer further judgment, or repent and call upon Yahweh--
the god of whom he said he did not know (5:2). What God desires is the redemption 
of Pharaoh and to this end the plagues are deployed. However, as Gowan remarks: 
"All this destructive activity seems to have failed to accomplish the purpose 
that is emphasized so strongly throughout the passage, except that Israel was 
persuaded" (15: 31)." 
To adapt an illustration from Fretheim, Pharaoh is in a canoe heading down a 
swift river. As the river narrows towards the waterfall it picks up speed. There 
are ample warnings along the way, one can hear the roar of the falls and see the 
spray rising up from it. One must either heed the warnings and get over to the 
bank or stay the course and suffer the consequences. There does come a point when 
it is too late to turn back and all of one's decisions come to a head. But such 
a doom was not in place from the beginning. Whether Pharaoh steers to the bank 
or goes over the edge, the Egyptians will know that Yahweh has done these things 
and so will be glorified. 
In making use of the resources available, divine sovereignty does not exercise 
absolute control over the human order. God does not easily get his way with 
either Moses or Pharaoh. God persuades, commands, gives comfort, and sometimes 
brings judgment in order to get humans to sign on to his project. The picture 
presented is one where God genuinely wrestles with his human creatures. Regarding 
the non-human creation, however, the book of Exodus presents a very different 
picture of divine sovereignty where there is little, if any, resistance. 76 The 
plagues, the crossing of the Sea of Reeds and the provision of food and water in 
the wilderness all testify to Yahweh's ability to make use of the created order. 
These forces do not appear resistant to the divine will as is the case with human 
75GoWan, Theology in Exodus, i39. 
76See Fretheim, "Suffering God and Sovereign God in Exodus," 35-7. 
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agents. God can make use of the processes in nature to produce some quite unusual 
events. Again, God makes use of the resources available in the created order. God 
elects to work in and through the world he made in order to deliver and provide 
for his people. 
3.10 Divine-Buman Relationality In The Covenant 
God created in freedom. God elected to work with Abraham in freedom. In freedom 
God elected Isaac over Ishmael, Jacob over Esau an~ the Israelites over the other 
nations. In these cases divine election comes first but election must be 
understood as resulting from the divine love for the sake of relationship. 
Consequently, a conditional element enters the scene: will the people accept the 
divine election and be faithful to it? In election God freely takes the 
initiative and then, freely binds himself by promise and covenant to creation, 
Abraham and Israel. God now establishes a covenant with the people. After Sinai, 
"the entire history of Israel, as portrayed in the Bible, is governed by this 
outstanding reality. Covenant consciousness suffuses all subsequent 
developments. "77 While camped at Sinai God institutes a covenant with the 
Israelites: 
You have seen what I did to the Egyptians, and how I bore you on 
eagles' wings and brought you to myself. Now therefore, if you obey 
my voice and keep my covenant, you shall be my treasured possession 
out of all the peoples. Indeed, the whole earth is mine, but you 
shall be for me a priestly kingdom and a holy nation (Ex. 19:4-6). 
In gracious freedom God establishes a covenant--a working arrangement with the 
people of Israel. In grace God delivered the people from their bondage in Egypt. 
In his mightiness he brought them to himself. This act is described with the 
metaphors of a mother eagle (cf. Deut. 32:11-4) and of a father carrying his son 
(Deut. 1:31) . 78 Both these metaphors depict powerful help and concern for the 
77 Sa+:"na , Exodus , 13 4 . 
780n the eagle metaphor see Walter Kaiser jr .. , Exodus, Expositor's Bible 
Commentary vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990), 415. 
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people. The first words of the covenant are about God's gracious acts of 
deliverance and closeness--"brought you to myself." Whatever word follows in the 
covenant, its foundation is laid in grace. In the divine-human relationships 
grace is always first. 
In response to divine grace God expects the people faithfully to keep the 
covenant. Although no stipulations are given at this point God desires obedience 
to his word. But even the commandments will have the people's best interest in 
mind for they will be for their good (Deut. 6:24; 10:13). In response to the 
divine grace God desires that the people exercise trusting obedience to his word. 
God is still in the work of developing people who love, trust and obey him. God 
has already displayed his mighty love for them. Now he wants a loving response 
from the beloved. Brueggemann comments: "While Yahweh's initial rescue is 
unconditional and without reservation, a sustained relation with Yahweh is one 
of rigorous demand for covenant. 07 ~ The bestowal of the covenant promise was 
solely Yahweh's prerogative and was not conditioned by anyone. Human-... 
participation in the covenant promise and the blessings it entailed were 
conditional.'° God initiates the relationship and intends for it to be one of 
give-and-take. The covenant involves reciprocity but this is due solely to God's 
free decision. 
Eichrodt describes the covenant relationship as "bilateral. "81 He acknowledges, 
however, that it is not a covenant between· equals for God is the superior 
partner. The covenant truly involves partnership but "bilateral" is perhaps not 
"Brueggemann, Exodus, 834. 
'°See Walter Kaiser Jr. Towards an Old Testament Theology (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1978), 93-4, 111, 130, 156-7. 
nwa'lter Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament in 2 vols., tr. J. A. 
Baker, OTL (London: SCM, 1961), 37. Balentine claims that the majority of Old 
Testament theologies, including those of Eichrodt and Von Rad, are deficient on 
divine-human relationality. The relationship has been described in one-sided 
terms where divine solicitation of human input was regarded as unworthy of deity. 
See his Prayer in the Hebrew Bible, 229-249. 
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the best term for the divine-human covenant. KOnig prefers the term 
"monopluristic" since it emphasizes the fact that the covenant is one-sidely 
established by the Lord yet, it also conveys the sense of mutuality between God 
and the people. 82 God brings about the covenant in gracious free love. God is 
not forced into this relationship. Inside the covenant relationship exist 
boundaries and obligations for both the people and God. God, the king, wants a 
relationship with the people, the vassal, not with automatons who can do nothing 
but what the programmer designs. God is dependent upon the people to ratify and 
fulfill the covenant. 83 He expects them to be responsible and to contribute 
(within the limits of their createdness) to the relationship. God binds himself 
to the covenant people and will do what is appropriate and legitimate (within the 
limits he has established) for their well being. God is deeply involved in 
history. Moltmann comments: "The more the covenant is taken seriously as tlte 
revelation of God, the more profoundly one can understand the historicity of God 
and history in God. 1184 
Blessings are promised if the people faithfully trust the covenant God: they will 
be a "kingdom of priests and a holy nation." The text does not explain what this 
means. I suggest that it involves a ministry on the part of the Israelites to the 
rest of the world. Through them, all the nations of the world would be blessed 
(Gen. 12:3). As God's "treasured possession" they would serve to direct people 
to God. The question is whether Israel will fulfill this calling. God places his 
project for the future of the world into their.hands. He will work with them but 
God sovereignly decides to make his project dependent upon this people. They 
cannot do it without God; God will not do it without them. Again we see risk 
involved for God makes his redemptive work vulnerable--will anyone faithfully 
82Adrio KOnig, Here Am I: A Believer's Reflection on God, {Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1982), 128-9. 
83 Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, p. xxx, says the aspect 
of divine dependence upon the people has generally been missed. 
"Jurgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, tr. R. A .. Wilson and John Bowden (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1974), 271. 
71 
keep the covenant? Will the people become a holy nation? Will they love God with 
all their strength (Deut. 6:5) and show love to their neighbors (Lev. 19:18)? A 
reading of the Bible reveals that, overall, God was very disappointed with Israel 
in this regard. The cultus failed to produce godly people and when prophets were 
sent their message went largely unheeded. After centuries of struggling with the 
people, God expresses his exasperation with them: "I was ready to be sought out 
by those who did not ask, to be found by those who did not seek me. I said, 'Here 
I am, here I am,' to a nation that did not call on my name. I held out my hands 
all day long to a rebellious people" (Isa. 65:1-2 NRSV). One can almost picture 
God jumping up and down, waving his arms shouting "here I am! 11 to little 
avail. 85 
3.11 Divine Goals With Open Routes 
The breaking and renewal of the covenant in Exodus 32-4 sheds important insight 
into the divine-human relationship. 86 Especially significant in this regard are 
the prayers of Moses. The worship of the golden calf (Ex. 32) constituted a 
grievous breaking of the covenant. The event precipitates a rather heated and 
tense exchange between God and Moses. God's speech begins and ends by telling 
Moses to leave him immediately (32:7, 10). Moreover, God proclaims that they are 
Moses' people thereby implying they are not God's. Finally, God informs Moses of 
a new plan of action: God will destroy the people and start over again with 
Moses. Moses will then have a role similar to Noah's. "God is prepared to scuttle 
Israel as the promised 'great nation,' and td reassign and redeploy the great 
Abrahamic promise of Gen. 12: 2 to Moses. 11 87 Certainly it is within the di vine 
freedom to do this. By starting over again with Moses, God would remain faithful 
to his basic commitment while basing his specific options and responses at any 
one time on the unfolding events and human actions. 
85More will be said on God's success and failures in working with.humans in 
the section on Acts 10-15 and Romans 9-11 in the next chapter. 
86See Gowan, Theology in. Exodlls, 217-243. 
87Brueggemann, Exodus, 9 31 . 
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Moses, however, does not agree with God. Instead of leaving, Moses risks the 
divine wrath in order to intercede for the people. 88 He believes it possible to 
alter the divine word and to this end he gives three reasons why God should not 
follow through on his promised course of action (32:11-3). First, he says the 
people belong to God for God is the one who just delivered them. Second, the 
Egyptians may ascribe "evil motives 11 to God. 89 Third, he reminds God of his 
promise to Abraham. Now God could have rebutted all of Moses' reasons: (1) yes, 
God delivered them but he has no confidence in them; (2) He does not care what 
the Egyptians think because he has healthy self-esteem; (3) He is keeping his 
promise to Abraham since Moses is one of his descendants. Or, God could have 
replied that he is sovereign and can do what pleases him. But God gives no such 
answers. Instead, the text simply says that God changed his mind and did not do 
what he said he would. Apparently, Moses has such a relationship with God th~t 
God values what Moses desires. If Moses interprets God's intentions in an 
unfavorable way and God values his relationship with Moses, then God must either 
persuade Moses or concede his request. It is unlikely that Moses presents God 
with new information. The real basis for the change in God's decision comes from 
a forceful presentation by one who is in a special relationship with God. With 
Moses' prayer the decision-making situation is now altered for God. 90 Being in 
relationship to Moses, God is willing to allow him to influence the path he will 
go. God permits human input into the divine future. One of the most remarkable 
features in the Old Testament is that people can argue with God and win! Fretheim 
comments: 11 Hence human prayer (in this case, intercession} is honored by God as 
a contribution to a conversation that has the capacity to change future 
directions for God, people, and the world. God may well adjust modes and 
880n these intercessory prayers of Moses see Balentine, Prayer in the Hebrew 
Bible, 135-9 and Patrick D. Miller, They Cried to the Lord: The Form and Theology 
of Biblical Prayer (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1994), 270-4. 
890n.the ascription of evil to God in such prayers see Balentine1 Prayer in 
the Hebrew Bible, 127-9. 
'°See Fretheim, "Prayer in the Old Testament, • 60. 
73 
directions (though not ultimate goals) in view of such human responsiveness. 1191 
After Moses visits the idolatrous scene he returns to Yahweh, continuing his 
intercession (32:31-4). He requests that God forgive the people. This time, 
however, God does not grant his petition: punishment will be meted out. Moses 
does not receive everything he requests. Furthermore, God says that the divine 
presence will not accompany the people. Instead, he will send a messenger 
(angel). The reason given is that God is worried that if he dwelt in their midst 
he would destroy them (33:3). Even in anger God is concerned for their well being 
and believes this will be a suitable arrangement. Yet, 33:5 indicates that the 
issue is not finally decided for God is watching the people to see their 
response. When Moses next prays he makes a complaint and a request. He complains 
that God has not revealed the identity of this "messenger." On the basis of h:i:s 
special relationship with God he asks, "show me your ways, so that I may know you 
and find favor in your sight" (33:13). 
In response to Moses' complaint, God again changes his mind and says that his 
"face" (the divine presence) will go with the people. To which Moses replies that 
if God himself does not go with them, then he does not want to go for it is 
Yahweh's presence which distinguishes the people of Israel (33:15-6). Concerning 
Moses' reque.st it is not entirely clear what Moses is asking when he says "show 
me your ways.·· Cassuto suggests an intriguing interpretation. 92 What Moses 
desires, he says, is to know the criteria by which God decides when to forgive 
and when to punish. In this way Moses will be able to determine when he should 
intercede knowing he will be successful and when he should not attempt it. God 
remains silent about this until, perhaps, after Moses' next request. 
God acknowledges his special relationship with Moses whereupon Moses seizes the 
91Fretheim, Exodus, 287. 
92U. Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, tr. Israel Abrahams 
(Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967), 433. 
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opportunity to request God to "show me your glory" (33:18). Again, it is not 
clear what Moses desires. Perhaps it is the desire to be radically close to God, 
to be face to face. The divine response is not to give Moses everything he asks, 
but, rather to grant Moses insight into the divine goodness and the meaning of 
the divine name (Yahweh). God says that it is enough for Moses to know that God 
is gracious and compassionate (33:19). But the exercise of these qualities is, 
finally, up to God. Moses may request forgiveness for the people .but it is 
ultimately up to God's discretion when to grant it. What Moses needs to know is 
that God is a God of grace and compassion. To this end God then provides Moses 
with a theophany.where the divine character is revealed. Yahweh is "merciful and 
gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness," he 
forgives iniquity yet will not neglect needed judgment upon sin (34:6-7) ." 
These are not abstract attributes of God but, rather, characterization of who Geld 
is in relation to his people. This is what humanity needs to know in order to 
live in relation to God. Informed of these divine characteristics we may make our 
way in the world with God. His steadfast love renewing us, his justice 
challenging us and his mercy comforting us. 
In this fascinating series of prayers we have seen that Moses does not get 
everything he requests. Yet, it is clear that God does take Moses' concerns 
seriously, even to the point of twice changing the divine plan. We are not told 
what God would have done had Moses failed to make these petitions. The text is 
clear, however, that Moses became a partner with God in shaping the future. 
Patrick Miller observes that Moses did not pray "thy will be done" for it is the 
divine will that we call upon God and even argue against God. 94 There is no 
self-surrender on Moses' part, rather, in prayer he enters into a relationship 
of reciprocity. Gowan says, 
~30n the significant changes between these verses and the earlier statement 
in 20:5 see Fretheim, Exodus, 302. Mercy and grace are clearly extended here! 
94 Patrick D. Miller, "Prayer as Persuasion: The Rhetoric and Intention of 
Prayer," Word and World 23 no. 4 (Fall 1993): 361-2. 
The picture of God presented to us throughout the Old Testament is 
that of a God who has chosen to work with, rather than just upon 
human beings, so that humans (in this case Moses) are given the 
chance, if they will accept the responsibility, to contribute to a 
future that will be different from what it would have been, had they 
remained passive. 95 
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Prayer encourages dialogue not monologue. By speaking up he made an impact on 
God. God chooses not to leave the future solely in our hands, but neither does 
he decide that we should simply leave it in God's hands. God sovereignly decides 
that the route into the future will involve a genuine divine-human partnership. 
Balentine comments: 
prayer is a constitutive act of faith that creates the potential for 
newness in both God and humanity. Neither partner remains unaffected 
or unchanged after the discourse of prayer. . in [the] Hebraic 
understanding God is open and receptive to change. . [grounded 
in] God's unrelenting commitment to be in relationship with 
humanity." 
3.12 Excursus on Divine Repentance 
The biblical references to God changing his mind have created no small 
controversy in the history of interpretation. '7 Such texts raise a number of 
issues. One concern is whether divine repentance implies that God is fickle or 
untrustworthy. If God £2!!. change his mind is· it permissible to trust God for 
anything? Yes, because as the biblical narrative progresses it becomes clear that 
God remains faithful to his overarching goals. For instance, in Exodus 32 whether 
God destroys the Israelites and begins again with Moses or decides to continue 
working with the people, God would be faithful to his promise to Abraham and his 
95Gowan, Theology in Exodus, 231-2. 
"Balentine, Prayer in the Hebrew Bible, 268-9. 
97See Lester J. Kuyper, "The Suffering and the Repentance of God," Scottish 
Journal of Theology 22 (1969) :257-77. 
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project of developing a people of faith. 98 But God has different options 
available and it is not a foregone conclusion which he shall choose. Sometimes 
God allows for human input to influence which option is realized. As God 
permitted Abraham's intercession for Sodom (Gen. 18:16-33) so now Moses is 
allowed incredible access to God. With or without human input God remains 
faithful to his project of redemption. God shows steadfast love and sticks to his 
overarching goals which he has made known through his promises. God remains 
unchangeable in his conunitment to this project of salvation but remains flexible 
regarding precisely when, where and how it is carried out. 
Another issue which the divine repentance texts raise concerns the conflict 
between divine repentance and divine immutability and foreknowledge. Theologians 
from Philo to Calvin have asserted that it is impossible for the divine mind eo 
change. For Calvin, God can no more change his mind than he can be sorrowful or 
sad. 99 Biblical texts about God changing his mind, according to Calvin, do not 
describe God as he truly is but only as he appears to us. It simply is not 
appropriate for God to be described as repenting or being sorrowful . 100 If we 
"w. Bingham Hunter holds that. the destruction of all Israelites except 
Moses would involve breaking a divine promise. He underst,ands Gen. 49:10: "the 
scepter will not depart from Judah" to be a messianic prediction. Since Moses is 
from the tribe of Levi the messiah could not have come from Judah had God 
destroyed that tribe. Hence, God did not change his mind. See his The God Who 
Hears (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1986), 53. These remarks reflect 
a common evangelical understanding of prophecy whereby the future is set in 
concrete and all conditionality is ruled out. Regarding Gen. 49:10 see Fretheim, 
Genesis, 665, 668 where he observes that this text is not a full-blown 
messianism. Evangelicals tend read more into prophecy than is actually there and 
this is especially true concerning messianic prophecy which is a late development 
in the Old Testament. 
99See John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses, tr. John King, 
2 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 1.248-9 and Institutes, 1.17.12-14. 
100I believe that Calvin is here following the long tradition of ruling out 
certain scripture texts because they do not fit with a preconceived notion of 
what is fitting for God to be (dignum Dea) . See my "Historical Considerations" 
in The openness of God. For a discussion of Calvin and some of the church fathers 
on divine accommodation see Ford Lewis Battles, 11 God was Accommodating Himself 
to Human.Capacity," Interpretation 31, no. 1 (Jan. 1977): 19-38. Unfortunately, 
Battles never .inquires as to either how Calvin knows God has to accommodate 
himself or what criterion Calvin uses to elevate one biblical truth above 
another. 
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assert that God does do such things it would imply "either that he is ignorant 
of what is going to happen, or cannot escape it, or hastily and rashly rushes 
into a decision. "1°' Any of these options make God look foolish and are not 
fit ting ascriptions to a transcendent, omnipotent, omniscient and irrnnutable 
deity. The repentance texts are anthropomorphisms.'" Reformed philosopher Paul 
Helm distinguishes between "the anthropomorphic and the exact language of 
Scripture" so that the 11 statements about the extent and intensity of God's 
knowledge, power and goodness must control the anthropomorphic and weaker 
statements. 11103 Otherwise, he claims we make God in our image. Bruce Ware, 
following Calvin, suggests a criterion for distinguishing anthropomorphic from 
literal texts in the Bible: "A given ascription to God may rightly be understood 
as anthropomorphic when Scripture clearly presents God as transcending the very 
human or finite features it elsewhere attributes to him. 010' 
At least three problems arise with this approach. First, how does one know which 
text transcends the other? One possibility would be to claim that texts which 
explicitly deny that God has certain human characteristics are the transcendent 
ones. In this case the passages which say that God will not change his mind 
because he is not human (Num. 23:19, 1 Sam. 15:29) describe God as he really is 
and force a reinterpretation of the repentance texts to mean something other than 
what they say . 105 What then, is one to do with Hosea 11: 8-9 where God repents 
101Calvin, Institutes, 1.17 .12. 
'°'Reformed theologian James Daane, The Freedom of God, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1973), 90-1, observes that decretal theologians have been interested 
only in those anthropomorphisms which imply an internal divine response to 
creatures. He claims that for decretal theology God is not personally affected 
by creatures and so God is not in a personal relationship with the world. 
103Paul Helm, The Providence of God, Contours of Christian Theology (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 54, 52. 
104B:tuce Ware, 11 An Evangelical Reformulation of the Doctrine of the 
Immutability of God," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, 29, no. 4 
(Dec. 19~6) :442. 
105For more on this "two-layered 11 approach to interpreting scripture see my 
11 Historical Considerations," 94-5. 
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because he is not human? Scripture asserts that God both repents and does not 
repent for the same "transcendent" reason that he is not human! In this approach 
the judgment of which texts mean what they say and which ones mean something 
other than what they say is dependent upon the theological control beliefs of the 
interpreter. 106 
Another problem is that this approach seems to abstract the "will not repent" 
idea from the contexts in which they occur. The texts which say that God will not 
repent refer to specific situations in which God refuses to reverse his decision. 
God refuses to allow Balaam to change the divine mind and curse Israel (Num. 
23:19). God rejects Saul's pleas to keep the kingship in his family (1 Sam. 
15:29) . 107 If one reads these "I will not change my mind" texts in their 
historical settings it becomes clear that they are not abstract principles df 
timeless truth. Rather, they speak of God's steadfastness in certain concrete 
situations to reject the human petition. But some do understand divine 
predictions to be immutable truths. 108 After all, do not texts such as 11 has he 
spoken and will he not perform it?" (Num. 23:19) and the test of a prophet (Deut. 
18:21-2) imply that whatever God speaks as a prediction will happen? The answer 
is both yes and no. It is yes in those instances just mentioned (e. g. the 
rejection of Saul) where God decides to go with one particular option. But the 
answer is no in a great many instances where God does indeed speak and does not 
perform it due to divine repentance (e. g. Jonah's announcement of the 
destruction of the Ninevites and the prolongat1on of Hezekiah's life in 2 Kings 
20). God, utilizing his wisdom in conjunction with input from the human 
106See my "God as Personal. 11 
1070n this text see Terence Fretheim, "Divine Foreknowledge, Divine 
Constancy, and the Rejection of Saul's Kingship," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 47, 
no. 4 (Oct. 1985) :595-602. Gowan, Theology in Exodus, 226, disagrees with 
Fretheim's explanation. Gowan claims that the texts on divine repentance 
(especially 1 Sam 15) are in tension with one another and cannot be reconciled. 
10•on: Deut. 18:21-2 in this regard see Francis Beckwith, "Limited Omniscience 
and the Test for a Prophet: A Brief Philosophical Analysis," Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 36 no. 3 (Sept. 1993) :357-62. 
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relationships, freely decides when he shall carry out the prediction and when he 
will alter it--but either way the decision remains faithful to his redemptive 
project. 
A final problem with this approach lies in the fact that many today admit that 
God experiences changes in emotions but continue to affirm foreknowledge. It is 
claimed that God knows from all eternity that, for instance, Saul will disobey 
God at a particular point in history, God nevertheless experiences a genuine 
change in emotion from joy to grieving over Saul. It is questionable whether it 
is coherent to affirm both that God has always known of this event and that God 
now has changing emotions about that event. Furthermore, Fretheim identifies a 
moral problem with this view. "For God to say, for example, 'I know that I will 
be provoked to anger by the sin of David with Bathsheba,' runs into tough moral 
ground. God should immediately be angry at the point of God's knowledge of the 
sin, and not just at the point of its occurrence. But the texts say that God was 
provoked to anger at a particular historical moment, and not that some previous 
divine provocation was realized.M 109 The notion of change in God is problematic 
for the doctrine of foreknowledge. 110 This is, in part, the reason why Calvin 
along with many others affirmed a strong doctrine of divine impassibility and/or 
that God's knowledge of the creatures is totally independent of the creatures. 
A better approach is to acknowledge that all these texts utilize metaphor . 111 
Metaphors do not provide us with an exact corr·espondence to reality but they do 
provide a way of understanding reality. No single metaphor captures the biblical 
God. Rather, a number of metaphors are used in order to build up a portrait of 
God. In the Bible some metaphors are more pervasive and are used to qualify 
109Fretheim, Suffering of God, 42. That past, present and future are real for 
God see pages 40-4. 
11
'Fqr biblical documentation on change in God see Richard Rice, "Biblical 
Support," The Openness of God, 22-50. 
111See Fretheim, Suffering of God, 1-12. 
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others. For instance, God as loving both pervades and qualifies other metaphors. 
God is not just any king or father or hen, he is a loving one. Fretheim refers 
to these- pervasive and qualifying metaphors as 11 controlling metaphors" and 
demonstrates that divine repentance is a significant controlling metaphor in the 
biblical narrative."' 
Fretheim's excellent studies on divine repentance contain several important 
insights . 113 I will now summarize those parts significant for my discussion. 
First, the metaphor of divine repentance is pervasive in the Old Testament. At 
least thirty five times God is said to repent or not repent (this includes only 
the times nicham is used, not all the times the narrative depicts a change in 
God) . 114 God is said to repent of something he has already done such as creating 
(Gen. 6:6) or making Saul king (1 Sam. 15:11, 35). God decides not to repent 
about certain matters. For instance, electing David king (1 Sam. 15:29) or when 
divine judgment has become inevitable (Jer. 15:6). God sometimes repents of what 
he said he would do or has already begun to do (Ex. 32:14). In these cases God 
changes his mind either because the people repent or someone intercedes (e. g. 
Moses) or simply because the divine compassion overrides the divine anger. 115 
The prophets learned that God is free to change his mind. In the words of 
Heschel: •[They] had to be taught that God is greater than His decisions. "116 
God cannot be compelled to repent nor be prevented from repenting for divine 
112See Terence Fretheim, "The Repentance of God: A Key to Evaluating Old 
Testament God-Talk," Horizons in Biblical Theology 10, no. 1(June1988): 47-70. 
113Terence Fretheim, 11 The Repentance of God, 47-70; "Divine Foreknowledge," 
595-602; and "The Repentance of God: A Study of Jeremiah 18:7-10, Hebrew Annual 
Review 11 (1987): 81-92. Also helpful is the study of nhm with God as subject in 
Francis I. Anderson and David Noel Freedman, Amos ;-A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, Anchor Bible vol. 24a (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 
638-679. 
1140n nicham see H. Van Paunak, "A Semantic Survey of NHM," Biblica 56 
(1975): 512-532. 
115See also, J. P. Hyatt, Exodus, New Century Bible Commentary {Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1971), 307, Kaiser, Exodus, 479, and Anderson and Freedman, Amos, 
644-5. --
116Heschel. The Prophets, 2. 6 6. 
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repentance is neither automatic nor predictable. Whereas Moses succeeded in 
getting God to change his mind, Samuel was unsuccessful in his attempt on behalf 
of Saul. 
Second, 11 Divine repentance is in fact found within a variety of traditions, 
northern and southern, early and late: Jahwist/Elohist; David-Zion; Deµteronomic 
History; eighth-and seventh-century prophets; exilic and post-exilic prophecy; 
psalmody." 117 It cannot be dismissed as belonging to some small band of esoteric 
teachers. The theme is widespread throughout Israel's history. Third, the 
repentance metaphor also occurs in a wide variety of genre. Two very important 
usages in this regard are when it occurs as divine speech (where God says "I 
repent") and in creedal statements. Basic creedal affirmations call attention to 
what is most important for Israel's faith. In two such statements God is 
described as •gracious and compassionate, slow to anger, abounding in 
lovingkindness, and repenting of evil" (Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2). Divine repentance 
is here placed right alongside the divine grace and love as a key characteristic 
of God. David Allen Hubbard remarks: "So dominant is this loyal love, so steeped 
in grace ... and mercy ... that it encourages Yahweh to stay open to changes 
in his plans. God's openness to change his course of action. has [in 
these two passages] virtually become one of his attributes. "118 
However, it may be objected that divine repentance is literally impossible since 
God has exhaustive foreknowledge of future events. In a later chapter I will 
argue that even foreknowledge does not necessarily rule out divine repentance. 
Here I wish to establish that there is sufficient biblical warrant for calling 
into question the belief in divine foreknowledge, at least certain understandings 
of foreknowledge. In his book, The Suffering of God, Fretheim details a vast 
amount of evidence to show that the Old Testament does not affirm (at least not 
117Fi::-etheim, 11 Divine Repentanc_e," 54. 
a•navid Allen Hubbard, Joel and Amos, Tyndale.Series, (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1989), 35 & 58. 
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uniformly) divine foreknowledge.u• Here I have space only to swmnarize his main 
points and list a few of the scripture texts he discusses. 
That the future is open is indicated by four types of divine speech acts. To 
begin, there are the occasions where God says "perhaps" the people will listen 
to my prophet and "maybe" they will turn from their idols (e. g. Ezek. 12:1-3; 
Jer. 26:2-3). Moreover, God says, "I thought Israel would return to me but she 
has not" (Jer. 3:7; cf. 32:35). God is here depicted as not knowing the future 
with certainty. Next, God makes utterances like, 11 if you repent then I will let 
you remain in the land" (Jer. 7:5). Such "if" language--the invitation to change-
-is ingenuine if God already knew they would not repent. If God foreknows from 
the moment he gives the invitation that it will be pointless, then God is 
deceiving the people by holding out a false hope. On the other hand, if God ts 
genuinely inviting the people to change, then the future is not yet decided. 
Third, scripture mentions occasions where God "consults" with certain people of 
faith in deciding the course of action God will take. God does this with Abraham 
concerning judgment upon Sodom (Gen. 18) and Amos (Amos 7) regarding judgment 
upon Israel. God, in freedom, decides not to decide without consulting these 
figures of faith or, as with Moses (Ex. 32) decides to change his decision in 
. response to Moses' intercession. Finally, God asks questions which are not merely 
rhetorical. God agonizes over what to do with his sinful people (Hos. 6:4; Jer. 
5: 7} . When God asks, 11 What am I going to do with you?", God is seeking a response 
from the people. God desires dialogue for if ·the people will join in dialogue 
reconciliation is yet possible. By asking such questions God puts a decision to 
the people and judgment is not yet inevitable. 
In addition to this evidence I would add some further points. First, that God 
does not know the future has already been discussed above in connection with the 
testing of Abraham where God learns that Abraham really trusts him (Gen. 22) and 
with Moses challenge to a divine "prediction" that the elders would believe him 
119Fretheim, Suffering of God, 45-59. 
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(Ex. 4:1). It is God who acknowledges that Moses was correct and the elders 
might, indeed, not believe him. Moreover, biblical characters do not seem to 
believe that divine forecasts are inevitable. Even though God had told Rebekah 
that "the older shall serve the younger" (Gen. 25:23) in reference to Jacob and 
Esau she does not believe this divine word will come to pass without her taking 
some risky actions (Gen. 27: 5-17) . 120 The text does not suggest that the oracle 
fixes the future for her sons. She certainly did not leave this 11 prediction 11 in 
the hands of God. The oracle expressed what God desired on the matter and God 
enlisted Rebekah's help to this end (a risk God takes in the patriarchal 
culture) . The common assertion that Rebekah's actions were sinful (much like 
Sarah's in Gen. 16) reflects a docetic view of divine activity in the world. God 
has sovereignly chosen to work through his creatures, allowing their actions to 
be significant to the divine project. 
It is often thought that Joseph's dreams indicate a revelation of divine 
foreknowledge since everything comes to pass as was "predicted." For instance, 
Joseph dreamed that his brothers and parents would "bow down" to him (Gen.37:6-
9). But neither Jacob nor Joseph's brothers believe they have to do as the dream 
suggested (37:8, 10) and, as a matter of fact, Joseph's parents never do bow down 
to him! 121 It is commonly overlooked by proponents of foreknowledge that some 
predictions in scripture either do not come to pass at all (e. g. Jonah and 2 
Kings 20) or not in the exact way they were foretold (e. g. Gen. 27:27-40 where 
Jacob's blessing is qualified by Esau's blessing and Acts 21:11 where it is 
incorrectly predicted that Paul would be bound by the Jewish authorities and 
handed over to the Gentiles) . 122 One would think that a God with foreknowledge 
120See Fretheim, Genesis, 521, 523, 538. 
121See Fretheim, Genesis, 601. 
122Actually, the Roman authorities rescued Paul from the mob and they bound 
him, not.the Jewish authorities. Of course, one could argue that the prediction 
did come true in a "general" sense. I agree, but those who affirm divine 
foreknowledge are the ones using such prophecies to claim God knows the future 
in detail. If so, then either God or the prophet cannot get the details straight. 
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would get such details straight. 
3.13 Divine wrath and Mercy Within the Context of Covenantal Relationality 
Within the covenant relationship between God and the people, God is described as 
caring deeply about the relationship. At times God becomes angry and at other 
times shows mercy. Abraham Joshua Heschel's monumental study, The Prophets, so 
wonderfully brings out these twin themes. He eloquently describes the passion of 
the divine-human drama with all the ebb and flow this relationship involves. 
Heschel's remarks on the divine wrath and how it relates to mercy have deeply 
influenced this section, and I might add, much of my thinking on God. 
Philo and many of the church fathers were appalled at biblical references to 
di vine wrath since it was not considered appropriate for God to be angry. 1-23 
Consequently, references to divine wrath were either allegorized or simply 
equated with punishment. Either way a volatile emotion was kept safe from the 
divine nature. It should be acknowledged that wrath can be a dangerous emotion 
for us, one that sometimes threatens to undo us, and so it is understandable why 
we might have reservations about ascribing it to God. But scripture unashamedly 
does just that. We have already seen in Exodus 32 that Yahweh is a God who gets 
angry. But Heschel is right in holding that wrath must be understood as an aspect 
of the divine pathos--it is a distancing of the relationship. For Heschel, 
"pathos" means God is concerned. He is not apathetic towards us. In other words, 
divine wrath must be discussed in connection with the divine-human relationship. 
As part of God's pathos towards us wrath is an instrument in the divine hands, 
not an attribute of God. It is a secondary and never the primary pathos towards 
us. God's wrath concerns the divine displeasure at a particular situation in 
history, not an essential attribute. It is not the creator's fundamental stance 
123See Heschel, The Prophets, 2. 58-9, 79-86 and my "Historical 
Considerations," 69-80. For a survey of contemporary approaches to the 
relationship between divine love and wrath see Paul Fiddes, The Creative 
Suffering of God, 21-5 and Donald G. Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, 
Holiness. Love, Christian Foundations (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
1995)' 139-145. 
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towards his creation. Hence, all attempts to balance wrath (or justice) with love 
as equal attributes of God are misplaced. 
Even as lawgiver God is not expounding a moral code of sheer justice. Rather, the 
covenant stipulations pertain to· righteousness or the right ordering of 
relationships. Heschel writes: "Righteousness goes beyond justice. Justice is 
strict and exact, giving each person his due. Righteousness implies benevolence, 
kindness, generosity. "124 Crime in Israel is not primarily a violation of a law, 
but a sin against the living God. It is a breaking of the fundamental 
relationship between creature and creator. Consequently, justice and 
righteousness must be understood within the divine-human relationalitywhich God 
established. 
God is judge over his people but this must not be understood in the Western legal 
sense of being a neutral decision maker. Judges in Israel were advocates for the 
people, displaying concern for the needy and oppressed. Deborah, Gideon and David 
sought to liberate the people and put societal relationships in the state God 
intended. Judges in Israel were to emulate the divine judge who is "the God of 
gods and the Lord of lords, the great, the mighty, and the awesome God who does 
not show partiality, nor take a bribe. He executes justice for the orphan and the 
widow, and shows His love for the alien by giving him food and clothing" (Deut. 
10:17-8). God is a judge who loves his creatures and desires their well being. 
Even when the divine judge pours out his wrath there is love behind it. This idea 
is aptly summed up by Heschel: "the secret of anger is God's care. "125 Divine 
wrath bespeaks divine concern. God cares deeply about his beloved--the creatures 
he made--he is not indifferent towards them. God cannot stand to see the beloved 
ruin herself so he actively seeks her renewal. When those efforts are rejected 
124Heschel, The Prophets, 1. 2 0·1. 
125Heschel, The Prophets, 2. 72. 
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God becomes angry. The divine wrath is a response to being dismissed by the one 
he loves. The break in relationship brings grief to the heart of God. 126 God 
is personally involved, he has made himself vulnerable and that vulnerability has 
been betrayed. The breaking of the relationship is like a divorce and its impact 
on God is real, it changes him. 
As grief moves to anger God takes steps to change the situation. Divine suffering 
results in attempts at reconciliation. God brings punishment upon his people that 
they might be redeemed (Hos. 6:1). Unlike our tendencies there is purpose in the 
divine anger and once this purpose is achieved it may vanish in an instant. 
Heschel explains: "The anger of the Lord is instrumental, hypothetical, 
conditional, and subject to his will. Far from being an expression of 
'petulant vindictiveness,' the message of anger includes a call to return and to 
be saved.' 127 The purpose of God's wrath is to open a future for the broken 
relationship. God sometimes imposes great suffering upon his people as a means 
of discipline. •The Lord is long-suffering, compassionate, loving, and faithful, 
but He is also demanding, insistent, terrible, and dangerous." 128 
Yet, it remains true that beyond the dangerous wrath of God lies his mercy. God 
is ever ready to repent in response to his people's repentance. These ideas are 
wonderfully portrayed in Judges 10:6-16. In this passage the Israelites worship 
other gods, forsaking Yahweh. In response Yahweh delivers them into the hands of 
foreign oppressors who mistreat the people for eighteen years. Finally, the 
Israelites cry out to Yahweh confessing their sin. That God is still angry at 
them is made clear by the divine speech to them. God says that he has taken care 
of them and repeatedly protected them from enemies, "yet you have forsaken Me and 
served other gods; therefore I will deliver you no more. Go and cry out to the 
"'on divine grief see Fretheim, Suffering of God, 109-113. 
127Heschel, The Prophets, 2. 66. 
128Heschel, The Prophets, 2.65. 
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gods which you have chosen; let them deliver you in the time of your distress• 
(10:13-4). Yahweh has had it with these people, he will no longer deliver them. 
He challenges them to seek help from her adulterous lovers. God is here depicted 
as a wounded lover speaking strong words of rejection. Yet the people of Israel 
do not believe the divine rejection final for they immediately put away their 
idols and serve Yahweh. Even though God has said in no uncertain terms to leave 
him alone for he will not help them, they persist. They do not take the divine 
wrath as the final word. And, indeed, it is not, for when "Yahweh could bear the 
misery of Israel no longer• (10:16) he raised up Jephthah to deliver the people 
he so emphatically said he would never deliver. 
That God's wrath is real, yet subsumed under mercy is brought out repeatedly in 
the prophets. Hosea speaks of the inner turmoil God goes through in relation eo 
the faithlessness of his people: "How can I give you up, O Ephraim? How can I 
surrender Y01:1, 0 Israel? . My heart is turned over within Me, all my 
compassions are kindled. I will not execute my fierce anger; I will not destroy 
Ephraim again. For I am God and not man, the Holy One in your midst, and I will 
not come in wrath" (11:8-9). God is not like us in that his compassion is more 
fundamental than his anger. 
The Old Testament displays movement in its understanding of divine wrath and 
mercy. The decalogue in Exodus places the divine wrath upon idolatry before it 
mentions God's lovingkindness (20:4-6). Although the extent of lovingkindness is 
greater than wrath, there is a conditional placed upon love: to those who love 
God. However, when God revises this statement later in Exodus after Israel's 
apostasy with the golden calf several changes are made which reflect a greater 
emphasis on the divine love (34:6-7) ."' First, the order is reversed; divine 
love is placed first before mention of punishment of sin. Second, the conditional 
is removed, calling attention to God's unconditional love. Third, many new 
elements are added in describing the divine nature: God is 11 compassionate and 
129See Fretheim, Exodus, 227, 302. 
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gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in lovingkindness and faithfulness," and 
"forgives iniquity, transgression and sin." Only after this is the reference to 
judging mentioned and it is not included in the list of divine attributes .. 
Moreover, in the creedal formulations of Joel 2:13 and Jonah 4:2 these verses are 
again modified. God is .still gtacious and compassionate, slow to anger, 
abounding in lovingkindness, but a new element is added: God repents of his 
judgments upon sin. Moreover, the reference to not clearing the guilty has been 
dropped. As God works with his people a clearer picture emerges of who God is in 
relation to his people. There is divine wrath and it can be terrible but it 
serves the purpose of attempting to bring the people back from a life of death. 
God puts before the people the ultimate choice: "I set before you life and death, 
the blessing and the curse. So choose life in order that you may live, you and 
your descendants, by loving the Lord your God, by obeying His voice, and ey 
holding fast to Hirn; for this is your life" (Deut. 30:19-20). Again we see the 
divine risk: will anyone love, obey, and hold fast to him so as to have life? The 
divine project is to give genuine life to his creatures. God's wrath and mercy 
are not arbitrary, but elements in bringing that project to fruition. 
3.14 The Allaance and Presence of God 
"The Lord used to speak to Moses face to face, just as a man speaks to his 
friend" (Ex. 32: 11) . "How long, 0 Lord? Will you forget me forever? How long will 
you hide your face from me?" (Ps. 13:1). The biblical writers sometimes speak of 
an incredible intimacy with God while at other times they speak as though God 
cannot be found. Some texts refer to God's great provisions for the people and 
the closeness of God at these times while others, especially the lament 
tradition, call divine providence into question. 
Fretheim distinguishes three aspects of divine presence in the Old Testament. 130 
There is· the structural or general presence of God where God can never be said 
to be absent from his created order. Next is the accompanying presence with his 
13
°Fretheirn, Suffering of God, 61-5. 
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people throughout their journeys (even into exile). Finally, there is the 
tabernacling presence where God chooses to dwell in a specific place among his 
people. To these I would add a fourth: God's acts of deliverance or special 
provision where people experienced the divine presence in miraculous providence. 
This last type of presence usually Occurs when God is either beginning a new work 
(notice the cluster of miracles in Exodus), validating that God has been with a 
prophet (Ex. 4:2-8), or demonstrating Yahweh as the true God (1Kings18; 2 Kings 
18-9). All four types of presence are due to divine grace and reveal God's desire 
to be present in an intimate way with his creatures. God makes himself 
approachable. Gad is holy and transcendent but these terms must be understood 
within the divine relatedness to his people, not as some abstract 11 wholly 
other ... i 3 i The holy God is one who may be approached by his creatures--even 
"face to face" for Moses. Holiness pertains to the way in which God establishes 
his presence among the people, not some other worldly transcendence. 
Presence has to do with relationship. The distance between those in the 
relationship decreases as they freely share themselves. Becoming close means 
being available and vulnerable. The relationship may backfire and one may be 
taken advantage of and hurt. In this regard it is not surprising that the divine 
presence is affected by human action. Although God is never considered entirely 
absent in the Old Testament--those who ask, "where are you God?" expect Gad to 
hear it--God may withdraw his special presence from individuals or from the 
temple ( Ezek. 8: 6) . Sometimes God 1 s presence is removed in order to test someone 
(e. g. Hezekiah 2 Chron 32:31 and Job). At other times the divine absence is a 
response to sin where God "hides his face" (Micah 3:4) from the evildoers. But 
this is certainly not true of every case where God is felt to be absent. In the 
complaint Psalms there is no mention of sin and God 1 s absence is seen as 
131See Fretheim, Suffering God, 70-1. 
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irrational. 132 In these cases no reason given and the supplicant is simply 
dismayed that God has withdrawn (e. g. Psalm 44). Such texts are another reminder 
that we are allowed to call God into question. One;s relationship with God is not 
so unambiguous as to prevent all skepticism. 133 Many a biblical writer faulted 
God for not acting and attempted t6 prod God into action. Brueggemann believes 
that these laments "the petitionary party is taken seriously and the God who is 
addressed is newly engaged in the crisis in a way that puts God at risk. "134 God 
is vulnerable to being misunderstood by failure to act and this places the 
relationship between God and the petitioner in tension. 
An offshoot of this type of divine absence is the complaint, "why do the wicked 
prosper?" (Jer. 12: l). If God is so almighty and concerned about widows and 
orphans, then why does God not act? The "lament tradition" does not ask God for 
strength to cope with the situation, it cries out for divine action to change it. 
This tradition asks, where is the divine presence in oppressive situations?135 
To such questions no definitive answers are given. A couple of possible answers 
are that God is slow to anger but will eventually bring judgment about and that 
sometimes the resources through which God wants bring judgment are not yet 
available. 
The prophet Habakkuk bitterly complained about God's absence in the midst of the 
violence and injustice of his day (1:1-4). He demands the divine presence to do 
132See Fredrik Lindstrom, Suffering and Sin: Interpretations of Illness in 
the Individual Complaint Psalms, trans. Michael McLamb (Stockholm: Almqvist and 
Wiksell, 1994) and Samuel Balentine, The Hidden God: the Hidding Face of God in 
the Old Testament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 45-79. 
133 See J. L. Crenshaw, "The Birth of Skepticism in Ancient Israel," eds. 
Crenshaw and S. Sandmel, The Divine Helmsman: Studies on God's Control of Human 
Events (New York: KTAV, 1980), 1-19. That questioning of God is early in the Old 
Testament is attested in Judges 6:13. 
t:~'Walter Brueggemann, 11 The Costly Loss of Lament," Journal for the Study of 
the Old Testament 36 (1986): 59. 
135See Balentine, "The Lament Tradition: Holding to God Against God," Prayer 
in the Hebrew Bible, 146-198. 
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something about it. 136 He will not remain silent and accept the status quo as 
ordained by divine providence. In response God reveals that the Babylonians shall 
invade Israel as a punishment for sin (1:5-11). 'God has been waiting for the 
Babylonians to grow in military might that he might make use of them. Habakkuk 
is dismayed and upset that God would use a people more wicked than the Israelites 
to punish the Israelites. He rebukes God for such an outrageous plan and accuses 
God of approving evil (1:12-17). God responds by asking Habakkuk to trust him and 
by giving him a vision in which God thoroughly condemns the evil practices of 
both Israelite and Babylonian (2:2-20). Habakkuk, armed with a better 
understanding of God's hatred of sin, prays, 11 in wrath remember mercy 11 ( 3: 2} . The 
book concludes with Habakkuk saying that he is terrified about the coming 
invasion for it is going to be rough. Nevertheless, he confesses his trust in God 
his savior. That is, he believes that the divine wisdom in bringing judgment upOn 
the people is for their redemption--God has their best interest in mind. Habakkuk 
acknowledges that the divine absence as well as the divine presence in judgment 
are aspects of God's redemptive project. 
3.15 The Potter and the Clay: an Examination of so-called Pencausality Texts 
"Like clay in the hands of a potter, so are you in my hand, 0 house of Israel" 
(Jer. 18:6; cf. Is. 29:16). The Old Testament describes God as directing the 
paths of people and kings (Prov. 16:9; 21:1), of making "dumb and deaf, seeing 
and blind" (Ex. 4:11), and of bringing calamity upon the people of Israel (Is. 
45 :7; Amos 3: 6). The simile of potter and clay along with the pan-causality texts 
just cited are typically used to claim that every single thing that happens 
should be ascribed to God for God gets exactly what he wants . 137 This idea is 
136For the placement of Habakkuk's prayers in the lament tradition see 
Balentine, Prayer in the Hebrew Bible, 183-9 and Miller, They Cried to the Lord, 
70-9. Balentine also discusses how such questioning of God is risky for it 
destroys old worlds and builds new ones (292-5). 
137The metaphor of potter and clay has, according to Louis Berkhof, played 
a dominant role in Calvinism. See his Systematic Theology, third ed. (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1946), 120. Examples of those who cites these pancausality 
texts in order to claim that God tightly controls every detail in history 
include: John Piper, "Are There Two Wills in God?," 119-123 and Jerry Bridges, 
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so taken for granted that scholars give little or no thought to the claim that 
the Old Testament writers considered every single event to be brought about by 
God. Hence, all the evidence we have already surveyed indicating that God is in 
a dynamic give-and-take relationship with humans and that in this relationship 
God sometimes does not get what he wants, is overturned. It is claimed that the 
verses just mentioned are the "clear didactic" passages while the others surveyed 
are mere anthropomorphisms. The verses interpreted as affirming divine 
pancausality of everything tell us the truth of the matter! Is this so? 
A significant problem with this approach lies in the hermeneutical malpractice 
on the part of many commentators and theologians to quickly jump from particular 
statements to universals. For instance, Calvin, after citing the texts about God 
sending wind to feed Israel with birds and cause Jonah's ship trouble, says, ftI 
infer that no wind ever arises or increases except by God's express command. 11138 
Moreover, after citing some particular divine blessings and judgments upon the 
Israelites, he claims that not a single drop of rain falls without God's explicit 
commana. i 3<J That God made use of wind and rain in his r:_elationship with Israel 
is clear, but these particular actions in historical situations must not be 
turned into universal principles. This common practice of extracting a universal 
idea from a particular historical statement is used to overturn the pattern of 
the divine-human relationship we have discussed above. But in our survey of the 
scriptures it was seen that God has sovereignly decided not to "control 11 
everything and that his purposes can be rejected. This pattern of open 
relationship discloses the divine character and the project God desires to 
accomplish. 
"Does Divine Sovereignty Make a Difference in Everyday Life?," 209-213, both in 
eds. Thomas Schreiner and Bruce Ware, The Grace of God, The Bondage of the Will, 
2 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1995). 
138Calvin, Institutes. 1.16.7: 
139Calvin, Institutes, 1.16. 5. 
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How then, should these so-called pancausality texts to be understood? Fredrik 
Lindstrom's God and the Origin of Evil: A Textual Analysis of Alleged Monistic 
Evidence in the Old Testament provides a careful and detailed study of these 
texts. He began his study with the intention of confirming the thesis that the 
Old Testament writers believed that everything which happend was specifically 
controlled by God. In the process of working through the texts, however, he came 
to the opposite conclusion: that none of the passages cited as affirming divine 
causality of all good and evil do, in fact, teach this. The basic problem, he 
says, is that commentators rush to assert a universal principle instead of 
placing the texts in their literary and historical contexts as well as conducting 
semantic field studies on the key terms. 140 Although Lindstr6m's study covers 
a large number of texts space limitations here allow coverage of only those most 
commonly cited in support of divine pancausality. 
Isaiah 45:7 states that "I form light and create darkness, I make weal and create 
woe; I the LORD do all these things." Does this mean that God is responsible for 
every single act of good and evil in the entire cosmos? Not at all, for as 
Lindstrom observes the entire section pertains to YHWH's dealings with Israel, 
not the entire cosmos. This is evidenced by the terms used. "Light" ('6r) is not 
used in Isaiah 40-55 to refer to cosmic creation. Rather, it is used as a 
metaphor for political liberation from the Babylonians (Isa. 42:6; 49:6; 53:11). 
The same is true of "darkness" (h6sek) which is a metaphor for misfortune and 
captivity (42:7; 47:5; 49:9) and also of the ·creation verbs (ysr, br' and 'sh) 
which are used in this section to depict God's bringing about the impending 
liberation of Israel. At this point opinions differ concerning the particular 
historical event to which "darkness" refers. Konig and others believe that it 
140L.indstr0m, God and the Origin of Evil, 208-9 issues a scathing attack on 
biblical scholarship for its general failure in this regard. My own suspicion is 
that the·pancausality of the Stoics had a tremendous influence on the classical 
concept of God. Add to this the influence of German Idealism upon modern biblical 
scholarship and one has a recipe for overlooking the particulars of historical 
life for the universal truths of reason. 
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refers to Israel's experience of the exile. 141 That is, their removal to Babylon 
is the calamity which YHWH made against them. Lindstr6m, however, sees here an 
antithetical reference. That is, "the positive phrases 'who forms light' and 'who 
makes weal' have to do with YHWH's saving intervention on behalf of his people, 
while the negative phrases 'who creates darkness' and 'who creates woe' refer to 
YHWH' s destruction of the Babyl_onian empire 11142 In either case the conclusion 
is the same: Isaiah 45:7 refers to the specific experiences of Israel in exile 
and not to divine pancausality. The "I the LORD do all these things" alludes to 
the promise of the return from exile, not to every single event that happens in 
life. 
In Amos 3:6 we read "Does disaster befall a city, unless the LORD has done it?" 
This is conunonly taken to mean that any and every calamity--every earthquake br 
terrorist bombing--which happens in the world is due to God. But this is not 
Amos' meaning for he has a specific historical occasion in view. The prophet 
asserts that it is Yahweh who is bringing calamity upon Israel. 143 The people 
were unwilling to recognize YHWH's hand against them (4:1-6; 9:10). They refused 
to believe that God would punish them for their sins so they sought other 
explanations. Amos declares that God reveals his judgments upon Israel to his 
prophets (3:7). The people should make no mistake, it is Yahweh who stands 
against them. Despite the fact that insurance companies refer to all natural 
disasters as "acts of God" this verse is not a general principle about divine 
pancausality. If that were meant then we have- some genuine problems for "what 
sense would there be in God 1 s punishing an evil action which he was himself in 
the last instance the cause of? What, for example, are we to gather from the fact 
that YHWH will punish the Ammonites for having ripped up pregnant women in Gilead 
(Amos 1:13) if the exegetes are correct in assuming that the ultimate cause of 
141K5nig, New and Greater Things, 61-2. 
142L.:j..ndstr5m, God and the Origin of Evil, 198. 
1430n Amos see Hubbard, Joel and Amos, 149 and Douglas Stuart, Hosea-Jonah, 
Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, TX: Word, 1987), 325. 
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all evil is YHWH himself (3: 6) ?'"" Moreover, if God is thought of as "the ruler 
of history" such that all events in world history flow from his hand and if it 
is asserted that the biblical writers assumed this', then it makes no sense to say 
that the prophets proclaim that God is now bringing about this or that particular 
event since all events, in fact, ar·e brought about by God (even if by secondary 
causes). If God foreordains every detail that happens then it is incredible that 
things go so badly and so absolutely contrary to God's stated will. Finally, Amos 
3:7 asserts that no calamity befalls a city unless God reveals it to his 
prophets. If this were a universal then one would expect God to inform us of 
terrorist bombings prior to the calamity! If Amos 3:6 is used to support divine 
determinism of all urban disasters then, according to 3: 7, there should be 
prophetic revelations concerning them. I am not aware of any such modern day 
revelations for the Oklahoma City bombing or the massacre of the children in tfie 
Scotland gymnasium. Problems such as these do not arise, however, if Amos 3:6 is 
understood as a particular pronouncement of divine judgment upon the sins of 
Israel. 
The same line of interpretation holds true for Lamentations 3:38 which reads: "Is 
it not from the mouth of the Most High that good and bad come?" Although many 
take this to refer to disasters in general rather than the calamity of the 
Israelite exile, LindstrOm's study demonstrates that a contextual analysis shows 
that only a singular historical event is in view. The verses immediately prior 
to 3:38 assert that "bad" which has come upon Israel is due to her sin. There is 
no arbitrary judgment or capricious action by God here. The context following 
3:38 follows the same sequence of ideas as Deuteronomy 30:1-3, the covenant 
treaty. Deuteronomy 28-30 refers to blessings· and curses, life and death 
depending on whether the covenant people remain faithful to God. The book of 
Lamentations has these treaty curses in mind when it is said that passers-by will 
144Lindstrom, God and the Origin of Evil, 118. Lindstrom observes that the 
majority. of scholars seek to deflect this criticism by claiming that YHWH does 
not cause sinful human behaviors, only natural disasters. I would add that many 
theologians attempt to duck the criticism by invoking the concept of secondary 
causes or compatibilistic freedom. 
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shudder (Lam. 2:15, 3:46; Deut. 28:37), they will eat the flesh of their children 
(Lam. 2:20, 4:10; Deut. 28:53ff.), and their wives will be ravished (Lam. 5:11; 
Deut. 28:30). Consequently, Lamentations 3:38. asserts that the specific 
historical calamity of the exile, not all calamities in general, is brought about 
by God. 
Proverbs 16:9 declares that "the human mind plans the way, but the LORD directs 
the stepsp and 21:1 says, "the king's heart is a stream of water in the hand of 
the LORD; he turns it wherever he will." A couple of points may be made about 
these verses. First, these sayings, along with all the others in Proverbs, should 
be understood as guidelines for godly living rather than universal principles 
which always hold true. If one takes every proverb as a universal one will run 
into contradictions (for they simply cannot all be practiced at the same time e. 
g. Prov. 26:4-5) and become untrue to life (e. g. it is not always true that a 
quiet answer turns away wrath, Prov. 15:1). Moreover, the proverbs about human 
plans and YHWH's purposes should be seen within the book's call for seeking the 
covenant God's wisdom in our planning. The God of Israel desires that his people 
seek his input rather than doing what they (on their own) think is best. Just as 
with Adam in the garden, so for the people of Israel, one cannot chart a wise 
course through life without trusting in divine wisdom (Prov. 20:24). God does 
direct his people's steps (16:9) and guide the king of Israel (21:1) when they 
seek God's wisdom. When they do not, then as we have seen, God stands against 
them. Though some kings "did right in the eyes of the Lord" (e. g., 2 Chron. 
20:32; 25:2), others, such as Saul, did not, in fact, do what God wanted them to 
do (e. g., 1 Sam. 15:11; 2 Kings 16:2; 2 Chron. 28:1). If we take this proverb 
as a universal then we have the problem of explaining why God became angry with 
so many Israelite kings for breaking the covenant when the kings were only doing 
what God wanted. How could YHWH desire the breaking of his covenant when this 
hurt him so? Furthermore, if we universalize this text to include all kings 
everywhere then we have to conclude that all the evils they have committed in 
history is exactly what God wanted from them since they, like water, could not 
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but go in the direction God's hand determined. 
In Exodus 4: 11 God responds to Moses• plea of being an inadequate public speaker 
by saying that he is the creator of the human mouth and is responsible for the 
dumb and deaf, seeing and blind. Some interpret this to mean that every single 
case of physical defect is specifically brought about by God. They "are not 
merely the product of defective genes or birth accidents. Those things may indeed 
by [sic] the immediate, but behind them is the sovereign purpose of God. 
No person in this world was ever blind that God has not planned for him to be 
blind. 11145 Others interpret this verse as a statement that God is Moses' creator 
so Moses should trust that God can use him despite this weaknesses. As creator 
God has bestowed gifts of human sensation and God takes full responsibility for 
creating a world in which such gifts might become defective. This is a general 
statement that such things happen in God's world. Fretheim observes: "The text 
does not say, however, that this divine activity is individually applied, as if 
God entered into the womb of every pregnant woman and determined whether and how 
a child would have disabilities." 1 46 Evangelical conunentator Walter Kaiser 
comments: "While God was not to be blamed for directly creating any defects, his 
wise providence in allowing these deprivations as well as his goodness in 
bestowing their ordinary functions mirrors his ability to meet any emergency 
Moses might have suggested. 11147 
Another point which needs to be made is that the created order and especially the 
human order have been given integrity and otherness by God. Neither the creation 
nor the human are God for God is a distinct other. Although the creation owes its 
being to the creator, God grants it space to be different. In working with his 
creatures it is sometimes the case that God seems to act alone, demonstrating his 
145Bridges, "Does Divine Sovereignty Make a Difference?," 211. 
146Fretheim, Exodus, 72 . 
147Kaiser, Exodus, 328. 
98 
special providence. At Jericho God instructed the people to enact an absurd 
military tactic, in the wilderness God miraculously fed the people, and in 
Hezekiah. s day he overthrew the Assyrian army. Normally I however r God "feeds" the 
people through their wise agricultural practices and grants them victory over 
enemies by exercising sound military strategy (e. g. Ai). Although God 
occasionally takes center stage (usually at the beginning of a new work) doing 
things for the people, normally God provides the wisdom which humans need for 
living properly in the created order. Furthermore1 even in the miraculous God 
uses the resources available in the created order (e. g. wind to part the Sea of 
Reeds and locusts to destroy crops). Sometimes God is said to directly control 
the natural elements while other texts ascribe them a degree of autonomy le. g. 
Hag. 1: 10-11) . 148 
Finally, something must be said about the metaphor of potter and clay. Just as 
with other metaphors for God, such as hen, rock and father, the metaphor of 
potter says something true about God's relationship with his people--but not the 
whole truth or even the only truth. There is an element of truth in describing 
God as a mother hen but it is not the sole truth and not every aspect of being 
a hen should be attributed to God. Similarly, in certain respects God can 
rightfully be described as a potter, but God is not a potter in all respects. To 
the Western mind clay is inanimate and cannot resist the potter. It is thus not 
surprising that this metaphor serves as a controlling metaphor in many 
theological discussions of providence since it -comports well with the notion that 
God meticulously controls everything. We are simply clay in the potter's hands. 
In the words of Berkouwer: "Scripture nowhere suggests that God's work is lirni ted 
by human activity. " 149 
The use of the potter and clay metaphor in the Bible does not, however, sustain 
148See Fretheim, Suffering of God, 73-4. 
149G. c. Berkouwer, The Providence of God (Grand. Rapids, MI: Eerdrnans, 1952), 
127. 
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such a conclusion. 150 In Isaiah 29: 15-6 and 45: 9-13 the metaphor occurs in a 
debate about whether God has the right to perform certain actions. Some people, 
far from being passive 11 clay, 11 were claiming that.God was doing things which he 
had no right to do. Isaiah responds by saying that God, as creator and potter, 
is fully within his rights in these cases. If God, in sovereign concern for his 
people decides it is best to bring judgment upon them, that is his 
prerogative. 151 In Jeremiah 18 it is also a question of divine prerogative. Does 
not God have the right to change his plans regarding Israel? Cannot God change 
his mind about a prophecy he has given if the people's behavior warrants such a 
change (18:7-10)? The metaphor of potter and clay leads some people to expect a 
clear assertion of God's complete control of Israel. But such is not the case for 
Jeremiah repeatedly speaks of the conditional ( 11 if") in connection to both Israel 
and God. If she repents then God will relent, if she is recalcitrant then God may 
change his mind regarding the promised blessing (7-10) . Brueggemann refers to 
this as "Yahweh's responsive sovereignty. 11152 The fact that Israel can take 
initiative violates the metaphor since clay cannot take initiative. So the 
relationship between Yahweh and Israel is not exactly like that of a potter and 
clay. For Jeremiah the word of the Lord does not foreclose the future but it 
opens up new possibilities. Yet, it also calls the people to a decision which 
will affect the future for both God and themselves. In this respect God is like 
a potter who, when the clay does not turn out as anticipated, changes his mind 
and works to reshape the clay into something else. But why would the clay not 
turn out the way God intended? Either because God is not a skilled enough potter 
or there is some defect in the clay. If God exercises meticulous control over his 
150Here again I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to one of Fretheim' s 
excellent studies: 11 The Repentance of God. 11 
151A. Van De Beek, Why? On Suffering, Guilt, and God, trans. John Vriend 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 105-7 reads these texts as supporting divine 
arbitrariness. I wish to affirm the divine freedom in these passages but God's 
actions here are not arbitrary since they pertain to the divine project. 
152Walter Brueggemann, To Pluck Up. To Tear Down: Jeremiah 1-25, 
International Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988), 161. 
Brueggemann has some very helpful observations on this passage. 
100 
clay then the problem is definitely with God. The texts using the potter 
metaphor, however, place the blame on the clay which resists the will of the 
potter. Neither Isaiah nor Jeremiah consider the clay (the people) to be 
inanimate objects incapable of resisting the divine potter. Rather, the divine 
potter desires to shape the human clay into a particular type of vessel: one that 
responds to the divine love with trusting obedience resulting in a kingdom of 
priests. God is carrying out the project of creating a people who are holy and 
loving. The potter wants a vessel that redounds to his glory. But this particular 
clay has rejected the divine project. The people do not want what God wants. 
Hence, the potter/clay metaphor must be understood in terms of the give-and-take 
relationship which God has sovereignly established. It should not be understood 
as teaching total divine control over all things since the biblical writers do 
not make use of this aspect of the metaphor. 
To sum up, God does bring about particular blessings to his people as well as 
particular calamities in response to their breaking the covenant. But God is not 
behind every single event that happens in life. After .all, biblical figures 
sometimes attributed evil deeds to God but, as it turns out, were quite mistaken 
(e. g., 1 Sam. 23:7; 2 Sam. 4:8; 18:31) .m The so called pancausality texts 
refer to specific actions of God and must not be understood as generalizations 
about divine action. Moreover, God is indeed a potter and king, but one whose 
clay and subjects sometimes cooperate with and sometimes rebel against divine 
initiatives. At times the rebellious subjects- even kill the king 1 s messengers. 
The clay refuses to be shaped in the direction the potter desires. In response, 
God sometimes brings events to a determined head and at other times allows events 
to go their way. This results in a messy view of providence. Deism and 
determinism offer more straightforward perspectives. But God has sovereignly 
decided to providentially operate in a dynamic give-and-take relationship with 
his creatures. 
153 See John Boykin, The Gospel of Coincidence.: Is God in Control? (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1986), 66-8. 
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3.16 Divine Love and Bum.iliation 
God loves his creation and out of love takes steps to redeem it when it goes 
astray. God sovereignly makes himself vulnerable because he cares for, and gets 
involved with, his creatures. We have already seen how the divine love is 
expressed even in wrathful judgment. God will not stand idly by and watch his 
beloved ruin herself. The love God has for his people is neither indifferent nor 
soft, but a powerful love that acts in the best interest of the beloved. Several 
metaphors are used to describe the depth of this love. God carried Israel in his 
arms as a father carries his son (Deut. 1:31). Israel is God's firstborn child 
(Ex. 4:221 to whom God gave birth and nursed as a mother (Isa. 49:15). God 
longingly remembers the period of his betrothal to Israel (Jer. 2:2). Finally, 
Hosea uses one of the most intimate metaphors from human experience: God is 
Israel's husband. 154 
In addition to these strong metaphors we have already seen that God's love and 
concern take preeminence in the theophany given to Moses (Ex. 34:6-7) and in two 
of Israel's creedal statements (Joel 2:13 and Jonah 4:2) . 155 As God worked with 
his people more and more love took center stage as the key characteristic of 
God. 156 Yahweh loves with an "everlasting love 11 (Jer. 31:3) and so continues in 
his faithfulness. Hosea says that despite such faithful love God's beloved 
154For a study of this metaphor see Nelly Stienstra, YHWH is the Husband of 
His People: Analysis of a Biblical Metaphor with Special Reference to Translation 
(Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Phares, 1993). 
155on the development of this formula in the Old Testament and further 
bibliography see Gowan, Theology in Exodus, 241-3, 283 no. 25. 
156 1 acknowledge that there are some texts in which God is described as 
sending an evil spirit against Saul (1 Sam. 16:14) or inciting David to the 
census so he can punish Israel (2 Sam. 24:1). These texts do offer some tension 
with the divine love, but even the most problematic text where God incites David 
and then gets angry with him, Yahweh's fundamental concern for the covenant 
people is not doubted (2 Sam. 24:14, 16). David does not understand all that God 
is doing but he knows that God is merciful. For a refutation of the 
identification of God with "demonic" elements in the Old Testament see Lindstrom, 
God and the Origin of Evil. I have. not addressed the development of the demonic 
or the Satan figure even though they are significant in showing that there is a 
definite war going on between God and other powers. Gregory Boyd has a two volume 
work forthcoming on this subject from InterVarsity. 
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conunitted adultery which produces anguish in God. There is no good reason for his 
wife to leave him, Israel's faithlessness is inexplicable. Despite her turning 
to prostitution God seeks her out and desires her return. God is willing to 
humiliate himself by restoring this disreputable woman as his wife. 157 Hosea 
describes God as a husband but it is not the typical hwnan husband who would 
divorce his wife, wanting nothing more to do with such a harlot. It is difficult 
to imagine a hwnan husband who would do what God does for it would mean self-
humiliating in the face of one's community, a loss of respect from one's peers. 
God, however, is the true husband whose ways are not our ways (Isa. 55:8). God 
suffers the humiliation and risks taking back his unfaithful bride in the hope 
that the relationship can develop into one of mutual love and respect. 
3.17 Conclusion to Chapter Three 
According to the Old Testament God has, in sovereign freedom, decided to place 
himself in fundamental relatedness to his creation. It is a world in which he 
grants genuine integrity to his creatures and singles out human beings for a 
special relationship involving genuine give-and-take dyn~ics. The divine-human 
relationship is to be one of reciprocal love. God loves his creatures and desires 
to bless them with all that is in their best interest and so God expects the 
humans to trust him. Despite human rebellion God remains faithful to his project 
seeking restoration of the broken relationship. As things progress we discover 
that God initiates new developments yet is open to input from his creatures. God 
has a goal but remains flexible as to the· details of its accomplishment. 
Sometimes God's plans do not bring about the desired result and must be judged 
a failure. 158 The covenant history records many disasters and setbacks for God. 
Nonetheless, God resourcefully tries out different paths in his efforts to bring 
his project towards a successful completion. God's activity does not unfold 
157F9r other texts on divine humiliation see Fretheim, Suffering of God 1 144-
8. 
158See Miles, God: A Biography, 187-194. 
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according to some heavenly blueprint whereby all goes according to plan. 159 God 
is involved in a historical project not an eternal plan. The project does not 
proceed in a smooth, monolithic way, but with surPrising twists and turns since 
the divine-human relationship involves a genuine give-and-take dynamic for both 
humanity and God. 
The type of relationship God displays towards his people is not one of control 
and domination but rather one of powerful love and vulnerability. God establishes 
the relationship in such a way that he risks the possibility of rejection. The 
divine project of developing people who freely enter into a loving and trusting 
relationship with God lacks an unconditional guarantee of success. Will anyone 
trust God? This initial question was met with some disappointment by God~ God 
expected positive results but all things have not gone as God desired. Yet, God 
continued to invest himself in the project in the hope of regaining what was 
lost. The Old Testament reveals how God is going about this and the incredible 
persistence of God in seeking to bring his project to fruition. 
159John Rogerson argues that the belief in an unfolding divine plan is read 
into the. Old Testament from Nineteenth-century meliorism. See his "Can a Doctrine 
of Providence be Based on the Old Testament?" eds. Lyle Eslinger and Glen Taylor, 
Ascribe to the Lord: Biblical and Other Studies in Memory of Peter C. Craigie, 
JSOT sup. 67 (Sheffield: JSOT press, 1988), 529-543. Bertil Albrektson, History 
of the Gods: An Essay on the Idea of Historical Events as Divine Manifestations 
in the Ancient Near East and in Israel (Sweden: Gleerup, 1967), 81, says the Old 
Testament does not affirm a divine plan that embraces all of history. 
Chapter 4: New Testament Materials for a Relational vi.., of Providence l'J2Volving 
Risk 
4.1 Introduction 
Many of the same ideas we just looked at in the OJ.:d Testament are brought out in 
the New. Again, I shall not attempt to cover all the New Testament in 
demonstrating that God enters into genuine give-and-take relations with humans 
in which God takes risks. Rather, I shall focus on the person and work of Jesus 
for it is in Jesus that God does something radically different in terms of the 
divine-human relationship. God had spoken before through the prophets, now he 
speaks through the Son (Heb. 1:1-2). It is in Jesus that God "tabernacles" or 
dwells among us in a most distinct and revealing way (Jn. 1:14). In the divine 
incarnation in Jesus we have the ultimate anthropomorphism! God becomes human: 
a most scandalous thing for a deity to do. Gregory of Nyssa remarked that it is 
the incarnation and cross of Jesus which manifests the transcendent power of God 
in a more luminescent way than miracles or the vastness of the creation. 1 If 
Jesus is the ultimate revelation of who God is and what humans are supposed to 
be in relationship to God, then we should pay particular attention to the way 
divine providence works in the life of Jesus. It is strange that most studies of 
providence say little or nothing about the words and works of Jesus. Works on 
providence typically pay a lot of attention to the relationship between the ideas 
of omnipotence and goodness and ignore the life of Jesus as revelatory of 
providence. Barth criticized Protestant orthodoxy (including Calvin) for being 
"blatantly 'liberal'" in deriving the doctrine of providence primarily from the 
concept of absolute omnipotence instead of Jesus Christ. 2 When the Bible is used 
it is common that Joseph or Job (understood from a risk-free model) function as 
the paradigms for understanding providence, but Jesus virtually never. Not only 
does the classical tradition fail to begin with Jesus, it also, as Gorringe 
observes, passes over the Old Testament motifs of God as servant and as one who 
suffers in favor of the metaphors of king and lord understood by "direct and non-
1Gregory of Nyssa, The Great Catechism, 24. 
'Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G. W .. Bromiley and R. J. Ehrlich 
(Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1960), 3.3.30-3. 
inverted analogy with earthly rulers. "3 The task of a Christian doctrine of 
providence is to understand the "foolishness of God" in the life of Jesus. When 
this is done we can appreciate the power of faithful love and understand that 
everything is not unfolding according to some eternal movie which God produced. 
In Jesus we see the genuine character of God which is altogether different from 
the options of omnipotent tyrant and impotent wimp. 
The plan here is to look at some of the events in the life of Jesus and some of 
his teachings to see what providence entails before examining some other passages 
in the New Testament. Whereas there are a number of Hebrew Bible scholars writing 
on the topic of providence from a relational perspective, the same cannot be said 
for New Testament scholarship. One exception is E. Frank Tupper who has produced 
an insightful study: A Scandalous Providence: The Jesus Story of the Compassion 
of God.' Tupper examines several episodes in the life of Jesus (primarily from 
the Gospel of Matthew) in order to see what is being said about providence and 
I will summarize his discussion. Then I shall discuss God's attempt to unite Jews 
and Gentiles into one body in the church since this has significance for divine 
risk in providence. 
4.2 The Baptism 
"This is my Son, the beloved" (Mt. 3:17). Tupper begins his study with the 
baptism in order to clarify the type of relationship Jesus had with God. 5 Jesus 
is described as the "beloved" Son, a filial relationship akin to that of Abraham 
and Isaac. Moreover, Jesus prayed to the "Father" and taught his disciples to do 
the same (Mt. 6: 9) revealing that God intends for us to have a filial 
relationship with him. From the beginning God intended to bless his creatures 
3T. J. Gorringe, God's Theatre: A Theology of Providence (London: SCM, 
1991)' p. 58. 
'E .. Frank Tupper, A Scandalous Providence: The Jesus Story of the Compassion 
of God (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995). His book is an enlargement of 
his earlier "The Providence of God in Christological Perspective 1 " Review and 
Expositor, 82 (1995): 579-595. 
5Tupper 1 Scandalous, chapter 1. 
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with his presence. In Israel, Yahweh brought his presence near to the people in 
various ways. Through Jesus we can experience the divine presence as Abba or 
Father. 6 It is not some remote deity of justice or distant creator who comes to 
us, but the heavenly Father who desires to bless us through Jesus. The king of 
creation does not come in intimidating fashion to domineer over us as in the 
traditional monarchical model of providence. Instead, the king sends his son in 
order to reconcile us, making us children of the king and siblings of Christ. God 
is indeed king and father, but, as we shall see, a very atypical king and father. 
4.3 The Birth of Jesus and the Bethlehem Massacre 
In reading Matthew 1-2 and Exodus 1-2 one encounters several parallels linking 
the birth stories of Jesus and Moses. In both there is a royal decree, parents 
who actively respond to the decree, fearful kings, slaughter of male babies and 
people on the run from the authorities (exile) . The study of these chapters in 
Exodus disclosed that God chose to work through and so become dependent upon the 
weak (the Hebrew and Egyptian women) in that situation. God became genuinely 
dependent and did not merely work through the women in the sense of 11 secondary 
causes. 11 It is the same in the New Testament. It is common for commentators to 
emphasize the unilateral intervention of God--completely independent of all human 
agency--when speaking of the incarnation. 7 But such is not the case. In the 
gospel of Luke an angel informed Mary of God's desire to bless her with a special 
child (1:26-33). Mary, however, does not simply acquiesce for she does what her 
Old Testament counterparts did: she ponders it and asked a question (1:29, 34) . 8 
No condenm.ation is issued for questioning a divine plan instead, she receives an 
6Calvin spoke of God's fatherly relation to us (Institutes, 3.20.36-40), but 
Van de Beek is correct when he inquires what sort of father Calvin's God is when 
he pushes the baby carriage over exploding land mines or beneath moving trucks. 
See A. Van de Beek, Why? On Suffering, Guilt, and God, trans. John Vriend (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), p. 102. 
7 E. 'Frank Tupper, 11 The Bethlehem Massacre--Christology Against Providence? 11 
Review and Expositor 88, no. 4 (1991) :417-8, ascribes this to a christology "from 
above" w;i.thout reference to the historical events in which Jesus is situated. 
8In contrast to Zacharias' question, Mary's did not contain an element of 
unbelief (cf. Lk. 1:18). 
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explanation. Satisfied, she grants her consent to participate in this activity 
of God. God does not unilaterally achieve his goal of incarnation by forcing his 
will upon Mary. God brings it about with the act0ive participation of Mary. If 
Mary had declined or if Moses' mother had drowned her son then God would have 
sought other avenues. After all, it is doubtful that there was only one maiden 
in all of Israel through whom God could work. God is resourceful in finding 
people and equipping them with the elements necessary for accomplishing his 
purposes. 
In this regard Mary needs some help since she is engaged to Joseph. When Joseph 
finds out that Mary is pregnant he assumes she has been unfaithful and decides 
to divorce her. Perhaps because it is important that Davidic sonship be conferred 
upon Jesus by Joseph that God intervenes in an attempt to persuade Joseph thAt 
Mary is righteously participating in an act of God. Joseph asks no questions and 
he consents to cooperate in this event. Even with their help, God's entry into 
the world is surrounded by scandal. In fact, the lineage of the messiah is 
cloaked in sexual scandal. In the genealogy Matthew lists four women: Tamar, 
Rahab, Ruth and Bathsheba. Tupper observes that, like Mary, each of these women 
is involved in some sort of sexual scandal and each is an active participant in 
their respective situations.' In bringing the messiah into the world God seeks 
the cooperation of people of faith, but he does not draw back from situations 
lacking public respectability. Mary and Joseph are both placed in an unfavorable 
predicament in which they may either reject God's desires and keep their public 
respectability or trust God and subject themselves to possible life-long disfavor 
among family and friends. They place their confidence in God and give consent to 
the risk this entails. God places his trust in them, giving his consent to the 
risks involved. The incarnation does not come about through sheer overwhelming 
power, but through the vulnerability of being genuinely dependent upon some 
9Tupper, Scandalous, 95-7. For other reasons for the inclusion of these 
women see D. S. Huffman, 11 Genealogy," eds. Joel B. Green, Scot McKnight, I. 
Howard Marshall, Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels (Downers Grove, IL: 
Intervarsity Press, 1992), 255-6 and D. A. Carson, Matthew, Expositor's Bible 
Commentary vol. 8 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984), 66. 
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Jewish peasants. 
While in Bethlehem the Magi visit the family. Several conversations most likely 
occurred between Joseph and the wise men. One can imagine Joseph 1 s shock when he 
was informed what the Magi had told Herod. Describing this baby boy as the "king 
of the Jews" in front of Herod is tantamount to signing his death certificate. 
Joseph and the Magi would no doubt be troubled by this turn of events. Working 
with the resources available now that the danger is known, God warns, through 
dreams, the Magi and Joseph of their danger. Tupper observes that the dreams in 
Matthew 1-2 are grounded in human awareness of the situation: it is this new 
information which makes it possible for God to provide the needed warning. In 
response, Mary and Joseph trust God and flee to Egypt. 
When Herod's soldiers arrive they kill all the children two years old and 
younger, producing great mourning in the village. Matthew then quotes Jeremiah 
31:15 claiming that this text is "fulfilled" (2:17-8). Questions flood out of 
this story. Why did God not warn the other parents?" Does God not care for the 
other children, only this special one? Does God play favorites? What of God's 
intended blessing for these children and their families? Did this happen 
according to some predetermined plan? Tupper provides some needed responses.u 
First, divine providence is exercised 11 in conjunction with and conditioned by the 
historically defined context of time and place, the participation of human 
agents, the extent of the development in the situation, and the limits and 
possibilities available. "12 According to the knowledge of Joseph and the Magi, 
Jesus was the only child in danger. The angel had warned that Herod was looking 
10M. Eugene Boring, Matthew, The New Interpreter's Bible vol. 8 (Nashville: 
Abingdon, 1995), 148-9, believes that such questions only arise if we take this 
story as historical instead of as 11 confessional language. 11 He thinks Matthew's 
point is only to affirm divine preservation in the life of the infant Jesus. Even 
so, Boring cannot escape the fact that Matthew tells a story which potentially 
calls the divine wisdom and goodness into question. 
11TU:pper, Scandalous, 101-2, 113. 
"Tupper, Scandalous, 106. 
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for only this child. Working within the limits of the context a warning to all 
Bethlehem did not make sense. Second, I do not believe Matthew understood 
Jeremiah 31:15 to be a prediction of a far distant event. Rather, it was seen as 
a reaction to the exile. Thus, this verse from Jeremiah is 11 fulfilled" in the 
sense that what had happened before is being repeated." It was neither 
predicted nor desired by God. The Bethlehem massacre was not the will of God 
neither was it planned beforehand by God. Instead, it reveals that the will of 
God in every situation is not fulfilled. 
4.4 The Temptation of Jesus 
Just as God had tested Abraham and Israel in the wilderness to see whether they 
trusted him, so now the Spirit drives Jesus into the wilderness to be tested by 
the devil (Mt. 4:1) . 14 Leaving aside the debate whether Jesus could have failed 
the test, I wish to focus on the sort of rnessiahship the temptation narratives 
disclose. 15 That Jesus is the son of God is not doubted by either the devil or 
by Jesus, rather, the issue in the temptations is the proper role of Jesus as the 
son of God, the messiah. 16 In Genesis 2-3 we saw that ~ad's word was open to 
interpretation, an opening which the serpent exploited. With all the messianic 
speculation going on in second temple Judaism, there were various understandings 
of what the messiah would do. The devil uses this state of unsettledness to see 
what path Jesus will take. Will he use his privileged status to turn stones into 
"Also, it is interesting that later in Matthew Jesus calls a child to him 
and says "it is not the will of your Father in heaven that one of these little 
ones perish" (18:14). In these words, which occur only in Matthew, Jesus speaks 
of the compassion of God for the children. 
140n these parallels see Carson, Matthew, 112. 
15Some people believe that Jesus could not have failed this test because he 
is God. This claim·, however, is based upOn preconceived notions of what it means 
to be divine instead of paying attention to the actual way of God in the world. 
How does one know that it is impossible for the divine son to fail a test? Why 
cannot the incarnation involve the genuine experience of vulnerability and 
testing? After all, Jesus' experience in Gethsemane seems to be just that. 
16For various interpretations of the temptation see Boring, Matthew, 165. 
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bread in order to feed, not only himself, but others? Will he apply certain 
scriptures to himself to the effect that the son of God cannot be harmed 
physically? Both of these would meet common messianic expectations and carry 
tremendous political weight. It was expected that the messiah would rule the 
world. Would Jesus take the devil's path in achieving this end? The world in 
which Jesus lived was one of brutal foreign military oppression, ruthless 
political and religious leaders among his countrymen, poverty, and lack of 
shalom. Jesus could take the path whereby all this could be overcome in rather 
quick fashion. Some of Jesus' contemporaries understood the Old Testament to 
warrant such a path. 
In the end all authority will be given to Jesus (Mt. 28:18) but it will come 
about through the way of death and resurrection. The way of God will not be 
achieved through overwhelming power or invulnerability. Jesus acknowledges his 
place as a creature of God dependent upon divine provision which entails the 
possibility that he shall go hungry and succumb to injury. Jesus accepts the 
finite conditions of existence as blessing from God. Consequently, he does not 
accept the Old Testament •prediction" that the messiah would be immune from 
bodily harm (Ps. 91:11-2) as applicable to himself. Jesus trusts in the same 
providence which covers all humans. This involves acknowledging the risk and 
vulnerability we experience in life and handling it responsibly. Providence does 
not mean protection from the frailties of life. Jesus chooses the path of 
faithful trust in God the father in the midst of life's uncertainties. "What does 
it mean to worship and serve the Abba God?" asks Tupper. "It includes the 
renunciation of dominating power and overwhelming force as the way to accomplish 
the will of God."" The way of God in the world is not a display of raw 
omnipotence, a love of power, but the power of love. It is in this that Jesus 
trusts. 
4.5 Confession and Transfiguration 
17Tupper, Scandalous, 133. 
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Wherever Jesus travels people are discussing his identity. In Matthew 16 Jesus 
asks his disciples what the word about him is on the street. Most believe Jesus 
is some sort of great prophet. When he asks his diSciples for their opinion Peter 
declares that Jesus is the messiah, the son of the living God (16:16). Jesus 
informs Peter that he is correct and orders the disciples not to reveal his 
identity to others. Moreover, he begins to instruct them that as the messiah he 
will suffer, be rejected, killed and raised to life again (16:21). Jesus repeats 
this message several times on his way to Jerusalem but the disciples fail to 
grasp it. Their preunderstanding of what it means to be messiah filters Jesus' 
words. The messiah was to be an invincible, dominating ruler, rendering the pagan 
gods impotent and forcing the pagans to acknowledge the only true God. The 
messiah would rid Israel's temple and land of pagan pollution." There is 
certainly enough material in the Old Testament to support these claims (but there 
is also enough room for God to decide to take a different path) . It is not 
surprising then, that Peter openly rejects the notion of a vulnerable, suffering 
messiah (16:22). Who desires that sort of risky road? For Jesus, the way of the 
messiah will be one of vulnerable love not political might. This was hard for the 
disciples to grasp given their particular reading of Old Testament messiahship 
(and it is difficult for us to accept given our views of omnipotence) . 
Matthew follows up this story with the transfiguration episode. Commentators 
regularly point out the numerous linkages in this story to the life of Moses." 
Jesus is portrayed as the new Moses leading a new exodus (see Lk. 9: 31). The 
imagery might have led the disciples to conclude that their views of what the 
messiah will do were correct: Jesus will overthrow the oppressive foreign regime 
in liberating the people. In fact, there will be another exodus but with some key 
18See N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: 
Fortress·, 1992), 473-4. On the connection between the messiah and dominating 
power see William Placher, Narratives of a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and 
Scripture (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 9-17. 
19For discussion see W. L. Liefeld, "Transfiguration, " Dictionary of Jesus 
and the Gospels, 839-40. 
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differences. There will be a killing of the first born son, only this time it 
will be God's son rather than the sons of the oppressors. There will be 
liberation from the power of sin and death rather than liberation from tyrannical 
political power. The exodus will take place through the weakness of God on the 
cross rather than through the powerful yet destructive plagues. Tupper suggests 
that we have here an ''exodus in reverse. 11 At the least, we can say that although 
Jesus is the new Moses and the prophet par excellence, God is going about things 
in a quite different fashion. 20 During the transfiguration God says again that 
Jesus is his "beloved son with whom he is pleased" and that we should listen to 
him (17:5). God approves of the way of Jesus in the world, a way of trust in the 
loving father despite the vicissitudes of life. In Jesus, God is going about 
things in a new way even while being faithful to his purpose; we do well to pay 
attention. 
4.6 Compassion, Dialogue and Healing Grace 
The gospels record Jesus performing a variety of miracles. He healed many, but 
certainly not most, of the sick in Israel. Jesus showed concern for those around 
him. At one point after teaching and healing for three days in a remote place 
Jesus said, "I feel compassion for the multitude, because they have remained with 
me now for three days and have nothing to eat; and I do not wish to send them 
away hungry, lest they faint on the way" (Mt. 15:32). Thus, when Jesus feeds the 
four thousand, the miracle does not occur out of thin air. Rather, it comes about 
in a context where the people have entered into relationship with Jesus and Jesus 
works to enlarge the resources available. Divine providence occurs within 
historically contextualized settings. Miracles such as this do not just happen 
anytime, anywhere for any reason. The messiahship of Jesus is being demonstrated 
and the people are open to this message. God works through this setting and the 
available resources to bless them. 
'°One can say with Van de Beek, Why?, that the reading of the Old Testament 
legitimately provides for a world-ruling messiah, but that God simply chose 
differently in Jesus. 
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Many of the stories of healing are presented as a result of dialogue with Jesus. 
From this is seen that a willingness to enter into relationship with Jesus is an 
important element in the healing. In one such stol:-y a Canaanite woman beseeches 
Jesus to have mercy on behalf of her daughter (Mt. 15: 21-8) . Jesus does not 
innnediately address the woman who persists that he pay attention to her thus 
causing a "scene." Finally, Jesus tells her that his mission is to Israelites 
alone. She refuses to accept this answer and bows before him begging for help. 
Jesus says, "it is not good to give the children's bread to the dogs" (15:26)--
his mission is to the Israelites. The woman refuses to give up, however, and 
comes back with a rejoinder which acknowledges the propriety of Jesus' mission 
but still wants a blessing. "Yes, Lord, but even the dogs feed on the crumbs 
which fall from their master's table" (15:27). Like Jacob wrestling with God she 
refuses to let Jesus go until he blesses her daughter. In response, Jesus grants 
her petition and her daughter is healed. It does not seem that Jesus was 
originally going to give her what she desired. The dialogue in the text suggests 
that she persuaded Jesus that her request did fit into his mission. Jesus here 
reveals· an openness even to Gentile women. 
A couple of other healings exhibit Jesus' openness to others even to the point 
of changing his plans. In Luke 8:43-8 Jesus is on his way to heal a young girl 
when a woman, ritually unclean according to the levitical code, reached out from 
a crowd and touched him. When Jesus inquires who touched him she remains silent, 
for she knows that anyone she touches is made ·ceremonially impure. Finally, she 
confesses her deed and her motive. After she enters into dialogue and ex.presses 
trust in Jesus, Jesus responds: "Daughter, your faith has made you well; go in 
peace 11 (15:48). Commenting on this story Moltmann says that Jesus "grows from the 
expectations of the sick and in this atmosphere learns what the kingdom of God 
in its r€ality is. 1121 In another instance, some friends bring a paralyzed man 
to Jesus· but they cannot get close to him since there is a crowd in the house 
21JU.rgen Moltmann, Jesus Christ For Today's World, trans. Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1994), p. 15. 
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(Mk. 2). Undeterred, they go up on the roof, dig a hole, and let their paralyzed 
friend down in front of Jesus on ropes. No dialogue takes place in this encounter 
but their actions speak louder than words. In light of their faith Jesus heals 
the man. 
The faith, or lack of it, in others deeply affected Jesus and his ministry. Mark 
says that Jesus could not perform many miracles in Nazareth due to the lack of 
faith by the people in the community (6:5-6). It is not that their unbelief 
completely tied God's hands but it did seriously alter what Jesus would have done 
had they been more receptive to his message." Not only did the response of the 
community affect what Jesus did, it also disturbed him. "Apparently Jesus had not 
anticipated the reaction of the people" 23 for 11 he was amazed at their unbelief" 
( 6: 6) . Oftentimes, what God decides to do is conditioned upon the faith or 
unbelief of people. As James says, we have not because we ask not (4:2). 
In these stories some people believe that God is doing something special in Jesus 
and so are willing to enter into trusting relationship w~th him. At times, Jesus 
does not seem interested in granting their requests, or in the case of the 
paralytic was not planning on performing a healing because he was busy teaching. 
Jesus did not intend or plan to heal the woman with the hemorrhage or the 
daughter of the Canaanite woman. 2' Nevertheless, Jesus shows himself flexible 
and open to what arises in the situations, making use of them in trusting service 
to his heavenly father. The particular acts of providence manifested in the 
ministry of Jesus are dependent upon the attitudes and responses of the people 
22See Larry W. Hurtado, Mark, New International Biblical Commentary 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1989)~. 
23Lane, Commentary on the Gospel of Mark, 204. 
"I ·recognize that the no-risk view of providence will interpret all of 
these stories in a quite different fashion. For the no-risk view nothing in the 
stories occurs for Jesus' benefit but only for the benefit of others {i. e., 
Jesus wanted to reveal to the people the state of their faith--after all Jesus 
was not testing to see if they had faith since the no-risk view affirms that 
Jesus already knew that) . 
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he encounters. What God wants to accomplish is brought about only when others 
enter into a relationship of faith. Jesus wanted to do some things, but was 
unable due to a lack of faith in the community. In light of these stories we see 
that everything does not follow a predetermined plan. 
Another point worth mentioning in connection with Jesus' healings is that they 
reveal that God is opposed to sickness. The people Jesus healed were not made ill 
by God in order to demonstrate Jesus as the messiah. Jesus is not going around 
"cleaning up" the diseases God has spread (as is the case if one affirms divine 
pancausality) . Rather, Jesus and the Father stand against that which destroys the 
health God intends for us. 
4.7 Gethsemane: The Pathos of Jesus 
Immediately prior to going to the garden the gospels record that Jesus celebrated 
the passover with his disciples. During the meal he claims that one of the 
disciples is opposing his mission and will "betray" him (Mt. 26:21; Lk. 22:21; 
Jn. 13:21). In response, each of the disciples thought Jesus was referring to 
himself and none thought of Judas. Due to the long history of the villanization 
of Judas we tend to think Jesus' words are clear and that everything is working 
out according to some foreordained plan. 25 But such is not the case. Jesus 
undoubtedly had plenty of discussions with his disciples in small groups and 
individually as they travelled. It is most likely that through such dialogues 
Jesus and Judas (the treasurer of the group) would have opportunity to discuss 
and debate the role of the messiah. Perhaps in this way Jesus learned of Judas' 
staunch commitment to a traditional nationalistic understanding of messiahship. 
Jesus, who had chosen Judas in good faith to be his disciple (he did not choose 
him to be the betrayer!) would undoubtedly seek to transform Judas' view of the 
matter. Jesus had not been successful in reshaping the rest of the disciples' 
understanding of the messiah and his attempts with Judas also apparently failed. 
25As of this writing a new book on Judas is due out which addresses these 
questions: William Klassen, Judas: Betrayer or Friend of Jesus? (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg/Fortress, 1996). 
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But Jesus does not simply give up on Judas. It seems likely that at the passover 
meal Judas was given the place of honor to Jesus' left {Jn. 13:26) . 26 Moreover, 
Jesus' act of dipping the bread into the bowl and. giving it to Judas would have 
been seen as an act of friendship without any negative intentions. 27 Through 
such gestures Jesus was reaching oU:t to Judas, seeking to change his direction. 
One can envision this scene of intimacy with Jesus looking Judas in the eye, 
probing him, bringing him to a point of decision. After this moment Jesus says, 
"What you do, do quickly" (Jn. 13:27). Jesus here pushes Judas to show his cards, 
to make up his mind regarding what sort of messiah he desires Jesus to be. A risk 
is involved here. since there is no guarantee which way Judas will decide. Judas 
does "lay down his cards" and takes steps which he believes will force Jesus to 
show his cards as well. Judas gambles on his hunch that if the authorities 
confront Jesus it will force him to take on the role of political liberator, 
becoming a "genuine" messiah. None of this was predetermined. 28 Genuine options 
face both Jesus and Judas. The actual course of divine providence works itself 
out through and in response to these specific human choices. Jesus sought to 
change Judas 1 mind but, apparently, was unsuccessful. Judas leaves the group and 
goes to the high priest. Jesus had reason to be deeply troubled. 
Jesus also leaves and goes to the garden of Gethsemane where he asks Peter, James 
and John to stay near him and pray. Jesus, deeply troubled (aqonia Lk. 22:44) 
about coming events, needs to pray about them and desires that his friends pray 
26 See D. J. Williams, "Judas Iscariot," Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, 
407-8. 
27See George R. Beasley-Murray, ~. Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, TX: 
Word, 1987), 238. 
"Much is read into Luke 22:22 that this was all predetermined. I understand 
the verse to mean that Jesus and the father have agreed or determined which path 
they will take. For a helpful discussion of Judas's betrayal not implying 
foreknowledge see Lorenzo McCabe, The Foreknowledge of God (Cincinnati: Cranston 
and Stowe, 1878), 99-139. See also, Richard Rice, God's Foreknowledge and Man's 
Free Will (Minneapolis, Bethany House, 1985), 95-7. 
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for him and for their own testing in this time of crisis. 29 But his closest 
friends, failing to grasp the gravity of the situation, fall asleep and Jesus 
alone prays. 
Three times Jesus prays the same prayer: "My Father, if it is possible, let this 
cup pass from me; yet not as I will, but as you will" (Mt. 26:39-44). Several 
things should be noted about this prayer. First, Jesus prays to his Father (Abba 
in Mark 14:36), not some distant and unconcerned deity. Jesus has an intimate 
relationship with God the father and puts this petition before his father because 
he assumes God is concerned. Another point to notice is that he does not want to 
drink from the "cup" about which he has been telling the disciples that he must 
drink it. The cup is Old Testament imagery for the divine wrath (Isa. 51:16, 32; 
Ez. 23:32-4) . 30 Jesus understands that he is being asked to experience deathO-
the reward for sin. Like Habakkuk he peers into the depths of the silence of God, 
the absence of God in judgment of sin and is terrified by what he sees. He knows 
that just as in the Old Testament divine wrath was exercised for redemptive 
purposes, so it will be this time. Even though the love of God is the driving 
force behind the divine wrath it does not make the experience of the wrath less 
painful. 
Tupper observes a third aspect to this prayer: "The prayer is not the simple 
petition: 'Give me the strength to drink this cup.' Rather, he prayed: 'Remove 
this cup from me.' "31 Although Jesus has repeatedly attempted to instruct his 
disciples of the particular path he, as messiah, will take, he has some hesitancy 
now. Is the path set in concrete? Must Jesus go this route even if he has 
misgivings? In Matthew Jesus says if it is possible (26:39) and in Luke he says 
if you are willing remove the cup (22:42). In Mark Jesus claims that it is 
290n the agony Jesus experienced see John R. W. Stott, The Cross of Christ 
(Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1986), 73-7. 
30See Stott, The Cross of Christ, 76-7. 
31Tupper, Scandalous, 324. 
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possible for the father to do this since "all things are possible" for him 
(14:36). These remarks are commonly ignored because Jesus finishes his petition 
with, "nevertheless, not what I want, but what y0u want father." The prayer of 
submission is used to discredit the prayer of petition. But this ignores the 
facts that Jesus presented this petition three times and that he requested not 
the strength to travel the path, but an alternate route. This petition, "remove 
this cup, 11 is not empty rhetoric but a serious effort to determine the will of 
God. Jesus wrestles with God's will for he does not believe that everything must 
happen according to a predetermined plan. Even the son of God must search and 
seek for the father's will for the son is not following a script but living in 
dynamic relationship with the father. Together they determine what the will of 
God shall be in this historical situation. Although scripture attests the 
incarnation being planned from the creation of the world, this is not so with the 
cross. The path of the cross comes about only through God's interaction with 
hum.ans in history. Until this moment in history other routes were, perhaps, open. 
Picking up again the illustration used in God's dealing with Pharaoh, it can be 
said that Jesus is in the canoe heading for the falls. There is yet time to get 
over to shore and portage around the falls. Jesus seeks to determine if that 
option is favorable with his father. But the canyon narrows even for God. 
Isaac had asked his father Abraham, "Where is the lamb for the offering?" Jesus 
is wondering whether his father will supply a lamb. God stopped Abraham from 
offering Isaac, but God will not stop himself from offering his son. Jesus is the 
lamb supplied. Providence has taken many a strange and twisting turn on its road 
to Calvary. In Gethsemane Jesus wonders whether there is another way. But the 
father and son, in seeking to accomplish the project, both come to understand 
that now there is no other way. Tupper writes: "In Gethsemane Jesus learned with 
utmost clarity the limitations within the commitments of the identity of God, the 
limits that inhere in the freedom of God's love. . Now the Kingdom of God 
arriving with Jesus collided with the limitation of God in the dying of Jesus. 
The cross of rejection proved inevitable for the incarnation of the Kingdom. So 
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God could not save Jesus from the cross and be who the ~ God is. "32 After his 
session of wrestling with the father Jesus no longer questions which path to 
take. Yet the big question remains: will this gaIDbit work? 
Scriptural and theological objections are raised against the notion that the 
cross was not set in concrete prior to the creation. It is suggested that texts 
such as Ephesians 1:4; 1Peter1:20; and Revelation 13:8, 17:8 conflict with such 
an understanding. However, it should be noted that Ephesians 1:4 says God chose 
us in Christ beforehand and 1 Peter 1:20 says God foreknew Christ. Although the 
verses can legitimately be interpreted as affirming that the cross was foreknown, 
neither verse necessitates such an interpretation and so there is no problem for 
the openness model. Revelation 17:8 says certain names have been written in a 
book from the foundation of the world. 33 Again, this is no problem if taken to 
refer to something like corporate election. Moreover, Revelation is an 
apocalyptic genre and care must be taken not to be overly literal. John's point 
is to assure the audience that God is on their side and they are safe with God. 
Revelation 13:8 is a bit more problernatic. 34 Translators are not agreed as to 
how to understand the syntax of the verse. What was it in particular that 
happened before the foundation of the world? Should it be understood in the same 
way as 17:8, viz., our names are written in the book before the foundation of the 
world? Or should it be understood that the lamb was slain before the foundation 
of the world? The NASB and NRSV say it is our names while the KJV and the NIV 
say it is the slaying of the lamb. The latter view is so ingrained in evangelical 
thought that either exhaustive foreknowledge is taken for granted (God always 
"Tupper, Scandalous, 325. 
"Those who believe everything that happens in the world was fixed, or at 
least foreknown, prior to the creation need to explain how this comports with 
names being blotted out of the book of life (Rev. 3:5). It would seem that either 
total foreordination or foreknowledge would exclude the possibility of revising 
the book_. 
"See George Eldon Ladd, A Commentarv on the Revelation of John (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1972), 181. 
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foreknew about sin and the cross) or divine determinism {God decided all this 
would happen) is assumed. But even if one goes with foreknowledge or 
foreordination neither view interprets RevelatiOn 13: 8 literally! It is not 
literally the case that Jesus was slain prior to the creation for he was slain 
during the reign of Pontius Pilate. 
The openness model could go with modifications of either translation. Perhaps God 
thought out different possibilities--what might happen if sin comes about or does 
not come about--and planned different courses of action in each case. In each one 
the incarnation was planned, but it takes on different rationales depending on 
which case comes about. 35 Hence, it could be said that God planned from before 
the foundation of the world that the Son would become incarnate. But God did not 
know which of the rationales for the incarnation would be actualized until after 
sin came on the scene. In any event one does not have to conclude that God was 
caught off guard. 
Another option is to say that the language of Paul and John should not be 
stressed in a literalistic fashionr but understood as praise for God's 
longstanding wisdom in accomplishing salvation for sinners. Hence, "before the 
foundation of the world" is a way of referring to the extremely long time that 
God's wisdom has been working towards the salvation of his sinful creatures. 
Paul Helm, a Reformed thinker, raises a theological objection when he argues that 
the fall must be presupposed in order to make sense of salvation for if there was 
no fall into sin the incarnation is rendered unnecessary. He believes that 
without human sin and Christ's redemption from it, God's character would not be 
fully manifest." Colin Gunton provides the proper response to this objection 
35Ariother possibility is to affirm a cosmic fall prior to the Adamic fall 
such that God thinks it likely that humans will succumb to sin. In which case the 
death of, the son is incorporated into the divine plan for creation. 
36Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Do\IJilers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
1994), pp. 100, 215. Is Helm suggesting that God "needs" the fall? 
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when he takes the "Scotist view" arguing that "had there been no fall, it would 
still have been the Father's good pleasure to come into personal relation with 
us through the incarnation of his Son. "37 For Gunton, the incarnation is 
necessary to the intended perfection of the creation for the praise of the 
creator. 38 So, God had always intended the incarnation but it took on additional 
significance in light of sin. Before leaving this point it should be noted that 
the 11 Scotist" position on the incarnation is compatible with divine foreknowledge 
of the fall since it only maintains that God had a purpose for the incarnation 
antecedent to the fall. The view that the incarnation was not planned until after 
God learned (in his foreknowledge) about the fall implies that although Christ 
may~ be the decisive turning point for human history, he was not so in God's 
original plan. 39 Hence, a major readjustment in God's purposes must be posited 
such that the incarnation becomes a contingent matter (unless one affirins 
supralapsarianism). This "contingency plan 11 means that even though God had 
foreknowledge, the divine risk in creating could not be avoided. 40 
Finally, a word about Acts 2:23 which says that Jesus was handed over to the 
Jewish leadership according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God. This 
verse is commonly taken to refer to the "paradox of divine sovereignty and human 
"Colin E. Gunton, Christ and Creation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1992), 
p. 96. On the history of this view see Eugene TeSelle, Christ in Context: Divine 
Purpose and Human Responsibility (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 35-45 and Robert 
North, Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1967), 120-162. 
38Herbert W. Richardson, Toward an American Theology (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967), p. 126 suggests a similar idea when he says, "Since, therefore, God 
created the world for Sabbath holiness, He must personally enter the world and 
dwell therein." Paul R. Sponheim, Faith and the Other: A Relational Theology 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), pp. 93-6 utilizes Richardson in holding that the 
incarnation was more than restorative since it was intended from the beginning 
in order to establish a special sort of relationship between God and his 
creatures. 
39See Tesell, Christ in Context, 45. 
'°This claim will be explored in detail in the excursus in chapter 5. 
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responsibility. 1141 There is no paradox here, however. It was God's definite 
purpose (h6rismene boule, a boundary setting will) to deliver the Son into the 
hands of those who had a long track record of res'isting God's work. God was not 
taken off guard by their rejection for he anticipated their response and so 
walked onto the scene with an excel1ent prognosis (foreknowledger proan6sei) of 
what would happen. The crucifixion could not have occurred to Jesus unless, 
somehow, it fit into the boundaries of what God willed (boule, Acts 2:23; 4:28). 
But this does not mean that humans cannot resist the divine will for Luke says 
that the Jewish leaders "rejected God's purpose (boulen) for themselves" (Lk. 
7:30). God sovereignly established limits within which humans decide how they 
will respond to God. 42 In this light it could be said that God determined that 
the Son would suffer and die and that he sent him into a setting where, given the 
history and character of the covenant people, it was quite assured what would 
result. 43 
4.8 The cross of Jesus 
Throughout history most talk of the cross of Christ centered around what the 
death of Jesus accomplished for humanity. In more recent times attention has also 
been given regarding how the cross affected God. Moltmann asks: "What does the 
cross of Jesus mean for God himself? 1144 Through the cross the incarnate God, 
Jesus, did something which changed both human history and divine history in such 
a way that neither were ever the same again. In the cross of Jesus the divine-
human relationship is affected on both sides. It is a decisive act in which God 
41The idea behind this overworked expression is so taken for granted in the 
commentaries that the commentators no longer wrestle with the text. 
"McCabe, Foreknowledge of God, 104-5, claims that the atonement only 
required the suffering and death (being mortal) of Jesus, not the cross 
specifically. Jesus was handed over to die, but "the instruments by whom he 
finally was put to death were by no means predestined" (105). 
43 F0r instance, if a freshman congressman attempts to overhaul the social 
security system of the United States there is little doubt about the sort of 
receptiop he will receive. 
44Jilrgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, tr. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1974), 201. 
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defines himself-in his relationship to sinful creatures. 45 
What impact does the cross have on humans? The gospels tell us that the earliest 
response was one of dashing the disciples' hopes against the rocks. They had 
thought that Jesus was the messiah (Lk. 24:21). But a crucified messiah was an 
oxymoron for them. A crucified person was accursed of God (Dt. 21:22-3) whereas 
the messiah was the anointed of God. How could the messiah be godforsaken? It 
made no sense to them given their interpretive framework of what messiahship 
meant. Things would not have been any better for a Greek audience since a 
crucified God was an oxymoron for them as well. 46 A real king 1 a genuine 
messiah, a true Son of God would have come down from the cross demonstrating his 
omnipotence (Mt. 27:42-3). The impact of the cross did not have a propitious 
beginning for it seemed to everyone looking on to be utter folly. What 'a 
ridiculously stupid and impotent thing for a deity to do! 
But "the foolishness of God is wiser than human wisdom and the weakness of God 
is stronger than human strength" (1 Cor. 1:25 NRSV). There is profound mystery 
in what God was doing on the cross and I make no pretense of understanding it 
all. 47 However" of one thing I am certain: God loves sinners and desires to 
destroy the evil which enslaves them and somehow the cross expresses how God 
seeks to accomplish this. The cross does not change God the Father's attitude 
450n God defining himself through the cross see Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative 
Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 265 and Eberhard Jilngel, God as the 
Mystery of the World) : On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in 
the Dispute Between Theism and Atheism, tr. Darrell L. Gruder, (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1983), 363-4. Fiddes correctly observes that the doctrine of God 
should not be built entirely out of the cross (as perhaps Moltmann) for the 
suffering of God occurs elsewhere than solely in Jesus. I have sought to show 
this in my survey of the Old Testament material. Furthermore, I would add that 
the resurrection must also be taken into account in defining God. 
"See Moltmann, Crucified God, 214-6. 
"Vincent Brilmmer' s The Model of Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993) is especially helpful on understanding the atonement in relational 
terms. See also, Stott, The Cross o_f Christ, Leon Morris, The Apostolic Preaching 
of the Cross (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1956) and for a historical survey H . 
. D. McDonald, The Atonement of the Death of Christ: In Faith, Revelation and 
History (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1985). 
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towards us as though he hated us until Jesus died whereupon he decided to love 
us. The Father has always loved his creatures--in spite of sin. As we have seen 
in the Old Testament God makes himself vulnerable· to his creatures. The God who 
said to Abraham, "may I be cut in two if I break my promise 11 (Gen. 15) is the God 
who dies on the cross to fulfill his promise. Although there is no single way of 
capturing the meaning of the cross since an array of images is required, this 
much is clear: the cross is God's answer to sin and evil. 
That Christ's work on the cross is multifaceted is demonstrated by the New 
Testament writers' various metaphors and explanations of what Jesus did (e. g. 
propitiation, redemption, justification, and reconciliation). No single theory 
of atonement can do justice to the diversity of images of Jesus' act. Without 
taking a stand on any particular theory I wish to make some observations. To 
begin, following Vincent Brilmmer I understand sin to be primarily alienation or 
a broken relationship rather than a state of being or guilt. 48 In this damaged 
relationship where mistrust has developed, we cannot compel God to love us. There 
is nothing we can do to merit God's love. Similarly, God cannot compel us to 
reciprocate his love for that would not be love. In order to win our love God 
forgives us the injury done to him. God considers the breach in our relationship 
a greater evil than the harm we have caused and so desires reconciliation. But 
forgiveness comes with a price: the suffering of the one who has been sinned 
against. 49 The injured party must suffer the pain, forgoing revenge, in order 
to pursue reconciliation of the broken relationship. In this respect forgiveness 
is not "unconditional 11 since the person forgiving must fulfill this condition. 50 
Calvary demonstrates that God is willing to pay the cost of forgiveness and work 
"Brilmmer, The Model of Love, 197. The following discussion is indebted to 
his chapter 8. 
"See Brilinmer, Model of Love, 185, 201-3. 
50The person forgiven by God experiences unconditional forgiveness in that 
there ar.e no conditions this person must fulfill in order to obtain divine 
forgiveness. Yet, there is a condition which the forgiven must meet in order to 
heal the relationship--accept the forgiveness of the one forgiving and desire 
that the relationship be restored. See Brilmmer, Model of Love, 185. 
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to bring about reconciliation .. BrUmrner writes: "Christ's suffering is not merely 
the paradigmatic revelation of God's atoning forgiveness. Such a revelation is 
also a necessary condition for this forgiveness. ,;si God has humbled himself and 
met this painful condition necessary for the restoration of the personal divine-
human relationship. In Jesus God oVercomes the estrangement and provides a way 
for us to repent and be reconciled. 
Looking at the gospels a number of other points may be made. Immediately prior 
to the crucifixion Jesus celebrated the passover with his disciples. In doing so 
he claims that he is instituting the "new" covenant through his blood (Lk 22: 20). 
During the commemoration of God's liberation of Israel Jesus implies that he is 
the new passover lamb sparing the people from the angel of death. In the Old 
Testament Yahweh suffered because of, with and for the people. Now Jesus does the 
same. He suffers because of our sins. He identifies with our suffering. He 
• suffers for us in order to restore us to a trusting relationship with God. The 
death of Jesus is the victory of sonship for he trusted the Father--despite the 
agony and uncertainty--obediently doing what he and the father had agreed upon. 
Who will trust in God? Jesus will! Jesus shows us that we can trust the Father 
even into death. Jesus' filial relationship with the Father gave him the 
confidence to follow through with his mission. 52 
But what of Jesus' lament: "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" It is 
intriguing that the gospel writers record thi"s for it is a scandalous outburst 
for the messiah to make! 53 In quoting Psalm 22 Jesus identifies with the lament 
51Brilmmer, Model of Love, 2 02 . 
52Clark Pinnock, Unbounded Love: A Good News Theology for the 21'st Century 
(Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1994), 99-110 and Paul Fiddes, Creative 
Suffering of God, 162 emphasize that the cross is more personal forgiveness than 
punishment, more a filial than legal relationship. Stott, Cross of Christ, 141-9 
rejects 'this claiming that the forensic element cannot be dismissed. 
53 Some believe that Jesus, in quoting the first part of Psalm 22, has the 
entire Psalm in mind and so this should actually be understood as including 
victory. "In first-century Judaism, was the citation of the opening of a psalm 
designed to recall the psalm in its entirety? Evidence for this phenomenon is 
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tradition which testified to uncertainty and even betrayal in the midst of 
trial. 54 In this lament Jesus identifies himself with our experience of 
godforsakeness. For the first time in his life Jestis experienced godforsakeness, 
a terrifying experience for one who had always been close to the Father. He was 
alone and cried out in dereliction~ Yet, in the midst of such suffering Jesus, 
like his Old Testament counterparts, exhibits an element of faith for it is to 
the God of the covenant community, his Abba, that he cries out and he expects to 
be heard and answered. Jesus is still speaking to God, he has not lost his faith. 
The disciples had deserted him, they could not trust God that this was the way 
of the messiah. Even Jesus found it difficult to trust in God as he trod this 
path. Is this really the way of wisdom? Will vulnerability and exposure lead to 
victory for God? 
As was seen in the survey of the Old Testament, God has been walking this path 
ever since he created. God has known suffering for a long time, but now he 
experiences it from our side through Jesus. Jesus becomes the victim and yet he 
is not rendered impotent by it for he demonstrates the way to victory: "Father 
forgive them" (Lk. 23:34) . 55 The victim refuses to be vindictive. It is through 
very late" (J. B. Green, "Death of Jesus, 11 Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, 
p. 151). Moreover, Moltmann thinks such a view far-fetched since the psalm ends 
with thanksgiving for deliverance from death "and there was no deliverance on the 
cross" (Jesus Christ For Today's World, p. 35) . For discussion of the 
interpretation of this cry see William L. Lane, The Gospel of Mark, New 
International Commentary on the New Testament ("Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), 
572-3; Boring, Matthew, 492; Carson, Matthew, 782; and James L. Mays, "Prayer 
and Christology: Psalm 22 as Perspective on the Passion," Theology Today, 42 
(Oct. 1985): 322-331. Fredrik Lindstrom, Suffering and Sin: Interpretations of 
Illness in the Individual Complaint Psalms (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1994), 
p. 463 argues that the note of praise at the end of Psalm 22 does not come about 
until after the resurrection when Jesus says, "go and tell my brothers" (Matt. 
28: 10) which he takes as an allusion to "I will tell of your name to my brothers" 
(Ps. 22:23). 
540n the nature of the lament tradition and its importance for our 
relationship with God today see Walter Brueggemann, "The Costly Loss of Lament" 
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 36 (1986): pp. 57-71. Also helpful is 
Lindstrom, Suffering and Sin. 
55Fiddes, Creative Suffering, 32 makes the important observation that we 
must emphasize that God is victorious through suffering and not rendered impotent 
by it. 
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the seeming weakness of forgiveness that Jesus overcomes the sin of the world. 
To cite the famous words of Bonhoeffer: "God lets himself be pushed out of the 
world on to the cross. He is weak and powerless in the world, and that is 
precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us and helps us. .only 
the suffering God can help .... the God of the Bible, who wins power and space 
in the world by his weakness. " 56 From a human perspective a messiah or son of 
God dying on a cross is sheer folly and weakness. But it is through this 
"weakness" that God demonstrates genuine power--the power of love. Moltmann says, 
"Thus suffering proves to be stronger than hate. Its might is powerful in 
weakness and gains power over its enemies in grief1 because it gives life even 
to its enemies and opens up the future to change. "57 
The cross made a difference to both God and humanity. Through the cross Gbd 
defeats the "powers" arrayed against his project of establishing a trusting 
relationship with humans. God is a God of self-giving love and the cross 
discloses this in an extremely blunt fashion. The cross is the exemplification 
of the power and wisdom of God--the way of God in the worJd. It remains, however, 
a way of vulnerability and risk rather than overwhelming might with guaranteed 
results. Will this route of being resourceful, receptive and responsive succeed? 
Will the disciples come to trust in God's way? Will their lives be turned around? 
Will other people come to trust God through Jesus? Will reconciliation come 
about? Is God crazy to take this path? Perhaps, by human standards. 
4.9 The Resurrection 
How does the resurrection of one individual solve anything? Second temple Judaism 
did not look for a dying messiah and certainly had no expectation of the messiah 
being resurrected. Tom Wright points out that the term "resurrection" meant for 
first-century Jews. 
56Di.etrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers From Prison (New York: Macmillan, 
1972) ' 3 60-1. 
57Moltmann, Crucified God, 249. 
The raising to life of all the righteous dead, as part of the 
dramatic moment, within history, at which Israel's god would return 
to Zion and restore the fortunes of his people. Now it must be said 
clearly that at first sight the coming to life of a single dead 
body. . would be, though of course exceedingly striking, quite 
insufficient to make Jews of the time declare that the longed-for 
redemption, the eventual release from exile, had in fact occurred. 
[I]t would not at all justify a claim that the person to whom 
this odd event had happened was therefore the saviour of the 
world. 58 
128 
The Jews were looking for a general resurrection (Jn. 11:24) not a dying and 
rising messiah. The cross had shattered the disciples' hopes and the resurrection 
did not immediately alter this state of affairs. Although the raising of Jesus 
revived the disciples' hope it did not fulfill it for they ask the risen Jesus 
if he is now going to restore the kingdom to Israel (Acts 1:6). The problem was 
making sense of the scandal of a crucified and resurrected messiah given their 
interpretive framework of providential expectations. They lacked a proper model 
for explaining the events in a way which connects them to God's project. A new 
framework had to be hammered out on the forge and this takes time. 
Eventually, the disciples and the New Testament writers come to see the 
resurrection of Jesus as the father's ratification of Jesus' Abba-experience and 
the victory of the way of love over the way of.hatred and death. In order to see 
it this way familiar readings of the Old Testament had to be modified or even 
rejected and new understandings developed. The "resurrection" had to be 
reinterpreted to apply specifically to Jesus. The long-standing expectation of 
what God would do providentially had to be reshaped to fit what God had actually 
decided to do. The exact route divine providence took did not line up with their 
predictions. In freedom and in connection to the historical situation of the day 
God decided on the path of death and resurrection. Once the path of God became 
58Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 399. 
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clear, then the cross and resurrection became God's definitive answer to human 
suffering, sin and death. In the resurrection God overcame death with life, 
despair with hope, and sin with salvation. God did not avoid pain and death, 
instead, he overcame them. God did not give up on his project when they crucified 
his son. Rather, he brought sornethirig good out of evil. The resurrection of Jesus 
is the divine ratification both of Jesus' experience of God as Abba and of his 
loving way with his fellow humans. Suffering, hatred and death do not have the 
last word. The resurrection gives hope that transforms our relationships, our 
societies, and, ultimately, the entire cosmos. It is the sign of the new covenant 
and the promise of a new creation. The cross and resurrection become symbols of 
such magnitude that Paul says that in light of them nothing, including our own 
suffering and death, can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus (Rom. 
8:38-9). In hope, we look forward to God's ultimate victory over death at which 
time he will wipe away every tear (Rev. 21:1-4). 
In light of what God does in the cross and resurrection three points should be 
singled out for attention regarding providence. First, Barth is correct when he 
affirms that God keeps true to his purpose in election but is free to vary the 
way in which he carries out his purpose. 59 Even with revelation we cannot 
presume as to how God will fulfill his promises. In wisdom God decided to fulfill 
his promises through the particular path Jesus took. In wisdom God decides how 
he continues to fulfill his promises and the divine wisdom takes the changing 
circumstances of the world into account. Consequently, God is faithfully free to 
act providentially in the way he sees fit in response to the decisions his 
creatures make. 
Second, despite our inability to forecast divine providence in light of the cross 
and resurrection we have solid grounds for trusting that God has our best 
interests in mind for he did all this to demonstrate his love towards us (Rom. 
5:1~11): Moreover, Jesus continues to work on our behalf in the presence of the 
Father (Heb. 2:18, 9:24). God has been faithful in the past so we look forward 
59See Barth, Church Dogmatics 3. 3 p. 56. 
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to his faithfulness in the future. Finally, as we look to the future we should 
expect providence to follow the path definitively revealed in the life of Jesus. 
That is, we should not look forward to overwhelming power but to the way of 
sacrificial love. In Jesus we learn that God has chosen to be this way in the 
world--the way of cross and resurrection. Not only should we expect this of God, 
it should also be normative for the Christian life. 
4.10 Grace, JUdgmant and Humiliation: Divina Love in Jesus• Teaching 
The teaching of Jesus brings out the way of God / s love towards a world of 
sinners. God does not overlook our sin for it must be dealt with in order to 
bring about reconciliation. Jesus sounds like Yahweh in the Old Testament when 
he says, 11 0 Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets and stones 
those sent to her! How often I wanted to gather your children together, just as 
a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you would not have it!" (Luke 
13: 34). 60 Jesus purposed to forge an intimate bond between Israel and God. 
This purpose, however, goes largely unfulfilled because Jesus gets himself into 
trouble with the religious authorities for they do not accept the way of Jesus 
as the way of God with sinners (Lk. 15:1-2). The term "sinner" in Judaism was a 
term of exclusion referring to Jewish people who ignored the covenant God. Those 
who kept the covenant assumed that 11 sinners 11 had no place in God's grace and 
could not be God's people. The Pharisees considered such people outside the 
acceptable boundary of God's kingdom so they took exception to Jesus' eating with 
them since sharing a meal implied acceptance. In response, Jesus tells the 
parables of the lost sheep and lost coin which inform us that God is actively 
seeking his lost creatures. But the parable of the prodigal son is one of the 
60This expression of God's anguished love for sinners is a far cry from 
Jonathan· Edwards' view that God hates sinners: 11 The God who holds you over the 
pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some loathsome insect over the fire, 
abhors you .... you are ten thousanq times. more abominable in His eyes, than the 
most hateful venomous serpent is in ours." "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry 
God," in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 2 volumes (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth 
Trust, 1986), 2.10. 
131 
most powerful descriptions of the depths of God's love and grace. 61 In this 
parable the youngest son says to the father, "I wish you were dead so I could get 
my inheritance now. 11 This son shows no gratitude· or respect to his father and 
displays a lack of trust that his father is concerned with his well being. He 
thinks his father is holding out on him. Jesus' audience would be outraged at 
such a request for it is truly scandalous. The Middle Eastern listener expects 
the father to loudly denounce this son and expose him to public shame. Amazingly, 
however, the father grants his request! The father seems unwise in doing this. 
Perhaps he is taking the risk that by letting this son experience life apart from 
him the son will come to his senses and repent. 
The son quickly departs from his father's providence and settles in a far 
country. After a time things turn sour and the son finds himself in destitution 
so he decides to return to his father, not as a son, but as a hired hand. When 
the son returns to the village the Middle Eastern listener expects this son to 
be publicly shamed by the villagers and the father when he returns. Instead, 
Jesus says that "while he was still a long way off, his father saw him, and felt 
compassion for him, and ran and embraced him, and kissed him" (15:20). The father 
refuses to allow the son to experience any scorn from the villagers. In fact, the 
father humiliates himself by running to meet the son--an act undignified in that 
culture. When the son begins to grovel in front of him, the father stops him and 
orders the son to be decked out in finery and a party to be thrown in his honor. 
These acts would confirm to the villagers that the father had completely accepted 
him back as a .22!!· The father humiliates himself in order to exalt this wayward 
son. 
Later, the elder son returns from the fields and hears the party going on. 
Instead of going in and fulfilling his culturally defined responsibilities of 
61The following account is greatly indebted to the cultural and literary 
analysis of Kenneth E. Bailey's Poet and Peasant and Through Peasant Eyes: A 
Literary-Cultural Approach to the Parables in Luke, combined edition (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 158-206. 
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helping his father entertain guests, he remains outside. This son also has a 
troubled relationship with the father. The father again culturally humiliates 
himself by going outside the house to meet with "this son. When the eldest son 
addresses his father he again insults him by failing to use a title of respect. 
Moreover, he does not even admit that the sinful younger son is his brother. 
Pharisees, remember, did not regard sinners as God's people. Nevertheless, the 
father ignores these insults and tenderly answers, "my child," thereby showing 
his acceptance of this son also. 
In this parable God is depicted as a father but what an unusual father! 
Both sons publicly insult the father and in both cases the father, in grace, 
humiliates himself and seeks reconciliation with his children. In terms of 
providence, both sons fail to trust the divine wisdom and love. God does not 
force his will on either son. Instead, God risks that his humiliating love and 
forgiveness will win them back. As head of the household the father he could have 
resorted to overwhelming power to secure compliance. But God, seeking the 
reconciliation of both sons, chooses a different path: one of vulnerability and 
risk. 
This same accepting love is found even in such unlikely places as Jesus' teaching 
on judgment. It is worth observing that when Jesus tells the formal parables of 
judgment they are all given in the last few days before the crucifixion." 
Consequently, they must be interpreted in light of the ministry of grace he was 
on his way to perform. When this is done it will be recognized that the judgment 
is precisely for reconciliation--not a settling of scores. Moreover, these 
parables bring out the teaching of inclusion before exclusion, grace before 
wrath, acceptance before rejection. No one is excluded from God's grace who was 
not already included in it. The parable of the king's son's wedding in Matthew 
22 illustrates this. 
62This section is indebted to Robert Capon 1 s The Parables of Judgment (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989). 
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The preceding context makes it clear that Jesus feels the religious authorities 
have rejected his messiahship and in consequence he tells them that the kingdom 
of God will be taken away from them (Matt 21:31-46). The broader background for 
this parable is the messianic banquet spoken of in Isaiah 25:6-9 where it was 
said that Jews and Gentiles would eat together in God's presence. 63 By New 
Testament times, however, Isaiah's encompassing vision had been curtailed so that 
Gentiles were thought of as being largely excluded from the messianic banquet. 
Apparently, the religious authorities thought it was to be an exclusive party 
with a short invitation list. 
In the parable, Jesus says that the king sent out his servants to inform those 
who had been invited that it was time to come to the party. The initial 
invitations had been sent out long ago and responded to so that the king could 
make preparations. But for some reason those invited refuse to come. The king, 
however, ignores this insult and sends out other servants to ask those invited 
to come. But again they refuse. Some turn to their business affairs while others 
openly brutalize and even murder some of the servants. Jesus is saying that just 
as the Old Testament prophets had been rejected so now the king's son is being 
rejected. The religious leaders refuse to come to the messianic banquet if Jesus 
is the messiah. They do not want that sort of messiah. They do not believe Jesus 
is manifesting God's way in the world. 
The king is rightfully enraged at this snub so he has those destroyed who spurned 
his invitation (there is divine wrath in the New Testament) . 64 Jesus is telling 
us that there comes a time when the rejection of grace must be dealt with. When 
63 For more on this and a discussion of the similar parable in Luke see 
Bailey, Poet and Peasant, 2.88-113. 
"There will be an eschatological judgment (e. g. Mt. 25:46; 2 Thes. 1:7-9). 
For discussion of the purpose of eschatological judgment and the nature of hell 
see Jerry Walls,. Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1992) and William Sigountos ed., Four Views on Hell (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 19 92) . For a non-retributionist account of hell see 
Jonathan Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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grace is refused, and refused by murdering the servants of the king, what else 
is left? Judgment ensues upon those who despise the grace of God. The king did 
not have to invite these people, he did so out of his magnanimity. Jesus invites 
them to participate in the newness of life which he brings. If the life Jesus 
offers is refused what can be left but deadness? The messianic banquet is only 
for the living. 
The parable does not end here, however, for this king is determined to have a 
party so he sends out more servants to invite anyone and everyone to the feast. 
The invitations are indiscriminate, including the "good and the bad" (22: 10) . God 
does not invite the good and snub the bad. He calls all, including the sinners, 
to trust in his gracious love. And the people do come, so many, in fact, that 
the banquet hall is filled with guests (22:10). Here we see God depicted as' a 
king--but what an unusual king! What ancient Near Eastern king would invite the 
common people, the low-life of the community, and even strangers to his son's 
wedding? 
Unexpectedly, however, a problem arises at the banquet as one individual thinks 
he can come to the wedding on his own terms. When the king arrives there is one 
guest not dressed in wedding clothes. The king requests an explanation from this 
individual but the man remains silent, refusing to accept the king's grace by 
entering into dialogue. Clearly the king showed love and acceptance to this 
person but he desires to come to the feast on his own terms. Consequently, he 
is excluded from the party for there is never a good reason for rejecting grace. 
For our purposes it is important to note that in the parable the first invited 
guests as well as the guests invited as replacements are all recipients of the 
king's undeserved favor. Nobody in the parable is outside the king• s favor. 
Everybody starts out with the king's acceptance and no one is excluded except 
those who rule themselves out by refusing to trust in the king's provision. 
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Jesus taught that God is serious about accomplishing his project. In fact, God 
brings the project to a climatic moment in the life and work of Jesus. In these 
parables God is depicted as gracious, willing , to humiliate himself, to be 
vulnerable, yet, all the while working to bring us to a point of decision 
(judgment). God desires that we trust him and become his reconciled children. God 
wants a filial relationship with us. Instead of using his power to enforce 
compliance, God has taken the path of vulnerable, humiliating love which results 
in the question: will we trust his providence or will we leave for the far 
country? Will we, like the younger son, return to the father? Will we reject 
God's way in the world (displayed in the life of Jesus) or accept the gracious 
invitation to the wedding? These are genuine questions for us as well as for God. 
They expose the risk God experiences given the route he has sovereignly 
established to take. 
4.11 Various Texts on Providanca 
Besides Jesus' acts of healing and his telling of parables, there are several 
teachings of his which are usually mentioned when discussing providence. 
Sometimes these verses are used to justify the claim that God is micro-managing 
every tiny detail that occurs in life. 
In Matthew 6:25-34 Jesus tells his disciples not to worry about their clothes or 
food since God provides for the birds of the air and the grass of the field. He 
states his case in absolute terms without moderation. 65 Does Jesus mean by this 
that humans are not to plant crops and produce clothes (v. 26)? If we plant, reap 
and store crops are we acting against divine providence? Hardly, such actions are 
called for in the covenant regulations (Lev. 19:9-10). Moreover, the birds of the 
air do not simply sit with their mouths open waiting for food to drop into 
them. 66 Jesus .says that God provides food for us the question is how God does 
"See Charles E. Carlston, "Matthew 6: 24-34, " Interpretation 41 (Ap. 1987) : 
179-183. 
66 See Carson, Matthew, 179-80. 
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this. It seems that by the "birds of the air" (v. 26), "the grass of the field" 
{v. 30) Jesus is harking back to the creation account in Genesis. 67 Moreover, 
the lilies do not "toil" (v. 28) and we are not to be "anxious." This possibly 
alludes to the curse (Gen. 3: 16-17). If so, then Jesus, in announcing his 
Father's kingdom, acknowledges the limits of our creatureliness as well as our 
plight, but assures his disciples that the Father remains faithful to his own 
plan of creation and work of redemption. In fact, in Jesus, God has already 
inaugurated the coming kingdom and we are to "seek first his kingdom" (v. 33). 
Jesus is not denying the validity of farming or household duties. A carefree 
existence simply waiting for God's provision to fall into one's lap is not in 
view. 68 Rather, his point is that God's provision of life's basic needs frees 
his followers to pursue the kingdom of God. Jesus knows that we do not live by 
bread alone but by the word of God (Mt. 4:4). We need bread and we are to produce 
it but this must never displace our part in God's larger project. Finally, the 
coming kingdom does not mean that the disciples of Jesus will never go hungry or 
naked. However, just as God cares for the grass, even if it is burned tomorrow, 
so God cares for us even should we experience droughts from time to time (6:30). 
Providence does not mean protection from the vicissitudes of life, but it does 
mean God will be with us through them. 
This last idea is brought out clearly in Matthew 10:24-34 (cf. Lk. 12:1-12). Here 
Jesus tells the disciples not to fear those who can kill you. Followers of Jesus 
may fall prey to serious harm and even murder. Nevertheless, they are not to fear 
those who have the power to put them to death. Rather, they are to fear God who 
will exercise eschatological judgment (10:28). Again, disciples of Jesus are not 
to worry about such things. They may be persecuted and killed for following Jesus 
but they should not be anxiety ridden about it. Even if they die for his sake 
"see Richard J. Dillon, "Ravens, Lilies and the Kingdom of God: Matthew 
6:25-33/.Luke 12:22-31," Catholic Biblical Quarterly, 53, no. 4 (1991): 614, 621. 
"Jesus' own ministry depended upon the gifts .of people (especially women) 
who worked to earn enough to support themselves and give to others. 
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their heavenly father cares for them. After all, God cares for the sparrows and 
knows the number of hairs on our heads (both insignificant details of life). Does 
this mean that God keeps a ledger recording dead sparrows and hair follicles? Or, 
perhaps, does it mean that no sparrow dies and no hair falls out without God 
specifically decreeing that it be so? Although some take it in this sense it does 
not seem to be what Jesus meant. 69 Rather, Jesus, in sending out the twelve on 
a mission wishes to encourage them despite the difficulties they will encounter. 
The issue is much the same as that raised in the Old Testament: if God's people 
suffer does this mean that God has been defeated? Jesus does not provide an 
explanation to the problem of evil. Instead, he gives two different responses 
both of which arise out of the Old Testament. 70 First, there is a coming 
eschatological judgment in which the truth will come forth (10: 26-8). Things are 
not always what they appear to be and God's eschatological judgment will 
vindicate the sufferings of Jesus• s disciples. Second, Jesus appeals to the 
wisdom tradition in emphasizing the inability of humans to understand life in its 
totality. God knows the insignificant details of life such as the number of hairs 
on one's head. Hence, we are not in a position to pa_ss judgment on God for 
failing to deliver us from suffering. Jesus calls for his disciples to trust God 
in the face of suffering. He does not say, however, that the suffering is 
ordained by God. Rather, he says that just as God even cares for sparrows and the 
hairs of your head, God cares about them even in their persecutions. So, in all 
this they are not to doubt God's concern for them even in the midst of such 
horrible experiences. Again, providence does rtot mean protection from evil. But 
nothing can separate them from God's concern. In this way the disciples are 
encouraged to hope in God's future and trust in God's care in order to free them 
from fearing what others shall do to them. 
69See 1 for instance, John G. Cook, 11 The Sparrow 1 s Fall in Mt 10:29b, 11 
Zeitschrift fr die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der Alteren 
Kirche, 79, no. 1-2 (1988): 138-44. 
'°See Dale C. Allison Jr. "Matthew 10:26-31 and the Problem of Evil," St. 
Vladimir's Theological Quarterly. 32, no. 4 (1988): 293-308. 
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In Jesus' day some people thought that all suffering was a direct punishment for 
one / s sins. This issue was discussed in the Old Testament wisdom literature 
without any conclusion being reached. Although Job, Ecclesiastes and the 
individual complaint Psalms call into question the belief that all suffering is 
due to sin, it seems that many people continued to affirm it. 71 In Luke 13:1-5 
Jesus is informed about some people whom Pilate had killed while they were 
presenting sacrifices in the temple. These were God• s people offering their 
worship in the way God had prescribed, yet they met a horrible death. These 
worshippers of the true God were slain by a pagan ruler. Did God care for them? 
Or, were they ingenuine worshippers whom God foreordained to be killed in their 
act of hypocrisy? Jesus asks the question whether they were wicked "sinners." He 
uses the term reserved for Jews who paid no attention to God's covenant. It would 
have been assumed by many that they were such sinners because of the way they met 
their death. But this seems unlikely since, in presenting their offerings, they 
were fulfilling the covenant. 
In the same passage Jesus also speaks of a tower which fell on eighteen people 
killing them. Was this an accident or God's punishment for their sins? The word 
on the street held that it was divine punishment. But Jesus refuses to attribute 
either the tragedy of the worshippers slain or the accident with the tower to 
their sins. 72 Jesus does not say these people came under divine judgment. God 
did not foreordain their deaths. Such events are not what God intends--this is 
made clear in the life of Jesus. Instead, Jesus makes use of these tragic events 
to call on his audience to seek God. No one knows when death may come, so place 
71See Lindstrom, Suffering and Sin. He argues that Old Testament scholarship 
generally assumes that all suffering is caused by God as retribution for sin, but 
that this is patently false since there is the realm of Death in which disorder 
and disease may arise if the divine presence does not subdue them. Hence, some 
suffering is simply irrational. For a study of the development in scripture 
rejecting the idea that material well-being as directly proportional to one's 
character see David L. Thompson, "The Godly and the Good Life in Biblical 
Thought,.' Christian Scholars Review 22, no. 3 (1993): 248-266. 
72See Walter Liefeld, Luke, Expositor's Bible Commentary vol. 8 (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984);"""970. 
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your trust in God now (cf. Lk. 12:20). 
The same question is raised in John 9:1-5 where jesus is asked about a man who 
was blind from birth. Was this caused by his sin or that of his parents? It was 
assumed that such things did not just happen apart from some moral cause. Some 
people thought that according to Exodus 20:5 God punished children or 
grandchildren because of distant sins (even though this teaching was overturned 
in Ez. 18:20). Others believed that the fetus was capable of sinning. 73 Jesus, 
following the Old Testament, rejects the doctrine that his blindness (or all 
defects in the created order) is the specific result of sin. For him, such things 
are opportunities for God's glory to be manifested in compassion and healing. God 
overrules this "faulty creation" by restoring normality to the man. Jesus stands 
with God against disease and deformity for they are not what God intends: Jesus 
is not running around 11 cleaning up" the sickness God has spread. Moreover, it is 
an opportunity for Jesus to challenge his audience with its own "blindness" and 
its need to come to trust in Jesus, the light of the world. 
4.12 Conclusion to the Life of Jesus 
In summary I would like to make three points regarding Jesus and providence. To 
begin, in Jesus God "tabernacled" among us displaying God's way in the world. 
Jesus is the model for understanding God's relationship to the world. In Jesus 
we see what God is most truly like and what sort of relationship with us God 
desires. God is not remote or disengaged, but· intimate and near. 
Second, the way of Jesus is compassion, sacrificial love, and a strong desire for 
the sinful humans to be cured of their rebellion. He stands against the sin which 
ruins the beloved and wants to eradicate it, transforming us into godlike 
creatures. In standing against sin Jesus, nevertheless, stands with the sinner. 
73 See C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St. John, second ed. 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978), 356 and Leon Morris, The Gospel According to 
John, rev. ed. New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids 1 
MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 424-6. 
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In fact, on our behalf Jesus undertakes alienation and death in order to 
reconcile us to God. If Jesus is the paradigm of providence, then God is 
fundamentally opposed to sin, evil and suffering_;, If Jesus was cleaning up the 
mess God had caused (e. g. disease and suffering), then Jesus stood opposed to 
God. But if Jesus is God manifest in the flesh, then never again can God be 
understood as ordering the destruction of a people for God is the God of the 
Gentiles also (Rom. 3:29). In Jesus, God identifies with our sufferings and 
temptations. 
Third, just like Yahweh in the Old Testament Jesus displayed a good deal of power 
over the non-human creation in that he miraculously healed, calmed storms and fed 
people. And, just like Yahweh, Jesus does not have an easy time getting humans 
to do the will of God. Humans are much more resistent to divine purposes than the 
rest of the created order. Jesus had desired to bring Israel together under God, 
as a hen gathers her chicks (Mt. 23:37), but that intention was left unfulfilled 
because the people were unwilling to be gathered. Luke explicitly claims that the 
Pharisees and lawyers "rejected God's purpose for themselves" (Lk. 7:30). Such 
texts fly in the face of Berkouwer's remark that "Scripture nowhere suggests that 
God's work is limited by human activity. "75 On the contrary, the teaching of 
Jesus stands opposed to the theology that everything happens just as God decrees 
it should and God's purposes are never frustrated. 76 Furthermore, in Gethsemane 
Jesus did not get everything he wanted. Sometimes the desires of God are stymied. 
"see Van de Beek, Why? On Suffering, Guilt, and God, 282-94. For Van de 
Beek, God has been moving increasingly toward grace and compassion and away from 
domination and punishing. In Jesus, he sees God as saying he will never again 
order the extermination of any people or send suffering etc. There is much in his 
book with which I agree. In the Old Testament section I sought to show, however, 
that the changes God makes are not those Van de Beek affirms. 
75G. C. Berkouwer, The Providence of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952), 
127. 
''Reformed theologian James Daane says that decretal theology does not allow 
these biblical texts to have their force. Instead, appeal is made to seeing 
things from the ·"eternal" or divine point of view in which case all works out 
just as God desires. See his The Freedom of God: A.Study of Election and Pulpit 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1973), 83-4. 
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But God is resourceful and faithfully works to bring good even out of evil 
situations. God needs to be resourceful since, as was shown, the providence God 
exercised in the life of Jesus was dependent upo~ human choices and responses. 
Divine providence took the particular path it did in response to the actions of 
humans such as Mary and Joseph, the disciples and the religious authorities. The 
ministry of Jesus displayed openness and flexibility in response to others. He 
maintained his purposes but was open to modifying his plans in response to the 
requests of people. In Jesus we come to see God's way as responsive to his 
creatures, receptive to what they say and do, and resourceful in working with the 
limited resources available to him in any given situation. God is extremely 
competent. 
Furthermore, in Jesus we see the divine hwniliation and vulnerability brought 
into clear focus. God is not the all determining power responsible for sending 
everything, including suffering, upon us. The way of God is love. 11 Jesus Christ 
is both the consummation and the explicative history of 'God is love.' "77 This 
love is even willing to humiliate itself in the hope that we may be redeemed. The 
life of Jesus ·demonstrated service to and suffering with people rather than 
domination over them. The son of God did not "regard equality with God a thing 
to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a bondservant" (Phil. 2: 6-
7). In him we understand that God does not have a "compulsive retention of 
power. " 78 Christology is the great stumbling stone to the classical view of 
omnipotence. Our views of divine power, proVidence and sovereignty must pass 
through the lens of Jesus if they are to come into focus regarding the nature of 
God. Metaphors such as king and potter must be interpreted in the light of Jesus 
rather than our normal understanding of kings and potters. After all, in the book 
of Revelation a search is made for one who can open the seals of a book (Rev. 
5:1-14). No one is found worthy to open the book until, at last, the lion of 
77Adrio Konig, Here Am I: A Believer's Reflection on God (Grand Rapdis, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1982), 40. 
"van de Beek, Why?, 164. 
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Judah appears--the one "who has overcome" ( 5: 5). This is what the disciples 
expected of the messiah and it is what we, with our traditional understandings 
of divine power, expect. Amazingly, however, the author changes metaphors for it 
is not the lion who actually opens the book, but an immolated lamb (5:6). It is 
the slain lamb which explains the kind of lion God is for it is in this way that 
God has "overcome" sin and death. This is not what anyone expected--this way of 
overcoming through suffering, death and resurrection. This way of God is risky, 
some would even say foolhardy and God, as Philip Yancy remarks, was courageous 
enough to risk it. 
It took courage to endure the shame, and courage even to risk 
descent to a planet known for its clumsy violence, among a race 
known for rejecting its prophets. A God of all power deliberately 
put himself in such a state that Satan could tempt him, demons could 
taunt him, and lowly human beings could slap his face and nail him 
to a cross. What more foolhardy thing could God have done? 
"Alone of all the creeds, Christianity has added courage to the 
virtues of the Creator, 11 said G. K. Chesterton. The need for such 
courage began with Jesus' first night on earth and did not end until 
his last. 79 
4.13 The Jeopardy of God's Project in the Early Church 
The book of Acts and the epistle to the Romans provide insights into divine 
providence as God sought to develop the Jesus movement into a more inclusive 
body. My comments will focus on Acts 10-15 and Romans 9-11 which I take to 
address a pivotal time in God's attempt to direct his people toward his vision 
of what the church should be. The main issue concerns the inclusion of the 
Gentiles into God's project without having to first become Jewish. 
4.13.1 Acts 10-15 
"Philip Yancy, "Cosmic Combat," Christianity Today 38, no. 14 (Dec. 12, 
1994) : 21. 
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God desired to complete his project of forming a people of faith from every 
nation, race, gender and economic status. Given the disciples' traditional 
understanding of the kingdom of God this was no easy task for providence to 
accomplish. In Acts 10-15 God sought to get the disciples to understand that the 
divine project was to include Jews and Gentiles together in one people of faith. 
At this point in history the church is essentially Jewish and led by Galileans. 
The disciples believed God's project was for Israel alone (Acts 1:6). In Acts 6 
we are told of a significant number of Hellenistic Jews who join their native 
cousins in the church. The integration of these two groups caused some initial 
friction which led to a reorganization of church leadership. But nothing prepared 
the disciples for the broad program God had in mind. In chapters 10-11 Luke 
describes God's attempt to get Peter to understand that Gentiles should be 
welcomed into the church without the obligation of having to become Jewish 
proselytes. Up to this time no disciples doubted that anyone wishing to be a 
Christian had to practice the public Jewish observances of Sabbath, circumcision 
and the dietary regulations. 8° Christianity was considered solely a Jewish 
phenomena. Before bringing unbelieving Gentiles directly into the church God 
selected a Gentile who worshipped Yahweh (a "Godfearer" acceptable to Jewish 
religion) to be the strategic bridge to full scale immediate acceptance of 
Gentiles into the church. The Roman centurion named Cornelius was a person given 
to prayer and caring for those in need (10:2). An angel informs him that his 
prayers have made a difference to God (v. 4) and that he should send for Peter. 
At the same time God grants Peter a visioh of ceremonially unclean food, 
commanding Peter to eat it. Peter refuses, telling God he keeps the covenant 
regulations~ This vision is repeated three times, but it is clear that God is not 
yet successful in getting Peter to understand the message (10:16-7). After the 
vision Peter accompanies Cornelius's servants back to his house where the entire 
extended family and slaves have been assembled. Peter then understands that God 
is accepting Gentiles who have faith (10:34-5). He explains to them that the 
80See James Dunn, Jesus, Paul and the Law (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1990), 
especially chapter 7. 
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crucified and resurrected Jesus is the messiah in whom they should place their 
trust for the forgiveness of sins. At that time the gift of the Holy Spirit is 
given to "all those who were listening to the mess.age" (10:44). Upon seeing this 
phenomena Peter and the Jews with him decide it is permissible to baptize these 
Gentiles into the Christian community (10:47). When Peter returns to Jerusalem, 
however, certain Jewish Christians take issue with him (11:2). After he explains 
the situation to them they conclude that God has accepted the Gentiles into the 
Christian community (11:18). Despite this initial victory for God, the 
achievement of his goal for the church was far from sure. 
In Acts 13-14 it is Paul who takes center stage with his missionary journey in 
which some Jews but many more Gentiles come to faith in Christ. However, certain 
Jewish Christians began to inform these Gentile Christians that they could not 
be genuine Christians unless they practiced the law of Moses (15:1). Paul and 
Barnabas strongly disagree with these fellow Christians, precipitating "much 
dissension and debate" (15:2). It is decided to take the matter to the leadership 
at Jerusalem. While there the debate breaks out afresh between Paul and some of 
his fellow Jewish Christians. Again, it must be stressed that this was a debate 
between Jews who accepted Jesus as the messiah. It is the Christian community 
which is attempting to discern where divine providence was leading the church in 
this controversial matter. Moreover, this was no mild difference of opinion, but 
a full-orbed fight which threatened the accomplishment of God's will for the 
church. After all, was not Paul guilty of blurring the lines between the covenant 
people of God and those who were outsiders? Where does the divine presence rest? 
A very important question indeed. A meeting is called in which there was 11 much 
debate" (15:7). During the meeting Peter recounted what God had done in the 
household of Cornelius, Paul and Barnabas speak of God's signs and wonders among 
the Gentiles, and James cites a passage from Amos to claim that these events are 
part of God's project to bring the Gentiles into the community of faith. James 
suggests. certain minimum behaviors which Gentiles should observe in order for 
Jews and Gentiles to fellowship together as the people of God. Those at the 
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meeting agree to this and send out a letter stating this accompanied by 
representatives to the churches where the debate raged. 
I wish to make several observations regarding providence related to God's plan 
of developing both Jews and Gentiles into a unified group of people exercising 
faith in Jesus. First, to accomplish this plan God was .dependent upon the people 
involved, especially Peter and Paul, to correctly interpret God's actions in 
these events. Obviously, not all Jewish Christians _understood it the same way. 
God had difficulty in getting the apostolic church to follow his direction in 
this matter. But through discussion, debate and much reflection they came to 
agreement. In the letter sent out from the Jerusalem leadership they say "it 
seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us" (15:28). In other words, they claimed 
that the conclusion they reached through argumentation was the will of God fbr 
their particular situation. The will of God was not mysteriously written on the 
wall of the room, but came through debate and dialogue. God worked through and 
was dependent upon the debating process such that the outcome was not guaranteed. 
In being dependent upon the leaders of the early church God took the risk that 
they would rightly ascertain the path God was leading. 
Although God's plan of including the Gentiles in the body of Christ apart from 
the Mosaic law met with initial success, God did experience some setbacks. In 
Galatians 2: 11-21 Paul describes what has come to be called the "Antioch 
incident."" The Jerusalem council had sent ·its letters to the churches. At 
Antioch--Paul's home base--Jews (including Peter) and Gentiles were eating 
together: a sign of fellowship without religious barriers. However, Peter and 
Barnabas retreated from this practice when some Jewish Christians sent from James 
in Jerusalem came to Antioch. After that the Jewish Christians separated 
themselves from the Gentile Christians. For Paul, this destroyed the unity of the 
church and derailed God's work. Tragically, there is reason to believe that the 
81See James Dunn, The Partings of the Ways Between Christianity and Judaism 
and Their Significance for the Character of Christianity (London: SCM, 1991), 
130-5 and Jesus, Paul and the Law, 118-121, 160-3. 
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Antioch church turned against Paul, forcing him to seek a support base 
elsewhere. 82 If so, then God's project was dealt a serious blow. Peter's failure 
in this incident is particularly troubling for among the apostles he had been the 
first to promote the inclusion of the Gentiles. It seems that God's original 
intention was to work through Peter in this matter. In the end, however, he fails 
and God, resourcefully, turns to Paul to be the stalwart in this matter. It is 
similar in some respects to the Old Testament situation where God thought Saul 
would be a good king, but in the end had to turn to David. 
Another observation is that God was not, in the long run, very successful in 
persuading Jews that Jesus was the messiah. Paul brought some to faith in Jesus, 
but the primary response of his countrymen is to reject his message and force him 
to flee for his life (Acts 9:22; 13:45; 14:5, 19). The story in Acts is a tragic 
one for just as the promises to Abraham are beginning to be fulfilled, Israel 
rejects God's way of fulfillment." The book of Acts ends with a speech by Paul 
to the Roman Jews. (28:25-8). Robert Tannehill observes that this speech "cannot 
represent a satisfying ending for the author of Luke-Acts. The quotation from Isa 
6:9-10 shows that the Jews' refusal to see and hear is anticipated in scripture, 
but the fulfillment of this scripture means that the 'hope of Israel' (also found 
in scripture) is not being fulfilled."" God had worked so long to build a 
covenant people who would trust him into the future, but his project seems to 
falling apart in his hands for the divine intentions for Israel are not being 
realized. In response to this reaction Paul decides that his primary mission will 
no longer be to the Jews but to the Gentiles (28:28; 13:46). This decision had 
huge consequences for the future of the church since, at least after 130 A. D., 
the church has been essentially Gentile in its identity. The parting of the ways 
82See Dunn, Jesus, Paul and the Law, 161. 
83R0bert C. Tannehill's "Israel in Luke-Acts: A Tragic Story," Journal of 
Biblical Literature, 104, no. 1 (1985): 69-85, provides a great deal of evidence 
from Luk<;!-Acts that God's intentions for Israel were not realized and the tragedy 
in which this results. 
84Tannehill, 11 Israel in Luke-Acts, " 82. 
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took a long time and it was not a foregone conclusion that Christianity would 
become a Gentile body." Nevertheless, there are relatively few Jews after this 
date who believe in Jesus as messiah. 
On the one hand it could be said concerning this that God is being flexible and 
working with the resources available. Jesus was sent to the lost sheep of the 
house of Israel and the early church focussed its attention on persuading Jews 
of Jesus' messiahship. What else is God to do if the Jewish people, overall, 
reject his messiah? God's vision of forming a people of God from every race 
centered around his son Jesus takes a very winding path and certainly meets with 
a degree of success. The church did develop from an introversionist Galilean sect 
to become an international conversionist group. 86 The church did become 
cosmopolitan and universal in nature. Nevertheless, God's goals met with both 
success and failure. The fact that the church came to include Gentiles at all 
means that God succeeded in this intention. The fact that the church became 
almost exclusively Gentile means that God failed to achieve his purpose here. In 
fact, the Gentile make up of the church called into question God's faithfulness 
to his covenant people. 
4.13.2 Romans 9-11 
Paul's epistle to the Christians at Rome addresses the issue of Jewish/Gentile 
relations within the body of Christ. Paul wanted to use Rome as his new base of 
operations and he wanted to be sure they understood his perspective on the 
Jew/Gentile question lest the Roman church go the way of the Antioch church in 
failing to understand God's way. I will concentrate on chapters 9-11 since they 
have traditionally been emphasized in discussions of providence. In fact, failure 
to grasp this historical debate embroiling the apostolic church has led to a 
misunderstanding of Romans and especially chapter 9. The issue under discussion 
85Se~ Dunn, The Partings of the Ways. 
86 See Derek Tidball, The Social Context of the New Testament: a Sociological 
Analysis (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984), 51-64. 
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is not eternal salvation and reprobation for individuals. 87 Al though North 
American evangelicals still cite Romans 9 as the classic text for predestination 
of individuals and divine pancausality, modern biblical scholarship places the 
letter in its historic context, arriving at a very different subject-matter. 88 
Consequently, Paul's issue is whether God's election of Israel has turned out a 
failure since the majority of Jews were not accepting Jesus as the messiah. The 
danger was that a predominately Gentile church, placing its faith in Jesus 1 would 
become arrogant, regard ethnic Israel as hopeless, and believe a mission to the 
Jews unnecessary. 89 
The covenant faithfulness of God is the topic of Romans 9-11. Paul argues that 
God has kept his promise to Abraham and is faithfully accomplishing his project. 
Paul is emphatic that God's project, overall, has not failed but, rather, tfie 
majority of his countrymen have misunderstood God's project. Although this 
misunderstanding is centered in the messiahship of Jesus it has antecedents in 
the Old Testament. In the survey of the Old Testament material we saw that 
Israel, from time to time, refused to acknowledge God's work in their midst. So 
now, they refuse to acknowledge God's work in Jesus as well as the inclusion of 
the Gentiles into the people of God apart from observing the public badges of 
covenant membership (Sabbath, circumcision and food laws). According to Paul, God 
is accomplishing a new work which was promised from the beginning. The long 
awaited inclusion of the Gentiles is happening--but not in the way his Jewish 
brethren thought appropriate. 
87John Piper takes this approach in his The Justification of God: an 
Exegetical and Theological Study of Romans 9: 1-23 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1983) 
as does Thomas R. Schreiner, "Does Romans 9 Teach Individual Election Unto 
Salvation?," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 36, no. 1 (March 
1993) : 25-40. 
"se·e James Dunn, Romans, Word Biblical Conunentary in 2 vols. (Waco, TX: 
Word, 1988), 520. 
"This section is greatly indebted to N. T. Wright's, The Climax of the 
Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1992) 
esp. 231-57 and Dunn's, Romans. 
149 
Paul claims that simply being a member of ethnic Israel does not place one in 
proper standing with God (9:6-13). God freely chose Isaac and Jacob rather than 
Ishmael and Esau to be the people through whom he would fulfill his promised 
redemption. Israel, of course, placed its trust in God's election of them, but 
misunderstood both their status in this election and that God's purpose was 
always to bring the 11 non-elect 11 into his project. Is God not free to accomplish 
his task in the way he sees fit? Did God not reveal to Moses that it was solely 
God's decision when and to whom God would show mercy? Paul's point is that if God 
wants to show mercy to the Gentiles by bringing them into the people of God 
simply by faith in Jesus without the badges of covenant membership, God is free 
to do it (9:15-16). Cranfield notes correctly that Paul is not thinking of an 
arbitrary and unqualified will of God, but of God's merciful will which desires 
the salvation of both Jew and Gentile.'° Furthermore, in the Old Testament we 
saw that God strengthened Pharaoh's heart in his rebellion in the hopes that it 
would help him come to his senses and repent. In the same way God now is 
hardening Israel in its rebellion in hopes she will repent and so be redeemed 
(see 11:7, 25). For to God to enact his power in this way upon Israel would no 
doubt seem very strange to Paul's fellow Jews for it is a significant change in 
God's providential ways. But, as Cranfield notes, the 11 power 11 that God exercises 
upon Pharaoh and Israel is consistent with Paul's use of the power of God in the 
rest of the epistle: it is God's saving power. 91 God is seeking to accomplish 
his redemptive purposes which involves bringing Jews and Gentiles together as the 
new covenant people based on faith in Jesus. 
Just as Jeremiah had used the potter metaphor for God in order to claim that God 
was free to bring judgment on Israel, so now Paul does the same (9:20-22). Dunn 
notes that divine 'judgment is for the purpose of eradicating all flaws in the 
90c. E. B. Cranfield, Romans: a Shorter Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans; 1985), 234. 
"Cranfield, Romans, 234-5. 
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vessels the potter is rnaking. 92 God does not wish to leave Israel in this state 
of mistrusting God's purposes. Paul draws upon the Old Testament theme of divine 
forbearance giving time for repentance and another theme that divine hardening 
is for the sake of pushing things to a head. 93 Yet, with one major difference 
since all is inverted. Ethnic Israel is the new Pharaoh, refusing to acknowledge 
God's ways. It is the covenant people themselves who stubbornly resist the 
potter's will. They refuse to become the sort of vessel God desires them to be. 
Concerning the potter metaphor it should be remembered that in the Old Testament 
we saw that the same metaphor was used and it was pointed out that in some 
respects the relationship between God and Israel is like that between a potter 
and clay, but that in other important respects the relationship is not like that 
of potter to clay. The potter metaphor is useful in highlighting God's directing 
purpose, but is inadequate to explain why the clay does not go the way the potter 
desires (unless one wishes to say that God is simply a deficient potter) . The 
relationship between God and Israel is not completely or solely like that between 
a potter and clay. God is not like a potter in all respects and Israel is not 
like clay in all respects. God, though wishing to direct his people in a 
particular way, is not manipulative with them. Although Israel is supposed to 
follow the """YS of the lord, in this instance she resists the will of the potter 
by refusing to follow in the path divine providence has chosen at this juncture 
in history. Paul is not arguing for divine pancausality here. This 
misunderstanding occurs when Romans 9 is divorced from its historical setting and 
universalized into a timeless truth. 94 Such hermeneutical malpractice is also 
done on several Old Testament texts (e. g. Isa. 45:7) and was discussed in 
section 15 of the previous chapter. In this passage, Paul is not arguing about 
92Dunn, Romans , 5 6 6 . 
"Helpful on Paul's use of the Old Testament texts in this chapter is James 
D. StrauSs' nGod's Promise and Universal History: The Theology of Romans 9" ed. 
Clark Pinnock, Grace Unlimited (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1975), 190-208. 
94Louis Berk.hot takes an ahistorical reading of the potter and claims that 
Romans 9 actually "speaks from a pre-creation standpoint." See his Systematic 
Theology, third ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1946), 120. 
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general principles of providence, but about a specific historical situation 
between God and Israel. When this is kept in mind the error of pancausality is 
easily avoided. 
God had always planned on including the Gentiles and he is now accomplishing this 
goal (9:23-33) . 95 This is not a new plan for God, but the bringing to fruition 
of his plan from the beginning. God did not foreordain Israel's rebellion (9:22). 
Yet, God accommodates to this situation, making use of it to further his goal of 
bringing the Gentiles to faith in Jesus. Although God did not cause Israel's 
unbelief, he is resourceful enough to utilize Israel's rejection in order to 
bring about something good. 96 
Does God's hardening of Israel mean they cannot repent and come to faith in 
Jesus? Not at all. In Exodus we saw that divine hardening did not render one 
unable to change. Paul explicitly says that hope is not lost regarding his 
kinspeople for God is seeking to use the conversion of the Gentiles to provoke 
Israel to faith (11:11-27). Trust in God's way is all that is required of them 
(10: 1-13). God intends to reclaim them, they may yet call upon his mercy for "God 
has shut up all in disobedience that he might show mercy to all" (11:32). This 
indicates that the overarching purpose of God is one of mercy. 97 Paul concludes 
this section by praising the ways of God and claiming that no one would have 
"see Dunn, Romans, 568-9. 
'°Here I disagree with Dunn (Romans, 671, 690-1) and Wright (Climax of the 
Covenant, 239-41) who seem to suggest that God specifically brought about 
Israel's rejection of Jesus in order to direct the gospel to the Gentiles. In 
Romans I do not think Paul is saying that God caused Israel's unbelief, but, 
rather, that God made use of it. Wright does not seem consistent in his claim, 
however, for he says both that God had always intended Israel's rejection (this 
was the divine plan) and that Israel "did not submit to God's own covenant plan 11 
(241). If God's plan was for Israel to rebel, then it cannot also be claimed that 
God planned for Israel to submit. Dunn has a similar problem in that he holds 
that God purposed Israel's unbelief as a means of starting the mission to the 
Gentiles· and he also believes that Israel was to blame for its own unbelief. From 
Acts 10-15 I sought to show how God first began the Gentile mission from among 
Jewish Christians. It was only subsequent development that forced God to modify 
his plans. 
97 See Dunn, Romans, 689. 
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thought God would bring about his merciful salvation to the world in the way God 
has done it (11:33-6). 
Did Paul win the day with this argument? Did his fellow Jews accept Jesus as the 
climax of the covenant? Was he Successful in achieving equal standing for 
Gentiles within the church apart from the badges of covenant membership? Did the 
salvation of the Gentiles stimulate Israel to trust God that Jesus was the 
messiah? It seems that God achieved some of what he desired but not all. On the 
one hand Paul certainly won the day regarding Gentile salvation without having 
to become identified with ethnic Israel. On the other hand the predominately 
Jewish make up of the early church faded from the scene since fewer and fewer 
Jews placed their trust in Jesus. Originally, God wanted to redeem the nations 
through Israel, but ends up attempting to reach Israel through converted 
Gentiles. Moreover, in my view, God banked his strategy on the Gentile church and 
it has failed him for, overall, the church has not been the agent God desired it 
to be in relation to Israel. 98 This does not mean that God has given up on his 
goal of uniting Jews and Gentiles into one people of faith through Jesus Christ. 
God may resourcefully take up other means to accomplish his goals, but he will 
remain faithful to them. 
God has achieved some of what he desired, but not everything. God took the risk 
of working through the disciples and others in the early church. Some of the 
apostolic Christians understood the direction-divine providence was going while 
others did not and worked hard against it (witness Paul's detractors). The goals 
God did accomplish were not easily achieved and there is yet more that God 
desires to accomplish. God encounters conflict and opposition to his project and 
in seeking its fulfillment he experiences both victory and defeat. 
4.14 The· Natura and Goal of the Divine Project 
"on the controversial "thus all Israel shall be saved" (11:26) see Wright, 
Climax of the Covenant, 249-51 and Dunn, Romans, 681-3, 691-3. 
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"By this the love of God was manifested in us, that God has sent his only 
begotten son into the world so that we might live through him. In this is love, 
not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent his son to be a propitiation 
for our sins. Beloved, if God so loved us, we also ought to love one another" (1 
John 4:9-11). God's project is to develop people who love and trust him in 
response to his love and manifest their love of God in effective action to 
others. God takes the initiative of love towards sinners. God is gracious towards 
sinners and it is this gracious love which enables us to turn from our sin and 
place our trust in God. Furthermore, it is the divine love which transforms our 
hearts to be concerned about the wellbeing of others. Salvation brings us into 
a personal relationship with God such that we actually begin to become godlike 
in our character. A transformation that anticipates God's eschatological 
transformation of things in the new heaven and earth. 
The Ne\'1 Testament writers see Jesus both as the one who brought divine love to 
us anc also the model for the way we should live. The book of Hebrews speaks of 
Jes1ls working to "bring many sons to glory" (2:10}. God desires to give us a 
place i11 l .... is household. On our way to glory we are faced with temptations to turn 
away from God's way. Hence, the exhortations not to commit apostasy (Heb. 3:12; 
4:1, 6). The author of Hebrews holds Jesus up as our model. He faced temptations 
and overcame them so he is able to help us overcome ours (2:18). Despite the 
difficulties and even death Jesus experienced he remained faithful to God's 
project (3: 2) . We are to follow his example ·rather than those Israelites who 
refused to trust God, desired to return to Egypt and so died in the wilderness 
(3:7-19). God was not proud of this generation. He had reached out to them 
repeatedly, but they continually refused to believe God cared for their best 
interest. Hebrews 11, however, cites people of whom "God is not ashamed to be 
called their God" (11:16). God is still seeking such people who will trust him 
despite hardships. The recipients of the letter were going through tough times 
(10:34) and the author encourages them to "fix their eyes on Jesus" (12:2) in 
order to faithfully continue in God's way. The author says that God has not 
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changed his purpose for God remains faithful to his promise (6:17-8). Yet, the 
hope we are to have does not mean that our lives will be comfortable or that 
nothing bad will happen to us. In 11: 32-39 the author explains that although some 
people in the Old Testament were successful (by human standards) others were not. 
Whereas some were victorious in battle others were killed; while some were 
miraculously delivered, others were martyred. Nevertheless, all these people 
gained God's approval since they trusted God whether good or bad happened to them 
(11:39). God was pleased not just with those who conquered kingdoms but even with 
those who went hungry or were tortured. Providence does not allow us to predict 
what people of faith shall experience in life. 
God's son Jesus was faithful yet he suffered rejection and death. If we begin 
with Jesus as the model for experiencing divine providence as well as the goal 
of humanity--what we are meant to be--then our understanding of the role of 
providence changes dramatically. When people hear the word providence it is 
common that they think of power and control over all our circumstances. But if 
we look to Jesus and understand that he is what God wants to produce in us--a 
holy people--then we will not be concerned with power over others or look to God 
to manipulate our circumstances so that our lives are comfortable. Instead, we 
shall seek the way of God, faithfully following his love, perusing sanctification 
no matter what befalls us. God is seeking to create a people of whom he is proud 
to be their God. This is the project God has had in place from the creation of 
the world. God has remained faithful to that project, not giving up on the 
creation despite our sin. God has demonstrated his faithfulness through all the 
twists and turns providence has taken." And God is not finished yet. 
4.15 Eschatology and Providence 
God is yet working to fulfill his promises and bring his project to fruition. The 
eschaton·will surprise us in the way God chooses to accomplish his purposes for 
the future is not set in concrete, it is not unfolding according to a prescribed 
"See Van De Beek, Why?, 279. 
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script. Helpful in this regard is a distinction Konig makes between prophecies 
or promises and predictions or forecasts. 100 He points out two basic 
differences. First, whereas predictions come about only once, promises are 
fulfilled repeatedly. There are very specific predictions of future events which 
come to pass (e.g. 1 Kings 13:20-5). "But these predictions have a limited 
value1 exerting no particular influence on salvation history. Distinct from these 
are prophecies and promises which are repeatedly fulfilled and which decisively 
influence the unfolding of salvation history. 11101 KOnig cites several examples 
of divine promises which the biblical writers claimed were fulfilled on several 
occasions and in a variety of ways. A prophecy such as "the day of the Lord" 
(Amos 5:18-20) "finds repeated fulfillment: in the fall of Jerusalem (586 B.C.; 
Ez. 13:5; Lam. 1:12; 2:1, 22), in the ministry of John the Baptist (Mark 1:2, cf. 
Mal. 3:1-2), in Jesus' earthly ministry (Luke 4:16-21; cf. Isa. 61:1-2), in the 
outpouring of the Spirit (Acts 2:16-21; cf. Joel 2:28-32), and in Jesus' second 
advent (2 Pet. 3:12; Rev. 16:14). 11102 Prophecies or promises continue to be 
fulfilled because God is not yet finished with his project. 
The second basic difference between prophecies and predictions is that whereas 
predictions are very specific forecasts of what is to occur, prophecies allow 
room for God to fulfill them in a variety of ways--ways which we cannot 
anticipate. God fulfills prophecies or promises repeatedly, bringing out new 
aspects of them in conjunction with the new historical situation. As was seen 
above, despite the messianic prophecies no one anticipated the sort of 
messiahship which Jesus exhibited. The book of Acts (2: 16) claims that the 
promised outpouring of the Spirit on the "day of the Lord" in Joel 2:28-32 
occurred on the day of Pentecost despite the fact that most of the specific 
"signs 11 mentioned by Joel did not come about. If this was a prediction then one 
100Adrio Konig, The Eclipse of Christ in Eschatology: Toward a Christ 
Centered APproach (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 183-189. 
101K6nig, Eclipse, 183. 
102KOnig, Eclipse, 184. 
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has the difficulty of explaining why things did not come about as predicted, but 
if it is a prophecy then God is free to bring it to fulfillment in a way 
befitting the new situation. 103 Again, Acts 15:15_:18 says that Amos 9:11-12 has 
been fulfilled. Whereas Amos had prophesied of Israel's return to political glory 
and rule over Edom, James claims, in Acts 15, that this prophecy has been 
fulfilled by the inclusion of the Gentiles into the.people of God. In other 
words, James sees that it is through faith in Jesus that Israel will "rule" over 
the Gentiles . 10' If this was a prediction, then it was a failure for Israel has 
not ruled Edom. But if it was a prophecy, then it was open to fulfillment in the 
way the wisdom of God saw fit. 
Who would have anticipated such fulfillments? Who could have expected that God 
would fulfill his ancient prophecies in the way the New Testament writers claim 
God has done? Van de Beek comments that "the way of God to Christ was not an 
established road. It is a way which can only be read in retrospect in the light 
of Christ, not guaranteed in advance. 11105 The promises made to Abraham regarding 
a land, seed, and blessing to the Gentiles have a long history of fulfillment in 
the Old Testament and in the New Testament they are qualified and universalized. 
Jesus is the seed of Abraham who climaxes what God intended from the beginning 
(Gal. 3:16). Through him, Gentiles can become children of Abraham by faith (Gal. 
3:29). The people of God look forward to inheriting a "better country" (Heb. 
11:16), a "new earth" and a "new Jerusalem" (Rev. 21:1-2). In all these we see 
that God is sovereign over his prophecies and-can bring them to fruition in the 
way he deems best fitted to the particular historical circumstances. 
103Some people believe the cosmic signs were fulfilled in detail at the time 
of Jesus' crucifixion while others believe they are yet to come. See I. Howard 
Marshall, Acts, Tyndale (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdrnans, 1988), 73-4 and F. F. Bruce, 
The Book o"'f"A.Cts, rev. ed., New International Commentary on the New Testament, 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdrnans, 1988), 62. 
10
'See Marshall, Acts, 252-3 and Bruce, ~· 293-4. 
105Van de Beek, Why?, 3 00 . 
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The promises of God should be understood as part of the divine project rather 
than as some eternal meticulous plan, a project in which God has not scripted the 
way everything in human history will go. According to KOnig God is working in the 
world according to the covenant rather than a meticulous plan. He gives several 
objections to the idea of the plan, the most important being that it casts a 
shadow on God. For it implies that God fights against (to the point of giving his 
only son) that which he wanted all along since it was part of God's plan. 106 
It is better to see God as working with us in history in order to bring about the 
fulfillment of his promises as part of his project of developing people who 
reciprocate the .divine love and trust God. Tupper uses the analogy of a master 
weaver in this regard. 107 The master weaver utilizes the possibilities open at 
any given time in order to weave his purposes into the tapestry. The tapestry is 
not finished and God is weaving alongside us to produce it. This is an 
eschatological ""'del of God's relationship to the world: there is yet more that 
God is going to do and it is not possible for us to predict the precise way it 
way go. What we do know, through Jesus, is the direction in which God is headed: 
producing a Christlike people (Rom. 8:29) to inhabit the new Jerusalem (Rev. 21). 
But sometimes the trials of life make it difficult for us to believe that God is 
working in our lives towards this project. In Romans Paul gives three reasons why 
we should remain confident in God amidst trials. First, God can use the difficult 
times in our lives to produce Christlikeness in us. Paul says that tribulations 
can produce in us patience and build character which should give us hope since, 
seeing tangible evidence of the Spirit's work in our lives, we should expect even 
more growth (Rom. 5:3-5). Second, "in all things God works for the good of those 
who love him, who have been called according to his purpose" (Rom. 8:28, NIV). 
Paul does not say that all things do in fact work together for good (contra NRSV 
106Kbnig, Here Am I, 198-9. 
107Tupper, Scandalous Providence, 68-70. 
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and NASE) but that God is working to accomplish good in all things . 108 Stott is 
correct that this latter reading must be rejected "since all things do not 
automatically work themselves together into a pattern of good. " 109 Sometimes 
even people of faith are worn down rather than built up by trials. Tribulations 
do not always strengthen one's love of and trust in God. That is what God is 
seeking to achieve but there are no guarantees. Just because God is at work in 
our lives does not mean victory is assured. James H. Evans, Jr., comments: 
"Providence refers not only to God's acts in history but more accurately to God's 
work in history. . God, in African-American religious experience, works in 
history. To work is to accomplish something in spite of resistance. "110 The 
purposes of God meet with resistance and even God does not always get what he 
desires. Furthermore, the verse does not say that God specifically sends the 
trouble into our lives . 111 Rather, God makes use of the sin, evil, a:hd 
tribulations--which he has not ordained to come about--attempting to bring good 
out of evil. Paul is not saying that God does evil that good may come! Third, no 
part of creation and not even death itself can separate us from God's love in 
Jesus (Rom. 8:38-9). For Paul, circumstances such as nakedness, danger or 
personal injury tell him neither that God has abandoned him nor that he has 
sinned. Instead, he allows the life, death and resurrection of Jesus to be the 
ground of his confidence in God's disposition towards him. The father of Jesus, 
who raised him from the dead, does not allow death to have the last word over us 
for we are, in Jesus, his children. Death itself cannot withstand the coming 
1080n the difficulty of translating this verse and discussion regarding 
whether all things are, in fact, advantageous for Christians see Tupper / 
Scandalous Providence, 338, Cranfield, Romans, 202-5, John R. W. Stott; Romans 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 246-8, and Dunn, Romans, 480-2. 
109Stott, Romans, 247. 
110James H. Evans, Jr., We Have Been Believers: An African-American 
Systematic Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 75. 
111This is opposed to Paul Helm, Providence, 116, who claims that God sends 
the trouble into our lives in order to produce transformation of character. Given 
his risk-free view of providence such that God accomplishes whatever God wants, 
one wonders why God wants some Christians to lose their faith since some do lose 
confidence in God amidst trials. One would think a risk-free God could do a 
better job. 
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kingdom of God--the divine project--for God is victorious over death. 112 
God is not yet finished with his project. Even after God's definitive work in 
Jesus there is still much sin and suffering. Things are not automatically put 
right. Van de Beek points out that· "the time between the resurrection and the 
eschaton is also the time of the Holy Spirit. . What the Spirit does is to 
make known in the world, by way of human agents and human history, the decision 
that has been made in Christ. That takes time. "113 Furthermore, the way of the 
Spirit, like God's way to Christ, is not predictable or uniform. No analytic 
truths or principle of sufficient reason determine the path the Spirit must take 
for the Holy Spirit is sovereign and free to work the way the divine wisdom deems 
best. The Spirit is not a computer program designed to follow a prescribed path. 
The Spirit is resourceful, flexible and patient in seeking to accomplish the 
divine project in the world. But is the Spirit being successful in this effort? 
Is the world being saved? Looking at the world one has a difficult time drawing 
a definitive conclusion. We see evidence for hope in the Spirit, yet, there also 
appear to be setbacks. The outcome is still open even for God. The way into the 
future is not closed and sealed. It is not a blueprint which is followed. The 
Spirit is active and seeking those who worship God in spirit and truth (Jn. 4:23) 
but action entails the risk of failure. The Spirit may not get what he desires. 
Nevertheless, we continue to hope in God because God has proven himself faithful 
time and again. 114 He does ·not give up on us, we have good reason not to give 
up on him. God has achieved some of what he wants but there is much more to be 
accomplished. 
112Gabriel Fackre believes that God continues to work towards salvation of 
people even after death. See his "Divine Perseverance," in John Sanders ed., What 
About Those Who Have Never Heard? (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 19~ 
71-95. Donald G. Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness, Love 
(Downerg Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 143-4, believes that divine grace 
pursues sinners even in hell. 
113Van de Beek, Why?, 2 97 . 
n•see Van de Beek, Why?, 305-16. 
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4.16 Excursus on Predictions and Foreknowledge 
Whereas theology has traditionally emphasized the abstractions of omniscience and 
foreknowledge the biblical writers stressed wisdom and knowledge God had which 
enabled God to be of help. 115 God has depth of knowledge (Ps. 139:1-6), breadth 
of knowledge (Job 28:23-4) and does at times declare what shall be (Is. 44:6). 
But what seems of greater value to the biblical writers is the wisdom of God in 
his dealings with people (Rom. 11:32). This is especially so in Jesus in whom 
"all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid" (Col. 2: 3). For the biblical 
writers, God's knowledge of the future is not as important as is his promise and 
faithfulness to it. The classical tradition, with Augustine, has seen 
foreknowledge as one of the key defining attributes of God."' Gorringe, 
however, is more in line with scripture when he writes: 11 What makes God God is 
not prediction but promise, God's hesed or covenant faithfulness. "117 
Nevertheless, the ideas of foreknowledge and the predictions assumed to be based 
on it are so taken for granted today that it must be addressed. In a later 
chapter I will discuss why foreknowledge is useless for predicting the future or 
for guaranteeing the end from the beginning. Here I shall limit the discussion 
to biblical "predictions" and how the openness model accounts for them. 
The word foreknowledge occurs seven times in the New Testament (the verb 
proginosko Rom. 8:29; 11:2; Acts 26:5; 1 Pet. 1:20; 2 Pet. 3:17 and the noun 
prognosis Acts 2:23; 1 Pet. 1:2) .m Five times it is used of divine knowing in 
advance and twice it refers to humans having foreknowledge. 119 Obviously, if the 
"'Gorringe is helpful here, God's Theatre, pp. 50-55. 
"'Augustine says a God without foreknowledge is not God (City of God, 5.9). 
117Gorringe, God's Theatre, p. 63. 
118 See Colin Brown ed., The New International Dictionary of New Testament 
Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1975), 1.692-3. 
"'I find it interesting that translators (who typically hold to divine 
foreknowledge) do not translate the two references to human foreknowledge as 
•foreknowledge." Perhaps they do this because they cannot bring themselves to 
believe that humans could have the same sort of foreknowledge (though not to the 
same degree) God has. 
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term is applied to humans then the mere use of the word 11 foreknowledge" does not 
settle our dispute since no human has exhaustive knowledge of the future. When 
God is said to have foreknowledge the object of the divine knowledge is either 
Jesus Christ or the people of God (as a group) . 120 Hence, God "foreknows" the 
incarnation as well as his decision to elect a people of God. 121 Neither of 
these requires exhaustive foreknowledge of future contingencies, but only 
knowledge of what God chooses to do. 
Aside from the actual term foreknowledge 1 it is common for evangelicals to focus 
on scriptural predictions and their fulfillment for apologetic purposes. Usually, 
these are used to prove either that Jesus was the messiah because he fulfilled 
all the messianic prophecies or that the Bible is divinely inspired since the 
predictions are thought to be precisely fulfilled . 122 At a minimum, the 
predictions are said to demonstrate that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the 
future. In his book, The Only Wise God, William Lane Craig provides a helpful 
summary of the biblical texts commonly used in this regard. 123 Although the 
passages he cites are compatible with the affirmation of foreknowledge, they do 
not require it. One goes beyond what the texts actually say in making the claim 
to divine foreknowledge. For instance, that God "declares the end from the 
beginning" (Isa. 46:10) can be interpreted harmoniously with either divine 
foreknowledge or the openness model defended here. The Psalmist says that before 
120see William W. Klein, The New Chosen People: A Corporate View of Election 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990), 277-8. 
121McCabe, Foreknowledge, 102-110, claims that the death of Jesus as a human 
was foreordained, but the precise means of death was not foreknown. He says that 
it is Jesus' death, not how he died, which is the important point in atonement. 
122See, for instance, Josh McDowell, Evidence That Demands a Verdict (Campus 
Crusade for Christ, 1972) . For a brief discussion of this sort of interpretation 
of prophecy in Judaism, Islam and Christianity see John F. A. Sa'V\fYer, Prophecy 
and Biblical Prophets, Rev. ed., Oxford Bible Series (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1"993), 153-9. 
123William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine 
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1987), 25-37. Some 
texts usually cited are: 1 Sam. 23:10-12; 1 Kings.13:2; Psalm 139:4, 16; Isa. 
44:7; Dan. 2:28-9; and Lk. 22:34. 
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a word is on his tongue God knows it (Ps. 139:4). Again, this may be explained 
by divine foreknowledge or as God knowing the Psalmist so well that he can 
"predict" what he will say and do. The psalmist expresses this idea in typical 
poetic fashion. 
Craig correctly claims that the scriptures proclaim that God 11 discloses the 
future.• But this does not settle the issue whether forecasting the future 
requires foreknowledge or may be explained in some other way. Richard Rice 
provides an overview of how such disclosures of the future may be understood by 
the openness model . 124 First, sometimes God simply discloses what God is going 
to do irrespective of creaturely decision. God can bring some things about on his 
own if he decides to do so (Isa. 46:11). But this does not require foreknowledge, 
only the ability to do it . 125 
Another explanation which accounts for some predictions is that they are 
conditional. 126 That is, God declares that something will happen if certain 
factors come about {Jer. 18:7-10). God discloses what "will" happen, but this is 
dependent upon human response. For instance, God may declare that judgment is 
coming if the people do not repent or blessing upon them if they demonstrate 
trust in him. Sometimes, as is the case with Jonah, the conditional element is 
124Richard Rice, God's Foreknowledge, 75-81, and his "Biblical Support, 11 in 
The Openness of God, 50-3. Craig, Wise God, 42-3 and 36 believes these 
explanations a failure. He erroneously thinks that conditional prophecies require 
middle knowledge. Moreover, he claims that the openness model denudes the 
biblical passages of any theological significance. It may denude them of the 
particular theological significance to which Craig ascribes, but it hardly 
evacuates all theological meaning. 
125Lorenzo D. McCabe, The Foreknowledge of God (Cincinnati: Cranston and 
Stowe, 1878) agrees and adds the observation that God can also overrule human 
freedom if necessary to accomplish a divine purpose. McCabe points out that if 
God does this then the human agents whom God overrules are not held responsible 
for their actions. In my opinion, McCabe appeals to divine overruling far too 
often iri order to explain predictions and does not adequately consider other 
explanations available to the openness model. 
i 26Proponents of foreknowledge need to explain how a conditional prediction 
by God can be genuine when God already knows the future result. How is it truly 
a conditional? 
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left unstated by God. This is the usual way of accounting for "failed" 
predictions, where what God said would happen did not come about. For instance, 
in l Samuel 23:9-13 David asked God if Saul would.come to the town of Keliah and 
God said he would. Then David asked God if the people of the town would hand him 
over to Saul. Again, God said this would happen. But David was not, in fact, 
handed over to Saul because David fled the area! In these cases if what God says 
will happen does not come about, then the conditional element is assumed. I 
agree, but it should be noted that even 11 successful" predictions may have been 
conditional also. It is common for proponents of foreknowledge to apply the 
category of conditional prediction only to failed predictions and to view all 
fulfilled predictions as manifestations of exhaustive foreknowledge. But some 
divine statements regarding the future which came to pass were just as 
conditional--just as dependent upon human response--as those which were 
unfulfilled. This was discussed in some detail in the previous chapter in the 
section on divine repentance. Moreover, there is a problem regarding conditional 
promises which proponents of simple foreknowledge need to explain: how a 
conditional promise can be genuine if God already foreknows the human response 
and so foreknows that he will, in fact, never fulfill the promise. 127 
A third way of explaining some predictions according to the openness model is to 
see them as statements about what will happen based upon God's exhaustive 
knowledge of the past and present. In other words, given the depth and breadth 
of God's knowledge of the present situation God forecasts what he thinks will 
happen. In this regard God is the consummate social scientist predicting what 
will happen. God's ability to predict the future in this way is far more accurate 
than any human forecaster, however, since God has access to all past and present 
knowledge. This would explain God's foretelling to Moses of Pharaoh's refusal to 
grant his request. Nonetheless, this does leave open the possibility that God 
might be mistaken about some points. In Exodus God thought that the elders of 
127For more on this see the section on divine repentance in the previous 
chapter. 
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Israel would believe Moses, but God acknowledges that Moses is correct in the 
possibility that they may not believe him (Ex. 3:16-4:9) . 128 God also thought 
the people of Jeremiah's day would repent and return to him, but they did not 
(Jer. 3: 7, 19-20) . 
In summary, the openness model holds that divine predictions may be accounted for 
in one of three ways: as statements of what God intends to do unconditioned by 
his creatures, declarations of what God will do or what will happen that are 
conditioned by the creatures, and inferences based upon God's exhaustive 
knowledge of the past and present. When God provides a prediction regarding the 
future, a key consideration is whether God has the ability to bring it about and 
the openness model affirms that God does have such power (Isa. 43:13). Yet, God 
is free to change his path based on his own purposes and his relationship with 
the creation. 
Other factors must also be considered, however. Mention has already been made 
regarding the distinction between prophecy or promise and prediction (section 
14). Prophecies undergo multiple fulfillments and are not stated with a high 
degree of specificity. After all, who, from reading the Old Testament would have 
predicted exactly what the messiah would be like? The biblical literalists of 
Jesus' day rejected him as an impostor, not the true messiah "predicted" in the 
Bible. Another consideration regards the way the New Testament authors use the 
Old Testament as a source of ''predictions" Which are "fulfilled" in the New 
Testament. Some evangelicals believe that anyone could have read the Old 
Testament and understood that the messiah would be crucified and resurrected. 
But, as was shown above, this was not the case in Jesus' day. There is nothing 
specifically said in the Old Testament that would have led one to predict a dying 
and raised messiah. But does not Paul claim (Acts 13:32-3) that the raising of 
Jesus is· the "fulfillment" of the ancient promise? Yes, but it must be remembered 
that the term "resurrection" here has undergone a transformation of meaning. It 
128See the discussion of this text in section 8 of the previous chapter. 
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is only in light of what happened to Jesus that the New Testament writers are 
able to reformulate their understanding of the Old Testament. Berkouwer is 
correct that it is only after the fact, through faith in Jesus, that the 
believing community reads these prophecies . 129 
Moreover, care must be taken to understand what the New Testament writers meant 
when they claim that something Jesus did "fulfilled" some Old Testament 
passage. 13° For instance, when Matthew cites Hosea 11:1 as being "fulfilled" by 
the return of Mary, Joseph and Jesus from Egypt he is well aware that the passage 
in Hosea is not a prediction at all. It is a reference to the Exodus of Moses' 
day. For Matthew, such events are not the fulfillment of ancient predictions 
about the messiah, but, rather, serve to identify Jesus having similar 
experiences to those of Israel or individuals in the Old Testament. 131 Matthew 
goes on to say that Jesus' being from Nazareth fulfilled what was written in the 
prophets (2:23). Boring, who has a helpful section of Matthew's view of prophecy, 
comments on this verse that "the fact that Jesus came from Nazareth generated a 
'prediction' in 2: 23. "132 Today we would probably not word things the way 
Matthew did. However, in New Testament times it was quite acceptable. 
It might be objected that Matthew does claim that things must happen in a certain 
way so that the scriptures might be fulfilled (Mt. 26:54; cf. Mk. 14:49). Yet, 
it should be noted that Jesus here fails to say what it is that must be fulfilled 
i 29G. C. Berkouwer, The Person of Christ, trans. John Vriend {Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1954), 113-154. 
"'Evangelicals tend to understand "fulfilled" to mean only the exact 
instantiation of some specific Old Testament prediction. 
131The same is true in John's gospel (13:18) where Jesus says the scripture 
is fulfil.led that one who eats with him betrays him. Jesus here applies to Judas 
what David had applied to Absalom. It was not a prediction, but a similar event. 
For other examples of this practice see Sawyer, Prophecy and Biblical Prophets, 
142-6. 
i 32Boring, Matthew, 154. Boring also makes the insightful observation that 
Matthew is not writing to non-Christian Jews attempting to convince them by these 
"proofs" that Jesus is the messiah for Matthew's procedure would be unconvincing. 
Rather, he writes to believer.s seeking to build their faith. 
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and which prophecy he is alluding to. Boring says, it "does not mean that the 
prophecies are a pre-written script that Jesus must dutifully act out, but that 
the Scriptures represent the plan and will of God·, to which Jesus willingly and 
trustingly submits. " 133 Jesus is not referring to some pre-determined plan of 
God, but to his understanding of the way of the messiah gleaned from the Old 
Testament. 
Another problem is how to explain the predictions Jesus himself made since these 
are sometimes understood as implying foreknowledge. 134 Jesus predicted a nwnber 
of items including his passion and resurrection, the destruction of the temple 
and Peter's denial. Regarding his passion and resurrection several points should 
be made. 135 First, the initial disclosures were veiled and the one that is quite 
detailed (Mk. 10:33-4) "contains no features which would not be generally kno\l/n 
in capital proceedings in Palestine at the time of Christ. 11136 As the time draws 
nearer Jesus becomes more explicit and though his predictions would later 
identify him as a prophet, they do not require foreknowledge. Moreover, Raymond 
Brown observes that it is doubtful that Jesus' initial predictions were all that 
clear since "the disciples who are supposed to have heard these predictions do 
not seem to have foreseen the crucifixion even when it was imminent nor to have 
expected the resurrection (Lk. 24:19-26). . One may attribute this failure 
to the slowness of the disciples, but one may also wonder if the original 
predictions were as exact as they have now come to us. "137 Brown's suggestion 
has some merit since the gospel writers did clarify Jesus' words and actions so 
133Boring, Matthew, 477. 
134Raymond E. Brown, "How Much Did Jesus Know? 11 Catholic Biblical Quarterly 
29, no. 1 (1967): 9-39 discusses the various texts and concludes that Jesus did 
not have foreknowledge. 
135For an overview of the issues see H. F. Bayer "Predictions of Jesus' 
Passion ·and Resurrection," Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, 630-3. 
136 ~ayer, 11 Prediction of Jesus' Passion, 11 632. 
137Brown, "How Much Did Jesus Know?" 14. See also, McCabe, Foreknowledge, 
106-111. 
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that their respective audiences would understand the meaning. After the events, 
things became clear. Moreover, even if Jesus' predictions of his passion were 
veiled they were still made and so one must accoUnt for them. 
Concerning the temple, Jesus said it would be destroyed and that "not one stone 
would be left upon another" (Mt. 24:2; Mk. 13:2; Lk. 21:6). Brown comments: "If 
anyone would propose that this represented an exact foreknowledge of what would 
happen in 70, he need simply be reminded that the gigantic blocks of the Temple 
foundation are still standing firmly one upon the other in Jerusalem. 11138 This 
has led many commentators to pass over this prophecy in silence or say that it 
is fulfilled in essence even if not in detail or to claim that the foundation is 
not considered part of the temple . 139 Actually, foreknowledge could still be 
affirmed if one allows that Jesus is using hyperbole. Nevertheless, I believe 
Jesus is basing his statement on what he believes will happen as a consequence 
of Israel's refusal to trust God. In my opinion, this was a conditional prophecy, 
not set in concrete. If the Jewish people had come to faith in Jesus then this 
would not have happened. 
Regarding the prediction of Peter's denial several things should be noted. To 
begin, the announcement takes place after Jesus knows that Judas has left to turn 
him over to the authorities. Thus, Jesus knows that the forces arrayed against 
him will also come against his disciples. Moreover, according to Luke, the 
disciples have just had a dispute among themselves as to which one of them was 
the greatest (22:24). This reveals that the disciples are not in the best 
spiritual position for coping with the coming events. Furthermore, Jesus informs 
Peter of an impending spiritual attack on his faith: Satan wants to test him (Lk. 
22:31). Jesus is quite aware of the formidable demonic forces ready to put his 
138Bi:'own1 "How Much Did Jesus Know?" 19. I discussed predictions that were 
not fulfilled or not fulfilled in the precise way predicted (e. g. Acts 21:11) 
in the e~cursus on divine repentance in the previous chapter. 
139See Wil.liam L. Lane, Commentary on the Gospel of Mark, New International 
Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), 451-3. 
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disciples to the test. 140 It is on the basis of Jesus' knowledge of the 
situation that he makes his prediction regarding Peter's denial. The prediction 
does not come "out of the blue," but arises out of the context of the 
interpersonal relationships between Jesus and the disciples. Upon hearing the 
announcement, Peter strongly denies that it will come about. Like his Old 
Testament counterparts and despite his belief that Jesus is the messiah Peter 
does not view such predictions as pre-determined to occur for he says that Jesus 
is wrong in this matter. This is a very interesting point. Against it one could 
claim that Peter held a deficient view of foreknowledge or foreordination, but 
it seems more likely that he held to the same view presented in the Old Testament 
that even with God the future is open and the "prediction" is conditional. 
Immediately after this dialogue Jesus encourages the disciples to pray in ord~r 
to resist temptation (Mt. 26:38, 40-1). They do not take his injunction to pray 
seriously (they fall asleep) and so render themselves more vulnerable to the 
possibility of failing to trust God during the coming crisis. In light of these 
factors I understand Jesus' prediction of Peter's denial to be a conditional one 
based upon his knowledge of Peter's spiritual state of mind and the situation at 
hand. 141 In this case the "prediction" serves as a warning to Peter: unless he 
takes some important steps he will fail. Jesus knows both the forces arrayed 
against him and his disciples as well as the disciples' spiritual unpreparedness 
for the forthcoming crisis. If Peter and his fellow disciples had followed Jesus' 
instruction to pray they would have been prepared for temptation and the 
140McCabe, Foreknowledge, 86-94, discusses this point and suggests that Jesus 
is attempting to teach Peter a lesson concerning the importance of spiritual 
preparedness. 
141Craig, Only Wise God, 3 6, claims that the denial of foreknowledge to Jesus 
evacuates such events of all theological significance. He seems to suggest that 
if Jesus lacks foreknowledge then he cannot be considered a prophet. If so, then 
it appears that Craig is assuming the truth of foreknowledge and reading the 
texts from that perspective. But, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, one 
can be accounted a prophet without exhaustive foreknowledge. Craig correctly 
observes that the New Testament writers ascribe to Jesus the same sort of 
predictive ability given to God in the Old Testament. But this does not 
necessitate foreknowledge. 
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prediction might not have come about. In which case it is doubtful it would ever 
have been recorded. However, Peter failed to pray and so he did succumb to 
temptation. Thus, the conditional prediction was"fulfilled."' 
To sum up, God can predict the future as something he intends to do regardless 
of htunan response, or God may utter a conditional statement which is dependent 
on human response, or God may give a forecast of what he thinks will occur based 
on his knowledge of past and present factors. The predictions of Jesus may also 
be understood in these categories. Again, I am not claiming that the theory of 
foreknowledge fails to explain biblical predictions. What is being claimed is 
that biblical predictions do not require this theory for their explanation. Now 
it may seem to proponents of foreknowledge that the explanations of various 
scriptural texts discussed above are strained and unconvincing. But that is the 
way those who affirm the openness of God regard the explanations offered on other 
texts by their critics. "The crucial question," says David Basinger, "is whether 
the idea is faithful to the overall biblical portrait of God."'" The preceding 
two chapters have sought to show that the openness model is indeed faithful to 
the biblical portrait of God. 
4.17 Conclusi<111 to Chapter Four 
Some of the biblical material pertaining to God's relationship to the world has 
now been discussed. Through this survey I have sought to show the nature of the 
divine project as one where God sovereignly enters into a relationship with his 
creatures in a way which involves risk for both God and his creatures. The 
almighty God creates significant others with freedom, grants them space to be 
alongside him and to collaborate with him. God expects this collaboration to 
"'I understand the prediction of Judas' betrayal to be conditional as well. 
See Rice, God's Foreknowledge, 95-7. 
143 David Basinger, "Can an Evangelical Christian Justifiably Deny God's 
Exhaustive Knowledge of the Future?" Christian Scholars Review 25, no. 2 (Dec. 
1995): 142. Basinger observes that there is no neutral set of hermeneutical 
criteria by which to settle the issue. 
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proceed towards the fulfillment of his goal for creation. God loves us, provides 
for us and desires our trust and love in return. We see this most fundamentally 
demonstrated in the life of Jesus who came not to dominate over others, but to 
reconcile rebellious creatures through the power of love. From the New Testament 
material we find continuity.with many of the same Old Testament themes, but with 
some significant clarifications. In the life of Jesus we see both the goal God 
has for us (Christlikeness in the new heaven and earth) and the means of 
providential care God provides in the attainment of the goal. Jesus trusted his 
Father 1 accepting his place as a creature with all the vulnerability this 
entailed. Moreover, the work of God is dependent upon the resources available in 
any given situation and the cooperation of humans. God resourcefully works with 
human attitudes, values and character, seeking to accomplish his project. One 
may, with many of the Old Testament writers, question the divine wisdom in this 
regard. Is this the proper way for a deity to run the world? Should God have 
granted this much liberty to his creatures? Should God have taken the risk in the 
first place? 
In the life of Jesus we see that he is able to exercise greater control over the 
non-human world than over humans. We also find that miracles are, in part, 
dependent upon the social context and the relationships people had with Jesus. 
In these relationships Jesus showed himself flexible and open to adjusting his 
plans in response to the concerns of others. The way of providence in the life 
of Jesus did not occur by some pre-determined plan. Everything is not being 
worked out according to some eternal script. God responds to his creatures and 
gets involved in the give-and-take of life. God remained faithful to his original 
commitment, yet worked to fulfill it in ways the covenant people did not 
anticipate. 
Furthermore, in Jesus God demonstrates his love towards us and the cross and 
resurrec~ion are God's measured response to sin and evil. It is through suffering 
and humiliation that God pays the cost of forgiveness and overcomes evil. This 
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is the way that God displays his wisdom and seeks to win our trust. God is 
seeking to build a people of whom he is proud to be their God. This is the divine 
project, established at creation, to which God h'as remained faithful. Yet the 
path of providence has taken many a winding turn and no one can predict precisely 
what God will do. But a couple of things remain clear. In Jesus we see the very 
face of God and so we can no longer doubt that the way of God is a love which 
desires the eradication of the sin which ruins the beloved. Yet, this love does 
not force its will on the beloved. Rather, it comes to us in passionate 
vulnerability. Furthermore, in contrast to the no-risk model, Jesus did not go 
around "cleaning up the mess" of disease, disasters and misery which his Father 
had caused. In Jesus we find that he and the Father stand fundamentally opposed 
to sickness, chaos, and evil. Our views of providence must be grounded in what 
God actually decided to do in history rather than deducing a normative 
understanding of providence from eternal principles buttressed with some 
prooftexts. 
The other thing that is clear is that God is not yet finished with his project. 
Jesus promised that the Holy Spirit would help us (Jn. 14:16-18, 26). The divine 
presence is still with us. In the Old Testament the divine promise that God would 
be "with 11 his people normally occurred in times of danger. God usually did not 
remove the danger, but, instead, promised to be with his people through the 
danger. Likewise, Jesus promised to be •with" us to the end of the age (Mt. 
28:20). The promise is that the divine presence is with us even in the midst of 
difficult times. The Spirit who helps is still working. History has already 
witnessed the fruit of the Spirit and we hope for more. True, the Spirit has not 
achieved everything which God desired, but God is making progress in reclaiming 
rebellious humans over to him in love and faith. The people God redeems are to 
participate in the covenant, working to enlarge the kingdom. God is working, but 
has chosen not to work without us. Consequently, humans have been given 
signific~nt responsibility in the accomplishment of God's project. The exact way 
God decides to go as well as the degree of fulfillment God achieves in reaching 
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his goal depends, in part, on us. God's initial risk has not proved a failure 
since we see evidence of God 1 s work in history. We look forward to God's work 
in the future when he will abolish death and sub]ect all things to himself (1 
Cor. 15:26-8). We have reason to hope since God has repeatedly proven himself 
faithful in history. Because of the life and work of Jesus we have a solid basis 
to place our confidence in God's amazing love, faithfulness and resourcefulness. 
God is wise and competent in carrying out his project and we look forward to its 
completion. 
Chapter 5: Risk and the Divine Character 
5.1 :Cntroduction 
In this study the overarching theological model of God has been that of a 
personal being entering into loving relationships with human persons. A key 
metaphor employed to elucidate this model has been that of risk-taker. As with 
all metaphors they say something about the subject, but not all that needs to be 
said. Other metaphors must be utilized to give a full picture of the subject. 
Nevertheless, the image of God as a risk-taker has been under employed in the 
Christian tradition despite the significance of this idea in the biblical 
narrative. Although divine risk-taking is implied by certain doctrines, for 
example the free will defense, it has been overlooked in many discussions. Only 
the various forms of theological determinism self-consistently deny divine risk-
taking. This chapter explores the impact divine risk-taking has on doctrines such 
as the divine nature, sovereignty, and salvation. 
Before beginning, however, a word on criteria and a definition of providence are 
needed. The criteria for evaluating a theological proposal, discussed in chapter 
one, were: (1) concordance with the tradition; (2) conceptual intelligibility; 
and (3) adequacy for the demands of life. Chapters three and four sought to show 
that God in personal relationships which involve risk-taking is consonant with 
the primary norm of Christian theology--scripture, especially in light of the 
person and work of Jesus. I have argued elsewhere that the history of Christian 
thought witnesses the attempt to speak of God in terms of personal, give-and-
take, relationships . 1 At the same time the element of divine risk-taking in 
these relationships has been neglected. Consequently, the proposal here explored 
is in full agreement with the canons of scripture and certain segments of the 
Christian tradition. Regarding other streams of the tradition my proposal perhaps 
1Though this has not always been done consistently. See my 11 Historical 
Considerations,n Clark Pinnock et. al. The Openness. of God, (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1995), 59-100. 
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only agrees with the intentions and functions, rather tnan the material content, 
of their confessions and doctrinal expressions. 2 The present chapter will focus 
on the conceptual intelligibility of the proposal. Does it make sense? Is it 
self-consistent? Does it cohere with other well established doctrines? Does it 
shed light on some old problems? Intelligibility occurs within particular 
traditions. Does the model of a personal God gambling in his personal 
relationships "fit 11 within the Christian tradition? The purpose here is not a 
rationalism whereby we seek to establish the transcendental truth of providence 
by human reason. Rather, the intention is to see whether the proposal meets the 
standards of rational discourse for meaningful assertions. In this regard, if a 
theological model contains self-contradictory assertions, then the model pays the 
price of conceptual coherence. The third criterion, adequacy for the demands of 
life, although touched upon in this chapter, will be more fully discussed in the 
next. 
Finally, a word about definition. From the biblical material it was shown that 
God freely creates a world and gets involved with its affairs. There develops a 
give-and-take dynamic interpersonal relationship between God and humanity in 
which God does not always get what he desires. God, though sometimes defeated, 
proved, nevertheless, victorious over the course of history in achieving his 
project with some people. God was resourceful and adaptable in working to fulfill 
his plans. Moreover, God, in some respects, made himself dependent upon humans 
for the achievement of his desires. Furthermore, God is not yet finished with his 
work for there is more "up his sleeve." In light of this what sorts of conditions 
must be met for an adequate definition of providence? Thomas Flint suggests that 
any orthodox view of providence must contain three elements: (1) foresight; (2) 
2For surveys of the doctrine of providence see Benjamin Wirt Farley, The 
Providence of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1988), Horton Davies, The Vigilant 
God: Providence in the Thought of Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin and Barth (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1992), and Langdon Gilkey, Reaping .the Whirlwind: A Christian 
Interpretation of History (New York: Seabury, 1976), 159-238. 
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control "in some sense; 11 and { 3) a plan. 32 
Much depends upon how one elaborates these three conditions, but as a beginning 
I think Flint is correct that the doctrine of· providence in the Christian 
tradition has affirmed these. The model of God as risk-taker in attempting to 
achieve his goal of creation thr·ough personal relationships affirms these 
conditions. God's foresight involves the ability to anticipate human responses. 
God intervenes in human affairs--especially the incarnation--such that he can 
introduce new factors into history which direct it towards ends not otherwise 
attainable. Moreover, God places limits on what humans can do (e. g. removes them 
from the garden lest they eat of the tree of life and live forever, Gen. 2:22). 
In these ways God exercises a degree of "control" over human affairs. Finally, 
regarding a plan it may be said that God has ultimate goals which he refuses to 
change while remaining flexible as to precisely how he seeks to accomplish 
them. 4 In these respects, H. H. Farmer was on track when he defined providence 
as "the adequacy of God's wisdom and power to the task with which he has charged 
hirnsel f . " 5 
5.2 Summary of a Risk View of Providence 
This definition of providence focusses on God's wisdom and power to accomplish 
the divine project. God's project involves the creation of significant others who 
3Thomas Flint, "Two Accounts of Providence, 11 ed. Thomas V. Morris, Divine 
and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 149-150. Flint believes that "foresight" must entail 
eternal foreknowledge of all future contingencies. However, I believe this 
condition arises from a Hellenistic concern for divine perfection--where God 
cannot change--rather than from the biblical data. 
'Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, tr. Geoffrey Bromiley 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 380 and 388, says that the concept of a goal 
implies a difference between the goal and its fulfillment. Thus, God can have no 
goals. He claims that if God has goals then God is finite. Hence, for Pannenberg 
God does not have an open future at all! This is quite contrary to what many have 
thought Pannenberg was saying regarding God's actual experience in history. His 
use of sempiternity where God experiences all time at once (following Boethius 
and Plotinus) and his disavowal of talk of God as an agent leads me to suspect 
that Pannenberg is uneasy, at best, with the notion of a personal God working 
with us in history towards an open future. 
5 H. H. Farmer, The World and God: A Study of Prayer, Providence and Miracle 
in Christian Experience, Rev. ed. (London: Nisbet, 1955), 236. 
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are ontologically distinct from himself and upon whom he showers his caring love 
in the expectation that they will respond in love. God grants humans genuine 
freedom to participate in this project as he does ~ot force them to comply. Love 
is given freely and received freely. Prior to creation, though God did not expect 
any resistance -- there was no warrant for such a belief -- there existed the 
"implausible possibility" that resistance to the divine purpose may arise. 
Regardless, God enters into real give-and-take personal relationships with his 
creatures. God not only gives, he receives. God freely chooses to be affected by 
his creatures--there is contingency in God. Moreover, God sovereignly decides not 
to determine everything which happens in history. He does not have to because God 
is supremely wise, endlessly resourceful, amazingly creative, and omnicompetent 
in seeking to fulfill his project. In the God-human relationship God sometimes 
decides alone what will happen while at other times God modifies his plans eo 
accommodate to the choices, actions and desires of his creatures. In grace God 
created and embarked on this program. In grace God invites us to participate as 
significant partners with him in bringing about the eschatological glory he 
inten·ds for the creation. By his free sovereign will God makes us his lovers 
(Hosea) and friends (Jn. 15:15) towards the establishment of his kingdom.' It 
is God's desire that we worship and enjoy him forever in a relationship of love. 
In the words of Hendrikus Berkhof, "The God who is free uses his freedom to 
establish communion. The sovereign one gives himself away . ... Apparently he 
wants to be able to do nothing else than be our covenant partner. "7 
The goal of the divine project is to produce people who reflect the trinitarian 
love in all their relationships: with God, other humans, and the entire creation. 
God's intention is that all of us come to the maturity of Jesus. Because of God's 
'on a relationship of love see Vincent Brilmmer, The Model of Love (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). On friendship see Sallie McFague, Models of 
God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 157-
180. 
7Hendrikus Berkhof, Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Study of the 
Faith, tr. Sierd Woudstra (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979), 106, 222. 
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faithfulness the goal of the project has never changed but the means and specific 
paths God takes towards the achievement of the project can and do change 
depending on what the divine wisdom deems best at.the time. The particular path 
God takes to obtain his goal depends on the interaction between God and humanity 
in the course of the historical outworking of the project. Hence, the goal of the 
project remains constant while the means remain flexible. 
5.3 The Nature of the Divine Risk 
The first thing that must be said about the risks that God takes is that God does 
not risk for risk's sake. Divine risk-taking must not be divorced from the 
creational project which desires a relationship of love. Furthermore, it must be 
affirmed that God was under no compulsion to take any risks whatsoever. God could 
have created a very different world from the one we have. God did not have to 
create a world where humans had the freedom to enter into a personal relationship 
of love with himself. Following Barth I affirm that God sovereignly created the 
conditions of all creaturely working. 8 God alone establishes the rules of the 
game. And, says Barth, one of the rules which God freely makes is that God 
himself will he affected and conditioned by these creatures. God freely grants 
a degree of separateness from God so that the creature is no tool or puppet: "the 
activity of the creature over against that of God remains the creatures own. 119 
So it is solely God's decision whether to take any risks at all and if so, what 
sorts of risks God is willing to allow. But just what do we mean by risk? Paul 
Helm says, 11 We take no risk if we knowingly set in motion events which will turn 
out exactly as we want them to do. "10 Though this remark might be understood 
as claiming that foreknowledge rules out risk, this is not what Helm has in mind. 
8Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 
Torrance, tr. G. W. Bromiley et. al. 
pp. 45, 119, 285. 
4 vol. eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. 
(Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1956-1975), 3.3 
9Bar:th, Church Dogmatics, 3 .3 .• 149. See 92-3. 
10Paul Helm, The Providence of God, Contours of Christian Theology (Downers 
Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1994), 40. 
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For Helm, God foreordains everything which comes to pass. It is foreordination 
or exhaustive divine control over everything which rules out divine risk taking, 
not foreknowledge. I will seek to show below that a God with complete 
foreknowledge still takes risks. William Hasker provides a more precise 
definition of risk when he writes: "Does God make decisions that depend for their 
outcomes on the responses of free creatures in which the decisions themselves are 
not informed by knowledge of the outcomes?" 11 Both Hasker's and Helm's 
definitions are formulated in terms of knowledge but for Hasker the crucial point 
is not foreknowledge but whether the divine knowledge of creatures is contingent 
upon what the creatures do and whether divine planning for the future is done on 
the basis of what he knows will actually happen. Accordingly, a God with either 
simple foreknowledge or the openness model propounded here will make decisions 
about what to do without basing those decisions on the certainty of the outcom~. 
David Basinger provides a further refinement in defining risk when he says, God 
is a risk-taker if "God adopts certain overall strategies -- for example, the 
granting of significant freedom -- that create the potential for the occurrence 
of individual instances of evil which are, as such, pure loss and not a means to 
any greater good. "12 What Basinger is driving at, I believe, is that the central 
component of risk-taking may not be so much lack of knowledge at the time of 
conunitment, but the decision to grant creatures the freedom to be significant 
others from God which entails the possibility of movement away from God's 
desires. For Basinger, the crucial question is not the type of knowledge God has, 
but the specific rules of the game for the creation which God elects to 
establish. If God establishes a creation where the outcome of at least some 
undertakings is indefinite then God takes risks. 13 With this last definition a 
God with middle knowledge, simple foreknowledge or presentism takes risks. The 
"William Hasker, God, Time and ·Knowledge, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy 
of Religion, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 197. 
12David Basinger, "Middle Knowledge and Di vine Control: Some 
Clarifications," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1991): 135. 
13Richard Rice uses this definition of risk in. his God's Foreknowledge and 
Man's Free Will (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1985), 42. 
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only way I know of to avoid a risk-taking God is to affirm some form of 
theological determinism or exhaustive sovereignty where it is impossible for 
humans to thwart or hinder God's plans for each and every specific event which 
takes place in creation. Hence, divine risk-taking means that some things occur 
in the creation which God does not specifically intend to occur. God does not 
want sin and suffering, for instance. 14 
Another aspect regarding the nature of risk is that the risk may be small or 
great in a couple of different senses: (1) there may be a small or great chance 
(probability) of success, (2) there may be a small or great amount ventured 
depending upon its importance (value) to the person investing. A couple of 
illustrations may help in grasping this distinction. Take Mary who has a lot of 
money, but few friends. Let us suppose that she does not care a great deal about 
her money but is quite a sensitive person, fearful of being hurt by others. 
Regarding the first sense of risk--the probability of success--Mary's investing 
capital in a particular company may seem to her a tremendous risk due to its poor 
past performance. In this case the chance for success is very poor. On the other 
hand, given her knowledge of Deborah's good character Mary may believe that she 
takes little risk of being hurt by opening herself and becoming vulnerable to 
her. In this case she believes the chance for becoming close friends is very good 
and so little risk is involved. Concerning the second sense of risk-taking, Mary 
may not care a great deal about the money she has and so decides to invest it in 
this risky but potentially profitable company. In this case, although she 
ventures a large amount of money she does not take muc~ of a risk because it 
matters little to her. On the other hand, Mary, being a sensitive person, yet 
convinced of Deborah's trustworthiness, decides to be open with her, though only 
sharing a few things about her private life at first. In this case Mary risks a 
lot (qualitatively) even though the amount of information shared (quantity) may 
be small. 
14At this point the concept of permission is usually introduced (see 6 .1. 4) . 
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Now it should be noted that Mary is not obligated to invest in the company nor 
to share herself with Deborah. But if she wants to help this company or develop 
a friendship then it is incumbent upon her to take some risks. That is, risk-
taking must be seen as an element within the broader structure of goals and 
relationships. Moreover, if things begin to go bad Mary can attempt to alleviate 
the risk by intervening in the situation. She may withdraw what is left of her 
capital or break off her relationship with Deborah. Yet, this decision will 
depend upon several factors. For instance, she may be patient and willing to 
suffer short term loss for long term gain. Again, she may have the strength of 
forgiveness and the depth of love to suffer the hurt in the hopes she win back 
the friendship. Whether she stays with the risk or withdraws depends upon her 
overarching goals as well as her character. 
In my estimation God's decision to create this particular sort of world could be 
seen to have a great chance of success (#1) and little possibility of failure 
while at the same time having a high amount of risk (#2) in the sense that it 
mattered deeply to God how things went. The decision to create beings who could 
receive and return the divine love and enter into loving personal relationships 
with each other was not much of a risk given all the blessings which God 
provided. Although sin was possible--given this sort of world--it simply was not 
plausible in view of the good environment God established and the love he 
bestowed. 15 On the other hand, because God cared so deeply about this project--
investing himself in it--God took a great risk in opening himself up to being 
grieved if the project went awry. This is borne out by the biblical material 
where God, because he cares, is repeatedly hurt, angered and saddened by sinful 
human actions. Moreover, as was seen in the previous two chapters God neither 
gave up on his project nor withdrew the original rules of the game. God's 
overarching purpose for the project as well as his character keep him in the game 
"Admittedly, it is somewhat speculative to say that prior to his decision 
to create God thought sin to be improbable but I think a case can be made for it 
in light of God's repeated expression of surprise at sin despite all the steps 
he takes to eradicate it in the Old Testament. 
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despite the risk. God freely chooses to intervene and determine some things so 
that not everything is at risk and God intervenes in order to redeem what was 
lost in the initial failure. Divine intervention occurs, however, within the 
rules God freely established because God remains faithful to the project. The 
connection this has with the character of God will now be assessed. 
5.4 The Divine Character and Providence 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Of vital importance for understanding divine providence as risk-taking is the 
particular view one has of the nature of God. A complete study of all the divine 
attributes is neither possible nor needed here. What is required is an 
examination of those attributes which have a direct bearing on our view of 
providence. In this study, I began with the particular type of providence G6d 
chose to employ as depicted in the biblical revelation. I did not begin with "the 
most perfect being 11 imaginable and then deduce the necessary view of providence 
from this model of God. For two millennia the attempt has been made to bring 
together the neoplatonic philosophical understanding of God (which begins with 
a particular understanding of "perfection") with the biblical portrait of God 
involved in history into one grand "biblical-classical synthesis."" Philo of 
Alexandria, for example, defined the divine essence as "that which is 11 (to 
.2!).) . 17 This resulted in a radical displacement of the Old Testament 
understanding of God as a personal being involved in a relationship of "steadfast 
160n this history see my "Historical Considerations." On the effect this 
synthesis has had on various doctrines, practices and spirituality see Donald G. 
Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness, Love, Christian Foundations 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 205-240. Regarding the early 
history of the synthesis see: Joseph C. McLelland, God the Anonymous: A Study in 
Alexandrian Philosophical Theology, Patristic Monograph Series (Cambridge, MA: 
Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1976); Richard A. Norris, God and the World 
in Early Christian Thought: A Study in Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and 
Origen (New York: Seabury, 1965); Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the 
Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (New York: Oxford 
Universi'ty Press, 1966); and F. W. Bussell, "The Purpose of the World-Process and 
the Problem of Evil as Explained in the Clementine and Lactantian Writings in a 
System of Subordinate Dualism," Studia Biblica et Ecclesiastica 4 (1896): 133-88. 
17See McLelland, God the Anonymous, 25-44 and Samuel Sandrnel, Philo of 
Alexandria (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
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love" (hesed) with his creation. Philo dehistoricized and deeschatologized the 
Jewish world view. 18 Following in the steps of Philo 1 the classical doctrine 
(both Jewish and Christian) of the divine essence was abstracted from the divine 
project and made a subject unto itself and so "God" was analyzed as a non-
relational concept. That is, the nature of God was divorced from the relationship 
in which God created us and the attempt was made to define God in terms of utter 
transcendence, imrnutabili ty and power apart from all relationships. Consequently, 
the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, aseity, and impassibility took center 
stage over the more biblical terms of wisdom, love, holiness and faithfulness. 
This would not have been so bad had these terms been qualified in light of the 
divine project involving the sort of divine-human relationships displayed in 
scripture. 19 Instead, these terms were defined utilizing Plato's understandiilg 
of perfection as that which could never change for any change would only be a 
change for the worse. A "perfect" God simply cannot change since this means that 
God was either not now perfect or was not perfect prior to changing. 20 This view 
of perfection has been a siren call which few have been able to resist and it has 
had a profound impact on the doctrine of providence. For instance, if a perfect 
being cannot change in any way then God's thoughts and will are genuinely 
immutable and impassible. This ultimately leads to a decretal theology which is 
then used to interpret the biblical text in such a way that a genuine give-and-
18N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, Christian Origins 
and the Question of God, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 248, no. 15. 
19Elizabeth Johnson attempts to remain faithful to the intentions classical 
theism while reforming it in light of a relational God. See her wonderful book: 
She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: 
Crossroad, 1993). Although she uses the term "panentheism" I do not believe she 
means it in the sense of process theology for she speaks of the "asymro.etricalN 
relation between God and the world. 
''John Lucas, The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality and Truth (Cambridge, 
MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 216, and Hasker, "A Philosophical Perspective," 132-
3, point out that this argument is fallacious as it assumes a linear scale of 
excellence for everything. But such is not the case with our experiences in life. 
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take interpersonal relationship between God and humanity is denied. 21 Such a 
relationship is impossible because it introduces an element of contingency in 
God. Aristotle clearly pointed out that if God has any relationships then God is 
dependent upon an other since any genuine relationship implies dependence. For 
instance, the master is dependent upon the slave to be master. For God to be Lord 
implies dependence upon the subjects. Hence 1 there can be no real relationship 
between God and others. God is self-sufficient, needs no friends and has no 
friends." The impetus in Greek philosophical thought is towards seeing the term 
'"God 11 as a category referring to the universal principle of explanation 
characterized by immutability and non-relationality. 
In contrast, the biblical writers see "God" not as a category, but as a person 
who has entered into relation with us in history. Whereas Aristotle's God had no 
friends, in the biblical traditions Yahweh and Abraham are friends (James 2:23). 
If we begin with the God who comes to us, especially as seen in Jesus, then it 
is possible to see God as interactive, parental, generous, sensitive, 
cooperative, wise, and mighty in the working out of his project. If the divine 
project and the particular paths God has sovereignly elected to pursue in history 
are kept in mind, then it is possible to qualify the traditional list of divine 
attributes in light of the scriptural revelation. 23 When this is done it becomes 
clear that God has all the wisdom, knowledge and power needed to work with the 
sort of world he freely decided to create. If God is seen as involved in a 
personal way with a project in which he freely enters into give-and-take 
"See James Daane, The Freedom of God: A Study of Election and Pulpit (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1973), 81-90. 
"Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1244b in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. 
Richard McKeon, (New York: Random House, 1941). For Aristotle, God cannot even 
be an efficient cause or be aware of the existence of others since this would 
imply a change as well as dependence in the being of God. 
23Helpful in this regard are Clark Pinnock' s, "Systematic Theology, " in The 
Openness of God, William Hasker's, "A Philosophical Perspective," in The Opennes"S 
of God and his God, Time and Knowledge. Frank G. Kirkpatrick's Together Bound: 
God, History and the Religious Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994) is especially helpful in tracing out the implications of God as personal 
agent in relation to us. 
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interpersonal relations then four attributes of God come to the fore: love, 
wisdom, faithful freedom, and almightiness. 
5 .4. 2 Love 
Despite the endless discussions about divine love Western theology has had a 
difficult time placing "God is love" (1 John 4:8) at center stage when discussing 
the divine attributes. Rather, the more abstract and impersonal attributes of 
omnipotence and omniscience have been emphasized. In my opinion this is due to 
the failure to place the discussion of the divine nature under the category of 
a personal God carrying out a project. That is, despite the constant claim that 
God is a personal being, Western thought has paid insufficient attention to the 
specific sort of world God decided to create where God enters into reciprocal 
interpersonal relationships. Instead, discussions of God's nature usually begin 
with the notion of the "absolute'' and once this is done it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to speak of God's love as anything other than mere 
beneficence (rather than interpersonal relations) . 24 Emil Brunner put it this 
way: "To think that it is correct first of all to deal with the metaphysical 
Being of God, and then with His Love, as His 'ethical attribute', means that the 
decisive element in the Biblical Idea of God has not been perceived. "25 To 
modify a statement by Bonhoeffer, only the personal God can help for it takes a 
personal being to love. 26 Whereas classical theism 1 s root metaphor is the motion 
24Feuerbach, Freud and others are correct in many of their criticisms 
concerning the Christian doctrine of God since, in many respects this God is 
secular, constructed without careful attention to salvation history. For helpful 
discussions of the atheistic philosophers and their conceptions of God see 
Eberhard Jilngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the 
Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute Between Theism and Atheism, tr. 
Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983) and Hans Kling, Does God 
Exist?, tr. Edward Quinn, (New York: Vintage, 1981). Unfortunately, Kung ends up 
with the absolutistic God beyond God concept. 
"Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1949), 192. 
260n the historical debate over God as a "person" see Berkhof, Christian 
Faith, 130-3 and Brunner, Christian Doctrine of God, 121-1, 139-141. It is common 
for people to say that "religiously" we need a personal God who enters into 
relationships with us but then go on to reject this either infantile or not the 
true nature of God--back to the "God beyond God." In this vein are the works of 
185 
of physical objects--God is the pillar around which all else moves--the root 
metaphor for the openness of God is persons in loving relation. 
A trinitarian metaphysic is illuminating in this regard. Beginning with a 
trinitarian God of love who enters into loving personal relations with his 
creatures gives some direction to the doctrine of providence. To see why this is 
so a few comments on the trinity are in order. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
love one another. They are involved in a tri-personal community where each member 
of the triune being gives and receives love from the others. God is essentially 
relational, the perfection of love and comm.union, the very antithesis of 
aloofness, isolation and domination. God is no solitary potentate forcing his 
will on others. The members of the trinity mutually share and relate to one 
another. In this view person not substance is the ultimate ontological category. 
Personhood, relationality and community become the center for understanding the 
nature of God rather than power, independence and control. 27 Whereas the main 
motif of the neoplatonic God concept is that of distance and unrelatedness, the 
Christian doctrine of the trinity asserts that to be God is to be related in 
love. 28 
Hence, God did not need to create in order to love for the trinity experiences 
Gordon Kaufman, God the Problem (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) 
and In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). For a solid defense of God as personal agent see 
Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 54-102. 
"Extremely helpful here are Catherine Mowry LaCugna' s God For Us: The 
Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 14-15, 243-317, and 
Robert W. Jensen's, The Triune Identity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982). See also 
Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1993). Colin E. Gunton provides an 
illuminating study of the disastrous impact wrought on Western culture by the 
lack of trinitarian relationality in Christian theology in The One, The Three and 
the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). Interestingly, Jonathan Edwards seems to have moved in 
this direction in his later writings. See Sang Hyun Lee, The Philosophical 
Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 
220. 
"Jensen, Triune Identity, 85, observes that if the .Father begets the Son 
then to be God is not only to give but to receive. 
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and manifests the fullness of love. The creation should be seen as the result of 
the openness of God's love to establish others who could experience this love and 
enter into loving relationships with God. A God who is antecedently relational 
and self-sufficient is free to create significant others and enter into genuine 
reciprocal relations with them. The triune God as both lover and beloved is free 
to take the gracious initiative in both creation and incarnation of opening the 
love of the godhead to others. 29 s0ren Kierkegaard understood that it was divine 
love which brought creation into being for the purpose of relationship when he 
wrote: 
Everyone who assumes that a God exists naturally thinks Him as the 
strongest. . but such a man hardly thinks of the possibility of a 
reciprocal relationship . ... But God who creates out of nothing, 
who almightily takes from nothing and says, "Be 11 , lovingly adjoins, 
11 Be something even in apposition to me. 11 ••• [T}his omnipotence . . 
which constrains itself and lovingly makes of the creature 
something in apposition to itself--oh, marvelous omnipotence of 
love! 30 
The aim of creation was to produce significant others who could experience the 
divine love and reciprocate that love both to God and other creatures. God 
intended to create a space-time community reflective of the triune life. Love, 
which does not force its own way (1 Cor. 13:5), allows for the creatures to be 
genuine others. Space is given them to freely participate in the fellowship of 
love. But what precisely is meant by love? 
w. H. Vanstone's The Risk of Love and Vincent Brilinmer's The Model of Love both 
29Se'.e Gregory A. Boyd, Trinitv and Process: A Critical Evaluation and 
Reconstruction of Hartshorne's Di-Polar Theism Towards a Trinitarian Metaphysics 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1992). 
30 S<tiren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, tr. Walter Lowrie (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1939), 132. 
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provide helpful criteria for identifying love. 31 Vanstone gives a phenomenology 
of love by which he claims that love must be limitless, precarious and 
vulnerable. By limitless he means "unlimited conCern for the other. 11 The lover 
desires to give all to the loved. In this respect love differs from kindness for 
kindness is limited in the amount it gives or forgives. There are, however, 
limits on the lover but they come from without not within. That is, the lover 
respects the loved and, though love desires to expand its activity, does not 
overwhelm or imprison the loved by expressions which are untimely or excessive. 
In developing our relationships we know that an expression of love too sudden or 
demonstrative may backfire on us and not achieve the desired goal. Genuine love 
aspires to give to the beloved but respects the personhood of the other such that 
the lover accepts and works within the conditions of the relationship. The 
ultimate goal is to enlarge those conditions so that the loved is able to 
experience more love. Though love desires the highest well-being of the other, 
it knows that "well-being• must be defined in terms of the particulars of the 
relationship and so the manifestations of love will vary from relationship to 
relationship depending upon their level of development. Applied to God, this 
means that God respects the rules of the game he established and so conditions 
his love according to the specifics of the individual or group with whom he is 
relating. God may want to give more to them, but they may not be ready for it. 
Hence, love, though limitless, is conditioned by the ability of the other to 
receive it. 
The second criterion Vanstone establishes is that love is precarious. Love is an 
activity for the sake of the other which does not control the other but wants the 
other to grow in love. Consequently, love is precarious because the intentions 
of the lover may not be satisfied. Love may be received properly or may even be 
rejected entirely. "Love proceeds by no assured programme. In the case of 
children·, a parent is peculiarly aware that each step of love is a step of risk; 
31W. H. Vanstone, The Risk of Love (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1978). 
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and that each step taken generates the need for another and equally precarious 
step. "32 Teaching children how to ride a bicycle or how to swim and providing 
proper safety instructions are expressions of love which may confirm and enlarge 
the love in the relationship or may embitter and estrange. There always lies the 
danger that the child may misunderstand and fail to respond properly. A love 
which so controlled the child that the child could not fail would be a false 
love. Love takes risks and is willing to wait and try again if need be. In the 
parable of the prodigal son God is the •waiting father" who desires the return 
of his children who have misunderstood his love (Lk. 15). God is willing to wait 
if need be and to give it another try. Waiting implies a degree of passivity and 
dependency while trying again implies that the efforts of love have failed to 
achieve the desired end as yet. 33 Classical theism has resisted attributing to 
God the notions of waiting, trying and failing in some things. 
The third criterion is that love is vulnerable. Lovers grant the beloved a power 
over themselves. The loved can make the lover delighted or angry, bring joy or 
grief, frustrated or fulfilled because the lover cares about what transpires in 
the relationship. People who I barely know have little power to affect me but my 
children are another matter. They can affect me deeply because I care about them 
and our relatioru;hip. If one of my children questions, "Do I matter to dad?" they 
have no further to look than the way I respond. If my children have the power to 
make a difference in my state of being then they have a signal that I care about 
my relationship with them. Furthermore, lovers ·ao not remain anonymous but reveal 
their names, their identities, by which they make themselves available and, 
hence, vulnerable, to the beloved. Love reveals and communicates the person to 
the other. Love is vulnerable because it surrenders into other hands the final 
outcome of love's aspirations. Whether love shall result in a deep interpersonal 
relationship or be scorned by the loved and result in suffering for the lover is 
32Vapstone, The Risk of Love, 46. 
33Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1, 409-411 says that God is patient, giving the 
other space and time to develop. 
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not under the control of the lover. There is much the lover can do, but guarantee 
success is not assured. God sovereignly elected to be vulnerable in creating a 
world of creatures with whom God could enter into loving relationships. God did 
not remain anonymous (in contrast to Greek thought and classical theism) but 
revealed himself to us, made himself accessible for us. God is open to us and for 
us. 34 God makes it possible for us to cause him joy or grief, suffering or 
delight. Moreover, God elects to establish a world where the outcome of his love 
is not a foregone conclusion. God desires a relationship of genuine love with us 
and this, according to the rules of the game God established, cannot be forced 
or controlled and so cannot be guaranteed. In the divine-human relationship God 
is more vulnerable than we are since God cannot count on our faithfulness in the 
way we may count on his steadfast love. 35 Now, for much of the Christian 
tradition it was thought that God is impassible and thus incapable of being 
vulnerable in any way. 36 However, if God decides to be passible and vulnerable 
in relation to us who is to say God cannot sovereignly do this? Has God decided 
to do things this way? From the survey of the biblical material it certainly 
appears that God has forsworn immunity. 37 This is especially clear from the 
incarnation where we see the son of God as open to others, dependent, vulnerable, 
and experiencing joy as well as suffering. 38 
"Helpful here is Paul R. Sponheim, Faith and the Other: A Relational 
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 84-98. 
35See Brfunmer, Model of Love, 163, 172. 
360n the history of the discussion see J. K. Mozley, The Impassibility of 
God: A Survey of Christian Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1926), 
Joseph M. Hallman, The Descent of God: Divine Suffering in History and Theology 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), Richard Bauckham, "Only the Suffering God can 
Help: Divine Passibility in Modern Theology," Themelios 9, no. 3 (April, 1984): 
6-12, and Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
37H<>ndrikus Berkhof, Christian Faith, 133-140, sees God as the "defenseless 
superior power. " 
38LaCugna, God for Us, 301, is correct when she asserts that the traditional 
denial of any real suffering to the godhead was a defeat for trinitarian theology 
since it allowed the attributes of God from neoplatonism to remain intact, 
controlling the reading of the Bible. 
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In addition to Vanstone's description of love as limitless, precarious and 
vulnerable I would like to add some further characteristics which Brfumner 
expounds even though they overlap at times with Vanstone's. Brfunmer surveys 
various ways in which Western thought has construed love and concludes that the 
tradition has been to understand love as attitudinal involving three aspects: 
intentions, evaluations and dispositions. 39 The attitude of love is intentional 
because it is something we resolve to carry out rather than something we simply 
experience such as an itch. Love also involves an evaluation of the object loved. 
Love is not blind or indifferent to the virtues and vices in the beloved. The 
lover is concerned to bring about the best for the beloved and this cannot happen 
without a realistic appraisal of the beloved. In theology this idea is usually 
discussed under the heading of the holiness of God. The holiness of God, it is 
said, cannot tolerate sin and seeks to obliterate it whereas the divine loVe 
brings forth mercy to the sinner. Emil Brunner, for instance, says that holiness 
creates distance where love creates communion. 40 This sounds as though there are 
polarities within God each struggling for supremacy. Others have removed any form 
of evaluation from the notion of love, reducing love to sentimentality and 
permissiveness. A better approach is to speak of God's holy love which cares 
deeply about the harm which the beloved does to herself." The anger, wrath and 
judgments of God are expressions of his caring love. 42 God does not simply let 
us go our own way for God desires to redeem us and so will convict and confront 
us, will stand in our way. Love is neither blind to the reality of what we are 
as sinners nor does it dismiss us from the relationship without further ado. The 
39Brfunmer, Model of Love, 150-6. 
'°Brunner, Christian Doctrine of God, 188. 
"See Bloesch, God the Almighty, 141-3. The sermons and fiction of George 
MacDonald bring out this idea better than anyone else I know. 
"See Clark H. Pinnock and Robert C. Brow, Unbounded Love: A Good News 
Theology for the 21st Century (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 67-
77 and Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1, 376, 418-9. G. C. Berkouwer says the 
basic problem with Barth's theology of God is that "the love of God dominates 
over His righteousness, His grace over his wrath. 11 See his The Providence of God, 
tr. Lewis B. Smedes, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952), 264. 
191 
divine caring is manifested in evaluating our situation and in his concern to 
open it to new possibilities. These possibilities can affect both parties. They 
can affect us in that the God of holy love who c'onfronts our sin is a fearful 
God--a God not within our control. They also affect God since God is open to 
being delighted and grieved by his Creatures depending upon our response to the 
new possibilities. Finally, says Brilrnrner, love is dispositional or habitual 
rather than occasional. There are occasions where we are happy, grateful, or 
afraid but love is not merely a passing state. It is more like a policy which we 
publicly carry out in repeated actions with the intention of achieving the goal 
of a mature relationship. 
In addition to these three characteristics which love shares with other 
attitudes, Brfunmer adds a fourth: the desire for reciprocation. This is 
important, he says, if we are to grasp the fact that love is more than a mere 
attitude, it creates a relationship. Love seeks the response of the other yet 
respects the personhood of the other. The lover desires that the beloved 
reciprocate the love and so bring to fruition the goal of the relationship. In 
this sense, love is between persons. Persons in relation for the purpose of 
reciprocating love (the divine project) becomes the lens through which we view 
the type of providential relationship God has elected to have with the world." 
One may observe the nature of love, as just defined, in the life of Jesus. His 
love was persistent, dependent upon the ability of others to receive it, 
evaluative and vulnerable. Everything did not go precisely the way Jesus 
intended. His concern was rejected by many who did not desire the new 
possibilities he sought to bring forth. Nonetheless, he endured rejection, 
demonstrating the way of love as the way to a redemptive future. In this light 
it is possible to think of the Apostle Paul's description of love (1 Cor. 13:4-7) 
as applicable to God: nLove is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or 
"I would add that the "goodness" of God is not to be thought of in the 
. abstract but, rather, defined in terms of the divine project. This will keep us 
from defining divine love and goodness in egocentric ways. 
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boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way; it is not 
irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the 
truth. It bears all things, believes all things, ·hopes all things, endures all 
things. 11 Though God has, in the Christian tradition, certainly been described as 
loving, patient and enduring, these traits have usually not been thought of 
within the framework of a divine project involving vulnerability and risk. 
Moreover, the fact that love does not insist on its own way has certainly been 
a neglected theme in discussions of providence and omnipotence. It has been 
common to insist, with Augustine, that "the will of the omnipotent is always 
undefeated. "44 Consequently, Paul's conception of love which entails 
vulnerability has been subjugated to absolute power. Again, I believe this is a 
result of talking about these in abstraction from the sort of project God has 
elected to set in motion. Finally, it hardly needs to be said that it has not 
been customary to think of God as "believing" or "hoping" in anything. But if we 
begin with the understanding of God as bringing into being creatures with whom 
he desires to enter into genuine personal and loving relationships then it is 
quite permissible to speak of God believing and hoping things will go a certain 
way. 45 For instance, the prophets proclaim that God repeatedly hoped that Israel 
would put away its idols and return to him, but the people seldom did. God 
desired the early church to be made up of Jews and Gentiles but it did not go 
exactly has God had planned. The divine love is persistent yet capable of being 
frustrated. Paul's characterization of love is appropriate for understanding the 
way of God with the world. God creates in love,-elects in love, commands in love, 
judges in love, incarnates in love and redeems in love. 46 The triune God is the 
perfection of love and brings into being other creatures to share in that love. 
"Augustine, Enchiridion, 26, tr. Albert Outler, Library of Christian 
Classics, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1~55 l , 400. 
45For a philosophical defense of this idea see William Hasker, "Yes, God Has 
Beliefs," Religious Studies 24, no. 3 (Sept. 1988): 385-394. 
46An. introduction to the Christian faith oriented around the theme of divine 
love is Pinnock's Unbounded Love. The classic work on divine love is by Anders 
Nygren, Agape and Eros, tr. Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1953) . 
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5.4.3 Wisdom 
In establishing and carrying out the project God is resourceful, competent and 
innovative. God has demonstrated in history that he has all the wisdom necessary 
to work with the sort of world he decided to create despite the fact that things 
do not always go as God desires ( e. g. , Israel's defection, Auschwitz, etc. ) . The 
divine wisdom is not defined by our standards of success but by the way God works 
to bring about the fruition of his project. After explaining how God has decided 
to bring the Gentiles into the community of God by faith in Jesus, Paul declares 
his amazement that God would accomplish his purposes in this way: "0 the depth 
of the riches and wisdom of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how 
inscrutable his ways!" (Rom. 11:33). It was the wisdom of God to judge both Jews 
and Gentiles under sin so that he would show mercy to all (Rom. 11:32). God did 
this through the reconciling ministry of Jesus who is both the power and wisdom 
of God (1 Cor. 1:24). For Paul, the "foolishness of God is wiser than human 
wisdom" (1 Cor. 1,25). God's wisdom is manifested in the incarnation, death and 
resurrection of the Son of God. To us, however, death, vulnerability and risk 
seem utter folly, inappropriate ways of acting for a deity. Yet, the way of Jesus 
is the way of powerful love, a love which calls us to be reconciled with God, a 
love which raises us in resurrection life to share in the divine love. God has 
not chosen immunity from the suffering involved in a relationship with sinners. 
Nor has God chosen to override by raw power the personhood of the creatures he 
made to love. Rather, it is the way of love which works to accomplish the divine 
project. And though in many respects history reflects a terrible mess, I believe 
and hope, on the basis of Jesus' resurrection, that God has made, is making and 
will continue to make progress towards satisfactory achievement of his goal. 
Although Paul came to see the wisdom of God displayed in the foolishness of the 
cross, it is possible to call the divine wisdom into question. Repeatedly, 
biblical· characters called upon God to explain himself (e. g. Habakkuk) or failed 
to understand the direction God was taking the project at that particular time 
in history (e. g. Peter in Acts 10:17). Since the Enlightenment it is common for 
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people to call the entire project into question and ask whether God has bitten 
off more than he could chew. I think it safe to say that there is nobody more 
hated than God. Many people are dissatisfied with what they have received in life 
and disappointed in God for not doing a better job of running the world. Though 
people are oftentimes angry at God.for egocentric reasons there is room in the 
model of divine risk-taking to allow for questioning God's wisdom. God takes the 
risk that we may misunderstand his loving intentions. Whereas in the no-risk 
model of providence there is no room to question God since everything happens 
exactly as God desires. In this view there is no room for genuine lament since 
God is always and only to be praised." After all, who are you to question God? 
The answer to this is that I am one of his creatures whom he created to share a 
relationship of love. But since love does not overpower the other there is the 
possibility that I may fail to grasp God's intentions. Moreover, in the risk 
model everything does not happen precisely the way God intends. God also 
experiences setbacks and even defeats. Given the sort of world God created there 
is opportunity to question the divine wisdom. 
Even if we cannot, given the risk model of providence, blame God for evil we can 
still wonder whether it was worth the risk of embarking on the project. With 
Barth, I agree that God shoulders responsibility for creating this world and 
establishing the rules of the game under which God has chosen to operate. 48 We 
can hold God accountable to his purposes and intentions in the project he has 
undertaken. The issue, for God, is whether we-will come to trust in the divine 
love and wisdom. The fundamental basis upon which God seeks to affirm his wisdom 
and love is the life and work of Jesus. According to Paul, it is Jesus who 
justifies us and intercedes on our behalf which is why he is convinced that 
nothing can separate us from the love of God in Jesus Christ (Rom. 8:31-9). Jesus 
"The church loses a significant aspect of life if it does not permit 
lament. .See Walter Brueggemann, "The Costly Loss of Lament," Journal for the 
Study of the Old Testament 36 (1986): 57-71. 
48Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.2, 165. 
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is the wisdom of God. If Jesus does not persuade us who or what will? God has 
placed his bet that he can establish a trusting, loving relationship with us 
through Jesus. Will we come to faith? This is the.risk the divine wisdom takes. 
The wisdom of God is displayed in the way biblical history reveals God's 
competency and resourcefulness as he works to achieve the goal of his project. 49 
Philosophers and theologians have not been prone to speak of the competence and 
resourcefulness of God. Instead, the traditional model has emphasized divine 
omniscience and omnipotence in a way where everything was fixed from the 
beginning. But, as Markus Barth remarks: "A God who has fixed every detail 
beforehand may retire or die. 1150 However, if God gets involved in our lives and 
history in genuine give-and-take relations then the competence and 
resourcefulness of God become significant. In fact, we could speculate as to 
which model offers a more exalted view of God. Gregory Boyd remarks: 
it takes far more self-confidence, far more wisdom, far more love 
and sensitivity to govern that which is personal and free than it 
does to govern that over which one has absolute control. It 
reflects a far greater depth of character and confidence, requiring 
a more profound depth of wisdom, to face a future with genuine 
openness, genuine unknowns, genuine risks, than it does to face a 
future with an exhaustive blueprint in hand. 51 
God is wise in that he is resourceful and competent in his relationship to us. 
Later on more will be said about the divine wisdom in relation to: sovereignty, 
evil, and planning. 
5.4.4 Faithful Freedom 
The divine faithfulness and freedom go together. In God's relationship with us 
49If one has a penchant for 11 omni's" one may say God is ornnicompetent. 
50Markus Barth, Ephesians: Introduction, Translation and Commentary on 
Chapters 1-3 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 106. 
51Boyd, Trinity and Process, 336. 
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we see the divine freedom working out the project in ways God deems best. And we 
see God choosing to be faithful to the project rather than give up on it. 
Hendrikus Berkhof speaks of this as God's "changea.ble faithfulness" where God is 
free to change in his relationships, yet God remains faithful in them." I will 
first say a few things about God's· freedom in relation to the creation before 
moving on to discuss his faithfulness to it. 
To begin, in the triune relationship there was no need to create in order to 
experience love. There is no nproblem of the lonely God" in the Christian 
godhead. The Godhead experienced the delight of sharing-receiving love apart from 
any creation. God does not need the creation in order to be God. The creation is 
not to be explained by some necessity in the divine nature, nor by some 
superabundance which needs an outlet, nor by some lack in God. 53 The creati6n 
is wholly contingent, out of sheer grace. 54 Not only is God free to create or 
not create anything at all, God is also free, once he decided to create, to make 
the sort of world he desired and to establish the particular rules of the game 
he wants. If God wants a world where he sovereignly controls every single event 
that happens then God is free to do so. If God wants a world where he sovereignly 
elects to establish genuine give-and-take relations such that God will, for some 
things, be conditioned by the decisions of the creatures, then God is free to do 
so. It is God's free decision whether or not to set up reciprocal relations 
between himself and his creatures. The divine nature does not dictate the sort 
of world God must make. 55 
52 Berkhof, Christian Faith, 140-7. 
53See Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1, 499. 
54Jean-Jacques Suurmond says the creation is 11 useless 11 since it exists for 
no reason at all. God just takes pleasure in it for God is a "playful God." See 
his Word and Spirit at Play: Towards a Charismatic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1994). 
551 do not know this de re (as if I know God in himself apart from 
revelation). Rather, I affirm God's freedom in creation de dicto, as part of the 
faith--that is, in its relation to other beliefs. The statements that God did not 
have to create and did not have to create this sort of world are, in some 
respects, speculative. But they are legitimate so long as we do not claim to know 
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Some understandings of the divine nature lead to the conclusion that God must 
create a world and must create a particular type of world. It was a proverb in 
Plato's day that "not even God himself can fight against necessity.'"' In the 
Christian tradition necessity was not placed above God, as with Plato, rather it 
became the backbone of the divine nature. God was thought to be a 11 necessary 11 
being whose nature necessarily determined what God did. 57 God is then not 
captive to an arche (exterior ruler} but God is "captive" to his own nature. 
Despite the fact that brilliant thinkers, such as Aquinas, claimed that God was 
them as part of a natural theology. 
56Plato, ~' 818, tr. B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 2 vols. (New 
York: Random House, 1937), 2.571. See also Laws, 741 and Timaeus, 30, 48. 
57Alvin Plantinga studies this most thoroughly in his Does God have a 
Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980) and The Nature of 
Necessity, Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974). It seems to me that in Plantinga's conception God is not 
sovereign over his nature. On whether God essentially must have the properties 
he does see James F. Sennett, "Is God Essentially God?" Religious Studies 30, no. 
3 (Sept. 1994): 295-303. 
Interestingly, Plantinga, who champions the free will defense on the grounds of 
human libertarian freedom denies this same freedom to God. See Wesley Morrison, 
"Is God 'Significantly Free?'" Faith and Philosophy, 2, no. 3 (July, 1985): 257-
264. That God has libertarian freedom is defended by Thomas Flint, "The Problem 
of Divine Freedom," American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983): 255-264. If we 
ascribe libertarian freedom to God, which I do, does this imply that God could 
commit a moral evil? There are a great many qualifications which need discussion. 
See: Vincent Brtimmer Speaking of a Personal God (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 90-107; Brtimmer, "Paul Helm on God and the Approval of Sin," 
Religious Studies, 20 (June 1994): 223-6; Stephen T. Davis, Logic and the Nature 
of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983), 86-96; Robert F. Brown, "God's Ability 
to Will Moral Evil," Faith and Philosophy 8, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 3-20; Richard R. 
La Croix, "Ornniprescience and Divine Determinism," Religious Studies 12 (Sept. 
1976): 375-6; and A. Van de Beek, Why? On Suffering. Guilt and God, tr. John 
Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 261-276. Thomas V. Morris, OUr Idea 
of God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 56-64 and 77-80, 
takes the other position, arguing that God has only compatibilistic freedom (does 
what his nature determines). He claims that God would be "imperfect" if he had 
morally significant freedom (p. 64). On the other hand Morris also says that some 
of God's decisions need not involve a sufficient reason {p. 128). 
If God has morally significant freedom it seems to raise the question whether we 
are justified in trusting God. Brtimmer (Speaking of a Personal God, 105-7) seeks 
to answer this by asserting that God, being omniscient and perfectly free from 
constraint, would never be "disposed" to act out of character. Following the 
biblical' material I would suggest that God has repeatedly demonstrated his love, 
wisdom and faithfulness to us--despite the fact that there have been some rough 
spots in the divine-human relati.onship from our perspective. We have solid 
reasons to trust God because of the kind of character God has manifested towards 
us. God has proven himself trustworthy. It is the p.ersonal God in whom I trust, 
not an inviolable philosophical principle. 
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free not to create and free not to create this particular world, the doctrine 
that God must do what his nature determines leads to the conclusion that God must 
create and denies genuine freedom to the creatures. 58 The problem is brought on 
by the application of the principle of sufficient reason to the divine nature. 
God must then have sufficient reas6n for every decision God makes. Freedom and 
contingency are rendered out of the question. If, however, God is a personal 
being experiencing the fullness of love in the triune godhead then God is free 
to create a world which God does not need. 59 The world, as the product of divine 
personal freedom, is genuinely contingent and so does not have a sufficient 
rational explanation that natural theology can ferret out by logic. There is 
simply no way for us to get beyond our relationship with the creator and, 
reaching the God beyond God, establish what the state of God's mind was at the 
point of creation. Brunner observes that the "One who is Free can never be knoWn 
by the way of thought--for only the Necessary can be found thus, but never the 
Free .... ~r can thought of itself build up the idea of a contingent, non-
necessary, freely-posited world. 1160 Pannenberg makes the same point when he 
says, "If . .. an effect is not grounded in a necessity, then one cannot without 
further ado draw conclusions from the effect about the nature of the cause ... 
. Therefore, the otherness of God in contrast to creatures is radically protected 
58 See Norman Kretzrnan, "Goodness, Knowledge, and indeterminacy in the 
Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," The Journal of Philosophy, supp. 80, no. 10 (Oct. 
1983): 631-649 and Keith Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God (New 
York: Pilgrim, 1982), 74-80, 171. Also see Robert Merrihew Adams, "Must God 
Create the Best?" Philosophical Review, 81 (1972): 312-332. Paul Helm believes 
that creation is contingent but that God had to create this particular world 
since God did not select from "options. 11 That is, God had no choices as to what 
sort of world to create given his nature. See his Eternal God: A Study of God 
Without Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 186-7. 
59Unfortunately, Ward, Rational Theology, 81, 86 1 and 141 caricatures social 
trinitarians as polytheists. After properly criticizing the doctrine of divine 
necessity Ward falls prey to saying God is not self-sufficient and so must create 
other beings for relationship. He goes on to qualify the way God "needs 11 the 
world by saying God does not need anything outside himself but that God "would 
not be c 0mpletely what he is without it; though he need not have been just what 
he is in every respect" (p. 144) . 
60Brunner, Christian Doctrine of God, 144, 14 7. 
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on the presupposition of the contingency of the divine operation. "61 
What we do know is that God has created us and decided to enter into reciprocal 
relations with us as part of the way God is working to bring the divine project 
to fruition. Although God does not need the world in order to experience love, 
God is free to create beings with whom to share his love and with whom he shares 
their love. Brfunmer holds that God has chosen to make a world where he wants his 
love reciprocated and so in this restricted sense it can be said that God has 
chosen to be in "need. "62 God is free to choose to be dependent upon the free 
response of the creatures and to respond to them if God so desires. Barth puts 
is this way: 11 If ever there was a miserable anthropomorphism, it the 
hallucination of a divine inunutability which rules out the possibility that God 
can let himself be conditioned in this or that way by his creature. " 63 In tlie 
survey of the biblical material it was clear Israel as well as individual humans 
affected what God experienced as well as God's decisions. Who is to say God 
cannot sovereignly be this way? Once God freely decides to create and elects to 
make this particular sort of world, God is free to work out his project as he 
deems best. As was seen in the previous chapter, this is precisely Paul's point 
in Romans 9-11. God is sovereignly free to work out his redemptive program as he 
sees fit. If God wants to include Gentiles by faith in Jesus into the people of 
God then God is free to do so. This is the point of the often abused metaphor of 
the divine potter having the right over the clay to work the way he desires (Rom. 
61Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, in 2 vols., tr. George 
H. Kellin, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), 2.171 (see also 138). 
62Brilmmer, Model of Love, 237. Disappointingly, he goes on to reject the 
social trinity. He erroneously believes it negates the unity of the godhead and 
rules out the need of God to love us. But a social trinity could still freely 
choose to. "need" our love in the sense Brfumner describes. There is nothing to 
prevent the social trinity from deciding to be conditioned by our love. In my 
opinion both Ward and Brfumner fail to grasp what contemporary social trinitarians 
are saying. See Cornelius Plantinga Jr., "The Hodgson-Welch Debate on the Social 
Analogy of the Trinity," Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1982. 
63 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 3.4. 108-9. Fiddes, Creative Suffering of God, 
67, observes that this does not rule out divine self~sufficiency regarding God's 
self-existence. 
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9: 20). God has decided to get personally involved--especially in the 
incarnation--and to work out his project according to his loving wisdom. 
Something now needs to be said about the divine faithfulness. The Christian faith 
does not require a risk-free God, but a faithful one. God has repeatedly 
demonstrated his faithfulness to his project. Though God has been remarkably 
flexible, innovative and adaptable in working to achieve his goals, there is a 
constancy in his program. With Thomas Oden one could say God is reliable in the 
way he exhibits his love." The author of Hebrews says that God has made 
promises and given us his oath that he will fulfill them so that we may have 
confidence in God's faithfulness (6:13-20). In fact, even though we have not been 
faithful to God, the apostle Paul says God has remained faithful to us (2 Tim. 
2: 13). Hendrikus Berkhof captures this idea when he writes: "Our wavering 
faithfulness is upheld on all sides by God's unwavering faithfulness. " 65 
The faithfulness of God has customarily been discussed as a category of divine 
immutability. This would not be so bad had the personal aspects of God's 
relationship to us been kept in mind. 66 Too often, however, immutability was 
defined apart from what we know of God in history and was seen to imply that God 
is absolutely unchangeable in every respect. Plato's 11 argument from perfection 11 
(any change for a perfect being is always a change for the worse) is the standard 
means of arriving at divine immutability. This is true even of those, such as 
evangelicals, who pride themselves on doing -"biblical 11 rather than 11 natural" 
"Thomas C. Oden, The Living God, Systematic Theology in 3 vols. (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), 1.110-4. 
"Be'rkhof, Christian Faith, 476. 
66See Isaak August Dorner, Divine Immutability: A Critical Reconsideration, 
Fortress Texts in Modern Theology, tr. Robert R. Williams and Claude Welch 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994) and Rem B. Edwards, "The Pagan Dogma of the 
Absolute Unchangeableness of God," Religious Studies 14 (1978): 305-313. 
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theology. 67 After mentioning Plato's dictum Herman Bavinck says, "He who 
predicates of God any change whatsoever, whether with respect to essence, 
knowledge, or will, belittles every one of his attributes .... He robs God of 
his divine nature. 1168 If God's thoughts, will or emotions ever changed then God 
could not be considered 11 perfect" and God would be in some sense conditioned by 
the creatures. 69 This line of reasoning undermined the personal and living God 
who establishes a covenantal relationship and remains faithful to it. Whereas 
"Eternal truths are unchangeable; an eternal Person is faithful. 11 ? 0 Bloesch puts 
it well: "God's being is indestructible, his plan and purpose are unalterable. 
His love is unfailing and inexorable. His grace is irreversible and persevering. 
This is the biblical picture of God's unchangeableness. "71 The essence of God 
does not change but God does change in experience, knowledge, emotions, and 
actions. 72 
God is both faithful and free or as Hendrikus Berkhof puts it, God has a 
"changeable faithfulness. "73 By saying God has faithful freedom it is possible 
67 See, for instance, Carl F. H. Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6 
vols. (Waco, TX: Word, 1982), 5.304, and J. I. Packer, Knowing God, 20'th 
Anniversary ed. (Downers Grove, IL: 'InterVarsity Press, 1993), 77. 
"Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, tr. William Hendriksen (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker, 1977), 151. 
"It was difficult not to conclude that God was perfectly immobile. But the 
purely immobile is death. See Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1, 494. 
70T. E. Pollard, "The Impassibility of God," Scottish Journal of Theology 
8 (1955): 360. 
71Bloesch, God the Almighty, 94. 
"A. Van de Beek holds that the very being of God changes and so one cannot 
speak of ~ omnipotence or .lJ1ll. goodness of God but only of the sort of divine 
omnipotence or goodness manifested in a particular historical situation. It is 
through changes in God's goodness that he attempts to deal with the problem of 
evil. See his Why, 261-274. Opposed to this Bloesch, Almighty God, 262, Pinnock, 
Openness' of God, 117-8, and H. Berkhof, Christian Faith, 141, all maintain that 
the being of God does not change. I tend to agree that the essence of God does 
not change but I think we can only affirm this as a consequence of the faith (de 
dicta) and not that we can demonstrate it in itself (de re). 
73Berkhof, Christian Faith, 140-7. 
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to affirm the personhood of God in relation to human persons. In his sovereign 
love for his creatures God experiences change yet remains faithfully committed 
to his project. With this understanding the biblical texts on divine repentance 
are read in a straightforward fashion. As Kuitert remarks: "There is nothing--
outside of theological prejudice--to prevent us from taking these words 
seriously. 1174 From this perspective the Bible does not need to read as a two 
layered cake with the top layer representing how God appears to us and the bottom 
one representing how God really is. 75 There is no need to dismiss the texts 
where God repents, changes in his emotional state, or is surprised at our sinful 
response as mere anthropomorphisms. 76 They are metaphors which reveal the kind 
of God who addresses us. That God is personally involved in the world and is 
faithful to it is best exemplified in the incarnation of Jesus. God was faithful 
74Harry M. Kuitert, Signals From the Bible, tr. Lewis B. Smedes, {Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1972), 54. 
75See Lester J. Kuyper, •The Suffering and the Repentance of God," Scottish 
Journal of Theology 22 (1969): 257-277 and Daane, The Freedom of God, 90-1. 
76Though I believe God is everlasting and so experiences temporal duration 
it is not absolutely essential to my argument. In my opinion, the Bible presents 
God as everlasting. For example# "from everlasting to everlasting you are God" 
(Ps.90:2) and Jesus Christ is "the same yesterday, today and forever" (Heb. 
13: 8) . For a survey of the biblical evidence for this claim while paying 
attention to the philosophical issues see Allen G. Padgett, God, Eternity and the 
Nature of Time (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 23-37. On the biblical words 
for time see James Barr, Biblical Words for Time, 2'nd ed. (London: SCM, 1969) 
and Oscar Cullman, Christ and Time, rev. ed., tr. F. V. Filson, (London: SCM, 
1962). For me, God is everlasting through time rather than timeless or 
sempiternal. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, "God Everlasting," in God and the Good, 
ed. C. J. Orlebeke and L.B. Smedes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 181-203, 
Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge, 144-185, and Davis, Logic and the Nature of God, 
8-24. For a helpful discussion of the impact Greek philosophical notions of time 
and eternity had upon Christian thought see W. Kneale, "Time and Eternity in 
Theology," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61 (1960-1): 87-108. For a 
defense of the compatibility of temporalism and ex nihilo see Thomas Senor, 
11 Divine Temporality and Creation ex Nihilo," Faith and Philosophy 10, no. 1 (Jan. 
1993): 86-92. 
Interestingly, William Alston, "Divine and Human Action,,, in Divine and Human 
Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1988), 279, acknowledges that the religious life seems 
to require a divine temporal agent but says "this more concrete picture cannot 
literally apply to God." For defenses of timelessness and sempiternity which 
admit that God cannot genuinely respond, deliberate and do some of the things the 
Bible ascribes to God see Helm, Eternal God, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzman, 
"Eternity," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 429-458, and William Alston, 
"Functionalism and Theological Language,• ed. Thomas Morris, The Concept of God, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 37. 
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in bringing the promises to fulfillment, but he was free to fulfill them in ways 
the people did not anticipate. The so10t of messiah Jesus elected to be was 
unexpected. On the basis of God's faithful f10eedom we may trust God to continue 
working toward the realization of his kingdom. Yet, we must also leave God free 
to wo10k things out as the divine love and wisdom deem best. 
There are those who object, however, wondering whether we should place our trust 
in a God who is free and changeable. Will such a deity be overcome by 
vulne10ability and stop loving us? Why should we trust a God whose p10ophecies are 
mutable? Where is our security if God's future is open? The answer to such 
questions is found in God's work in history, especially in Jesus for he is God's 
definitive wo10d that God is not overcome by vulne10ability. Even though the 
incarnate God was vulnerable to rejection and even death, God did not turn awAy 
from us in our sin. God stood toe to toe with our sin and did not flinch. God's 
unfailing commitment to his p10oject is what should pe10suade us that we may 
wholehea10tedly place our t10ust in God. 
Some, however, prefer to base their confidence in divine impassibility or 
timelessness as metaphysical guarantees that God will not let us down. 77 This 
is wrongheaded, however, since it substitutes certainty in an unchanging concept 
fo10 confidence in faithful God. The reason to t10ust a personal God is because God 
has proven to be faithful. The Ch10istian faith is not t10ust in an immutable 
timeless p10inciple, it is t10ust in the everlasting personal God who is faithful. 
The Christian faith is about the personal address of God in Jesus Christ. The 
faithful concern of God witnessed in scripture and exemplified in Jesus is the 
basis of our trust, not some metaphysical principle. Moreover, we do not have to 
fear that God will change his mind about eve10Ything. God is not fickle fo10 God 
77Cr'eel, Divine Impassibility, founds his trust on this principle. William 
Placher, Narratives of a Vulne10able God, 27-52, claims that a sempite10nal God is 
necessary to ensure that God will continue to love his creatures. It is 
particularly disappointing that Placher, so sensitive to the gospel, would tu10n 
to an abstract principle instead of the personal God as the source of his 
confidence. 
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has been faithful to his project. God swears by himself, not by some metaphysical 
necessity, to fulfill his promises (Heb. 8:13). God's purpose in creation has 
been firmly maintained even while God has fr.9ely taken various routes to 
accomplish it. God has a solid track record and the basis of our confidence 
should be in what the living God has chosen to do rather than in some principle 
which we attribute to God in order to secure our own rational certainty. We have 
an accumulated tradition of God's faithful love which is our ground for trusting 
him. God has proven himself faithful in the past so we have confidence that God 
will be faithful in the future. This is part of what it means to have a personal 
relationship with God. 
5.4.5 Almightiness 
Omnipotence is commonly discussed in terms of abstract power rather than in 
connection with God 1 s wisdom, love and faithfulness. Almightiness should, like 
the attributes discussed above, be understood under the category of the divine 
project God has undertaken rather than as a formal power. The powerful God (El 
shaddai) of the Bible is the one who is mighty to deliver and to care for his 
people. The almighty God is the God "for us" (Heb. 9:24). God's relationship with 
us in history is the proper basis for understanding almightiness. Language about 
omnipotence, no matter how exalted or superlative, must be critiqued in light of 
the sort of omnipotence God has actually exercised in relation to us. 78 Just as 
the love, wisdom and faithful freedom of God had to be viewed in light of the 
gospel story so must the almightiness of God. For, as van de Beek comments: 
"Christology is the great troublemaker in the domain of omnipotence beliefs. 1179 
The lordship of God is expressed in a most unexpected and, for many in Paul's 
day, unsatisfactory fashion. A crucified Messiah was a stwnbling block for many 
of his fellow Jews. An incarnate and dying Son of God was foolishness to his 
78See Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2 .1, 536-8. 
"van de Beek, Why?, 103. A good many theologians take the gospel into 
account when discussing omnipotence but philosophers. of religion and conservative 
evangelical theologians tend to ignore it. 
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Greek contemporaries. The gospel story made God sound weak and foolish to those 
who had preconceived notions of what is fitting for God to do. Paul, however, is 
convinced that Jesus is "the power of God and the wisdom of God. For God's 
foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than human 
strength" (1 Cor. 1:24-5). Elsewhere Paul says that the gospel is "the power of 
God for salvation" (Rom. 1:16). The way in which God decided to carry out his 
project in Jesus was, and still is, perceived by many to be impotence instead of 
power. 
Distorted images of divine power have developed in history. 80 One is that of 
pure transcendence where God is totally unrelated (the ideal of the strong male). 
God, as necessary being, is the transcendent lord over us whose relationship of 
love, mercy, and faithfulness are subordinated in importance to his lordship: 81 
In this view divine power stands far above and apart from us. It is questionable 
whether it is of any benefit to us other than meeting the need for a transcendent 
power as part of our explanation of the universe. 
Another distorted image of divine power does affirm a relationship between God 
and humans, but not a reciprocal one. Whereas Paul said that love does not force 
its will on the other (1 Cor. 13:5) Augustine said that "the will of the 
omnipotent is always undefeated. 1182 God is often conceived as the supreme 
monarch exercising the coercive power of brute force and compulsion. In classical 
theism the tendency has been to think of God's will in terms of a feudal king 
80 See Daniel L. Migliore, The Power of God, (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1983), 34-40. 
81See Jungel, God as the Mystery of the World, 21, 48, 213, who says that 
metaphysics assigns God a place over us in absolute superiority. Death works 
under us so whoever dies cannot be the absolutely superior. The death of Jesus 
is then understood to reflect a deficient God--a God who is not necessary. 
"Augustine, Enchiridion, 26 .102. It might be objected that Augustine sought 
to qualify this with a notion of "permission" where God "allowsu some things to 
happen (24.95-6). But it is clear even in this context that Augustine affirms 
"specific sovereignty" such that no detail in history is other than what God 
specifically wills it to be. 
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collaboration. "88 
In discussing omnipotence philosophers have not Usually defined it in terms of 
the actual relationship God has with us. Instead, the focus has been on deriving 
a concept of maximal power drawn frOrn our own experience of power. Gijsbert van 
den Brink's excellent study Almighty God examines the history of the discussion 
of the topic and systematically explores the similarities and differences between 
the concepts of almightiness and omnipotence. 89 Omnipotence is derived from our 
preconceived notions of God and power and refers to God's ability to do all 
things. Almightiness, on the other hand, is derived from God's revelatory actions 
in history and refers to God's ability to manage the affairs he undertakes in 
accordance with the character of God (which is also known only by his word). 
In seeking to elaborate the meaning of omnipotence, philosophers usually divide 
into one of two camps regarding God's ability to do "all things." On the one hand 
are those, such as Descartes, who held that God can do absolutely anything, even 
the logically contradictory." God can save and damn the same individual 
simultaneously or make two parallel mountain ranges without an intervening valley 
or create a waffle so big he cannot eat it. 91 After all, is not God the creator 
"Kristiaan Depoortere, A Different God: A Christian View of Suffering, 
Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 
84. 
"In what follows I will freely draw upon his work, though making some 
important modifications. This is the best philosophical study of the subject I 
have read. On the theological side the discussions by Barth, Brunner and H. 
Berkhof most closely approximate my own. It should be noted that Peter Geach had 
earlier made the distinction between omnipotence and almightiness. Though 
helpful, I do not agree with all of Geach's points or arguments and find van den 
Brink a more careful guide here. See Geach's "Orcmipotence," Philosophy 43 (1973): 
7-20, reprinted in Providence and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 3-28. Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso argue against Geach that God 
is omnipotent and not merely almighty. See their "Maximal Power," ed. Thomas 
Morris, The Concept of God, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 134-167. 
'°For a contemporary defense of this position see D. Goldstick, "Could God 
Make a Contradiction True?" Religious Studies 26 (Spring, 1990): 377-87. 
"The "paradox of the stone" is not nearly so delectable as the "paradox of 
the waffle. 11 
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of all things including logic? Does not God's logic transcend human logic? This 
may sound pious but there is a serious difficulty involved. One may, following 
Barth and Bloesch, say that God is not bound to htiman logic in the sense that it 
stands as an independent and equal partner alongside God, limiting what God can 
do. 92 We are not in position to deCree (de re) what God can or cannot do. But 
if one asserts that God can do the logically contradictory then one has also 
transgressed the boundaries of what ~ can know. 93 Since God created us within 
certain boundaries and limits and since the principle of noncontradiction seems 
to be a necessary condition for coherent discourse, ~cannot meaningfully speak 
(de dicto) of God doing the logically contradictory." It simply violates the 
conditions of meaningful discourse which is one of the boundaries God has placed 
us in. We could not recognize a "square circle" if we saw one, nor could we 
comprehend two parallel mountain ranges without an intervening valley. 
Problems with the first definition of omnipotence have led thinkers, following 
Aquinas, to qualify its meaning by asserting that God can do all that is 
"Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1, 532-8 and Bloesch, Almighty God, 34-5. 
"Regarding the status of the laws of thought and mathematics along with 
other wabstract objects" there are several views. One may say they are created 
by God and that God was free to determine their modal status at creation or that 
God had to create them the way they are or that they are uncreated and have 
eternally existed in the mind of God as necessary thoughts. For a review of the 
positions see van den Brink, Almighty God, 184-203. Van den Brink agrees with 
Philo, Augustine and Plantinga (Does God Have a Nature?) that they are uncreated 
necessary objects in the mind of God. Hence, God cannot (~) do the logically 
contradictory or make 2 + 2 = 5. Unfortunately, van den Brink does not discuss 
my position which is that all we know is that God works with us within the rules 
of the game he established atc;eation. These rules include the laws of thought 
and mathematics. Whether God created them or whether God could have made them 
otherwise or could break them we cannot (de re) say but we have to (de dicto) 
think this due to the conditions of the created order. Moreover, if God is going 
to relate to us meaningfully then God must do so within the boundaries (the 
rules) in which he created us. Whether God can do the logically impossible is 
more than I can know. But if God is going to relate to me in meaningful ways then 
doing the logically impossible will not be one of them. Barth's position, Church 
Dogmatics, 533-8, bears some similarity to mine but he also goes too far in 
claiming to know that the laws of thought are not eternal verities but rules 
established at creation. 
"Some philosophers, such as Paul Helm, Providence of God, 215, claim that 
God cannot do the logically contradictory. Others, however, such as Morris, Our 
Idea of God, 67 and Davis, Logic and the Nature of God, 78, argue only for de 
dicto knowledge on this point. 
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logically possible to do. Though God's power in this sense cannot perform that 
which is incoherent this has not been thought to imply any weakness on God's 
part. God remains able to do all things. It is' just that square circles or 
simultaneously damning and saving a person are not 11 things 11 or meaningful states 
of affairs at all. God has the capacity to realize all possible states of affairs 
even though God does not, in fact, do so. In this regard omnipotence is virtual, 
not actual power. In the Christian tradition it has been customary to distinguish 
God's absolute power (potentia absoluta) from God's actual power (potentia 
ordinata} . 95 God's absolute omnipotence concerns speculating on the kinds of 
things God could do but has not elected to do." 
God's actual power (potentia ordinata) is God's ability to manage all that he 
undertakes. God has unsurpassable power as creator, sustainer and redeemer. This 
is the biblical understanding of God's almightiness where divine power is not 
abstracted from the divine project. Almightiness is defined in terms of the 
relationship God has established with the creation. Almightiness is connected to 
God's authority which is a relational and social category. It refers to the 
actual power of God: what God has actually done in creating and interacting with 
his creatures. Says Barth: "it is not power for anything and everything, but His 
power with a definite direction and content. " 97 
"Van den Brink, Almighty God, 43-115, traces the historical shift of 
emphasis in the Christian tradition from the ootentia ordinata to potentia 
absoluta. One very important purpose of this distinction is to rebut the 
principle of plenitude whereby God's nature is so full that it must diffuse 
itself (p. 73). On the havoc the principle of plenitude has wreaked in Western 
history see Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1964). Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1, 539-542, says the 
distinction has been abused in the tradition to support a Deus absconditus behind 
the Deus revelatus. 
96So long as the speculation and hypothesizing is kept within the framework 
of what we know about the divine project I have no objection to this. But when 
the potehtia absoluta takes precedence over the potentia ordinata then we again 
encounter the danger of defining God apart from what he has revealed to us which 
will giv~ rise to important side effects on the doctrine of providence. Brunner, 
Christian Doctrine of God, 248-9, is very critical of this. 
"Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1, 544. 
210 
Regarding the definition of "power" there is no consensus. Van den Brink 
discusses four different understandings of the term." There is (1) the power 
to do certain specific acts (e. g. creation); (2) power over others; (3) power 
as disposition (i. e. to be or to act in particular ways); and (4) power as 
authority. With the proper qualifications all of these senses of power may be 
attributed to almightiness but the last one, power as authority, yields an 
interesting point in relation to providence. Authority may be used both in a de 
jure and in a de facto sense. De jure authority consists of the rights to issue 
and carry out commands without the consent of those affected. This sort of 
authority may be causal or coercive in nature. De facto authority, on the other 
hand, consists of the right to issue commands and carry them out only with the 
consent of those affected. This kind of authority is not coercive for it requires 
the acknowledgement of the authority's power by others in order to exist at all. 
In discussions of providence God's authority has often been construed as de jure 
rather than de facto. After all, is it proper to say of the omnipotent God that 
he needs our acknowledgement in order to be lord? 
In a sense, it is not proper since God is the lord our creator and provider 
whether we acknowledge it. or not. Yet, as was seen in the chapters on the 
biblical material God is not a lord in the image of a middle Eastern potentate. 
Rather, God is the lord who wants to love us and establishes covenantal relations 
with us. In this respect the biblical notion of divine authority is closer to de 
facto authority. The suzerain of the covenant·needs the consent of the vassal. 
To put it differently, the lover needs the reciprocation of love by the beloved 
since love cannot be forced. The kingdom of God is inaugurated but not fully 
realized yet. God is working to bring all things to the good (Rom. 8:28) and to 
bring it about that all may be loyal subjects and God may be all in all (1 Cor. 
15:27-8). It is clear that this is not a present reality but one toward which God 
is working. Moreover, God enlists our collaboration towards this end for we have 
"van den Brink, Almighty God, 119-134. See also Morris, Our Idea of God, 
69-73. 
211 
been "given the ministry of reconciliation" (2 Cor. 5:18) and are called to bring 
every alien world view and evil captive to the obedience of Christ (2 Cor. 
10:5) ." The biblical understanding of almightiness does not entail that 
everything happens precisely as God desires for it is defined in terms of the 
sort of project God has decided to establish. 
Van den Brink highlights five differences between philosophical definitions of 
omnipotence and the biblical concept of almightiness. 10° Firstly, in the Bible 
God's almightiness is not divorced from God's existential relations with the 
creation. Secondly, in the Bible the nature of divine power is disclosed in his 
actions. Take, for instance, the powerful image of the Lord Jesus becoming a 
servant and washing the disciples' feet (Jn. 13:4-17). In this passage Jesus 
expressly uses the action to highlight the nature of his lordship. Such actions 
are difficult to assimilate into Anselmian theology where omnipotence is derived 
from the most perfect understanding of power conceivable and we typically do not 
think lords shoulld behave this way. Thirdly, whereas omnipotence is usually 
thought of as an essential attribute of God such that nothing can oppose God, in 
scripture God's power and authority are continuously challenged and God's 
purposes for some things are thwarted. Fourthly, the Bible does say there are 
some things which God cannot do. For example, God cannot swear by someone greater 
(Heb. 6:13) or lie (Heb. 6:18) or be tempted (James 1:13) or deny himself (2 Tim. 
2:13). These are not "logical" impossibilities and so the formal definition of 
omnipotence might be questioned. However, ·the biblical writers were not 
attempting to provide us with philosophically precise meanings of terms. 
Moreover, scripture also says that nothing is impossible for God (Gen. 18:14; 
Luke 1:37) and that God's power is unlimited (Num. 11:23). Although there is no 
"That Paul (in 2 Cor. 10:5) is speaking about world views (i. e. Hellenism 
and the Judaizers) and not the psychological control of my own inner thoughts is 
defended' by Murray J. Harris, 2 Corinthians, Expositor's Bible Commentary vol. 
10, ed. Frank Gaebelein, (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1976), 380-1, and Philip 
E. Hughe~, Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians, New International Commentary 
on the New Testament, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1962), 352-3. 
'°'Van den Brink, Almighty God, 178-183. 
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attempt to reconcile the notion that God can do anything with the idea that God 
cannot do everything, it must be remembered that both sets of statements occur 
within the framework of God's relationship with the people to whom these 
particular statements are made. Fifthly, the Bible ascribes both power and 
weakness to God (1 Cor. 1:25); something Anselmian theology has difficulty 
accounting for. 
In my view, the almighty God wins our hearts through the weakness of the cross. 
God has made us to love and love does not force its own way on the beloved (1 
Cor. 13:5). Brunner puts it well: "God so wills to be 'almighty' over us, that 
He wins our hearts through the condescension in His Son, in the Cross of the Son. 
No other Almighty Power of God could thus conquer and win our hearts. The heart 
is the one sphere which cannot be forced. "101 Berkhof speaks of God's 
almightiness as the "defenseless superior power" in that God creates significant 
others and submits himself to the rules of the game he established for his 
relationship with them. 102 This must not be construed as sentimentality or 
impotency. As Migliore states: "God is Creator, Redeemer, and Transformer of 
life--not mere almightiness but creative power; not impassive but compassionate 
power; not immutable but steadfast, life-giving power that liberates and 
transforms the world. ulOJ 
5.5 Excursus on omniscience 
5.5.1 Introduction 
My preference, throughout this thesis has been to emphasize the divine wisdom, 
resourcefulness and competence rather than omniscience. Nevertheless, the term 
omniscience, defined as knowing all that can be known, accurately describes my 
view of the divine knowledge. Although nearly all theists affirm that God knows 
101Brunner, Christian Doctrine of God, 254. 
102Berkhof, Christian Faith, i33-140. 
103Migliore, The Power of God, 71. 
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all that can be known they disagree about exactly what can be known. That is, the 
disagreement is not whether God is omniscient, it is about the nature of 
omniscience. It is the same situation regarding offinipotence. Most theists agree 
that God is omnipotent but there is sharp difference of opinion regarding the 
nature of omnipotence. A good many theists believe that omniscience includes 
omniprescience or foreknowledge. In this case, God not only knows all the past 
and present in exhaustive detail, God also knows in complete detail everything 
that will ever happen in the creation. There is considerable debate about 
attributing omniprescience to God among contemporary philosophers of 
religion. 104 While some maintain omniprescience others contend that God knows 
the past and present in exhaustive detail but does not know the future in the 
same way. Again, it is important to note that the debate is not about whether God 
is omniscient but about the nature of that omniscience. 
Moreover, regarding the issue of whether or not God takes risks, the debate over 
foreknowledge is of no consequence. The primary question is not ornniprescience 
but divine responsiveness and conditionality. The assorted views to be discussed 
shortly divide into two groups~ the no-risk model and various risk models. The 
Rubicon to be crossed concerns whether at least some of God's knowledge of what 
the creatures actually do is contingent upon the creatures so doing. That is, all 
risk models affirm the idea that some of the divine knowledge is, in some way or 
other, conditioned by or dependent upon the creatures. If God permits things to 
happen which he did not specifically intend to happen or if God enters into give-
and-take dialogue with us or if God responds to our prayers because we ask God 
to do so then God is involved in contingent relations with us. This is true, as 
will be shown below, whether God has simple foreknowledge, middle knowledge or 
present knowledge. A God with simple foreknowledge or middle knowledge still 
takes risks in deciding to embark on the sort of project involving creatures with 
libertarian freedom. The only way of avoiding an omniscient God who takes risks 
104For a helpful survey of the debate see Nelson Pike, "A Latter-Day Look at 
the Foreknowledge Problem," International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 
33 (June 1993): 129-164. 
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is to uphold divine foreordination of all things. Consequently, the key issue is 
not the type of knowledge an omniscient deity has but the type of sovereignty an 
omniscient God decides to exercise. In order to substantiate these claims I will 
first summarize the various positions and then focus in on why a God with 
foreknowledge remains a risk-taking deity. 
~ 
5.5.2 The Main Alternatives 
Regarding the issue of divine risk the various understandings of omniscience may 
be divided into the no-risk and risk categories. In the no-risk model of 
sovereignty God is not dependent upon the creature in any way. Prior to creation 
God knew every single detail of every event that would every occur. God's 
knowledge of all these events was not contingent upon the creatures for 
omniscience is completely independent of anything external to God. God does not 
"need" the creature (an external being) in order to know what will happen. God 
does not "prevision" or "look ahead 11 into the future to see what the creatures 
will do and make his decisions on the basis of the creature's future actions 
since this would bring an element of contingency into the divine knowledge. None 
of God's knowledge is caused by the creatures as this would undermine God's 
absolute independence and immutability. What God knows is determined solely by 
what God decides to do. This was the view of Calvin, Jonathan Edwards and, I 
believe, the latter Augustine. For them, God does not know the future because God 
foresees what will happen, rather God knows the future because God determines 
what the future shall be. Hence, God's foreknowledge is a result of divine 
foreordination of all things. All that God knows is dependent solely on the 
divine will, not on anything the creatures may do. If God knows the future 
actions of humans because God foreordains precisely what they shall be then God 
does not take any risks. 
On the other hand, if one denies exhaustive divine sovereignty such that God 
takes risks and allows that God's knowledge of what creatures with 
indeterministic freedom will do is dependent upon the creatures then a variety 
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of views are available including simple foreknowledge, timeless knowledge, 
knowledge of all possibilities, middle knowledge and presentism. 105 Part of the 
motivation behind these theories is to assisi:. the explication of a non 
deterministic understanding of sovereignty. 106 Simple foreknowledge is a widely 
held view among theists. In this view God, prior to creation, had comprehensive 
direct vision of every single detail that would actually occur in this world. For 
instance, prior to creation God foresaw such things as Caesar crossing the 
Rubicon and the abolition of apartheid in South Africa. This view was held by a 
great many of the church fathers, Arminius and John Wesley. They used it to 
explain how God could predestine certain individuals to salvation without 
overriding human freedom. 107 God simply "looked ahead" to see which people would 
exercise faith in God and, on that basis, elected them. Prior to creation God 
learns what we will actually do for prior to God's decision to create God did n6t 
know what we would actually do. Hence, a God with simple foreknowledge was open 
(prior to the decision to create) to being surprised, shocked and delighted. 
Timeless knowledge works out in essentially the same way as simple foreknowledge 
but it is not "fore" knowledge at all. God atemporally sees all of history at 
once. There is no before or after in the divine knowledge. 108 Other than that, 
105I have not included process theology in this list since it is not a risk 
model of providence. The God of process theology does not create the""WOrld and 
so cannot be held accountable for what transpires in it. A process God was not 
faced either with a decision to create or a decision of what sort of sovereignty 
to exercise. The God of process thought is impotent to act unilaterally in human 
affairs. See Basinger's, Divine Power in Process Theism. 
106David Basinger's, "Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought," 
Religious Studies 22, no. 3 (Sept. 1986): 407-422, explores the elements of 
divine control and risk in middle knowledge, simple foreknowledge and presentism. 
1070n the fathers see James Jorgenson, "Predestination According to Divine 
Foreknowledge in Patristic Tradition," eds. John Meyendorff and Robert Tobias, 
Salvation in Christ: a Lutheran-Orthodox Dialogue (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1992), 
159-169. 
108A timeless deity knows the future but does not "think" or "plan 11 about it 
since drawing inferences or deliberating imply moving from premisses to 
conclusion--from ignorance to knowledge. Nevertheless, proponents of this theory 
attempt to eXPlain how a timeless deity may relate and even respond to us. See, 
for example, William Alston, "Divine-Human Dialogue and the Nature of God," Faith 
and Philosophy 2, no. 1 (Jan. 1985): 5-20. The Jesuit writer, John H. Wright, 
attempts to reconcile a strongly immutable God with divine conditionality, 
adaptability, and even frustration. See his 11 The Eternal Plan of Divine 
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the divine-human relationship is explained pretty much the same way in timeless 
knowledge as it is in simple foreknowledge. That God takes risks in this view 
will be made clear below. 
The knowledge of all possibilities view does not have an official name of which 
I am aware. According to this theory God, prior to creation, knows all possible 
events and their outcomes and may decide what responses, if any, God will make 
to every event. God may eternally decide to do X if A occurs, or Z if B arises. 
The possibilities which God eternally knows do not come into being or pass away 
for they are eternally in the divine mind. 109 Since God has exhaustive knowledge 
of all possibilities God may eternally decide to "prerespond" to each and every 
situation which might arise. Richard Creel says that God eternally resolved how 
he would deal with each possible situation. In this way there is no genuine 
change in God, including feelings . 110 But other proponents of this view allow 
for God to be temporally involved in the creation and allow for some significant 
change to occur in God. 111 Nevertheless, God is said to never be caught off 
Providence," Theological Studies 27 (March 1966) : 27-57 and "Divine Knowledge and 
Human Freedom: The God Who Dialogues," Theological Studies 38 (1977): 450-477. 
Objections may be raised against this theory. (1) It seems to exclude divine 
deliberation and planning. See Thomis Kapitan, 11 Can God Make Up His Mind? 11 
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 15 (1984): 37-47; 
11 Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives, 11 Philosophical Quarterly 
36, no. 143 (April 1986): 230-251; "Providence, Foreknowledge, and Decision 
Procedures," Faith and Philosophy 10, no. 3 (July 1993): 415-420. (2) If God 
cannot deliberate then questions arise about the divine freedom: Does God freely 
choose which creative option to actualize? Does God freely choose to become 
incarnate? See Richard La Croix, "Omniprescience and Divine Determinism," and 
David Basinger, "Omniscience and Deliberation: A Response to Reichenbach," 
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 20 (1986): 169-172. See also 
note 125 below. 
'°'See Ward, Rational Theology, 153. 
110Richard Creel, Divine Imoassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 17-34. Though Creel does an 
admirable job of defending classical theism, I do not believe this resonates well 
with the'biblical picture of God. Moreover, it seriously alters the understanding 
of the personal relationship between God and humanity. How can God be said to be 
in a rel~tionship of love with us? See Fiddes, Creative Suffering of God, 58-9. 
111See Thomas V. Morris, "Properties, Modalities., and God," The Philosophical 
Review 93, no. 1 (Jan. 1984): 35-55 and Richard Rice, God's Foreknowledge, 56-9. 
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guard, surprised by any event, or forced to make any ad hoc decisions. Yet, it 
is true that God's knowledge of what will actually (not just possibly) occur is 
dependent upon what the creatures freely decide to do. Hence, according to the 
view that God knows all possibilities, though God does not learn what £.fill 
possibly happen, God learns what does, in fact, happen. God learns what does 
occur in the actual world either prior to creation (as in simple foreknowledge 
or timeless knowledge) or as history unfolds (as in presentism). Thus, God may 
or may not have foreknowledge. Regardless, God still takes risks in creating a 
world where he does not exercise exhaustive sovereignty since even if God knows 
how he will react to any possible circumstance, God does not know, prior to his 
decision to create, which of the possibilities will come about. Furthermore, 
there may still be room for an element of divine shock or joy in this theory if 
one distinguishes between possibility and probability. In this case though God 
knows it is possible, for example, that Israel could defect from his love, God 
may not consider it likely and so may be shocked at Israel's unfaithfulness . 112 
A theory that shares some affinities with the foregoing view is called middle 
knowledge or Molinism. Luis de Molina, a sixteenth-century Jesuit theologian, 
developed this theory in an attempt to reconcile divine sovereignty and human 
indeterministic freedom. m According to middle knowledge God knows not only 
112There are several issues which this model of divine omniscience must 
resolve. Is it actually possible for God to et.ernally know all possibilities in 
an indeterministic creation--both on the physical and human levels? Do we want 
to say that God cannot generate new ideas and possibilities? (If I am correct, 
John Duns Scotus believed that the divine will could establish new orders and was 
not bound by the eternal archetypes in the divine mind.) Ward, Rational Theology, 
154, 165 and Fiddes, Creative Suffering, 97 both affirm that God knows the 
general outlines of all possible events but that there is no fixed sum of eternal 
ideas, rather there is a changing supply of imaginatively created possibilities 
as God works with us in history. Also, Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 238-9 questions whether a God who 
"preresponds" to everything renders the divine-human relationship impersonal. 
113see Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, tr. and introduced by Alfred 
J. Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). For a popular 
introduction to middle knowledge see William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The 
Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 
1987). Thomas Flint, "Two Accounts of Providence," compares Molinism with 
Thomism. 
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what could possibly happen but also what would happen if something were different 
in any given situation. That is, God knows all the "counterfactuals of freedom" 
such as what would be different in the world had Moses refused to return to 
Egypt. God knows, for instance, exactly how I would freely respond if someone 
offered me a million dollars not to.write this book. Prior to creation God knew 
all the feasible worlds he could create and what would freely happen in each of 
these worlds. In deciding to create this world God knows which creatures will 
come into being and all the circumstances these creatures will find themselves 
in and precisely which choices the creatures will freely make in each situation. 
Thus, God has comprehensive knowledge of the future prior to creation. 
This does not, however, rule out contingency and risk for God since God's 
knowledge of the counterfactuals (what the creatures would do in any given 
situation) is independent of the di vine will. 114 Prior to creation God may 
examine all the feasible worlds but what the creatures would do in each of these 
worlds is not controlled by God! God exercises control over which of the feasible 
worlds he wants to create but there may not be any feasible world in which 
indeterministic freedom is present where absolutely everything goes exactly the 
way God would like. God may have to select from options which provide only a 
seventy percent divine satisfaction rating. For example, God may desire a world 
where every single person comes into a loving relationship with God but there may 
not be any such feasible world. If there is such a world, it will not be a result 
of God's knowledge since divine knowledge does not cause these worlds to be. It 
will be because God was fortunate enough that there was such a feasible world 
available to create. It was possible that no feasible worlds existed in which 
even some people came to love God. As it turns out there was at least one such 
world--this one--where some people love God but God is dependent upon the 
114Regarding divine risk in middle knowledge see David Basinger, "Divine 
Control and Human Freedom: Is Middle Knowledge the Answer? Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 36, no. 1 (March, 1993): 55-64, his "Middle 
Knowledge and Divine Control," and w. S. Anglin, Free Will and the Christian 
~. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), chapter 4. 
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creatures for this to be. m If God does not control the free choices of 
individuals then God cannot bring about in feasible world A that Alex, whom God 
knows will not come to love God in world A, actually come to love God in world 
A. Hence, a God with middle knowledge is open to serious disappointment and even 
surprise in "learning 11 what obtains in the various feasible worlds. Such a God 
might be very lucky or unlucky as to whether there are any feasible worlds he 
could create where most of the divine desires are met. It is correct, though, 
that a God with middle knowledge takes no risks .2l1£§. he selects a particular 
feasible world to create since he knows how everything will turn out in that 
particular world-. 
The final view to be summarized is called present knowledge or presentism. 116 
It, like all the other risk models affirms omniscience but it denies 
ornniprescience. God knows all that can be known but it is denied that is possible 
to know the future actions of free creatures . 117 The future is not fixed but 
115Strong Calvinists reject middle knowledge because it makes some of God's 
knowledge contingent. See, for example, Richard A. Muller, "Grace, Election, and 
Contingent Choice: Arminius's Gambit and the Reformed Response," 265-9 and J. A. 
Crabtree, "Does Middle Knowledge Solve the Problem of Divine Sovereignty?, 429-
258, both in eds. Thomas Schreiner and Bruce Ware, The Grace of God, The Bondage 
of the Will, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids,· MI: Baker, 1995). It should be noted that 
some proponents of middle knowledge are determinists, however, and thus affirm 
foreordination of all things. 
116Arnong those who affirm this view are Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John 
Sanders, William Hasker and David Basinger, The Openness of God; J. R. Lucas, The 
Future; Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1977); and Keith Ward, Rational Theology. Even some defenders of classical 
theism hold that perfect being theology is quite compatible with presentism. See 
H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 32-3 and 
Thomas Morris, Our Idea of God, 102. Presentism was defended by several 
nineteenth-century American Methodists. To mention but a few: Billy Hibbard, 
Memoirs of the Life and Travels of B. Hibbard, 2'nd ed. (New York: self-
published, 1843); Lorenzo McCabe, The Foreknowledge of God (Cincinnati: Cranston 
and Stowe, 1887), and his Divine Nescience of Future Contingencies a Necessity 
(New York: Phillips and Hunt, 1862). See the debates this sparked in the 
Methodist Review in 1899. I would like to thank Randy Maddox for calling my 
attention to Hibbard and the debate in the journal. For further bibliography on 
those who are open to presentism see my 11 Historical Considerations," 97-8, 189-
190 notes 160-8. 
ii7Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge, 64-74 and "A Philosophical Perspective, 11 
147-8, provides a carefully constructed argument that omniprescience entails 
determinism. It should be noted that I have not .made use of this argument. 
Instead, I have argued that omniprescience is ruled out by the construal of the 
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open both to what God and humans decide to do. God's knowledge of what creatures 
do is dependent upon the creatures and God may genuinely dialogue with us, 
respond to our prayers and resourcefully adapt his plans to our actions. This 
model of omniscience was defended in the two chapters on the biblical material 
in this thesis (see especially 3.12 and 4.16). Presentism holds that the divine 
knowledge is unsurpassable in that no creature can even approximate God's 
exhaustive knowledge of the past and present . 118 Due to the knowledge of all 
past and present as well as God's superior abilities of analysis and inference 
God is able to predict with amazing accuracy what he believes will occur. Some 
proponents of presentism affirm that God knows all possibilities that could ever 
happen while other adherents affirm that God knows the general outlines of all 
possible futures . 119 Either way God is still open to being surprised, shocked 
and delighted as God works with us in history. 120 
5.5.3 The Useless of Simple Foreknowledge for Providence 
5.5.3.1 Introduction 
divine-human relationship in the biblical record. In my opinion, this theory best 
handles the give-and-take relationship with God though I admit more work needs 
to be done to fully develop this understanding of omniscience. Though God's 
openness to life far transcends ours.it could be argued that God is our model for 
openness and learning. On this see John M. Hull, What Prevents Christian Adults 
From Learning? (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991), 219-38. 
118Despi te this Helm, Eternal God, 125, 195, claims that presentism is an 
"attenuated" understanding of omniscience. But if omnipotence, defined as the 
ability to do all that is logically possible, is not an attenuated understanding 
of divine power then why should omniscience, defined as the knowing of all that 
is possible to know, be an attenuated view of divine knowledge? If some things 
are unknowable (de dicta) just as contradictions are undoable (de dicta) then it 
is no deficiency in God. 
119See note 112 above. 
120The degree of surprise a God with present knowledge experiences is often 
exaggerated by critics. See, for instance, Craig, Only Wise God, 134-5 and 
Hasker's reply, God, Time and Knowledge, 197, n. 13. Some critics charge that 
such a deity is a bumbling, unfulfilled God who makes mistakes and cannot 
accomplish all he desires. It is true that God does not get everything he wants 
but this' is not due to the type of knowledge God has! Rather, it is due to the 
type of sovereignty God elects to practice. Indeed, proponents of exhaustive 
divine sovereignty argue that all the risk views of omniscience share this 
problem. David Basinger's, "Can an Evangelical Christian Justifiably Deny God's 
Exhaustive Knowledge of the Future?," Christian Scholar's Review 25, no. 2 (Dec. 
1995): 133-145, handles many of these criticisms. 
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Before concluding this excursus it may be helpful to explore more fully the sort 
of divine control a God with simple foreknowledge is able to exercise since 
simple foreknowledge is probably the most widely h'eld position and its value for 
divine providence is often overestimated. 121 Does a God with simple 
foreknowledge (SF hereafter) possess greater providential control than a God with 
present knowledge (PK hereafter)? Proponents of SF claim the answer is yes 
because SF allows God to predict the future through his prophets and that it 
allows God to guarantee the end from the beginning. 
David Hunt claims that "divine control will be hamstrung and God's purposes 
jeopardized if events can ever catch Him by surprise, or find Him unprepared, or 
force Him to react after the fact to patch things up .... the kind of providential 
control expected of a theistic God is possible only on the assumption <If 
foreknowledge.""' Jack Cottrell maintains that SF is a key element in God's 
providential control over the world. He says. 
Because it is by this means that God can allow man to be truly free 
:fin his choices, even free to resist his own special influences, and 
at the same time work out his own purposes infallibly. For if God 
foreknows all the choices that every person will make, he can make 
his own plans accordingly, fitting his purposes around these 
foreknown decisions and actions .... Acts 2: 23 is a perfect 
illustration of the way God works through his foreknowledge .... On 
the one hand, God had predetermined that Jesus would die as a 
propitiation for the sins of the world; this was his own 
unconditional plan for saving the world. On the other hand, the 
details of how this would be accomplished were planned in relation 
to God's foreknowledge of the historical situation and of the 
121Much of the material in this section is from my more complete discussion: 
"Why Simply Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control than the Openness 
of God," .Faith and Philosophy (forthcoming 1996). 
122David P. Hunt, "Divine Providence and Simpl.e Foreknowledge, 11 Faith and 
Philosophy 10, 3 (July, 1993): 394-5. 
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character and choices of men such as Judas. 123 
Before examining the validity of these claims, I think it important to 
distinguish two different versions of how God's foreknowledge is accessed. SF is 
commonly explained as God 11 seeing the whole at once" and thus, knowing all that 
will happen. For example, God previsioned before the creation of the world my 
birth, sibling rivalries, marriage, adoption of children, etc. What God 
previsioned, moreover, included all the details leading up to and surrounding all 
these events--right down to the number of hairs on my head at any given moment. 
This vision of God happens all at once and even though he knows things will occur 
in sequence God does not acquire the knowledge in sequence. I shall coin the term 
"Complete Simple Foreknowledge" (CSF) for this version of SF. 
Unfortunately, CSF has a difficult time explaining how God can intervene in what 
he foresees will happen. The problem arises because of the fact that what God 
previsions is what will actually occur. Divine foreknowledge, by definition, is 
always correct. If what will actually happen is, for example, the holocaust, then 
God knows it is going to happen and cannot prevent it from happening since his 
foreknowledge is never mistaken. Furthermore, if what God has foreseen is the 
entire human history at once, then the difficulty is to somehow allow for God's 
intervention into that history. This raises a serious problem. Does simple 
foreknowledge imply that God previsions his own decisions and actions? If a God 
with CSF possesses foreknowledge of his own actions, then the problem is to 
explain how the foreknowledge can be the basis for the actions when it already 
includes the actions. Hasker explains: "it is impossible that God should use a 
foreknowledge derived from the actual occurrence of future events to determine 
his own prior actions in the providential governance of the world. 11 124 Such a 
123Jack Cottrell, What the Bible Says About God the Ruler (Joplin, MO: 
College Press Publishing, 1984), 208-9. It seems that what Cottrell is actually 
describing is closer to Middle Knowledge than SF. 
"'Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 63. See also note 125 below. 
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deity would then know what he is going to do before deciding what to do. A God 
with CSF would be unable to plan, anticipate, or decide--he would simply know. 
This seems to call the divine freedom into question, making God a prisoner of his 
own omniprescience . 125 Furthermore 1 if God sees Abraham's birth, life and death 
all at once then how does God interject the test of the binding of Isaac (Gen. 
22) into Abraham's life? How does God see God's own actions in Abraham's life 
which would alter Abraham's life and consequently change God's foreknowledge? 
Hunt is correct that a God "with total foreknowledge ... is equipped to make 
maximally informed decisions--but there is nothing left to be decided. "126 The 
divine freedom is seriously curtailed. 
Perhaps, however, we can propose a different explanation of God's direct 
apprehension of the future. One where God timelessly accesses the future in 
seauence or incrementally. 127 That is, not in a temporal sequence, but in what 
might be called an explanatory order. Using temporal language one may say God 
atemporally rolls the tape of the future up to a certain point and then stops it 
in order to interject his own actions into the tape and then rolls the tape 
further to see what his creatures will do in response to his actions. Then God 
again decides what he will do and then rolls the tape further. Hence, there is 
a logical sequence or order of dependence in the way God comes to access his 
foreknowledge. In this version God still learns the future, atemporally of 
course, but he learns it in sequence. As a result God can weave his own actions 
into the flow of human history. I shall co·in the term "Incremental Simple 
Foreknowledge" {ISF) to designate this view. I now propose to examine several 
125This problem holds unless, of course, one wishes to say that God sees his 
own actions in his foreknowledge (which, it seems~ SF needs to affirm). 
Unfortunately, this seriously challenges the divine freedom. See J. R. Lucas, 
"Foreknowledge and the Vulnerability of God," in Godfrey Vesey ed., The 
Philosophy in Christianity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 126 and 
Basinger·, "Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought," 416. (See also note 
108 above). 
126Htint, "Divine Providence," 408. 
127 See Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 57-9. 
224 
different, but related, areas of providence to see what benefits, if any, SF has. 
5.5.3.2 sin and Divine Risk 
Could a God with SF have refrained from creating creatures with indeterministic 
freedom and so have prevented them from committing evil? John Hick thinks so. He 
says it is "hard to clear God from ultimate responsibility for the existence of 
sin, in view of the fact that He chose to create a being whom He foresaw would, 
if He created him, freely sin. "128 Lorenzo McCabe, agrees saying "a being who 
the Creator foreknew would be disobedient should not be created .... How easy for 
omnipotence to prevent the existence of those who, as his omniscience foresaw, 
would choose to be disobedient. "129 Cottrell explains how God could exercise 
such control: "It is foreknowledge that enables God to maintain complete control 
of his world despite the freedom of his creatures. God knows the future; it is 
not open or indefinite for him. This gives God the genuine option of either 
permitting or preventing men's planned choices, and prevention is the ultimate 
control. 11130 
But can a God with SF prevent sinners from being born or prevent certain evil 
choices? No, for the simple reason that if what God foreknows is the actual world 
then God foreknows the births, lives and deaths of actual sinners. Once God has 
foreknowledge he cannot change what will happen for that would make his 
foreknowledge incorrect. God cannot make actual events "deoccur." If God 
foreknows, has knowledge of the actual occurrence that Adam will freely choose 
to mistrust God, then God cannot intervene to prevent Adam from this mistrust. 
Hence, God can see the evil corning before he creates the world but is powerless 
to prevent it. Hasker correctly observes that: 
"'John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, revised ed. (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1978), 69. 
"'McCabe, The Foreknowledge of God, 364. 
130Cottrell, God the Ruler, 214. I do not understand how Cottrell can 
consistently maintain both that the future is closed for God and that God is able 
to alter that same future. 
[I] t is clear that God's foreknowledge cannot be used either to 
bring about the occurrence of a foreknown event or to prevent such 
an event from occurring. For what God fo'reknows is not certain 
antecedents which, unless interfered with in some way, will lead to 
the occurrence of the event; rather, it is the event itself that is 
foreknown as occurring, and it is contradictory to suppose that an 
event is known to occur but then also is prevented from occurring. 
In the logical order of dependence of events, one might say, by the 
"time 11 God knows something will happen, it is "too late" either to 
bring about its happening or to prevent it from happening . 131 
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The proponent of SF may appeal to Incremental Simple Foreknowledge (ISF) in an 
attempt to rescue providential control. Thus, God roles the tape forward arid 
learns (prior to creation) that Adam is succumbing to temptation--but does not 
role the tape far enough to see whether he actually sins or not. At this point 
God may press the pause button on his remote and decide to intervene in order to 
buttress Adam's flagging trust. Will God's efforts be successful? To find out 
God roles the tape forward to see how Adam will respond."' If Adam chooses to 
continue to trust God then the temptation is overcome. If he fails to trust God 
then sin enters the world. Regardless, once God sees the actual future choice of 
the creature he is powerless to prevent it. Prior to the actual choice being 
made God can seek to persuade Adam to trust God, but once God knows that Adam 
will fail to trust God then it is too late for God to prevent the sin. 
It must be remembered that a God with SF (either CFS or ISF) does not have middle 
knowledge and so cannot "try out" alternative scenarios in order to ascertain 
which one will achieve his objective in preventing Adam from sinning. A God with 
131Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 57-8. This same point was made in 1843 
by Hibbard, Memoirs, 387, and is also discussed by Ward Rational Theology, 152. 
132The tape metaphor may, itself, be deceiving since it assumes the future 
is available to be known. Is the rest of the actual. future already on the tape? 
If so, then ISF may be incoherent. 
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SF does not know before he decides to create this particular world what sorts of 
decisions and actions will arise in the world. Consequently, a God with SF is no 
less a risk taker than a God with PK. God might. "luck out" in that his free 
creatures never, in fact, decide to sin. Even so it will not be because of any 
advantage afforded by SF. On the other hand, a God with SF cannot (contra Hick) 
be blamed for not preventing sin from coming about since this was not possible. 
5.5.3.3 Damnation and Divine Risk 
What of all those God foreknew would never exercise saving faith in him and thus 
are not part of the elect of salvation? Can God decide not to create them? James 
Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill thought so. "Think of a being, " he says, 
"who would make a hell, who would create the race with the infallible 
foreknowledge that the majority of them were to be consigned to horrible artd 
everlasting torment. 11133 Although this objection is appropriate to divine 
foreordination of all things it is irrelevant to SF because it misunderstands the 
nature of foreknowledge. Though God may use foreknowledge to see which 
individuals will freely come to faith in Christ and so decide to elect them, he 
cannot guarantee that only those who exercise faith in God come into existence. 
For SF God's election is dependent on, and logically subsequent to, the choice 
of the creatures even though God's election of them is temporally prior to 
creation. God aternporally responds to the free choices of his creatures. A God 
with SF takes risks in creating a world where God does not foreordain all things. 
But this means that God cannot be held responsible for ensuring that only those 
people who will love God will be born. Once he decided to create, God could have 
learned through his foreknowledge that no humans would ever freely come into a 
loving relationship with him. That there are those who love God is not due, 
however, to the providential use of foreknowledge. 
5.5.3.4 Divine Guidance and Protection 
It is often assumed that a God with SF would be in a maximally informed position 
133Quoted in McCabe, Foreknowledge of God, 25. 
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to offer guidance and protection to those who petition him in prayer. For 
instance, say Mandie asks God whether she should marry Matthew or Jim, believing 
that God knows what is best for her and will advlse her accordingly. In fact", 
Mandie may believe, with C. S. Lewis, that a God with CSF knew of her prayer 
beforehand and so has prearranged things (perhaps even prior to her birth) in 
such a way that her request will be providentially answered. 134 Mandie 
believes, for instance, that God knows whether Jim will be loving or abusive 
towards her and would advise her appropriately. The problem is that if God knows 
that she will actually marry Jim and be quite unhappy, then it is useless for God 
to give her the guidance to marry Matthew. It would be incoherent to claim that 
God, knowing the actual future and on the basis of this knowledge, changes it so 
that it will not be the actual future. Of course, God might foreknow that Jim 
will be a wonderful husband for Mandie. Even so, it is not because God brought 
it about. A God who already knows the future cannot answer such prayers. 
Appealing to ISF provides no help. If God only accesses his foreknowledge up to 
the point where Mandie invokes God for guidance as to whom she should marry--but 
does not yet know whom she will actually marry nor knows for sure whether Jim or 
Matthew will be good husbands, then God's advice to her will not guarantee a good 
choice. God is able to advise her on the basis of his knowledge and wisdom at 
that point--which is no different from the knowledge and wisdom a God with PK 
would have. 
The same is true concerning prayers for protection. If God knows that I will 
actually be seriously injured in an auto accident on a particular trip, then no 
prayer for "travelling mercies 11 can alter this situation. Consequently, prayers 
for protection would be useless and any divine interventions prohibited. Only if 
God does not yet know the outcome of my journey can a prayer for safe traveling 
be coherent within the model of SF. If God decides to act in response to my 
134C. S. Lewis, "On Special Providences" in Miracles (New York: Macmillan, 
1974), 180-7. 
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prayer it cannot be based on his foreknowledge. Hence, this situation is no 
different from asking a God with PK for protection. 
5.5.3.5 Mistakes and Divine Predictions 
Can God be mistaken about anything? If God can be mistaken about what will happen 
in the future then divine predictions may be in doubt. In chapter three the 
narrative of Moses' dialogue in Exodus 3-4 was examined. God explicitly says to 
Moses that the leaders of Israel will believe Moses. But Moses thought it was 
possible for God to be mistaken in this (4:1). In response God affirms that Moses 
could be correct .and so gives him signs to perform so that if they do not believe 
him they may believe the signs (4:5-7). Is it possible for God to have mistaken 
beliefs about the future? Yes, if God does not know for a fact, at the time he 
is speaking with Moses, whether or not the elders will actually believe Moses. 
God may have a very good idea of their predisposition to believe but the 
possibility remains that God could be mistaken. 
It is commonly thought that one of the strongest values of a God with SF is that 
he can know the actual future and so is able to inform his prophets beforehand 
what precisely will happen. As has already been shown CSF cannot be used as the 
means by which God predicts the future for the simple reason that, if God sees 
history 11 all at once" and, presumably, his actions were not foreseen (see 
5.5.3.1), then God never foresees any prophets making predictions given by God. 
Moreover, it is probably clear by now why ISF cannot be used to predict the 
future with absolute certainty. A God with ISF does not know precisely what is 
going to happen after the event he is foreseeing. If God learns as he previsions 
the future then it becomes impossible for God to interject something based on his 
knowledge of the future into the chemistry of past events which would alter his 
knowledge of what actually occurred in the past. For instance, if God foresees 
the whole of Jesus' life, he has not yet (logically speaking) foreseen the 
destruction of the Jerusalem temple in 70 A.D. Once God previsions the events of 
70 A.D. it is "too late" for God to go back and reveal through Jesus a prediction 
229 
about this event during the life of Jesus for when God previsioned Jesus' life 
he did never foresaw Jesus uttering such a prediction. The only way to argue for 
this would be to claim that God can change the past in such a way that what God 
knew was going to come to pass did not come about. But then SF will have been 
rejected. 
Consequently, a God with SF takes risks in creating the world. The God of SF is 
not able to prevent sin from arising or ensure that only those who will love God 
will be created or to guide us with absolute certainty or use the knowledge of 
the future to predict the future. A God with SF is not able to guarantee, from 
before creation, that God's plans would be successful in every detail. Hence, a 
God with SF has no more ability to guarantee the success of his plans than does 
a God with PK. SF is simply useless for providential control. 
If one denies exhaustive divine sovereignty and asserts indeterministic freedom 
for humans then it does not matter whether one affirms simple foreknowledge, 
timeless knowledge, knowledge of all possibilities or presentisrn, God remains a 
risk-taker and the outcome of the world was not guaranteed prior to God's 
decision to create this world. The same is true for middle knowledge except that 
the risk God takes is whether or not there is a feasible world which satisfies 
God's intentions. 
5.6 Conclusion to Chapter Five 
In the model proposed here God has the love, wisdom, perseverance and power to 
deal with any situation that arises in the working out of his project. When the 
divine nature is defined in light of the project God established and the actions 
God has done in history then we have a very concrete understanding of God. God 
is a personal being who freely enters into loving relationships with his 
creatures. The nature of God is not defined in terms of the infinity of being or 
absolute power, but rather in terms of his wise, free, faithful and powerful love 
manifested towards his creatures. In his relationships God is interactive 1 
230 
generous, sensitive, and responsive. There are genuinely reciprocal relations 
between the God and the creatures. In establishing such relations God, indeed, 
takes risks but this must be understood within the framework of the project God 
has undertaken. It is not risk for risk's sake but the quest for loving 
relationships with the creatures. Moreover, two senses of risk were 
distinguished. In the first sense God had every reason to believe his project 
would work out exactly as intended (the probability of success was great). Yet, 
God took a large risk of being hurt since God cared so deeply about the project. 
Some object, however, that this model of God is too costly, it is reduction or 
"shrinking 11 of God from the full majesty of what is properly divine. Several 
things may be said in response to this objection. To begin, what is a cost from 
one perspective may be a strength from another viewpoint. All evaluations arise 
from within particular frameworks. This objection stems from the model of the 
immutable, timeless God who exhaustively controls everything. Furthermore, though 
some aspects might have been eliminated from the no-risk model of God other 
elements have been added. God's exhaustive control of everything may have been 
forfeited but God's genuine responsiveness has been added. God's radical 
impassibility has been deleted but the rich emotional life which the Bible 
attributes to God has been included. Thus, in some senses the risk model of God 
is a reduction of the no-risk model of God but other elements are added so that, 
in another sense, it maY be argued that it presents a fuller, richer account of 
God. Some may believe that it is a revision of.the nature of God as conceived by 
classical theism. In a sense this is true but so what? Aquinas revised classical 
theism's understanding of omnipotence. Today, however, because we tend to take 
his view for granted we have forgotten that this was a revision. The doing of 
theology is not merely a handing on of tradition. At times the tradition needs 
revision--especially when, in my opinion, it has misread or ignored some of the 
crucial elements of the biblical portrait of God. Clearly, my contention is 
debatable. Yet, my point is that those who wish to caricature the fellowship 
model as presenting a bumbling, ignorant, dependent deity will do so from a 
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perspective that is itself open to serious questions. In the relational model God 
is wise, competent, resourceful, loving and responsive even though God does not 
get everything he desires. This, in my view, is the God our creator and redeemer. 
If this is a shrinking of God, it is so only in terms of a very specific model 
of God. From what I see as a well sustained biblical model, it is in fact an 
enriching view of God. Such a perspective of God's nature and the risk involved 
in his project has profound ramifications when applied to the subjects of 
sovereignty, eschatology, suffering, prayer and guidance. To these subjects I now 
turn. 
Chapter 6: Applications of the Risk Model of Providence 
6.1 Divina Sovereignty 
6.1.1 Introduction 
It is now time to apply the discussions of risk and the divine nature to various 
aspects of the Christian life. I will begin with the topic of sovereignty and 
develop it in some detail since most of the other topics follow from this one. 
On several occasions I have said that God has sovereignly decided to enter into 
a project where he desires reciprocal loving relationships and so does not 
control everything that happens. 1 Some theologians, however, react strongly to 
this idea, claiming that it is not sovereignty at all! They attempt to claim the 
term "sovereignty" for themselves, saying it can have only one rneaning--theirs 
(one may as well say that theological terms such as salvation or the millennium 
can have only one meaning}. R. C. Sproul, for instance 1 says "If God is not 
sovereign, then God is not God. "2 Sproul defines sovereignty as exhaustive 
control over every detail that happens and then says that God, by definition, 
must be this way. A major reason decretal theologians argue this way is due to 
the fact that they believe the divine nature, which allows for no conditionality, 
determines all of God's decisions and actions. 3 Hence, God necessarily must 
determine (even if by secondary causes) all that happens in the creation. Taking 
a different road, I have suggested that we begin with the actual project and the 
1For similar views of sovereignty see Pinnock et. al. The Openness of God, 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), Pinnock, 11 God's Sovereignty in 
Today's World," Theology Today 53, no. 1 (April 96): 15-21, the chapters by 
Pinnock 11 God Limits His Knowledge, 11 and Bruce Reichenbach, 11 God Limits His 
Power, 11 in eds. David Basinger and Randall Basinger, Predestination and Free 
Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom {Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1986), Jack Cottrell, What the Bible Says About God the Ruler 
(Joplin, MO: College Press, 1984), Michael J. Langford, Providence (London: SCM, 
1981), Shirley C.. Guthrie, "Human Suffering, Human Liberation, and the 
Sovereignty of God," Theology Today 53, no. 1 (April 1996): 22-34, and Cynthia 
L. Rigby, "Free to be Human: Limits, Possibilities, and the Sovereignty of God, 11 
Theology· Today 53, no. 1 (April 1996): 47-62. 
'R .. c. Sproul, Chosen by God (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale, 1986), 26. 
'See James Daane, The Freedom of God: A Study of Election and Pulpit, (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1973), 81-90. 
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types of relations God has freely chosen to establish rather than begin via 
dignurn Deo with what sort of world God must create. Emil Brunner notes correctly 
that the God of the Bible is not the Deus absolutus but the "Lord our God," the 
God who enters into genuine covenantal and personal relationships with us. 4 
6.1.2 Types of Relationships 
In his Speaking of a Personal God, Vincent Brfunmer distinguishes between two 
types of "games" God could establish with human beings.' In Game 1 God, a 
personal agent, creates human personal agents and establishes rules whereby both 
parties in the game may say Yes or No to each other. In this game God makes the 
initial move by saying Yes to us, loving us and desiring a relationship of mutual 
love. It is now our turn to respond to God's move and we may either respond with 
a Yes or a No. At this point a significant qualification needs to be added to 
Brilmmer's explanation. As was said in the discussion of Genesis 1-3 in chapter 
three, God did not say to us that we may choose however we please--as though all 
that mattered to God was that we choose one way or the other. Rather, God's 
initial instructions were to eat of any tree except the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil. Though God did not give his permission to eat of that tree, 
obviously it was a possibility since it was, in fact, done. With this 
qualification in mind it can be said that humans have the ability, as personal 
beings, to say Yes or No to God's love. Love cannot be forced~ Consequently, even 
though God wants us to respond with a Yes so that we enter into a relationship 
of mutual love, such a response cannot be coerced. 6 If we respond to God's Yes 
4Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter / tr. Amandus W. Loos (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1943), 55-9, 66, 123-8. In his various writings 
Brunner is very critical of the tendency in the Reformed tradition to speak of 
the divine-human relationship in causal/mechanistic rather than 
covenantal/personal terms. 
5Vincent Brilmmer, Speakino of a Personal God, 
University Press, 1992), 61-5. 
(New York: Cambridge 
'This is how we have to think .(de dicto) about love. I do not say~ that 
God could not force love but I have no understanding what that would mean. Those 
theologians who appeal to "mystery 11 or "paradox" at.this point to claim that God 
forces our love are simply speaking incoherently. 
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with a Yes of our own then God achieves part of what he desired for his project. 
If, on the other hand, we respond with a No then God may either withdraw his 
love, saying No to us, or God may continue saying Yes to us working to redeem the 
situation. 
The other Gaine God could have established is one where God is a personal agent 
but humans are not. In Gaine 2 humans do exactly what God decrees they will do. 
In this scenario God determines, directly or mediately, all that happens. In Gaine 
2 if God says Yes to humanity then humans still have to say Yes or No to God, but 
our 11 response 11 is caused by God. Hence, God may prevent us from saying No and 
cause everyone to say Yes (universalism) or God may predestinate some to say Yes 
while predestinating others to say No. 
It is God's sovereign choice which game to establish: Game 1 with its person to 
person relations or Game 2 with its causal relations. It depends upon the outcome 
God desires. If he wants mutual fellowship then God will opt for Gaine 1, but in 
so doing God takes the risk of our rejecting his love (the possibility of evil). 
If God does not want to take any risks then he will opt for Gaine 2. Of course, 
I believe God has established Gaine 1 with its personal relations. 
In his The Model of Love Brilinmer clarifies and enlarges his typology of 
relationships.' He classifies them as: (1) manipulative relations; (2) 
agreements of rights and duties; and (3) ·mutual fellowship. Manipulative 
relations are those of Gaine 2 above where party A is able to gain complete 
control over party B. Of course, the control may be for beneficent purposes but 
it still means that B is treated as an object or, in Buber's terms, an I-it 
relation. Such relations are asyrrnnetrical in the sense that only A is a personal 
agent. A's manipulative power means that "B loses the ability either to bring 
about or· to prevent the relationship being established, changed or terminated. 
'Vincent Brilinmer, The Model of Love, (New York:. Cambridge University Press, 
1993)' 149-205. 
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The relationship therefore becomes impersonal .. 
". 
In relations involving agreements of rights arid duties parties enter into 
contractual agreements entailing obligations. I may, for example, contract with 
B to supply baseball uniforms for my team. Such agreements are not strictly 
coercive but they do establish obligations. If B wants my business then she is 
obliged to provide the uniforms I desire. A couple of additional points should 
be noted. It is of no small consequence that B can earn or merit my payment by 
doing good work. In terms of salvation one could say that we can merit salvation 
by doing good works. Moreover, the relationships involved in such agreements are 
not the same as those in mutual fellowship. When looking for a supplier of 
uniforms for my baseball team I am looking for someone who is useful to me. John 
Lucas explains: 
If I do business with you. my good will towards you is 
conditional and limited. I will keep my side of the bargain provided 
you keep yours. Your value in m'1 eyes is contingent on your doing 
certain things whereby you are of use to me; and the good I am 
prepared to do you is proportional to your value to me. Your 
good is not eo ipso my good, and your value in my eyes is simply as 
a person who can bring good things to me, as a furtherer of my own 
cause. Anybody else who could do the same would do equally well.' 
8Brfuamer, The Model of Love, 158. George Mavrodes reviews various 
philosophical models of divine causation in reference to the hardening of 
Pharaoh's heart. All of them, he says, are beset with serious problems. See his 
"Is There Anything Which God Does Not Do? 11 Christian Scholars Review 16, no. 4 
(July 1987): 384-391. Paul Helm rejects Brilinmer's definition of personal 
relations. See his The Providence of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
1994), 149-153, and "Prayer and Providence," ed. Gijsbert van den Brink et. al. 
Christian Faith and Philosophical Theology (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 
1992), 103-9. Helm conflates influence with coercion and then claims that all 
personal relations involve coercion. He provides two criteria, stated in 
compatibilitist terms, for defining personal relations. Though Helm is correct 
that eveh personal relations involve influence he fails to answer how God can 
practice the sort of exhaustive control required of specific sovereignty without 
this dis.solving the personal relationship into manipulation. In my opinion, 
Helm's understanding of personhood is deficient. 
'J. R. Lucas, Freedom and Grace, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976), 57. 
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In contrast to these first two types of relations, mutual fellowship involves 
reciprocal relations between personal agents . 10 In this type of relation the 
free assent of both parties is necessary for the relationship to be established 
and maintained. Although one party may be the initiator and do much more to 
establish the relationship it still. requires the free participation of an other 
in order to have a personal relationship. Both parties express their wish for the 
relationship and it comes about through their mutual consent. Regarding the 
divine-human relation it may be said that God has been the initiator in both 
creation and redemption and does much more than we do in establishing and 
maintaining the relationship. God, however, does not want to dance alone or with 
a mannequin or hire someone who is obligated to dance with him. God wants to 
dance with us as persons in fellowship, not with puppets or contracted performers 
and for this, our consent is necessary. Mutual fellowship requires reciprocity 
between two parties. Says Lucas, 11-The man who is wooing a woman can neither 
manipulate her into loving him, nor claim that she is, or would be if he 
performed certain feats, under an obligation to love him: but there are many 
things he can still do; things which are pleasing to her, things which will show 
her his ardent devotion. "11 Moreover, in contrast to the two other types of 
relations, relations of fellowship mean that I identify with you and treat your 
interests as my own rather than merely for what I can get out of it. It is you 
I want to fellowship with and not someone else who can do similar things. An 
additional difference between fellowship and the other sorts of relations is that 
fellowship involves a kind of risk which the others do not. In reciprocal 
relations the two parties are dependent upon the other to uphold the value of the 
relationship. If one party backs out and rejects the other, the one rejected 
bears the pain involved in the loss of love--which is distinct from the loss of 
10Regarding personal relations the Gifford Lectures of John MacMurray are 
outstanding: Persons in Relation (London: Faber and Faber, 1961) and The Self as 
Agent (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1969). Also of benefit is Peter 
A. Bertocci's The Person God Is (New York: Humanities Press, 1970). I also find 
the personalist theology of Emil Brunner rewarding. 
11Lucas, Freedom and Grace, 19. 
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a business transaction. Personal relations entail the risk of failure in that the 
relationship may be broken and love may not materialize. 
In terms of Brilinrner' s typology I suggest that God has sovereignly established the 
rules of the game for personal relations of fellowship rather than manipulative 
or contractual relations. This was, of course, the conclusion reached by tracing 
the establishment and outworking of the divine project in scripture. This view 
has immediate implications regarding providence, human freedom and God's success. 
To these topics I now turn. 
6.1.3 Specific Versus General Sovereignty 
6.1.3.1 Specific Sovereignty 
There are two main views regarding the nature of sovereignty in theological arld 
philosophical discussions: specific and general. Specific sovereignty or, as it 
is sometimes called1 meticulous providence maintains that there are absolutely 
no limitations, hindrances, or insurmountable obstacles for God to achieve his 
will in every specific circumstance of the created order. God has exhaustive 
control over each situation such that only what God wants to happen in that 
particular time and place to that specific creature will happen. Hence, this is 
a no-risk view of providence. The popularity of this position is attested by the 
fact that decretal theology, universalism and certain atheological arguments 
(used by atheists) all affirm it. While theists and atheists generally agree that 
in debating the existence of "God" they have this particular conception of God 
in mind, they disagree whether there is actually a deity external to the concept. 
It is commonly asserted that the divine nature is omnipotent, omniscient, and 
wholly good which ensures that whatever happens to us was specifically chosen by 
Gcd to happen and that even if we do not understand how certain events are 
compatible with God's goodness, we can rest assured that God has a good reason 
for them. If we experience something as "evil" we should view it as God's 
necessary means to a greater good. This is not to say that there are "possible" 
or 11 general" greater goods that 11 may 11 be achieved. Rather, God's preordained plan 
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guarantees that greater goods are achieved for each and every act including 
inherently morally evil acts. Hence, if Susan has a job with excellent benefits 
it is because God specifically wanted that to happen and it serves a specific 
good purpose--even if Susan does not know it--in God's plan. Or, if Susan is 
raped and dismembered it is because God specifically wanted that to happen and 
it serves a specific good purpose--even if Susan does not know it--in God's plan. 
John Calvin defended this position when he argued there is no such thing as 
fortune or chanc.e. In life one person escapes shipwreck while another drowns, 
one is rich and another poor, one mother has abundant breast milk while another 
has hardly any. All these says Calvin are expressly arranged by God for some 
reason. 12 According to meticulous providence nothing can stymie God's will in 
anything that occurs since God is in total control of everything. Does such 
divine control rule out human responsibility? Proponents of specific sovereignty 
claim that it does not. To support this they typically appeal to compatibilistic 
freedom, antinomy or God's timeless foreknowledge in order to affirm meticulous 
providence and human responsibility. I do not find these replies successful, but 
since I discuss them elsewhere in this thesis I will say no more about them 
here. 13 My principle argument against exhaustive sovereignty is that it rules 
out certain experiences, decisions and actions that the Bible and many theists 
attribute to God. For instance, the biblical portrait depicts God as being 
grieved (Gen. 6 :6), changing his mind (Ex. 32: 14), resorting to alternative plans 
(Ex. 4:14), being open and responsive to what the creatures do (Jer. 18:6-10), 
being surprised at what people have done (Jer. 3: 7, 32: 35), and that God 
sometimes makes himself dependent upon our prayers {James 4:2}. However, these 
sorts of things make no sense within the framework of specific sovereignty. If 
12John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 1.16. 2-3. 
13Regarding the appeal to antinomy see 2. 5. 2; .on compatibilism see 6 .1. 5; 
and on foreknowledge see 5.5. 
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God always gets precisely what he desires in each and every situation then it is 
incoherent to speak of God being grieved about or responding to the human 
situation. How can God be grieved if precisely what God wanted to happen did 
happen? If specific sovereignty is true then it is incorrect to speak of God 
getting upset with human sin since it is specifically what God wanted to come 
about. It is inconsistent to affirm exhaustive sovereignty and also claim that 
God wants to give us something but does not give it because we fail to ask him 
in prayer. This is so because, according to specific sovereignty, if God wants 
to give us something then God can insure that someone will ask for it. God's will 
is never thwarted in any respect according to specific sovereignty and this does 
not comport with my reading of scripture nor my understanding of prayer. 
Finally, exhaustive divine sovereignty appears to pit Jesus against the Father. 
Jesus washed the disciple's feet and instructed them that Christian leaders were 
to emulate this style of leadership. In my opinion, the church leadership has not 
done a good job of fulfilling Jesus' intention. But if the Father gets exactly 
what he wants then what has transpired in the history of the church is precisely 
what the Father intended. If Jesus desires that Christians love and forgive one 
another instead of seeking to dominate over one another but the Father desires 
that we lord our power over each other (as witnessed by what actually happens) 
then the desires of the Son and the Father are at odds, resulting in a 
schizophrenic godhead. Unless, of course, one posits a hidden will of God the 
Father behind the revealed will of God the Son. But if one goes this way it 
results in the unfortunate consequence of undermining the "revelation 11 of God in 
Jesus. 
6.1.3.2 General sovereignty 
The other main view is called general sovereignty and maintains that God has 
sovereignly established a type of world where God sets up general structures or 
an overall framework for meaning and allows the creatures significant input into 
exactly how things will turn out. God desires a relationship of love with his 
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creation and so elects to grant it the freedom to enter into a give-and-take 
relationship with himself. This is a risk model of providence. In contrast to 
specific sovereignty, this model does not claim that God has a specific purpose 
for each and every event which happens. Instead, God has general purposes in 
connection with the achievement of the di vine project. Within these general 
structures God permits things to happen, both good and bad, which he does not 
specifically intend. Yet, God may act to bring about a specific event in order 
to bring the divine project to fruition. The incarnation and the exodus are 
examples of God's electing to bring about particular events. It is within God's 
ability to bring about blessing and punishment in human affairs. But general 
sovereignty denies that each and every event has a specific divine intention. God 
may intensify his ongoing activity to bring about some particular event but God's 
normal way of operating is to allow the creatures significant freedom and, 
consequently, not to control everything. Even when God wants humans to perform 
some particular task God works to persuade free creatures to love God and serve 
him rather than force them to do so. Take Moses for example. He was chosen by God 
for a specific purpose--liberation of the Hebrews--yet God did not force him. If 
Moses had stubbornly refused God would have had to have been resourceful in 
finding another path towards the achievement of his goal. But most of the 
Israelites {and most of us) are not chosen for specific roles. Take the case of 
Susan. That Susan has a job with excellent benefits is part of the general 
structure of the world where God gives humans the freedom to create and staff 
jobs. Whether her work helps fulfill God's project depends upon her and her 
relationship with God. If she is raped and dismembered it is not the case that 
God specifically chose her to experience that horror. In general sovereignty 
there are things which happen which are not part of God's plan for our livesi 
there is pointless evil. 
Although· these two views of sovereignty are clearly distinct there is a tendency 
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for people to switch back and forth between them depending on the situation." 
For instance, many people would thank God for Susan's job but shy away from 
praising God for her rape. The leadership of an organization may thank God for 
providing the funding for the previous year but fire the development director and 
embark on a new fund raising strategy' the next year if funds are lacking. Many 
Christians vascilate from meticulous to general sovereignty. On the one hand they 
wish to affirm God's total control over everything that happens while also 
wanting to affirm that God has established the rules of the game whereby humans 
can bring things about which God does not intend. Some claim both that God is 
omnidetermining and that God genuinely responds to us. But, as William Alston 
observes, this is incoherent for an omnidetermining deity never responds to any 
external reality. 15 He says that if God has decided every detail of his creation 
(pace Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin) then genuine divine-human dialogue is rulE!d 
out since dialogue requires two independent participants. The "conversation" an 
omnidetermining deity has with humans is more like that between a ventriloquist 
and the dummy or a computer programmer and the program or a hypnotist and the 
subject. Such 11 dialogue 11 is a charade since it is merely a sophisticated form of 
talking to oneself. In terms of Brilmrner's models meticulous providence goes with 
a manipulative view of the divine-human relationship while general sovereignty 
connects to relations of personal fellowship. One simply cannot have it both 
ways, either God controls everything and the divine-human relationship is 
impersonal or God does not control everything and so it is possible for the 
divine-human relationship to be personal. r have argued that God is wise, 
competent, and resourceful in dealing with us rather than manipulating all that 
happens. This may seem like a diminution of sovereignty but "the sovereignty that 
14See David Basinger and Randall Basinger, 11 In the Image of Man Create They 
God: A 'Challenge," Scottish Journal of Theolocy 34 (1981): 97-107 and 
Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom 
(Downers.Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1986), 9-10. 
"William P. Alston, "Divine-Human Dialogue and the Nature of God," Faith 
and Philosophy 2, no. 1 (Jan. 1985): 5-20. 
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reigns unchallenged is not as absolute as the sovereignty that accepts risks." 16 
It requires tremendous wisdom, patience, love, faithfulness, and resourcefulness 
to work with a world of independent beings. A God of sheer omnipotence can run 
a world of exhaustively controlled beings but what is magnificent about that? 
In the risk model of providence God does not control everything that happens but 
God is in control in some respects. The word 11 control" has a wide range of 
meaning from coercion to accountability. A ventriloquist is in control of the 
dummy in a different way than a teacher is in control of her students since the 
ventriloquist guarantees what the dummy says while the teacher does not. If the 
dummy says something indecent and we ask who is in control here the correct 
answer is the ventriloquist. If the students begin throwing things around the 
room someone may legitimately ask, "Who is in control here?" And the appropriate 
response will be the teacher. But obviously the word control in this case means 
something like accountability or being in charge of the situation. In most of our 
human relationships such as government, family, and church, we use the word 
control in the sense of accountability rather than manipulation. In our 
impersonal relations we use the control in a coercive sense. According to general 
sovereignty God is in control in the sense that God is accountable for creating 
this sort of world and carrying out the project in the way God has. As was seen 
in the review of the biblical "pancausality• texts God is not controlling 
everything that happens. God is, however, in control in the sense that God and 
God alone is responsible for initiating the di"vine project and for establishing 
the rules of the game under which it operates. 
Within the rules of the game God makes room for indeterminacy or chance . 17 
16Albert C. Outler, Who Trusts in God: Musinqs on the Meaning of Providence 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 96. 
17Some Christians are quite put off by this as they think it leaves to much 
to chance. But chance never causes _anything to happen. The concept of chance must 
not be reified or personified into the goddess Fortuna or Lady Luck. Rather, 
chance is merely the name we use to describe the. indeterminate or unplanned 
relation between things. A very helpful study of how chance functioned in the 
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Though God sustains everything in existence he does not determine the results of 
all actions or events even at the subatomic level. Peter van Inwagen defines 
chance as: "The event or state of affairs is withollt purpose or significance; it 
is not a part of anyone's plan; it serves no one's end; and it might very well 
not have been. 1118 In this sense Chance corresponds to general sovereignty. 
Whatever was not specifically determined by God may not have been. For instance, 
when God brought the animals to Adam God did not determine what the names would 
be but left it up to humans to decide. That God decides to grant humans 
significant freedom is determined by God but what humans do with that freedom is 
not specifically part of his plan. For general sovereignty much of what happens 
to us in life, even much of what seems important to us, is not specifically part 
of God's plan. If one of my children was climbing a tree when a branch broke and 
my child fell to her death many people would ask why it happened. By this they 
do not mean to inquire about her motives for climbing the tree or an explanation 
for the weak branch which broke. What they want is a divine explanation for why 
God allowed or brought about this particular death. For proponents of specific 
sovereignty there are no such things as accidents or genuine tragedy. Alexander 
Pope states something along these lines when he writes: 
All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee; 
All Chance, Direction which thou canst not see; 
All Discord, Harmony not understood; 
All partial Evil, universal Good: 
And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason's-spite, 
One truth is clear, "WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT. 1119 
Bible, how God makes use of chance, and how we utilize it so often in our lives 
to make things fair or predict patterns is D. J. Bartholomew's God of Chance 
(London: SCM, 1984). 
"Peter van Inwagen, "The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God, " ed. 
Thomas Morris, Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism 
(Ithaca,·NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 220. 
19Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, Epistle 1, lines 289-94, ed. Martin 
Price, The Selected Poetry of Pope (New York: Meridian, 1980), 132-3. When Pope 
says, 11 Whatever is, is right, 11 I take him to mean that every single event is the 
right one but he could mean only that the system as a whole is the best. 
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Now, though I do not wish to deny that God may sometimes bring about a particular 
misfortune or sometimes deliver from a misfortune, I do want to deny that there 
is a divine reason for each and every misfortune. G'enuine accidents or unintended 
events, both good and bad, do happen for that is the sort of world God 
established. 
Does this mean that the world is out of God's control? Again, it depends on what 
is meant by control. God is not in control in the sense that absolutely nothing 
happens which God did not specifically want to happen. After all, God is 
fundamentally opposed to sin yet, there is sin. But God is in control in the 
sense that he shoulders the responsibility for creating this type of world. God 
is the potter seeking to shape the clay into the sort of vessel he intended. 
However, the relation between God and humanity is not merely that of a potter arid 
clay. If it were there would be good grounds for saying that God is an 
incompetent potter since the vessel has not turned out the way he intended. 
Perhaps some other analogies will help. In the book of Hosea God is pictured as 
Israel's husband. In Israelite society the husband held complete authority over 
the wife. Yet, despite such power Gomer left Hosea and prostituted herself. 
Yahweh's authority over Israel was absolute but this did not prevent the people 
from conunitting apostasy. 20 Yahweh simply did not "control" his wife in a 
manipulative sense. Recent writings on providence develop various analogies for 
getting at the diversity of God's roles in a relational understanding of 
sovereignty. 
Langford puts forth the analogy of a leader of a climbing party. 21 The leader 
is responsible for the initial planning of routes and supplies. As the party 
climbs there will be occasional ad hoc decisions due to the specifics of the 
20See Nelly Stienstra, YHWH is the Husband of His People: An Analysis of a 
Biblical Metaphor with Special Reference to Translation (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok 
Pharos, 1993), 116-7. · 
21Langford, Providence, 5. I will modify his discussion slightly. 
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terrain and the condition of the climbers. If someone has injured a hand it may 
mean the route has to be modified since the preselected path will no longer be 
possible. Some of these decisions may be made solely by the leader while others 
may be made in consultation with the party. This analogy highlights the 
competency and resourcefulness of the leader and the need for ad hoc decisions 
on the journey. T. J. Gorringe develops the analogy of God as a theater 
director." The director is responsible for the overall play and a good director 
does not manipulate the actors but seeks to bring out their own creativity. The 
actors play a significant part in determining how the play goes. 
To think of God in terms of the theatre director, then, is to think 
of one whose job it is to evoke talents, skills and capabilities the 
creature (who remains the "actor") did not know it had. It gives God 
a supremely active and creative role, leading and being alongside as 
Orthodoxy conceived it (praecurrit et concurrit), but does not 
destroy the autonomy of the creature. It is creative without being 
manipulative. 23 
These types of analogies highlight God's creativity (God as potter) and ongoing 
involvement in the project compatible with the model of general sovereignty. 24 
6.1.4 Divine Permission 
These analogies suggest that God is not omnidetermining but permits the actors 
or climbers to be significant others in the outworking of the play or the 
adventure of the climb. That God permits or allows states of affairs to come 
about that he does not desire has a long history of debate. 25 Going back to 
"T. J. Gorringe, God's Theatre: A Theology of Providence (London: SCM, 
1991). 
23Gorringe, God's Theatre, 82. 
24Fo·r other analogies of divine action in connectioxl to theological and 
scientific theories see Langford, Providence, 56-95, Gorringe, God's Theatre, 68-
87, and Bartholomew, God of Chance. 
"see John Gill, The Cause of God and Truth (.London: W. H. Collingridge, 
1855). 
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Augustine one finds: "in a strange and ineffable fashion even that which is done 
against his will is not done without his will. 1126 "Nothing, therefore, happens 
unless the Omnipotent wills it to happen. He either allows it to happen or he 
actually causes it to happen. "27 These remarks may sound as though Augustine 
affirmed general sovereignty where God grants permission for the creatures to do 
that which God specifically does not want done. However, in the same context 
Augustine also makes remarks which sound as though he affirmed specific 
sovereignty. He claims that no one resists God's will (Rom. 9: 19) and that 
neither angels nor humans, whether they do good or evil, can thwart the will of 
the omnipotent. 28 Calvin understood Augustine to affirm specific sovereignty 
and, more clearly than Augustine, realized that this excluded any concept of 
permission. Calvin ridicules "those who, in place of God's providence, substitute 
bare permission -- as if God sat in a watchtower awaiting chance events, and his 
judgment thus depended upon human will."" Calvin simply could not accept that 
God would establish genuine give-and-take relations with creatures as this would 
imply passivity or conditionality in God. 
Some in the Reformed tradition have sought to say that the Calvinists and the 
Arminians both affirm a notion of divine permission or two wills in God. Jonathan 
Edwards said that "All must own that God sometimes wills not to hinder the breach 
of his own commands .... But you [Arminians] will say, God wills to permit sin, 
as he wills the creature should be left to his own freedom ... I answer, this 
26Augustine, Enchiridion, 26.100, tr. Albert C. Oulter, Augustine: 
Confessions and Enchiridion (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), 399. 
27Augustine 1 Enchiridion, 24.95. 
28Augustine, Enchiridion, 25.99, 26.102. 
"Calvin, Institutes, 1.18.1. Calvin's analogy of God in the watchtower does 
bring out the aspect of God's conditionedness but it fails to see that for the 
model of general sovereignty God is not always or only in the watchtower. After 
all, God'is seeking out the lost: Hosea actively sought out Gomer and the woman 
in Jesus' parable diligently looked for her lost coin (Lk. 15:8). G. C. 
Berkouwer, The Providence of God, tr. Lewis B. Smedes, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1952), 137-141 follows Calvin in rejecting "permission" since it makes 
God a balcony observer, a mere reactor. For Berkouwer, any explanation or logical 
synthesis is impossible. 
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comes nevertheless to the very same thing that I say .... So that the scheme of 
the Arminians does not help the matter." 30 Reformed philosopher Paul Helm argues 
that even the risk view of providence entails two wills in God: "God wills (in 
the sense of permits) the occurrence of certain morally evil actions, which are 
(by definition) contrary to the conunand of God. "31 John Piper makes the same 
claim and applies it to the doctrine of election: 11 What are we to say of the fact 
that God wills something that in fact does not happen?" One could say that God 
wants to save everyone but cannot because other beings are more powerful than God 
or one could say 11 that God wills not to save all, even though he is willing to 
save all, because there is something else that he wills more, which would be lost 
if he exerted his sovereign power to save all. This is the solution that I as a 
Calvinist affirm along with Arminians. 1132 
What should be made of these assertions? On the one hand, these writers are 
correct in calling attention to a similarity between the two views in that 
Arminians and those who affirm the free will defense are committed to making some 
sort of distinction regarding God's desires. I will say more on this shortly. 
Moreover, it is al.so correct to claim that the concept of permission implies that 
God had the power to prevent sin and evil from coming about. On the other hand, 
there are some significant problems with the claim that the type of Calvinism 
represented by these three authors and various forms of free will theism agree 
on the notion of two wills in God. To begin, Piper identifies a crucial one: 
The difference between Calvinists and Artninians lies not in whether 
there are two wills in God, but in what they say this higher 
commitment is. What does God will more than saving all? The answer 
30Jonathan Edwards, "Concerning the Decrees in General, and Election in 
Particular," The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: The Banner of 
Truth Trust, 1974), 2.528. 
33Helm, The Providence of God, 132. 
32John Piper, "Are There Two Wills In God? Divine Election and God's Desire 
for All to be Saved," eds. Thomas R. Schreiner and.Bruce A. Ware, The Grace of 
God, the Bondage of the Will, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1995), 1.123-4. 
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given byArminians is that human self-determination and the possible 
resulting love relationship with God are more valuable than saving 
all people by sovereign, efficacious grace. The answer given by 
Calvinists is that the greater value is the manifestation of the 
full range of God's glory in wrath and mercy (Rom. 9:22-23) and the 
humbling of man so that he enjoys giving all the credit to God for 
his salvation. 33 
One side locates the concept of permission within the framework of the divine 
project while the other locates it as a manifestation of the divine nature. This 
ties into the discussion in the previous chapter regarding whether the divine 
nature is free to create the sort of project involving loving relations with 
creatures or whether the divine nature necessarily must create a world where God 
is omnidetermining. In this case, it may be asked, what has become of the concept 
of permission? It has disappeared from the scene for there can be no question of 
God's will being thwarted. If the divine nature requires the divine glory to be 
expressed in the unconditional salvation and damnation of people then there is 
only one will in God. 
Secondly, it does not seem to me that the divine glory has to be conceived of as 
coercive power totally unconditioned by the creature. The debate between the 
Calvinists and the Arminians is, at the heart, about whether God is in any sense 
conditioned by the creatures. If God is absolutely unconditioned in every respect 
then there is no room left for the concept of permission or two wills. In this, 
Calvin was entirely consistent. If, as Calvin and Edwards argued, God's 
foreknowledge is determined by his foreordination and not in anyway conditioned 
by the creature then languag.e about two wills in God or permission is suspect. 34 
"Piper, "Are There Two Wills in God?" 124. 
"Edwards, "Concerning the Decrees,• 532. He goes on to say (p. 535) that 
God cannot be dependent upon human choices since God is timeless and humans are 
in time. A temporal being cannot be the cause of something eternal! Hence, all 
of God's decisions are timeless and unconditioned~ If so, then the Arminians 
cannot, as Edwards claimed, be saying the same thing he is. 
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A third difference between the two sides of the debate surfaces if we return to 
the distinction between specific and general sovereignty. Proponents of specific 
sovereignty rule out talk of chance or accident and, if consistent, they cannot 
justifiably speak of divine permission. After all, if God's specific will for 
each and every instance always happens then the notion of permission is nonsense 
as is any talk of there being two wills in God. True, a Calvinist may not 
understand how scriptural statements about God desiring all to be saved are to 
be reconciled with God not saving all. But, in the final analysis, for the 
proponent of exhaustive sovereignty there is only one will of God (the secret 
will) which is always efficacious. The integrity of the "revealed" will of God 
is made suspect by the "hidden" will is never thwarted in the least detail. 
Consequently, I do not believe there is agreement on this issue between Calvinism 
and Arminianism as the above authors claim. 
How exactly should the concept of divine permission be understood? First of all, 
God permits something to be which is not God. God and the creation are distinct 
others in relation to each other. God did not have to create but once God creates 
he grants the world to be that which is other than God. Second, God decided that 
this relationship would involve dialogue, not merely monologue. As a professor 
I can determine whether my class shall be comprised only of my lectures or 
whether I shall permit discussion. If I choose to lecture and not allow any 
discussion or questions from my students I can ensure that only that which I want 
said will be said. However, I am also free to permit discussion and if I do then 
certain types of relationships between the students and myself may develop not 
possible if I merely lecture. But concomitant with this possibility I also run 
the risk that students may say things harmful to others in the class. However, 
I may be confident in my abilities as a professor to bring healing and redemption 
to this situation. As professor I am still ultimately responsible for 
establishing the conditions of the course and for doing my best to accomplish the 
course objectives. Though I can be held accountable for permitting discussion in 
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the first place I cannot be held responsible for the speech of my students since 
I do not manipulate what they say or intend them to use discussion irresponsibly. 
Brilmmer explains: "although the agent does not warit these in the strict sense of 
intending them, he does want them in a minimal sense of consenting to their 
occurrence. "35 In light of God's first and second order desires it may be said 
that God, in permitting significant others who have, in fact, done evil, takes 
responsibility for creating a world where such evil could obtain but God cannot 
be blamed for the actual evil of the creatures since God did not intend it. We 
can, if we like, hold God responsible for establishing genuine dialogue as one 
of the conditions of the course, but we cannot blame God for the actual dialogue 
which transpires. God may be said to give his "consenting ontological support" 
to actions which he does not give his moral support. 36 Moreover, God elects not 
to renege on the conditions he established, but chooses instead to work towards 
redemption of the project gone awry. That is, God could simply put an end to his 
project and halt all sin now. However, God has decided to continue working with 
his project, still seeking to accomplish his goals for it (more on this in 6.4). 
Finally, it should be noted that God is not in all respects like a professor 
since God is uniquely responsible for upholding the conditions of the creational 
project. Consequently, though a human professor would be expected to intervene 
in the classroom when things get out of hand, the same cannot be expected of God, 
or at least not in the same way, since God is uniquely reponsible for preserving 
the conditions by which things can get out of hand (see 6. 4. 31 . The type of human 
freedom required by this understanding must now be examined. 
6.1.5 Human Freedom 
Various understandings of human freedom have been propounded in the history of 
philosophy and theology. The arguments for and against these views are complex 
35Vincent Brfunmer, "On Thanking God Whatever Happens, " Journal of Theology 
for Southern Africa 48 (Sept. 1984): 9. 
36See Stephen T. Davis, Logic and the Nature. of God (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1983), 70. 
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and I have no illusions about the possibility of settling the matter here. 
Instead, I will briefly discuss the two main options, give the reasons why I 
prefer the view I do, and respond to two objectiOns to my position. 
The compatibilist account of human f·reedom is very popular among those who affirm 
meticulous providence since it provides a way of understanding how God can be in 
complete control of every situation and yet still hold humans responsible for 
their actions. Compatibilism maintains that freedom and determinism are 
compatible: "an agent is free with respect to a given action at a given time if 
at that time it is true that the agent can perform the action if she decides to 
perform and she can refrain from the action if she decides not to perform it. "37 
According to this view a person is free to perform an action if she chooses. That 
is, a person is free so long as she desires to do it. However, her desires are 
determined by such things as genetics, upbringing, sinful nature or God so that 
she is not free to change her desires. ,In this schema a person is free so long 
as she acts on her desires even if her desires are determined. If, for example, 
Susan's desires are controlled by a sinful nature then she will want to sin and 
she is free to do so. So long as her desire is to sin she is not free not to sin. 
Her Adamic or sinful nature functions as the remote cause producing her desires 
while her desires function as the proximate cause for her willing. In Susan's 
case, only God can give her a new set of desires so that she freely chooses not 
to sin. 
All sorts of objections have been raised against a compatibilistic conception of 
freedom but there is no ironclad refutation. Nevertheless, if compatibilism is 
true then God can guarantee everything that happens by determining what the 
remote cause will be. At this point the charge is usually made that this would 
make God the author of sin. Compatibilists typically deny that this is the case. 
I shall return to this later. Regardless, scripture speaks of God grieving over 
37William Hasker, "A Philosophical Perspective," Clark Pinnock, et. al. The 
Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of Gad 
(Downers Grove, IL: 1994), 137. 
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sin, changing his mind, responding to what humans do and entering into genuine 
dialogue and reciprocal relations. If compatibilism is true then such language 
is nullified for, again, it makes no sense to speak of God grieving over sin if 
God so controls things that he determines what the human desires shall be. 
If this language of scripture is to be taken seriously then another view of human 
freedom must be affirmed. The libertarian or incompatibilist defines freedom as 
11 an agent is free with respect to a given action at a given time if at that time 
it is within the agent's power to perform the action and also in the agent's 
power to refrain. from the action. 1138 In this sense a person does not have to act 
on her strongest desire. It is within the agents self-determining ability to 
change her desires. Libertarians do not ignore genetics or environmental factors 
that influence decisions but they maintain that a person could have dor\e 
otherwise than she did in any given situation. 
Various arguments are put forward in support of this view of freedom. The most 
common line of reasoning claims that libertarian freedom must be assumed if: (1) 
we are to have genuine loving relationships; (2) our thought is to be rational; 
(3) we are to be held morally responsible for good and evil in a way that really 
makes a difference. 39 To these more philosophical arguments I would add two 
theological ones. Firstly, if God did not intend sin but has always stood in 
fundamental opposition to it then something like libertarian freedom must be 
affirmed. According to compatibilism God could have changed Adam's desire so that 
he never wanted to sin and so he would have freely never sinned. But God did not 
do this so God must have wanted him to sin. The libertarian, on the other hand, 
can maintain that God did not want Adam to sin but would not control his decision 
38Hasker1 "A Philosophical Perspective, 11 136-7. 
390n these and more arguments see W. S. Anglin, Free Will and the Christian 
Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 1-28. C. Stephen Evans, 
Preserving the Person: A Look at the Human Sciences (Downers Grove1 IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1977), explores the loss of the. personal in the natural and 
behavioral sciences if significant freedom is not assumed. 
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due to his faithfulness to the rules of the game God sovereignly established. 
Secondly, libertarian freedom must be presupposed in order to make sense of God's 
grieving over sin and entering into genuine dialOgue with us. If we can truly 
affect the divine life then we must be capable of doing other than what God 
specifically intends. Moreover, if humans have libertarian freedom then it makes 
sense for the apostle James to say that we do not have because we do not ask in 
prayer (4:2). For these reasons I affirm libertarian freedom. 
When discussing providence two theological objections are often raised against 
this view of freedom. The first objection comes from Calvinistic compatibilists. 
Don Carson asks, "Must God be reduced to accommodate the freedom of human 
choice? 114° For Carson, we reduce the magnificence of God if we affirm that God 
is contingent in relation to us. Paul Helm, after citing philosophers William 
Hasker, John Lucas, Robert Adams, and Richard SWinburne, says, "It will be noted 
from this selection of views on providence that the chief (if not the only) 
reason why a 'risk' view of providence is taken is a concern to preserve human 
freedom.'"' What may be said about the claim of Carson and Helm that proponents 
of the risk model of providence seriously revise the doctrine of God because of 
their commitment to libertarian freedom? 
To begin, they are correct that some proponents of the risk view begin with 
libertarian freedom as a control belief, using it to reshape the doctrine of God. 
However, that was not the method used here.· I began with an examination of 
scripture to see what was said about God and the nature of God's relationship 
with us. When one arrives at the model of God as a personal being who enters into 
genuinely reciprocal relations with us then human libertarian freedom fits in 
nicely with the biblical story. It is not that God is being reduced--unless one 
has in mind some particular model of deity which cannot in anyway be contingent 
40D .. A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical 
Perspectives in Tension (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1994), 1. 
41Helm, The Providence of God, 42. 
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upon the actions of creatures. If God actually does respond, change his mind and 
dialogue with his creatures then the model here explained is not a reduction of 
God but an affirmation of how God really operates in relation to us. If the views 
defended in this thesis on omniscience, prayer 1 and God's love are correct then 
libertarian freedom should be assunled. 42 
The second theological objection to libertarian freedom is that the Bible does 
not speak about freedom in this way. Adria KOnig, 43 raises a number of questions 
about this approach. Why, he asks, does God then get so upset in the Genesis 3 
story with Adam and Eve if they were simply exercising the "freedom of choice" 
God had given them? Furthermore, he argues that the biblical view of freedom is 
not this "formal" or libertarian freedom, but "material 11 freedom whereby they are 
free from sin and free only to obey God. After all, God does not say in Genesis 
2 that they may obey or not obey as they wish. According to Konig, if one affirms 
formal freedom then in eating the forbidden fruit they only enacted their freedom 
and did not lose their freedom. However, according to material freedom, they did 
not enact their freedom, but lost it. They were not free to disobey, and in doing 
so they lost the only freedom they had. Proponents of libertarian freedom, says 
Konig, seek to explain the inexplicable by offering an easy solution to the 
problem of sin. He claims that the free will defense explains sin as the exercise 
of the freedom of choice God gave humans." 
42Moreover, it could be argued that Calviriists usually affinn cornpatibilisrn 
due to their control belief of exhaustive divine sovereignty while Wesleyans 
affirm libertarian freedom due to their control belief of God's goodness to all. 
See Jerry L. Walls, "The Free Will Defense, Calvinism, Wesley, and the Goodness 
of God," Christian Scholar's Review 13, no. 1 (1983): 19-33. 
43Adrio KOnig, "Providence, Sin and Human Freedom: On Different Concepts of 
Human Freedom," (unpublished paper). 
"Konig also asks why God would grant humans libertarian freedom when God 
himself does not have such freedom. After all, God's freedom does not include the 
possibility to sin. Two responses are in order. To begin, Konig argues that God 
cannot sin and that this is the sort of material freedom God gave humanity. Thus 
human sin is totally inexplicable. But, if humans were not given the possibility 
to sin and they did sin, then what is to prevent one from saying the same about 
God? God does not have the possibility of sinning, but may, inexplicably, sin. 
How can K6nig be so sure that God cannot sin given the total mystery of sin? The 
second response is to point out that Christians are divided on the question of 
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Though I am sympathetic to Konig's concerns I do have a number of responses. 
First of all, I admit that some accounts of free will sound as though God gave 
humans the option of trusting or mistrusting and sO God has no reason to be upset 
with them should they sin. Richard Creel, for instance, says that God does not 
get upset at our lack of trust since what God wants is not that we choose to 
trust God, but only that we choose one way or the other. 45 But my account of 
Genesis 1-3 is different! In my view God gets upset with them for misusing their 
freedom because they do not choose what God wants for them. Although they 
exercise their freedom of choice they choose against the express will of God, 
which is sin. Second, regarding the distinction between formal and material 
freedom I would concede that the Bible does not speak in the precise 
philosophical terms such as compatibilism or libertarianism and that it does tend 
to speak of human freedom in relation to God. Apart from a loving relationship 
with God there is only bondage. "The Hebrew Bible,'' says Levenson, never regards 
the choice to decline covenant as legitimate. 1146 However, the distinction 
between formal and material freedom is a common one in the history of theology 
and the idea may be found expressed in various ways in Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman 
Catholicism and Protestantism. 47 Moreover, the Bible itself presents formal 
divine impeccability. Throughout history numerous theologians have held that the 
divine nature is such that it is impossible for God to commit a moral evil. What 
prevents it is God's goodness, onmipotence, omniscience and the fact that God 
lacks morally significant freedom. See Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God:An 
Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1991), 56-64, 77-80. Why did God not create us with the same sort of 
nature? Because those attributes are "inconununicable" (not possible to share 
them). The other alternative is to hold that it is possible for God to commit a 
moral evil since God does have morally significant freedom. God does not, in 
fact, do evil, but remains faithful in his love towards his creation. (See Davis, 
Logic and the Nature of God, 86-96 and Br(Jmmer, Speaking of a Personal God, 90-
107.) 
"Richard Creel, Divine Impassibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 141-6. 
46Jon D. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama 
of Divine Omnipotence (Princeton 1 NJ: Princeton University Press1 1988), 141. 
47See the discussion in G. C. Berkouwer, Man:.The Image of God, tr. Dirk 
Jellema (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdrnans, 1962), 37-66, 310-348. 
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freedom as the structure in which material freedom is enacted. 48 That is, formal 
or libertarian freedom is understood as the infrastructure of love. It is a 
necessary condition for a loving relationship Since love cannot be forced: 
material freedom presupposes libertarian freedom. Human trust and love of God 
cannot be forced, which implies the possibility (as a formal structure) of 
mistrust and rejection of God. In sin we lose our material freedom (to be in 
right standing with God) yet we retain our formal freedom because we still stand, 
even in sin, before God. 49 Furthermore, "even the sinner is a personal being" 
whom God addresses. 50 When God addresses sinful persons he addresses a who not 
a what. It is the address of a holy and loving God to sinful human persons and 
so it never becomes impersonal or manipulative. Finally, this version of the free 
will defense does not explain the inexplicable. There is no good reason for sin, 
it is highly implausible given all that God has done. True, my account claims 
that God gave enough space that God's word could be questioned which creates the 
possibility (however remote) of mistrust. But this does not explain sin, it 
simply accounts for the structures of created reality. Within the structures God 
establishes the possibility of a loving relationship and expects this to 
materialize. When the divine provision is rejected there is no explanation as to 
why humans choose to seek their well-being outside God's good intentions for 
them. In this way the structure whereby sin comes about is explained, but not the 
actual breaking of the relationship. Sin, as a broken relationship remains a 
mystery. Perhaps, as Gorringe suggests, we should not call this the "free will 
defense" but, rather, the "logic of love defense" since it is connected to the 
purpose of God in creation rather than simply human autonomy. 51 In the model 
48See Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, tr. 
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952), 55-61. 
49See C. Stephen Evans, "Salvation, Sin, and Human Freedom in Kierkegaard," 
ed. Clark Pinnock, The Grace of God, the Will of Man (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1989), 181-9. 
50Brunner, Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 123. This is the 
thesis of the Reformed theologian Harry Boer's, An Ember Still Glowing (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990). 
51Gorringe, God's Theatre, 45-6. 
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proposed here it is not freedom~ freedom that God values but the potential for 
reciprocal love. What God values is the loving relationship and libertarian 
freedom is simply a means to that end. 
6.1.6 The Concept of Divine Self-Limitation 
Do the concepts of divine permission and human freedom imply that God has chosen 
to limit himself? The concept of divine self-limitation has, despite belief in 
the incarnation, only become popular among theologians and philosophers in the 
twentieth century. 52 Nevertheless, the idea that God experiences certain 
"limits" is not new since, at least from the time of Aquinas, it has been 
commonplace to say that God cannot do the logically iropossible. All sorts of 
things have been suggested which God cannot do and these fall into two 
categories: things God cannot do in relation to himself and things God cannot do 
in relation to creation. Regarding the first category some claim that God cannot 
cease to exist, change his nature, commit a moral evil or break a promise as 
these would contradict the divine nature. 53 Given certain propositions about the 
God's goodness, necessary existence, immutability, etc., it makes no sense to 
speak of God doing these things. 
Concerning things God cannot do in relation to creation several ideas are put 
forward. To begin, creation of something different from God implies a limitation 
on God since God is no longer the only being which exists. Says Brunner, "God 
limits Himself by creating something which is not Himself."" One may recall 
Aristotle's assertions that to have friends is to be in relation and to be in 
52 See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 4 vol. eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. 
Torrance, tr. G. W. Bromiley et. al. (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1956-1975), 
2.1.518 and 2.2.50; Jurgen Moltrnann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, tr. Margaret 
Kohl (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 108-111; Reichenbach, "God Limits His 
Power; " Pinnock, "God Limits His Knowledge;" and Helm, The Providence of God, 
103. 
53 I discussed this in 5. 4. 4. 
"Brunner, Christian Doctrine of God, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1949), 251. See also his Christian Doctrine of Creation and 
Redemption, 175. 
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relation implies dependency upon the other for the relationship. If so, then God 
by creating others distinct from God imposes a sort of limitation for God needs 
the others in order to be in relation. Again, given the trinity God did not need 
to create in order to be in relation but if God makes creatures then God is 
dependent upon them in order to ·be the creator. Another strictly logical 
limitation is that any decision God makes rules out other options for God cannot 
do everything: selection is limitation. For instance, it is impossible for God 
to create and not create a world simultaneously. Moreover, if God decides to make 
only certain kinds of creatures (set A instead of set B) then God limits himself 
to them. Furthermore, "The one kind of control God cannot logically have over 
free human agents is self-control. "55 A final kind of divine limitation in 
relation to creatures is that God cannot exercise meticulous providence and grant 
human beings libertarian freedom. Either God practices specific sovereignty so 
that his will is always and everywhere obeyed or God does not practice it. Keith 
Ward says, "Creation is thus in one sense a self-limitation of God. His power is 
limited by the existence of beings, however limited, with power to oppose him. 
His knowledge is limited by the freedom of creatures to actualize genuinely new 
states of affairs, unknown by him until they happen. His beatitude is limited by 
the suffering involved in creaturely existence. "56 
Some object, however, to placing any limitations on God. They want to gain the 
high ground in the discussion by claiming that all talk of divine limitation 
defaces the divine glory. But a moments reflection will show that nearly everyone 
admits of some sort of divine limitation." If one asserts that it is 
impossible for God to create beings over which he does not exercise specific 
sovereignty then God is limited. If God must control every detail of human life 
55Axel D. Steuer, "The Freedom of God and Human Freedom," Scottish Journal 
of Theology 36, no. 2, (1983): 173. 
56Keith Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God (New York: 
Pilgrim, .1982), 84. 
57I say nearly everyone for there are those who appeal to absolute paradox 
or mystery. I showed why this approach fails in 2.5. 
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in order to achieve his goals then God is limited. If it is claimed that God 
cannot create personal agents who may act independently of the divine will then 
God is limited. If it is not possible for God to create beings who can surprise 
and possibly disappoint him then God is limited. If an omnipotent God cannot 
create a world in which the future actions of free creatures is unknown then God 
is lirnited. 58 If it is impossible for God to make himself contingent upon the 
decisions of creatures then God is limited. 
There is debate, however, whether saying that God cannot do something means that 
God has limits. Most of those who define omnipotence as God's ability to do that 
which is logically possible or omniscience as that which is knowable would deny 
that this is a limitation on God. John Lucas, for instance, says, "We do not 
regard it as any limitation of God's omniscience that he cannot know that two and 
two make five; neither should we think it all strange that he cannot know what 
I am going to do in advance of my deciding what to do, since in that case there 
is nothing for God to know, and so no possible criticism of him for not knowing 
it. "59 Though Keith Ward agrees with Lucas's views of omnipotence and 
omniscience he takes precisely the opposite stance regarding divine limitations 
when he says, "The laws of logic are restrictions on the Divine being, but not 
avoidable ones; they are absolutely necessary. 1160 Barth objects to this line of 
thought arguing that God created the laws of logic and thus God is not bound by 
them. Rather, God creates them and remains faithful (limits himself) to them in 
relating to us. 61 Barth also speaks of God's self-limitation in connection with 
the incarnation where the Son emptied himself (Phil. 2:7) in love and service to 
the Father on our behalf. "God has limited himself to be this God and no 
58See J. R. Lucas, The Future: An Essav on God, Temporality and Truth 
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 227. 
59Lucas, Freedom and Grace, 36. 
60wara, Rational Theology, 122. 
"Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2 .1. 537-8. 
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other.'"' According to Barth, God really is the sort of God revealed in Jesus 
and this is a limitation since it means that God is not some other kind of God. 
I am very sympathetic to Barth's position here but I do believe several 
qualifications are needed on this whole discussion of divine self-limitation. 
To begin, in the previous chapter I argued for a conceptual limitation which 
renders it illegitimate for us to claim either that God is or is not bound by the 
laws of logic or that we can know that God created them. 63 Barth is correct that 
God limits himself to being the sort of God revealed by Jesus but he goes too far 
when he claims to know that God created the laws of logic just as others go too 
far in claiming to know that the laws of thought are eternal verities in the 
divine mind. We do not know either way. What we do know is that ~ have to 
operate within the laws of thought when speaking of the divine-human 
relationship. There are certain conceptual limitations if we are to communicate 
coherently. Whether God is bound by them we cannot know. But if God is going to 
speak coherently to us then he will do so within the boundaries in which he 
created us. The person who claims that God is the absolutely unlimited, as did 
the ancient Greek Anaximander, is not referring to any definite concept for when 
we think of something we think of it as something or in relation to something 
else. We think within the boundaries God created us to be in and it is useless 
to attempt to think the unlimited or unrelated." 
Another distinction which must be made is that between a self-restricting (or 
self-limiting) God and a finite God. Some critics of the risk model of providence 
say it results in a finite God. In response two points will be made. First of 
all, anyone who says that God cannot do the logically impossible or that God 
"Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2 .1. 518. 
63 See 5.4.5, epecially note 93. 
64This is the thesis of the fine book by Frank G. Kirkpatrick, Together 
Bound: God, History and the Religious Community (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) . 
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limits himself to deciding one course of action or another is applying the 
category of limits to God and so may be open to the charge of believing in a 
"finite" God. But no one takes seriously the charge that Aquinas believed in a 
finite deity simply because he said God cannot do the logically impossible. 
Secondly, the accusation of finite godism fails to understand the nature of a 
finite God. Finite godismwas defended in the school known as Boston Personalism 
represented by the thought of Edger S. Brightman and Peter A. Bertocci. 65 
Georgia Harkness and Nels Ferre, students of Brightman, both call attention to 
the important distinction between a self-limited and finite God. 66 They point 
out that a finite God is limited by some force outside of God's power, by some 
rival deity or by an irrational "Given"' in God's own nature. In Boston 
Personalism God cannot control this force even though he desires to do so. 
Consequently, those who speak of divine self-limitation are not advocating·a 
finite God. 
A third qualification regarding talk of divine limitation of power questions 
whether it is lb.etter to speak of God limiting or restraining himself. Marcel 
Sarot argues that divine self-limitation implies that God resigns power and 
cannot get it b&ck and this means that God is no longer ornnipotent. 67 According 
to divine self-restraint, however, God does not limit his power or abilities but 
does restrain the exercise of his power or the scope of his activities. Hence, 
God gives up none of his abilities. Take the case of God's wrestling with Jacob 
(Gen. 32:24-30). It seems better to say that God restrained his power to make it 
"Brightman, The Problem of God (New York: Abingdon, 1930) and Bertocci, The 
Person God Is. 
"Georgia Harkness, The Providence of God (New York: Abingdon, 1960), 105 
and Nels Ferre, The Christian Understanding of God (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1951), 104-6. 
67Ma'rcel Sarot, 11 0mnipotence and Self-Limitation, 11 eds. Gijsbert van den 
Brink et. al. Christian Faith and Philosophical Theology: Essays in Honour of 
Vincent Brtimmer (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1992), 172-185. In my opinion 
there is an unstated assumption in the debate over whether God is essentially 
omnipotent: meticulous providence. That is, it is often assumed that omnipotence 
must mean exhaustive divine control over everything. 
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a "fair fight" rather than God actually gave up his power. In fact, God 
restrained it sufficiently that Jacob "prevailed" over God in this matter. In my 
view it is preferable to speak of divine restraint lnstead of self-limitation but 
I do believe that a good many people who use the expression self-limitation 
actually mean what Sarot means by self-restraint. The language of self-restraint 
fits better with the biblical portrait of God with the divine wisdom deciding 
when to act and when not to. Nonetheless, even if we do not speak of self-
limitation it is still permissible (and necessary) for us to speak of God working 
within the limits of rational discourse. 
A final qualification for discussion of limits and divine power is that our talk 
should be placed within the framework of God's self-giving love." In light of 
the divine project we may speak of the limits or boundaries which God established 
and elects to work within. The desire to bring about a loving relationship with 
humans means that God does not force himself on us. He gives freely and restricts 
himself. It may be compared to a marriage relationship. To the outsider it may 
seem that self-limitation is normative whereas, in reality, it is self-giving 
love. The language of divine self-limitation should be qualified in this 
direction. Hence, the divine self-restraint should be understood as the restraint 
of love in concern for his creatures. 
6.1.7 Can God's Will be Thwarted? 
Does talk of divine permission, libertarian freedom and divine restraint imply 
that God's will can remain unfulfilled? The Psalmist writes: "Whatever the LORD 
pleases he does; in heaven and on earth" (135: 6). Daniel says of God, 11 he does 
what he wills with the host of heaven and the inhabitants of the earth. There is 
no one who can stay his hand or say to him, 'What are you doing?' a (4:35). Such 
statements are often interpreted to mean that absolutely nothing--not the 
68E .. Frank Tupper provides an excellent discussion on the limits of God in 
relation to the gospel story of Jesus and the life of prayer in his A Scandalous 
Providence: The Jesus Story of the Compassion of God {Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 1995), 326-335. 
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smallest detail--ever goes contrary to what God wants and that humans have no 
ability to stymie the will of God. Augustine, for example, says, "he is called 
Almighty for no other reason than that he can do whatsoever he willeth and 
because the efficacy of his omnipotent will is not impeded by the will of any 
creature. 1169 This understanding of ·providence does not, however, fit with the 
biblical story as traced in this thesis. This is especially so in light of the 
life of Jesus who, for instance, was prevented from doing more miracles in 
Nazareth due to the unbelief of the people (Mark 6:5-6). Hence, it seems some 
qualifications are in order. 
To begin, in terms of the boundaries, structures and goals of the project which 
God has sovereignly established there is no question whatsoever that God gets 
what he wants. God can create the world, provide for it and grant it his lo~e 
without anyone or anything being able to thwart his first order desires. If God 
decides to create a world with persons capable of reciprocating the divine love 
and if God establishes genuine give-and-take relations with them then it is 
proper to say that nothing can stymie God's intentions. However, if God does not 
force the creatures to reciprocate his love then the possibility is introduced 
that at least some of them may fail to enter into the divine love. In this case 
it could come about that God's second order desires might be thwarted. If God 
wants a world in which the possibility exists that God may not get everything he 
wants then, in an ultimate sense, the divine will is not thwarted but, in a 
limited sense, the divine will can be thwarted. It is important to note that if, 
in some cases, God does not get what he wants it is ultimately because of the 
decision ~ made to create the sort of world where God does not get everything 
he wants. In this sense, the responsibility falls directly on God for nothing 
forced him to create such a world. Utilizing the distinction between intentions 
and permissions Ward says, "Whatever God intends inevitably comes about. But even 
God cannot intend on behalf of another rational creature; he can hope, wish or 
desire. And those hopes not only can be, but are constantly thwarted; that is 
69Augustine, Enchiridion, 24. 96. 
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precisely the import of moral evil and sin. 1170 Returning to my analogy of the 
professor one may say that God intends to establish opportunity for discussion 
in the classroom and so permits things to be said which, on a secondary level, 
he never approved of. Not all free will theists, however, like this conclusion. 
Peter Geach, for instance, who affirms libertarian freedom and rejects meticulous 
providence along with exhaustive foreknowledge, nevertheless claims that God's 
will is never thwarted. To lend some plausibility to this claim he proposes an 
analogy: God as a chess master. 
God is the supreme Grand Master who has everything under his 
control. Some of the players are consciously helping his plan, 
others are trying to hinder it; whatever the finite players do, 
God's plan will be executed; though various lines of God's play will 
answer to various moves of the finite players. God cannot be 
surprised or thwarted or cheated or disappointed. God, like some 
grand master of chess, can carry out his plan even if he has 
announced it beforehand. "On that square, 11 says the Grand Master, "I 
will promote my pawn to Queen and deliver checkmate to my 
adversary": and it is even so. No line of play that finite players 
may thing can force God to improvise: his knowledge of the game 
already embraces all the possible variant lines of play, theirs does 
not. 71 
Geach, like William James before him, uses the Grand Master analogy to assure us 
that despite libertarian freedom and an indefinite future God remains in complete 
control." The analogy serves to · highlight God's knowing in advance all 
'°Ward, Rational Theology, 83. 
71Peter Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 58. 
12Williarn James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy 
(New York: Dover, 1956), 181-2. 
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possibilities and deciding beforehand how he will respond to them. But the 
analogy lacks the genuinely relational qualities of the other analogies suggested 
above: theater director, professor, and leader of a_ climbing expedition. In fact, 
it is doubtful that the chess master analogy adequately handles the nature of the 
personal relationship between God and humans: are things as closed as Geach 
suggests?73 How can God be in total control if human beings are significantly 
free? 74 Does Geach mean that the Grand Master can guarantee victory on every 
move or only that he will win the game? It would seem Geach cannot say God wins 
every move on account of human sin and evil. If Geach says God wins the match 
with every human then it would seem he is committed to universalism. 
Furthermore, just because God knows all possibilities does not mean that God can 
do whatever he will. 75 If God grants humans libertarian freedom then they may 
do things which God does not want. If God is so controlling as Geach suggests 
then it is difficult to see why there is sin at all. 
Finally, Geach claims that God is never disappointed. The Bible, however, 
repeatedly says that God is disappointed with sin and human rejection of the 
divine love (e. g. Gen. 6:6). Creation is not presently the way God wanted it to 
be: it has miscarried. Sin and evil do thwart God's will and disappoint him. God 
did not and never has wanted sin for he stands fundamentally opposed to it and 
this is seen most clearly in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. God 
redeems from sin but this was not his original plan. God is working within the 
rules of the game he established to overturn· the results of sin and so it is 
73Brfumner, What are We Doing When We Pray? A Philosophical Inquiry (London: 
SCM, 1984), 44-5, 68 uses Geach's analogy but fails to see its inadequacies in 
light of the fellowship model of the divine-human relationship. 
74David Basinger criticizes Geach for this in his "Human Freedom and Divine 
Providence: Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem," Religious Studies 15 (1979): 
491-510. 
75Paul Helm makes this point against Geach. However, since Helm affirms 
compatibilism and specific sovereignty he only criticizes Geach for affirming an 
indefinite future which is incompatible with exhaustive divine control. See his 
. Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time (New Yor.k: Oxford University Press, 
1988), 122-5. 
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quite possible that God may not get everything he wants. Does this mean that God 
could fail? Again, God's first order intentions cannot fail in that God 
establishes the boundaries in which the world will operate, but God's second 
order desires can fail in that God may not achieve all he wants for every 
individual. Hell, after all, implies the failure of humans to reciprocate the 
divine love and the failure of God to reclaim everyone. If some people ultimately 
refuse to love God and God will not force their love then what else is God to do? 
Unless one affirms either universalism or double predestination, it must be 
concluded that God's project ends in failure for some. 76 
6.2 Divine Purpose With Open Routes 
In bringing about the divine project God established a covenant with the 
creation. In covenanting with creation God makes a fundamental commitment to ies 
well being and to seeing the project through to completion. The commitment to 
love his creatures and bring them into a reciprocal relationship of love is 
fundamental to God. Once sin enters the scene God does not give up on his 
covenantal commitment but, instead, responds to this development with a plan to 
redeem the situation. 77 This adaptation of God's plan does not imply a change 
in the fundamental commitment but it does mean that God reacts to contingencies, 
taking them into account in order to fulfill the goal of his project. 78 God 
remains faithful to his original purpose even while adjusting plans to take into 
76Universalists, however, claim that God never forecloses on anyone. For an 
explanation and evaluation of the arguments for universalism see my No Other 
Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the Unevange~ · ~ (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1992), 81-128. Concerning the issue of whether ,11 is justifiable see 
Jerry L. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre r University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1992) and Johnathan Kvanvig, The Problem c ~11 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). On whether hell should be uilderstood as eternal 
conscious punishment or as annihilation of the finally impenitent see William 
Crockett ed., Four Views on Hell (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992}. 
77 Even those who affirm timeless knowledge or simple foreknowledge have to 
say that' God atemporally either planned ahead for this contingency or responded 
to it in this way once God in foreknowledge "saw" sin would obtain. 
78For a helpful discussion of this notion see Eugene TeSelle, Christ in 
context: Divine Purpose and Human Responsibility (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 
148-155. 
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account the decisions of his free creatures. God establishes general conunitments 
and is free to decide some specific future actions that he will undertake. Hence, 
the future is only partly open. It is not the case that anything may happen for 
God has acted in history to bring about events in order to achieve his unchanging 
purpose. 
Furthermore, the covenant or general commitment God makes is not a detailed 
script but a broad intention which allows for a variety of options regarding 
precisely how it may be reached. 11 The divine plan," says Jacques Maritain, "is 
not a scenario prepared in advance, in which free subjects would play parts and 
act as performers. We must purge our thought of any idea of a play written in 
advance." 79 Some things are fixed while others are contingent. At creation God 
establishes a general purpose that, as history progresses, becomes more specific. 
God decides on certain routes in connection with human choices such that the 
specifics of the final destiny as well as the path to it take on greater 
definitiveness as the relationship unfolds. In the biblical tradition it is not 
"what will be will be" but, rather, what will be may not be and what was may not 
have been. What God and people do in history matters. Had Jacob's family returned 
to Canaan after the famine was over there would have been no bondage in Egypt and 
no need for an exodus. God would have continued working with them but history 
would have been very different. If the midwives had feared Pharaoh rather than 
God and killed all the baby boys it would be a different story than the one we 
have. That God resorts to plan B in allowing Aaron to do the public speaking of 
Moses altered what God had in mind. Had king Josiah not been killed while 
attempting to prevent the Egyptian army from passing through Israel perhaps the 
religious reforms he initiated would have made a significant difference for 
Israel's future. If the Jewish leaders had come to accept Jesus as God's way in 
the world we would have had a very different book of Acts and subsequent history 
79Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent, tr. Lewis Galantiere and 
Gerald Phelan (New York: Random House, 1966), 116. Unfortunately, Maritain 
inconsistently attempts to reconcile this idea with God's timeless knowledge 
being totally unconditioned by the creature. He believes sernpi-eternity rescues 
him from this contradiction. 
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than we do. What people do and whether they come to trust God makes a difference 
concerning what God does. 80 This does not mean that God is helpless in the face 
of human sin. "God is not,n says Brian Hebblethwaite, "stumped by men's failure 
to co-operate. There are things that God can do to bring good out of evil--the 
paradigm being the incarnation and ·the cross of Christ. But at every point, we 
realize that God does not fake the story of human action and human history." 81 
Proponents of specific sovereignty, however, object to this open-ended view of 
history. According to Paul Helm: "God does not, then, exercise providential 
control in a way. that leaves two or more possible ways of achieving some goal. 
Nor does he will the end but leave the means to others. . Rather, the 
providence of God is fine-grained; it extends to the occurrence of individual 
actions and to each aspect of each action. "82 Helm is articulating a position 
quite popular among Christians: that God has an exhaustive blueprint for 
everything. God has, it is said, an eternal plan which contains all the details 
which ever occur. 83 After all, is there not only one best way to achieve any 
goal? If so, then any change in God's plans would be a change for the worse. In 
response to this objection it should be noted that the old Platonic assumption 
that any change is a change for the worse is fallacious. Behind this sentiment 
lies the assumption that perfection must be conceived as static. There are some 
kinds of change which are neither better or worse (e. g. the changes a clock 
makes as it keeps time). If God wants to create a world where he takes our 
actions into account in formulating his own plans then this does not imply that 
God's plans go from best to worse since this sort adaptation is what God desired 
80 Proponents of specific sovereignty can say that what people do matters in 
the sense that God is using people as a secondary causes. But they cannot say 
that it makes a difference for God since every single detail God wants to happen 
does happen according to specific sovereignty. 
81Brian Hebblethwaite, "Some Reflections on Predestination, Providence and 
Divine Foreknowledge," Religious Studies 15, no. 4 (Dec. 1979): 437. 
82He~m, The Providence of God, 104. 
83 It seems to me that this reifies all historical action into ideas 
resembling some sort of Platonic archetype. 
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in the first place. Lucas suggests that God be seen as a Persian rugmaker who 
lets his children help in production. 
The children fail to carry out their father;s instructions exactly, 
but so great is their father's skill, that he adapts his design at 
his end to take in each error at children's end, and work it into a 
new, constantly adapted, pattern. So too, God. He does not, cannot, 
have one single plan for the world, from which we, by our errors, 
ignorances, and sins, are even further departing. "84 
Because of the sort of rules of the game God decided to establish there is not 
just one great masterplan or blueprint but any number of plans. 
It is not possible to deduce from God's initial covenant purpose exactly how God 
will seek to accomplish his project. It was not possible for anyone to predict 
that God would elect the people of Israel for a special task. Nor was it knowable 
just how the people would respond and how God would react to them in the course 
of the covenant relationship. The studies in chapters three and four of this 
thesis disclosed the surprising ways in which God has worked. Nobody expected the 
particular kind of messiah Jesus chose to be. Who would have thought that God 
would "overrule" sin by the redemptive grace of the cross? Who could have known 
that God was going to bring the Gentiles into the people of faith as he did? The 
route God takes to achieve his purpose is not a direct route to a pre-planned 
destination but, as seen in the biblical story, is an unpredictable zigzag 
course. Van de Beek puts it well: "the way of God to Christ was not an 
established road. It is a way which can only be read in retrospect in the light 
of Christ, not guaranteed in advance. It is a way on which God went past many 
dead ends." 85 Just as there is no way to deduce what God must do in carrying out 
his purpose so there is no infallible way of predicting what God will do in the 
"Lucas, Freedom and Grace, 39-40. One difficulty with the analogy is that 
it is difficult to accept the notion that all of our sins (e. g. the holocaust) 
are weaved into the divine pattern. 
85A. van de Beek, Why? On Suffering, Guilt, and God, tr. John Vriend (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 300. 
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future. But God does provide us some clues about his ultimate direction based on 
the way God has chosen to work in history. The life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus are especially important in this regard. If Jesus is the image of God (Col. 
1:15) then we should look to him for the definitive statement on what God is like 
and for the direction in which God is working to bring his project to fruition. 
Wherever the Holy Spirit blows he seeks to take people in the trajectory of 
Jesus. Jesus points us toward the future which the Father wants to establish. 
Christology informs eschatology." 
All things are not presently the way God wants them for God has not yet reached 
his ultimate goal (1 Cor. 15:25). Everything is not yet subject to God. At 
present God experiences both tragedy and triumph. The time until the eschaton is 
a time of the Holy Spirit; a time where the Spirit tries different things in 
history to accomplish the divine purpose. There are signs of the Spirit's work 
in history (e. g. Israel and the church) but the signs are ambiguous since 
neither Israel nor the church has lived as the redeemed communities God wanted. 
There are people who are being reclaimed and transformed by God's grace and this 
gives us hope. Despite such signs it remains painfully clear that all is not 
right in the world. 
Nevertheless, God is lord of history even though not everything happens which God 
wants for God has not given up on his creation. God continues to work towards the 
ultimate victory over sin and evil when everything will be subject to him (1 Cor. 
15:28). The resurrection of Jesus points to a new order beyond death and 
destruction. God is still bringing about new and greater things and we look 
forward in hope to a time when God's love is experienced and reciprocated in such 
a way that we live life in a different way than we do now. The book of Revelation 
speaks of this time as having no darkness (21:25), curse (22:3), sea (21:1), 
death (21:4) or temple (21:22). These images express the hope that there will be 
86A .point badly neglected in. many discussions of eschatology. See Adria 
KOnig, The Eclipse of Christ in Eschatology: Toward a Christ Centered Approach 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982). 
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amazing differences between our present and our eschatological experiences. There 
will be continuity for it will still be God and us in relationship but some 
things will be changed. The author of Revelation is attempting to communicate a 
reality which in some respects will be radically dissimilar from the one we now 
experience. 87 Christ has brought about our redemption, changing lives and 
societies1 and we wait in longing expectation to when we shall experience divine 
salvation in its fullness. 
Yet, it may be asked: Where is our security if God cannot guarantee everything? 
What guarantee is there that God will prevail given conditions of freedom he has 
bestowed? Can God's purpose be ultimately thwarted? Though this issue was 
discussed above (6.1.7) a few additional comments will be helpful. The first 
thing to remember is that God has not given everything over to us. God is the one 
who established the conditions and so his overarching (first order) purposes 
cannot be thwarted. Whatever ability we have to thwart God's second order 
purposes is given us by God. Moreover, there are some things which the almighty 
God retains the right to enact unilaterally in the future. If the divine wisdom 
decides it is best to intervene then God can do so. Prior to creation it may have 
been possible that no single human would ever come to reciprocate the divine 
love. But that has not happened. God has achieved his desire with a good number 
of people. To inquire whether God will have anyone in the future who will believe 
is a moot point since God already has achieved a fair degree of victory. 
Yet some proponents of the no-risk model remain troubled by this. Sproul, for 
instance, says, 11 If there is one single molecule in this universe running around 
loose, totally free of God's sovereignty, then we have no guarantee that a single 
promise of God will ever be fulfilled. . . . Maybe that one molecule will be the 
thing that prevents Christ from returning. "88 Will God win in the end? Is it 
87 Pr1Scisely what the eschaton will be like I do not know. Regarding the 
issue of free will and the afterlife see note 177. 
"Sproul, Chosen by God, 26-7. 
272 
simply unwarranted posturing for proponents of the risk model to claim that God 
will achieve victory? In response let me say that it is clear that the vision of 
the prophets was of a time when God would reign victorious over all and shalom 
(peace and well being) would be pervasive. The most significant step in achieving 
this vision was taken when God, throllgh Jesus, achieved victory over the opposing 
powers (Col. 2:151. Yet God is still working to bring the effects of this victory 
to greater realization. Jesus has inaugurated the reign of the God of powerful 
love, but it clearly is not yet climaxed for God is still working to make his de 
jure rule a de facto one. 
We should not underestimate God's ability nor overestimate our own in this 
enterprise. God is omnicompetent, resourceful and wise enough to take our moves 
into account, mighty enough to act, and faithful enough to persist. If one of 
God's plans fails he has others ready at hand and finds other ways of 
accomplishing his objectives." Does this imply that it is guaranteed that God 
will achieve the sort of future, in all details, that God desires? Here 
proponents af the risk model disagree. For Lucas the answer is yes: 11 We may 
thwart Godgs purposes for a season, but in the long run the pervasive pressures 
of rationality and love will circumvent our petty resistances. . 1190 In my 
opinion this betrays a rationalism which overlooks the irrationality of sin: the 
mystery of iniquity. Paul Fiddes is on track when he says 
Decisions and experiences in this life matter: they are building 
what we are. Since God's aim is the making of persons, he has the 
certain hope that we will be 'glorified,' but the content of that 
end depends upon human responses, for the content of the end is 
persons. . Thus the risk upon which God is embarked is real and 
serious, though not a total one. He has a certain hope of the fact 
of the end, but there is a genuine openness about the route and 
89see Lucas, Freedom and Grace, 29-30. 
'°Lucas, The Future, 231. 
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therefore the content of the end. 91 
It is our privilege to hope in the living God (1 Tim. 4: 10). We, who have a taste 
of the victory of God, look forward to our own salvation as well as the 
redemption of the cosmos (1 Thes. 5:8; Rom. 8:18-23). We hope in the revelation 
of the glory of God (Rom. 5:2) but it is not something we have in the bag for we 
must wait eagerly for it (Rom. 8:24-5). God makes promises and we may have 
confidence that God will keep them even though the exact way and form God elects 
to bring them about may surprise us. Though we do not know precisely what the 
prophets meant by the new heavens and new earth this should not prevent us from 
longing expectation of the new and greater things which he who creates ex nihilo 
will bring forth. Regarding our confidence in God, just as we must not substitute 
belief in an inunutable principle for trust in a personal God so we must not 
substitute a demand for guarantees in place of hope in the living God. 
6.3 Salvation and Grace 
6.3.1 Introduction 
"For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; 
it is the gift of God--not the result of works, so that no one may boast• (Eph. 
2:8-9). These words of Paul are traditionally used as a boundary marker for what 
may legitimately be said regarding who gets the credit for our salvation. Any 
view which suggests that humans, not God, should receive praise for our 
redemption is rendered out of bounds. According to the doctrine of sin we are in 
bondage and cannot free ourselves from it (Eph. 2:1-3). God, in grace, liberates 
us from this bondage, reclaiming us as his own. In Christ Jesus God has elected 
a people for himself. Hardly anyone will object to these remarks. However, as 
soon as someone delves more deeply into the bondage to sin, how grace changes the 
situation and the nature of election it becomes apparent that Christians have 
developed quite divergent views on these matters. In what follows, only two 
91Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 105. 
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models, the no-risk and risk views of providence, will be examined on grace and 
salvation. 
6.3.2 The No-Risk Model of Salvation 
In the no-risk position sin is understood as a condition which must be changed 
rather than a broken relationship. Sin is a state of corruption in which humans 
find themselves and this condition manifests itself in sinful behavior. Typically 
this is explained as a result of inheriting a sinful nature. In compatibilistic 
terms this sinful (Adamic) nature is the remote cause which produces sinful 
desires. So long as we do what we desire we are free. Hence, we are only free to 
sin. Given this condition we can never desire God since our sinful nature 
excludes such 11 good 11 desires. In order to confess Jesus as lord the remote cause 
of our desires must be replaced with a new entity or condition which produces the 
desire to confess Jesus. Obviously, we are in no position to bring this about. 
God is the sole and complete cause which replaces our sinful nature with a 
regenerate nature. There is nothing we do to initiate this change or aid in 
bringing it about for, so to speak, there is no one home for God to address. 
This is so not only because of our own inability but also because of the nature 
of God. If God is totally unconditioned by the creature in such a way that God's 
will is never affected by or dependent upon the creature then God must be the one 
to bring about salvation in the life of an individual. The decision God makes to 
release a person from the bondage of sin is never in response to anything the 
person in question may do. The election of God must be totally unconditioned by 
anything external to God. Calvin, for instance, is very clear that God ordained 
some for eternal salvation and others for eternal damnation not because God had 
foreknowledge of their faith or wickedness but simply because God decreed it. 92 
God's knowledge of the future is not dependent upon the creature. Rather, God 
knows the future because he decrees or foreordains the future. The divine decree 
of election is atemporal, unconditional, and ahistorical. But if God is totally 
92 See his Institutes, 3.23.6. 
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unconditioned by the creature such that God never responds to us then what about 
sin? Did God decree that humans should sin? Calvin, as is well known, admitted 
that this was the case and took the supralapsarian position. According to this 
view God decreed salvation and damnation prior to decreeing the fall into sin. 
It is interesting that, as Louis Berkhof points out, the early supporters of 
infralapsarianism maintained that God only foreknew the fall rather than that God 
decreed it." The problems was that this introduced conditionality in God for 
it meant that something happened which God did not want to happen; it was 
something to which God had to aternporally respond. This would make God dependent 
upon the creatures, forcing God to react to them. For this reason, says Berkhof, 
later infralapsarians all affirm that the fall was included in the decree. 
When the notion of sin as a condition is conjoined with the rejection of arly 
conditionality in God then the grace God gives to sinners must be understood as 
irresistible grace. Moreover, if one affirms specific sovereignty then God gets 
precisely what he wants in every single situation. If God wants Bob converted 
then Bob will be converted. There is no way Bob can thwart God's specific 
decision to convert him. It is like a game of billiards. God pushes the cue stick 
of power which strikes the cue ball of irresistible grace which in turn implants 
faith in the eight ball (the sinner) which rolls into the specific pocket that 
God had eternally decreed it should go. God, who never misses a shot, puts all 
the balls into the pockets of salvation and damnation as he pleases." The balls 
cannot resist his shooting expertise. God never takes any sort of risks that 
those he elects will fail to inherit salvation. Everything works out with 
absolute precision, guaranteeing exactly what God desires for every single 
individual. 
"Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, third ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: 1946), 
118-125. ·He claims that if infralapsarians affirm conditionality in God then they 
are Arrninians and no longer Calvinists. 
"Some would deny that God shoots balls into the pocket of damnation. 
Instead, they would say that all the balls are rolling towards the pocket of 
damnation but God shoots some of them into the pocket of salvation. 
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This model has several problems. To begin, even with talk of secondary causes 
every sin is specifically intended by God. Secondly, in this view there can be 
no reciprocity or conditionality regarding salVation for it is necessarily 
monergistic: faith is solely a divine work in us. In terms of Brilnuner 1 s three 
models of relationships this view is the manipulative model where God is fully 
personal but human beings are not. 95 It is an I-It relation. Salvation is not 
the restoration of a broken relationship but consists in being freed from the 
condition of corruption. In view of compatibilism it can be said that when Bob 
confesses Jesus it is Bob's confession. But it cannot be said that the desire to 
confess came from Bob for he cannot determine his own desires. The desire for 
faith must be implanted in the sinner. Once it is, the result is guaranteed for 
Bob must act on this desire. On the positive side irresistible grace may be seen 
as divine liberation from a prison in which escape was impossible. On tl'.J.e 
negative side it may be seen by some as divine rape since it involves non 
consensual control over the person in such a way that the will of one is forced 
upon the will of the other. Of course, the desire God forces on the elect is a 
beneficent one--for their own good--but it is rape none the less. Love, not even 
the desire for love, can be forced since it involves the consent of persons. 
Another interesting issue emerges if we go beyond conversion to sanctification. 
According to specific sovereignty nothing happens--including what humans do--that 
God does not want to happen. Every state of affairs, including my personal 
holiness, is precisely the way God desires. Consequently, if I do not desire a 
greater degree of holiness my lack of desire and degree of holiness is precisely 
what God wants for me at that moment. It cannot be said that God's first order 
desire is for me to be more sanctified at this point in my life but I am 
frustrating God's desires. If God wants me to exhibit greater personal holiness 
"A.problem in the Reformed tradition is that it has used both the language 
of personal relationships and also the causal language of impersonal 
relationships. See Brilinmer's comments on the Synod of Dordt in Speaking of a 
Personal God, 83-9. Ben Carter, The Depersonalization of God (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1989), discusses how decretal theology ends up with 
an impersonal divine-human relationship. 
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then I will--guaranteed--manifest it. Compatibilism affords no escape from this 
problem. According to compatibilism I can be held responsible for my actions but 
not my desires. Hence, I cannot be blamed for not desiring a greater degree of 
holiness since such a desire is not within my control. But without the desire for 
greater holiness I will never act in a more holy manner. Unless the Holy Spirit 
gives me the desire it shall not come about. For example, Ananias may be blamed 
for lying to the Holy Spirit but his lying was specifically intended by God. 
Thus, in this model the degree of sanctification in Christians at any one time 
is exactly what God wants for if God wanted them more holy, they would be. Hence, 
it does not make sense for proponents of exhaustive sovereignty to affirm that 
the Holy Spirit may be grieved (Eph. 4:30). 
Thirdly, a typical complaint raised against this view is: why then does God n6t 
save everyone for it is within his power to do so. The answer is that God, for 
inscrutable reasons, is not willing to save all. What about scripture which 
asserts that God 11 desires everyone to be saved 11 (1 Tim. 2:4) and that God "does 
not want any to perish, but all to come to repentance" (2 Pet. 3:9)? Proponents 
of the manipulative model interpret them to mean that God wants all the elect 
saved and does not want any of them to perish. That is, the 11 any" and 11 all 11 refer 
to those God has chosen for salvation, not to absolutely every single human 
being. The logic behind this interpretation is simple. God gets precisely what 
he wants for each individual human life. Scripture says that not all humans will 
be saved. Thus, the "all" cannot mean all people generally but only all the 
elect. 96 After all, if God actually did want absolutely everyone saved then God 
could guarantee universal salvation for God's will is never thwarted in any 
respect. Hence, this reading of scripture is done through the theological lens 
of specific sovereignty. If one does not agree with specific sovereignty one will 
not likely buy into this handling of scripture. 
"This is an example of sachkritik or theological criticism: the use of 
ideas drawn from scripture to control the reading of certain scriptural texts. 
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Another answer to the complaint that God should save all was first put forth by 
Augustine. He answers that God cannot save or damn all people as this would be 
inappropriate to the divine nature. If God damns €veryone then the divine mercy 
would fail to be manifested. If God saves everyone then the divine justice would 
remain unexpressed." Either way the universe would not reflect the complete 
harmony of God. John Piper is in line with Augustine when he claims that the 
essential nature of God is to dispense mercy and wrath on whomever he pleases 
apart from anything originating outside his own will. 98 This response operates 
from a consideration of the divine nature abstracted from Jesus Christ. In fact, 
I do wonder whether the ancient principle of plenitude has influenced this strand 
of theology. That is, since plenitude necessarily diffuses itself into the full 
range of being1 the divine nature must create those who are saved and damned in 
order to manifest the full range of plenitude (God's nature of mercy and wrath) 
and thus produce the best of all possible worlds. The divine glory requires God 
to create beings intended for damnation since, without them, the glory of God 
would be deficient. There are several distasteful implications of this teaching. 
God cannot save all and cannot even desire to save all because the divine nature 
forbids it. God is not free to even want such a result. Moreover, if God must 
express his justice in the damnation of certain people then God is dependent upon 
the damned (as well as the saved) for the fulfillment of his nature. That is, God 
needs them in order to be who God wants to be. However, this is not the God of 
Jesus Christ but the God of neoplatonic imagination. Yet, even if one concedes 
that God must manifest his justice, it need not be expressed in this way for God 
could manifest his justice in accounting for sin in the work of Jesus rather than 
in some necessity requiring a massa darnnata. 
A final argument which seeks to justify why the God of specific sovereignty does 
"Augustine, City of God, tr. Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, 1950), 
21.12. 
98John Piper, The Justification of God: An Exegetical and Theological Study 
of Romans 9:1-23 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1983), 100. 
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not save everyone is that divine grace is freely bestowed or withheld at will. 
11 The very inequality [distribution] of his grace, " says Calvin, "proves that it 
is free."" But to say that God gives his love freely does not require that God 
withhold it from some. If God loves all people it does not mean his love is any 
less free. Moreover, as Walls observes, the "idea that grace is freely bestowed 
is easily run together with the idea that it is undeserved. That is to say, it 
is easy to think that because none of us deserves grace, God can give it to 
whomever he will, overlooking the rest. "1°' Walls suggests an analogy to help 
grasp this point. Suppose a father has two sons who, against his wishes, live 
recklessly and eventually become drug addicts. After a time they request help 
from their father. Neither of them deserve the father's aid but the father gladly 
helps them anyway and pays for their rehabilitation. Later, however, they both 
relapse into drugs and the father rehabilitates them again. This happens several 
times. Suppose that the father knows that if he rehabilitates them one more time 
it will result in a permanent transformation for both of them. But suppose the 
father decides to rehabilitate only one of the sons and leave the other in 
lifelong addiction. The father does not owe it to either son. Yet, if he knows 
that both sons would go right from one last rehabilitation, then we have reason 
to doubt that the father loves both sons. The issue is not whether God owes 
sinners anything but whether he loves sinners and even all sinners (see chapter 
4). According to the model of specific sovereignty God does not love all sinners. 
Sproul says that God does not owe love to anyone since it is of grace. Hence, 
people who hate God get what they deserve . 101 True, God does not owe us his love 
but Sproul overlooks an important point. Strange as it may seem, according to 
exhaustive sovereignty God wants some people to hate him for if God did not 
specifically want anyone hating him then God would ensure that no one did. But 
if God desires that some people hate him, what has become of the divine love we 
99Calvin, Institutes, 3. 21. 6. 
100Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation, 99. 
101Sproul, Chosen by God, 32-3. 
280 
read about in the gospels? In the parables of the vineyard (Mt. 20:1-16) and 
talents (Mt. 25:14-30) divine generosity is given to all. There is judgment but 
only after all had been shown divine favor and given an opportunity to respond. 
Such parables bring out the distributive justice of God whereas proponents of 
specific sovereignty typically emphasize only the retributive justice of God."' 
Things are quite different, however, in the model of general sovereignty. 
6.3.3 The Relational Model of Salvation 
6.3.3.1 Sin 
According to general sovereignty God does not control every single detail that 
occurs. There are some things which happen that God did not want to happen but 
permitted to occur. God takes a risk in creating this sort of world where he 
desires a relationship of love and where love cannot be forced. This relational 
or fellowship model understands sin, election, grace and salvation in a quite 
different fashion than the manipulative model. 
According to the relational model sin is a broken relationship with God rather 
than a condition or entity. When we fail to trust in God's good provision for us 
and reject the boundaries in which he placed us we are refusing to respond in 
love to the divine love. As was discussed in chapter 3 this is irrational for 
there is no good reason not to trust God. 103 In this sense sin does not have a 
cause. If it did then it would not be blameworthy and it could be readily 
prevented or corrected. God took a risk in creating the type of world where it 
was possible though not plausible that humans would fail to reciprocate the 
divine love. God grants enough space that sin may come about but does a great 
deal to insure it will not. Sin did occur, however, and God is genuinely grieved 
102 See Bruce Reichenbach, 11 Freedom, Justice, and Moral Responsibility, 11 ed. 
Clark Pinnock, The Grace of God, the Will of Man (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
1989)' 277-303. 
103John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 
1978), 66, 174, thinks this idea self-contradictory. Hick simply cannot accept 
the notion of gratuitous sin. He believes there must be a cause somewhere and he 
places he squarely on the shoulders of the creator. 
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over this for it is not what he wanted. Once sin came on the scene it has not 
departed but has become a universal human experience. Each of us grows up in 
relation to other sinners and sinful institution$ and organizations. Socially, 
we are born into sin. 104 Individually, we follow our forbearers in sin. All of 
us are in bondage to sin, each of us· becomes a slave to sin (Rom. 6:17). We serve 
a master other than God. Returning to the discussion of libertarian freedom 
(6.1.5) it was said that we are formally free and materially unfree. Yet, we 
remain persons even in sin. The address of a holy God to sinners is still 
personal address . 105 There is no need to resort to the impersonal language of 
causes or the manipulative model. Barth puts it thus: "Though Adam is fallen and 
disgraced, he is not too low for God to make Himself his Brother, and to be for 
him a God who must strangely contend for his status, honour and right. 11106 
6.3.3.2 Contingency in God 
Barth's remark that God must contend for our love raises the most important issue 
in the discussion: is God in any way dependent upon us for the relationship of 
love? Does God make himself at all contingent upon our response? Does God ever 
respond to us? How one answers these questions will shape the way one understands 
election, grace and salvation. The debate surrounding Arminius, Wesley and their 
Calvinistic counterparts was not primarily about salvation but about the nature 
104The concept of hereditary sin has many problems but there is a core 
element of truth in it. For views of sin in general see David L. Smith, With 
Willful Intent: A Theology of Sin (Wheaton, IL: Bridgepoint, 1994) and Ted 
Peters, Sin: Radical Evil in Soul and Society (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994). 
On hereditary sin see van de Beek, Why?, 143-8, Evans, "Salvation, Sin, and Human 
Freedom in Kierkegaard," and Gregory R. Beabout, "Does Anxiety Explain Hereditary 
Sin?" Faith and Philosophy 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1994): 117-126, Hendrikus Berkhof, 
Christian Faith, tr. Sierd Woudstra (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979), 187-210, 
and Clark Pinnock and Robert Brow, Unbounded Love: A Good News Theology for the 
21'st Century (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 57-66. 
105The Eastern Orthodox are able to speak of a personal address between 
sinful p·ersons and God. They have never affirmed the Augustinian understanding 
of sin. See John Meyendorff, 11 Humanity: 'Old' and 'New' --Anthropological 
Considerations," eds. Meyendorff and Robert Tobias, Salvation in Christ: A 
Lutheran~Orthodox Dialogue (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1992#), 59-66. 
106Barth, Church Dogmatics, 3.3.357. 
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of God!'°' Whether God ever responds to us and does things because of us (not 
merely through us) is the crux of the debate. Obviously, I am defending the view 
that God does make certain of his decisions and aCtions contingent upon what we 
do. If we had done otherwise then God may have done otherwise also. 
Interestingly, a fair number of Reformed theologians reject Louis Berkhof's claim 
that Reformed theology denies any conditionality in God. James Daane says, 
"Classical, creedal Reformed theology is not an uncondi tiOnal theology . 
. Election in Reformed thought is God's gracious response to a sinful world. "108 
Vincent Brfunmer and David Fergusson argue that the Reformed confessions were 
attempting to be both theocentric and personal (in the sense of the fellowship 
model) but at times fell into the language of the manipulative model. 1°' These 
writers claim that the Reformed tradition wants to affirm that salvation is God's 
unmerited gift which excludes human boasting but that this does not rule out all 
conditionality in God. Other traditions also allow for divine conditionality in 
election. The early fathers used simple foreknowledge to explain how God is 
responsive to the human act of faith. God "preVisions" human faith and responds 
by electing them to salvation. 110 Eastern Orthodoxy, Arminius and Wesley follow 
this move. in allowing for conditional election. 111 God is responsive to his 
101See Richard A. Muller, God, ·creation, and Providence in the Thought of 
Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1991), 143-207, "Grace, Election, and 
Contingent Choice: Arminius's Garobi t, " eds. Thomas Schreiner and Bruce Ware, The 
Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1995), 
2. 251-78. On Wesley see Randy L. Maddox, Responsible Grace: John Wesley's 
Practical Theology (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 55-6. 
108James Daane, "Can a Man Bless God? 11 eds. Clifton Orlebeke and Lewis 
Smedes, God and the Good (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 166. 
109Briimmer, Soeakina of a Personal God, 68-89 and David A. S. Fergusson, 
"Predestination: A Scottish Perspective," Scottish Journal of Theology 46 (1993): 
457-478. 
110See James Jorgenson, "Predestination According to Divine Foreknowledge in 
Patristic Tradition," eds. John Meyendorff and Robert Tobias, Salvation in 
Christ: A Lutheran-Orthodox Dialogue (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1992), 159-169. 
111Divine election may be conditional whether one affirms that God 
predestines individuals on the basis of foreknown faith or whether one holds that 
election is of a corporate nature: we are elect in the Son. On these two views 
see Jack. Cottrell, "Conditional E·lection," ed. Clark Pinnock, Grace Unlimited 
(Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, 1975), 51-73 and William W. Klein, The New 
Chosen People: A Corporate View of Election (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990). 
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creatures in bringing about salvation. In all these traditions God does not 
coerce the act of faith for salvation involves a relationship between persons. 
When one affirms that God allows himself to be conditioned by his creatures one 
has crossed the Rubicon on this issue. 
6.3.3.3 Grace for Fellowship 
In the previous chapter (5.4.2) divine personal love was described as limitless 
but conditioned by the ability of the other to receive it; as precarious since 
it does not control the other; as vulnerable since it may not get its way; and 
as desiring reciprocation. If salvation is seen as a personal relationship of 
mutual love then, says Brlimmer, there are three conditions for salvation . 112 
First of all, God must be personal and we must be persons. Secondly, we cannot 
compel or make God obligated to love us. We are solely dependent upon his grace 
to initiate and enter into relation with us. God does not have to enter into this 
relationship with us, it is done so in divine freedom. Thirdly, we have to choose 
to enter it and our choice can.not be manipulated if it is to remain a personal 
relationship. God may enable us to enter the relationship and provide reasons and 
examples of his love for us but God cannot make us choose without it ceasing to 
be our choice. If the relationship is unavoidable for the human partner then it 
has ceased to be a personal relationship. But if humans are in bondage to sin how 
can they respond to God and enter into a personal relationship of mutual love? 
As sinners we do not trust or love God, we have turned away from God's love for 
us and are not inclined to accept his love; In order to fulfill the third 
condition two more elements must be added. To begin, a distinction can be made 
between libertarian freedom (liberurn arbitriurn) and the ability to respond 
favorably to God ( liberurn consiliurn) . 113 We are formally free while being 
materially unfree. Materially we are unable to be reconciled to God unless the 
Holy Spirit enables us. God can provide enabling or prevenient grace by which we 
112Brilrnrner, Speaking of a Personal God, 87-8, 75-6. 
113See Brilrnrner, Model of Love, 202-3. 
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are enabled but not coerced to give our consent to God. This grace is the 
revelation of God's mercy and love which opens up new options in the lives of 
sinners (1 Peter 1:3). The gospel story enlightens, convicts and enlivens us to 
a future that was closed to us before. The foolishness of the cross is God's 
wisdom and power to save (Rom. 1: 16) . In hearing the gospel we come to a 
realization of God's stance towards us that provides a way out of our darkness. 
The love of Jesus elicits our loving response and motivates our imitation of his 
love. Enabling grace is invincible but it is not factually irresistible . 114 God 
wants a relationship with persons so his grace cannot then be factually 
unavoidable for humans. A person who is enabled has the option of accepting or 
rejecting the divine love. A person who is made willing has no such option. God 
can enable all and give everyone an opportunity to experience salvation. 115 Yet, 
there are those who reject his grace and God cannot save them without destroying 
the rules of the game he has established for his project of having a reciprocal 
relationship of love with us. 
Even with enabling grace God takes risks since people are not forced to believe. 
God does not believe in himself through us. The love of Christ and the prompting 
of the Spirit create the context in which we may respond in penitence and faith 
to God's gracious gift. 116 God is the initiator and provider of salvation yet 
he does not want a relationship without our consent. Our penitence and faith are 
necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for divine forgiveness. God is 
114Brilmmer, Speaking of a Personal God, 68-89 and Lucas, Freedom and Grace, 
22-6, discuss the various understandings of "irresistibility. 11 Brilmrner says that 
the love of God is rationally irresistible since it is irrational to reject it. 
115Regarding various theories as to how God makes salvation universally 
accessible see my No Other Name, part three. 
116This understanding of faith and salvation may be found in Eastern 
Orthodoxy and John Wesley. For the Orthodox position see Bi ship Maximos 
Aghiorgollssis, "Orthodox Soteriology," and John Breck, "Divine Initiative: 
Salvation in Orthodox Theology," both in eds. John Meyendorff and Robert Tobias, 
Salvation in Christ: A Lutheran-Orthodox Dialogue (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1992). 
For the Orthodox 11 synergy 11 does not mean there is some latent power in humans 
which co-operates in conversion. Rather, it is an a.ttitude of openness in faith 
to God's saving grace. On Wesley see Maddox, Responsible Grace, 141-156. 
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willing to forgive and he has suffered the breech in our relationship for it, yet 
our acknowledgement of the harm we have caused God and our willingness to desire 
restoration is necessary if reconciliation is to' be personal in nature . 117 All 
of these conditions are required for the break in the personal relationship to 
be sufficiently healed. Faith is coming into a trusting relationship with God. 
God provides the light by which we are enabled to see his love and this light 
does not break our will or force our desires in a certain direction. Faith, then, 
is altogether the work of God and altogether the work of human persons."' This 
statement makes sense in the fellowship model but not in the manipulative model 
for in the latter faith is solely of God. Paul says we are saved by grace (Eph. 
2:8-9) which comes from God and we enter into a relationship of love with God by 
faith. The relationship is a dance of personal partners, not a person with a 
mannequin. In salvation humans are receptive of grace but not merely passive fOr 
grace is not overpowering. It is truly an I-Thou relationship where God desires 
to be the Lord£!!!:. God, the Lord "of• (de facto) and not merely "over" (de jure) 
humanity. The process of salvation in the divine-human encounter is personal in 
nature. Because of this, it should be noted, divine risk is not eliminated since, 
despite being unreasonable, it is possible for us to refuse the gift. Even those 
enabled by God's .grace may refuse salvific love: there are no guarantees 
here. 119 The di vine love is patient, enduring, bears with our sinful obduracy, 
hopes for our return but does not force itself on us (1 Cor. 13:4-7). 
6.3.3.4 Some Objections 
Several objections are raised against the fellowship model of salvation. Paul 
Helm inquires whether this model opens the door to human pride to take credit for 
our salvation. "Given that there is more than one contributory causal factor how 
117See Briiromer, What Are We Doing When We Pray?, 79-80. 
118See Barth, Church Dogmatics, 3.3.247. 
119See Jerry L. Walls, "Can God Save Anyone He Will?" Scottish Journal of 
Theology 38 (1985): 155-172. Walls discusses diffe~ent views of sovereignty in 
relation to universalism and predestination. 
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does one ascribe to one of them more importance than the others? . [N]o 
arithmetical measure of the size of the various causal factors is available. " 120 
He then claims that if a person's relation to God is based on an act of free will 
then the person might take pride in this since every result brought about by the 
person's free will allows for pride. Several things may be said in response to 
these charges . 121 Helm is correct to call our attention to a sinful tendency--
taking credit away from God. But if a person responds to God's gracious love with 
thanksgiving and love then pride will be excluded. Moreover, if one wants to use 
the language of causes then one could, with Lucas, distinguish between the 
complete cause and the most significant cause. For instance, if an arsonist sets 
fire to a building using gasoline then we would say that gasoline and combustible 
material were certainly causal factors for the fire. In the moral realm, however, 
we would look for the most significant cause and that would be the arsonist. God 
is clearly the most significant cause but not the complete or sole cause of the 
personal relationship . 122 Take the case of an alcoholic. The alcoholic cannot 
cure himself. True, he must admit his need and then undergo a thorough program 
in order to be released from its bondage but does this allow for the alcoholic 
to claim pride for his cure? Hardly. The figure of the beggar has often been 
employed in the history of theology to elucidate this view of salvation. 123 
Imagine a beggar who lives in terrible misery and who is offered a gift by a 
wealthy person sufficient to allow the beggar to live a life without poverty. 
Suppose that the beggar accepts the gift. In accepting the gift the beggar is 
actively involved--the act of acceptance is· his not the benefactor's. Yet, 
boasting on the part of the beggar is ruled out by the fact that we do not 
"'Paul Helm, "Grace and Causation," Scottish Journal of Theology 32 (1979): 
102-3. 
121The following discussion is indebted to William Abraham, An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985), 149-
151. 
122See his insightful discussion in Freedom and Grace, 2-5. 
"'See the discussion by Gijsbert van den Brink .. Almighty God: A Study of the 
Doctrine of Divine Omnipotence (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Phares, 1993), 237-9. 
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consider acceptance of a gift ~ meritorious act. It would be ludicrous for the 
beggar to take credit for his new found wealth. The credit goes to the 
benefactor. There remains an asymmetrical aspect to the relationship between the 
benefactor and the beggar. Although there must be an other for the benefactor to 
show grace to1 the benefactor does rtot have to give and if he does then he is the 
initiator and sole source of the gift. In such cases we readily acknowledge the 
benefactor as the most significant cause. No precise arithmetical measurement is 
possible here but so what? Arithmetical measurements are appropriate to 
impersonal relations but not to personal ones (unless one is a hard rationalist}. 
Divine grace functions in ways appropriate to personhood rather than billiard 
balls . 124 
Yet, asks A. A. Hodge, should not humans then get the glory since they are the 
ultimate cause of their own salvation? Should we not then pray for humans to 
convert themselves?125 Such questions betray a serious lack of understanding 
regarding l:he Eastern Orthodox, Wesleyan and even Dutch Reformed views of 
salvation ...ihich are in general agreement with the view articulated here. These 
questions arise from the manipulative model which uses the language of causal 
forces rather than interpersonal relations. Humans are not the initiators nor the 
givers of salvation so what sense does it make to say they achieve their own 
salvation? We love God because he first loved us (1 John 4:19). We cannot compel 
God to love us nor can we oblige God to save us. One simply cannot speak of love 
or fellowship in such terms and if salvation is understood in a relational sense 
then we cannot earn eternal life. our response of trust to God's enabling grace 
is not meritorious. Neither does it bring about salvation for God must first do 
so. If God does not initiate the process of reconciliation and seek to heal the 
124Moreover, according to quantum physics even billiard balls do not operate 
by strict determinism. 
125Tl.iis is the position of A. A. Hodge and C. Samuel Storms. See Storms' 
11 Prayer and Evangelism Under God / s Sovereignty," eds. Thomas Schreiner and Bruce 
Ware, The Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will,. 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker, 1995), 230-1. 
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break in our relationship then it will not happen. The beggar can only respond 
in trust or hatred to the divine gift, not initiate it. 
Why then do some not exercise faith in God after receiving the gospel? As 
mentioned above, the proponent of specific sovereignty will claim they do not 
believe because God has chosen not to make them believers. Thus, the answer lies 
with God. If one presses the issue asking why God decides this way the answer is 
that it is a mystery belonging to the unsearchable counsel of God's will. Hence, 
the proponent of specific sovereignty arrives at a point where further 
explanations are_ impossible. The proponent of the fellowship model also arrives 
at a point where further explanations are impossible, but for a different 
reason. 126 Lucas comments: "Two people may have the gospel preached to them in 
the same way, and have the same opportunities of hearing God's call for each, and 
one may harken and the other harden his heart. We ask 'Why?' No answer can be 
given except that the one decided to, and the other not to. "127 The model of 
personal relations simply comes to a point where there is mystery, but it is the 
mystery of iniquity rather than the mystery of God. God's stance towards sinners 
is not mysterious for the cross of Christ demonstrates his love towards us. 
The same answer applies to the issue of personal holiness. According to specific 
sovereignty the holiness of an individual at any point in time is exactly what 
God desires it to be, no more and no less. If I ask why God does not want me more 
sanctified at this time the answer is that God, for some secret reason, has not 
willed it so. Things are different, however, in the relational model. God has 
given everything necessary for a life of holiness but we need to make use of 
God's gifts (2 Peter 1:3-11). In the fellowship model God may want us to exhibit 
a greater degree of holiness and may be frustrated with us because we do not 
follow the leading of the Spirit. It is possible for us to thwart God's will for 
146See Walls, "The Free Will Defense, Calvinism, Wesley, and the Goodness of 
God," 2s·. 
147Lucas, Freedom and Grace, 14. 
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our sanctification. It is possible for us to lie to the Holy Spirit and bring the 
Spirit to grief (Eph. 4:30) even though God does not intend such to happen. We 
cannot achieve personal holiness without the Holy Spirit but the Holy Spirit will 
not do it without us. God has supplied all we need for holiness but the complete 
set of sufficient conditions requires my consent and active participation. 
What about assurance of salvation and what of final perseverance? Does the 
relational model imply that God takes the risk that those who respond in faith 
to his salvific love may later on reject it and apostatize? Jesus tells the 
parable of the sower (Lk. 8:9-15) in which some people initially believe but are 
later overcome with the cares of the world. Paul says that Christians will be 
presented holy and blameless before God if they continue in faith, not moving 
away from the hope of the gospel (Col. 1:22-3). The book of Hebrews warns its 
audience not to fall away from the living God (3:12, 6:4-6). Of course, all of 
these texts receive different interpretations depending to a large extent upon 
one's views of sovereignty. The proponent of specific sovereignty will say that 
God does not take any risk that those he has eternally elected to salvation will 
apostatize. If God wants them to persevere in faith then they will. The biblical 
texts warning of apostasy are then usually understood as either hypothetical 
warnings (since it cannot actually occur) or as warnings which apply only to 
those who "look like" genuine Christians but, in fact, are not . 128 This is 
thought to give Christians security that they are saved since there is no risk 
that they will fail to persevere. 
Proponents of general sovereignty usually affirm that God does take the risk that 
believers may apostatize. God may want them to persevere in faith and seek to 
uplift them when they are tempted to apostatize, thus making falling away 
128Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 206-222, helpfully discusses many of the church 
fathers on Hebrews 6:4-6. Unfortunately, he concludes that the author of Hebrews 
is only .worried that some of those reading the letter might not be genuine 
believers in the first place and thus, do not belong to God's people. Actually, 
one would hope that false believers in Christian coqgregations would be shown to 
be what they actually are so that genuine believers might not be harmed! 
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extremely difficult, but in the final analysis, will not render apostasy 
impossible. 129 Proponents of specific sovereignty commonly claim that this view 
produces insecurity in the believer since there {s the risk that they will not 
persevere. At this juncture some clarifications are needed. To begin, it is 
correct that the God of specific sovereignty takes no risk that genuine believers 
will apostatize if God decides that this will be the case. If, however, God 
decides that some genuine believers will apostatize then they will do so but even 
this entails no risk on God's part since it is precisely what he wants to happen. 
Furthermore, it is correct that the God of general sovereignty does take the risk 
of genuine belie.vers committing apostasy unless God takes steps to ensure that 
this will not happen. 130 Hence, God may or may not take risks concerning human 
apostacy depending on what he has decided to do. 
The other clarification that needs to be made is that whether or not God takes 
the risk of genuine believers committing apostasy has no bearing on .21!£ assurance 
or security unless we are able to know that, in fact, we are genuine believers. 
Even if God always prevents Christians from committing apostasy that does not 
imply that there is no risk for :!:!.!!.· The no-risk model of sovereignty does not 
imply assurance for the believer since the "believer" may be deceived that she 
is genuinely regenerated. After all, God may have sovereignly decided to have 
certain individuals erroneously believe they are Christians. In this case they 
would be convinced of their salvation when it fact they are damned. It is 
commonly agreed that there are those (even Clergy says Calvin) who look like 
129For an exegetical study of this position see I. Howard Marshall, Kept By 
the Power of God: A Study of Perseverance and Falling Away (Minneapolis, Bethany 
Fellowship, 1969) and "The Problem of Apostasy in New Testament Theology," Jesus 
the Saviour: Studies in New Testament Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1990), 306-324. 
"'Robert R. Cook suggests that even those who affirm libertarian freedom may 
claim that apostasy for Christians is impossible because God performs "radical 
soul-surgery 11 on the believer such that he settles their dispositions. After all, 
most believers claim God will do this in heaven so why not now? See his 
"Apostasy: Some Logical Reflections," Evangelical Quarterly 65, no. 2 (1993): 
148-9. I believe Cook has a point but I do not believe our dispositions are 
settled, even by God, in an instantaneous fashion. 
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Christians but are not. If so, then how does one know one is a genuine believer? 
Wesley and Edwards held that this was the important question and they endeavored 
to explain how people could know they are regenerate by the fruit of the Spirit 
in their lives and, for Wesley, the internal witness of the Holy Spirit. 131 The 
confirmation of past conversion iS present convertedness not some religious 
ceremony performed in the past. 132 Whether one affirms general or specific 
sovereignty the same problem remains: there is no absolute security that one is 
a believer. This leaves some people feeling insecure in their relationship with 
God. But, as JUngel points out, the desire for security is an attempt to gain 
control over the other, a lack of trust. 133 Trust in the relationship renders 
the need for control superfluous. When the divine-human relationship is 
understood in the model of mutual fellowship the basic issue becomes: are the two 
partners faithful to each other? The relationship may ebb and flow on our part 
but we can be assured that God will be faithful. Because of the divine 
faithfulness we do not take any risks. We may count on God's faithfulness in a 
way which he cannot count on ours. Hendrikus Berkhof says, "Our wavering 
faithfulness is upheld on all sides by God's unwavering faithfulness. That 
faithfulness is not dependent on our faith. " 134 The seminal question in the 
apostasy issue is what it means to be a Christian. In the fellowship model it 
means being in a relationship of reciprocal love with God for this is genuine 
life. 
131These two thinkers are compared on this issue by William J. Abraham, 
"Predestination and Assurance," ed. Clark Pinnock, The Grace of God, the Will of 
Man (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1989), 231-242. 
132This is in opposition to the popular evangelical teaching that one knows 
one is a genuine believer by saying a liturgical formula ("I accept Jesus as my 
savior"} or a religious ceremony (coming forward at an alter call) . Such 
religious rites may be the start of fellowship with Christ but not necessarily. 
A basic problem in this approach is that it tends to make salvation a thing or 
object which one possesses instead of seeing salvation as a relationship between 
persons.· 
133Eberhard Jiingel, God as the Mystery of the World, tr. Darrell Guder (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdrnans, 1983), 170, 196-7. 
"'H. Berkhof, Christian Faith, 4 76. 
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6.3.3.5 Conclusion to Salvation 
By way of conclusion it may be said that in the fellowship model sin is 
understood as the breaking of a relationship rather than some sort of entity or 
condition. God takes it upon himself to overcome this breech and restore the 
relationship through the cross and resurrection of Christ and by giving us the 
grace by which we are enabled to see the injury we have done and make 
reconciliation possible. Because God does not manipulate our love but makes 
himself contingent upon our response, it is God who takes the risks that we shall 
respond to enabling grace with trust and love and continue to mature in the 
relationship. This does not mean that we merit God's love for we are the 
recipients of grace. Grace opens up possibilities for us which would not 
otherwise be open. We can only thank God for such opportunities. Yet, grace does 
not fix the outcome. God neither forces our response to his love nor does he 
guarantee that we shall develop the degree of personal holiness he desires. In 
all these God takes the risk that we may not enter and grow in the divine love. 
6.4 Evil 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The question of God's relationship to evil has, on several occasions, been 
touched on already in this thesis. Yet, a direct discussion of the issue will be 
helpful. In order to understand how the risk model of providence should be 
applied to this topic it will be beneficial to first see how the no-risk model 
of providence handles the subject. Before - doing so, however, a few more 
introductory comments are needed. 
In the first place, there is no single problem of evil. Rather there are various 
problems of evil depending on the particular view one has regarding the nature 
of God, God's relationship to the world and human freedom. Different models of 
God and· different views of providence generate different problems of evil . 135 
135See David Basinger and Randall Basinger, "The Problem With The 'Problem 
of Evil, '" Religious Studies 1 (March, 1994) : 89-97. 
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One may ask: Can God create a world where free creatures never commit a moral 
evil? Surprisingly the answer does not depend on whether one affirms 
compatibilistic or libertarian freedom. The compat"ibilist could answer yes if God 
always provided creatures with desires that produce righteousness and never 
allowed sinful desires to arise. Of.course, this raises the question why God has 
not done so. The libertarian can also say yes if the creatures never, in fact, 
decide to sin for then it will be true that God created free beings who never 
committed a moral evil. One may ask: Can God create a world where God can 
guarantee (no-risk) that free creatures ·Will never sin? In this case only the 
compatibilist can claim that God is able to make such guarantees and take no 
risks. The libertarian is committed to saying that God takes a risk in creating 
beings with morally significant freedom. Thus, these two views of human freedom 
engender different sets of questions or problems regarding evil. 
Turning to the nature of God it may be asked: Can an omnipotent God ensure that 
creatures with libertarian freedom never sin? If one holds that God can do the 
logically contradictory then God can give such assurances. But if one believes 
that we (de dicto) cannot meaningfully speak of God doing the logically 
contradictory then the answer is no. Finally, different views of sovereignty give 
rise to different answers to this question. If one affirms specific sovereignty 
then it may be claimed that God could guarantee a sinless world. If one affirms 
general sovereignty this cannot be claimed. It may come about that sin never 
occurs but this is not because God can guarantee it. Again, these two models 
produce different sets of questions regarding evil so it is incorrect to speak 
of 11 the" problem of evil. 
The different understandings of the nature of God, human freedom and providence 
have given rise to quite a number of standard responses to suffering and evil. 
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These may be summarized as follows. 136 (1) Evil is a punishment for sin. Though 
there are biblical references supporting the idea that some suffering is divine 
punishment for sin this is not the whole picture for the Bible rejects the notion 
that all suffering is due to divine punishment (see chapter 4, section 11). (2) 
It is sometimes claimed that evil is necessary since it is only by the contrast 
of evil that we are able to understand the good. This hardly explains the degree 
and amount of evil in the world. (3) Perhaps God is the great educator who brings 
about evil so that our souls may mature and develop as persons . 13' Yet, many 
people do not experience growth. Rather, they become embittered or overwhelmed 
which casts doubt on God's ability to teach. Also, in order for me to grow must 
my children suffer from debilitating illnesses? Furthermore, the inequitable 
distribution of suffering is disproportionate to the needs of the learners. It 
is doubtful that it can be shown that no one suffers more than is necessary for 
his spiritual benefit. 138 (4) Some have claimed that this is the best of all 
possible worlds. Personally, I doubt that this claim is coherent. Moreover, it 
is hard to reconcile this claim with the depth and amount of evil actually 
present in the world. (5) Others hold that if we could only see things from God's 
perspective we would see that all is well with the world. Furthermore, God's 
morality is not our morality and who are we to blame God? One problem with this 
approach is that it leads to a vacuous understanding of morality since we no 
longer know what divine morality actually is. God becomes inscrutable which leads 
to a denial of evil and resignation. 139 Also, the Bible clearly says that things 
are a mess--even from God's perspective! (Gen. 6: 6). (6) Finally, some claim that 
136For a helpful summary and evaluation of some of these views see Michael 
Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach and David Basinger, Reason and 
Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 103-112. 
137The most celebrated proponent of this view is Hick, Evil and the God of 
Love. 
138Again, see Schilling, God and Human Anguish, 169-173. 
139 S~e Kristiaan Depoortere, A Different God: A Christian View of Suffering, 
Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 
47-8, and S. Paul Schilling, God and Human Anguish .(Nashville: Abingdon, 1977), 
59-72. 
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all evils will result in higher goods in the future, either in this life or the 
next. It is a serious question whether each and every evil or experience of 
suffering will produce some greater good and it 1s not clear that future goods 
justify the present evil. 
Some of these standard answers are mutually incompatible with each other. 
Moreover, some of them are also incompatible with certain views of God and 
sovereignty. To this I now turn. 
6.4.2 Evil and the No-Risk Model 
According to the no-risk model of providence there is a specific divine reason 
for ordaining each and every particular occurrence of evil and suffering . 140 If 
Jones is afflicted with a debilitating mental illness in which he loses touch 
with reality or if a three-year-old child contracts an incurable and painful bone 
cancer, suffering terribly until death, or if a number of kindergartners are 
murdered in a school gymnasium in Scotland, or if Christian woman and children 
are raped and sold into slavery in Sudan, such experiences were specifically 
selected by God to happen to these individuals. In the no-risk view all the 
poverty, genocide, ethnic conflicts, debilitating illnesses, rapes, birth 
defects, blindness, destructive government policies, etc., are all specifically 
ordained by God and applied to the particular individuals involved. We may not 
know the divine reasons, but, we are told, we can be sure they are good ones 
since God is good. Jerry Bridges writes: "God's sovereignty over people . ... 
means that God is in control of our pain and suffering, and that he has in mind 
a beneficial purpose for it. There is no such thing as pain without a 
purpose. "lo11 
"'This shows affinity to the strong version of the principle of sufficient 
reason. 
141J9rry Bridges, "Does Divinia Sovereignty Make a Difference in Everyday 
Life?" eds. Thomas Schreiner and Bruce Ware, The Grace of God, The Bondage of the 
Will, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1995), 209. 
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For instance, God may desire to teach someone a lesson. God as educator selects 
and sends these painful lessons into our lives and since God is perfect he never 
fails (according to specific sovereignty) to get· the pupil to learn precisely 
what God intended. In this model it cannot be claimed that God wanted Jones to 
learn a particular lesson (e. g. humility) but that Jones failed to learn it. If 
those who suffer become embittered towards God then that is precisely what God 
intended to come about since the divine educator perfectly achieves the result 
he wants from each and every lesson. Saying that God wanted Jones to learn 
humility but failed to do so would mean that God's will was thwarted in this 
case--which is impossible given the no-risk model. Moreover, whatever view we 
take towards social responsibility in these matters is also ordained by God. If 
we take the stand that these are wrong and work to overcome them then that is 
what God intended for us to do. On the other hand, if we do not work to overcome 
them then this also is what God intended for us to do. If we choose to feed those 
starving in Ethiopia or Somalia and God wants them fed then this will happen. If, 
on the other hand, we choose to feed them but God wants them to starve (for some 
good reason) then God will ensure that the food we send them never reaches the 
people who need it. Those working for and those working against apartheid are 
doing exactly what God intends them to do at that particular time for God's 
perfect plan is never thwarted in any detail. 
Does this make God the author of sin and moral evil? Proponents of the no-risk 
model put forward several lines of thought in order to deflect this charge. 
Calvin, for instance, says that God is the "remote cause" and we are the 
"proximate cause" so God is not the author of sin. 142 Since God accomplishes his 
purposes through his chosen instruments it is the fault of the instruments! 
Though Calvin admits that God wanted the Adamic fall into sin and so it had to 
happen since God's will is never thwarted, yet, God is not blameworthy so long 
as God does not directly determine such events but only establishes the causes 
142John Calvin, Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God, tr. J. K. S. 
Reid (London: James Clarke, 1961), 179-181. 
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by which they will come about. Calvin, moreover, says that God is perfectly good 
so whatever God does is right and we have no justification to question God 
concerning this. 143 
Why then did God not ensure that hi.lrnans would have a nature incapable of sin? 
Calvin admits that this was possible for God to accomplish and that "Such a 
nature would, indeed, have been more excellent." 144 The reason, he says, lies 
hidden in the divine plan that "from man's Fall he might gather occasion for his 
own glory." The glory of God will be more manifest if sin occurs than if it does 
not. Paul Helm,. articulating the no-risk view of evil, follows Calvin by 
suggesting that the fall was not actually bad since good came from it. He takes 
the 0 felix culpa! (oh happy fault) approach to theodicy. The fall of Adam 
is happy because it, and it alone, makes possible the divine 
redemption from which the blessings of pardon and renewal follow .. 
. . the states of forgiveness and of renewal and all that these imply 
are of greater overall good than a state of primitive innocence. . 
.. Finally, without the permission of moral evil, and the atonement 
of Christ, God's own character. would not be fully manifest. 145 
God could have guaranteed a world without evil but did not want this since it 
would have meant that part of the divine nature--God's mercy--would not have been 
displayed. The revelation of the full divine nature is the "greater good" which 
makes the divine desire for sin and evil justifiable. On this account evil is 
necessary for God to accomplish his own self-manifestation. 146 
143In his theodicy Calvin finally gives up on rational argument. After using 
circular reasoning, equivocation and name-calling he appeals to mystery. See Anna 
Case-Winters, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary Challenges 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1990), 73-80. 
"'Calvin, Institutes, 1.15. 8. 
145H~lm, Providence of God, 214-5. 
146With this in mind Hegel is quite correct to think God has an identity 
crisis! 
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There are several problems with this approach. To begin, as was shown above 
(6.1.4), the use of the term "permission" is problematic in the no-risk model. 
According to specific sovereignty everything that occurs is precisely what God 
intended to occur. We do not use the term permit to mean intend. At best, the 
term permission could be used in the following sense. Suppose God had a rat that 
he wanted to run through a maze. Suppose further that everytime the rat began to 
go down a path which God did not intend him to go, God placed a gate in its way 
so as not to permit him to go that way. Eventually, the rat goes in the direction 
which God "permits" since other paths are closed. This is a tendentious use of 
the word permission. 
Secondly, as was argued above (6.3.2), it seems that the philosophical background 
for saying that evil is necessary for the divine nature to be fully rnanifest~d 
is the principle of plenitude. Does God really need sinners in order to display 
his justice and mercy?"' Does God have a deficiency which would be left 
unfilled without the occurrence of evil? If so, then what has happened to God's 
absolute independence which the no-risk model affirms? Saying that the fall was 
necessary so that some might experience Christ's redemption sounds as though 
Jesus was cleaning up the mess the Father caused. In my view, the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit stand fundamentally opposed to sin and evil. One may claim that God 
is only the remote cause of moral evil yet, for the no-risk model, every specific 
act of moral evil arises from God's first order intentions. Hence, it cannot be 
claimed that God is fundamentally opposed to sin. Van de Beek comments on this: 
"Sin does not proceed from his divine will. The predominant classic Reformed idea 
was that all things came from the hand of God. This view is not based on the 
knowledge of Jesus Christ, however, but on the idea that God is the cause of all 
things. It is based on our idea of God, not on God as he really is. "148 
1470n these and other problems see Bruce R. Reichenbach, "Evil and a Reformed 
View of God," Philosophy of Religion 26 (1988): 67-85. 
148Van de Beek, Why?, 230. 
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The proponent of specific sovereignty may object that God is only the remote 
cause of sin, thus getting God off the hook. But does it? If a child is raped and 
dismembered there will be a human agent who is the.proximate cause but God is the 
remote cause. The rapist is doing specifically what God ordained him to do. 
Hence, the human agent is the immediate rapist while God is the mediate rapist. 
George Mavrodes wonders who is ultimately responsible in such cases. He gives the 
following illustration: 
If a woman pushes a child down a stairway, and the child is thereby 
injured, we may be inclined to blame the woman, to hold her morally 
responsible. But if we bring in a more remote cause of the incident-
-if, for example, we come to believe that the woman herself was 
pushed so that she fell. then the moral responsibility of the 
woman seems to disappear. The child's injury remains, but the woman 
is not to blame for it, although she is the proximate cause of 
it. 149 
David Hurne, raised in the midst of proponents of the no-risk model, said that it 
was impossible in such a system of thought to reconcile God as the mediate "cause 
of all the actions of men without being the author of sin and moral 
turpitude. 11150 Human reason must 1 he said, be discarded here and appeal made to 
unfathomable mystery. Some adherents of the no-risk model do, in fact, appeal to 
antinomy at this point claiming that God's ways are not our ways. On the misuse 
of Isaiah 55:8 and the illegitimacy of antinomies see chapter two. 
Thirdly, there is no room for the biblical lament tradition in the model of 
specific sovereignty model. If everything happens for the greater good then 
complaint is out of the question for it reveals an immature faith. According to 
specific sovereignty the complaints and laments of Moses (Ex. 5:22-3), David (Ps. 
13) and Habakkuk show that they did not see things from God's perspective. If 
149Mavrodes, "Is There Anything which God does not do?, 388. 
150David Hurne, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Charles W. 
Hendel, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), 111. 
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only they had allowed for the "big picture" they would not have spoken to God in 
such accusatory fashion. But then again, God specifically ordained their laments 
for some reason--perhaps so we would see their fotly if God also ordains that he 
wants us to see the folly of lament. 
A fourth problem with this explanation of sin and evil is that it implies that 
God only causes (remotely, of course) those evils which serve his specific 
purposes for a greater good. This puts human morality in a bind, however, since 
either (1) God will prevent me from doing harm to another if doing harm is not 
for a greater good, or (2) God will not prevent me from doing harm to another if 
the harm will produce a greater good. 151 Therefore, I can only serve as God's 
instrument for good and cannot bring it about that I cause anyone an ultimate 
harm. It is all for the best. If each specific sin happens by divine decree then 
whatever is, is right. That is, right for that particular time and place. Helm 
denies that exhaustive sovereignty implies that what is coincides with what ought 
to be. 152 Helm is correct that what is, does not imply that it ought to be for 
all time but he fails to recognize that whatever is, is specifically intended by 
God to be and so it ought to be for that particular time and place. God may, of 
course, decide to change things tomorrow in which case whatever is, tomorrow, 
will be right. Also, one may claim that it is wrong for .Y.§. to commit such acts, 
but it is 11 right 11 in the sense of being precisely what God intended to happen. 
Finally, it does not make sense in the no-risk-model for the biblical writers to 
say that God was genuinely grieved (Gen. 6:6) or angered (Isa. 1:10-15) by sin. 
These must be reinterpreted as mere anthropopathisms. If God gets precisely what 
he intends in each and every specific situation since his secret will is never 
thwarted then it is incoherent to also claim that God gets upset at certain of 
151See William Hasker, "The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil," Faith and 
Philosophy 9, no. 1 (Jan. 1992): 29-30. 
152Helm, Providence, 137. 
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these situations. 153 Does God get upset with himself? Moreover, it may be asked 
whether this view entails a serious split between the purposes of Jesus and the 
Father. For instance, Jesus instructs his disciples to be servant leaders and 
models this by washing the feet of the disciples. The church, however, has often 
operated by power relations rather than with a servant's heart. But if the Father 
gets precisely what he wants in each and every situation then people in the 
church have done specifically what the Father wanted them to do. Since the 
followers of Jesus have not always done things the way he wants them done but 
have always done things the way the Father wants them done there seems to be a 
serious problem within the godhead regarding divine intentions. The Son and the 
Father seem to be at odds with each other. 
6.4.3 Evil and the Risk Model 
6.4.3.1 The Divine Project 
Throughout this thesis the problem of evil has been discussed in light of the 
divine project in which God desired to create beings capable of entering into 
genuine give-and-take relationships of love with him and one another. 
Unfortunately, the problem of evil, like the divine attributes, is often 
discussed without concern for the type of project God desires. If, however, the 
divine project is kept in mind it becomes possible to place the issue within the 
context of divine wisdom and love in pursuing such relationships. This enables 
us to see the difficulties raised by evil and suffering within the context of 
personal relationships and trust rather than simply the attempt to reconcile evil 
with the abstract concepts of omnipotence, onmiscience and omnibenevolence. 
God has established the structures within which the divine project is possible. 
God made human beings capable of responding to the divine love with love of their 
own. God is solely responsible for bringing this possibility about yet, what God 
153 Sqme proponents of the no-risk view appeal to antinomies at this point, 
saying that they siroply do not know how to harmonize human responsibility with 
exhaustive divine control of all things. In chap.ter two I argued that this 
theological manoeuver was illegitimate (see 2.5.2). 
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desires is a reciprocal relationship of love. Love is vulnerable and does not 
force itself on the beloved so there is the risk that the beloved may not want 
to reciprocate love. In creating such conditions'God takes the implausible yet 
possible risk that his creatures may reject him. This view may be called the 
"logic of love defense" since it stems from the divine love as well as bearing 
a family resemblance· to the free will defense . 154 The free will defense is 
grounded in God taking the risk of creating people with libertarian freedom and 
refusing to exercise specific sovereignty. Proponents of the free will defense, 
however, tend to affirm the intrinsic value of libertarian freedom (freedom for 
freedom's sake) or freedom as requisite for morality. However, as was argued 
above (6.1.5) God does not desire that we have the liberty of choice without 
concern for what we choose. Rather, God wants a relationship of personal love, 
grants freedom to that end, and is not satisfied until we reciprocate the divine 
love. Thus, the free will defense needs to be grounded in the love of God, God's 
desire for give-and-take relationships and the conditions necessary for this to 
come about. The logic of love defense connects the discussion to God's purposes 
in creation rather than to the supposed intrinsic worth of human freedom. 155 
In order for the conditions of love to be met God must exercise general rather 
than specific sovereignty and this provides an answer to why God does not prevent 
all evil. God has sovereignly established the structures whereby he does not 
always get what he desires in each and every specific situation. If God 
habitually prevented moral evil then God would overturn the very project he 
"'The most celebrated statement of the free will defense is Alvin 
Plantinga's God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977). See also, 
Michael Peterson, Evil and the Christian God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1982). 
isssee Gorringe, God's Theatre, 45-6 and Brfunmer, Speaking, 133, 139-144. 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, 3.3, 292, 365, rejects the free will defense since it 
places the blame on the creatures implying that evil arises out of God's good 
creation .. He seeks to avoid this by speaking of the "Nothingness" and so 
emphasize God 1 s opposition to and Victory over it in Jesus. However, it seems to 
me that Barth has not escaped making God culpable since the Nothingness arises 
from God's No. Furthermore, Barth here loses touch with personal categories. 
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initiated. 156 Some object, however, saying that if God is like a human parent 
then God ought to intervene more often to prevent harm and suffering. After all, 
what parent would stand by while her child is raped without attempting to prevent 
it? Though it is true that God is like a human parent, God is also unlike a human 
parent. God is, after all, responsible for upholding the ontological, moral and 
relational structures of the universe. That is, God has a role unlike that of any 
human. 157 Yet, even we have different roles in life. As a parent I have 
responsibility to care for the health of my children but this does not make me 
obligated to prescribe medical drugs for them or perform surgery on them. In his 
role as the one who establishes and sustains the project God cannot also bring 
it about that he abandons the very conditions for the project. Take morality, for 
example. What if God prevents us from intentionally harming another? Anglin 
provides a number of illustrations which render this supposition problematic."' 
Suppose I accidently discharged a gun while it was pointed at someone's heart. 
In this case God would not prevent it and the person would be killed. But if I 
fired it intentionally then God would prevent it and the person would remain 
unharmed. A scientist seeking to discover truth would get the correct results of 
an experiment while if he were attempting to demonstrate his superiority to a 
hated rival God would foil his eXPeriment. If God practiced such a policy then 
our intending harm to someone would be a sure way to avoid hurting them 
accidentally. God simply cannot operate this way without undermining the very 
project he has established. 159 In this respect, God's role is fundamentally 
different from the role of, for example, a teacher whose responsibility is to put 
a halt to any trouble in the classroom, by physical force if necessary. Only God 
occupies such a unique role. The almighty God could veto any specific act but if 
156See Keith Ward, Divine Action (London: Collins, 1990), 119-133. 
157See George B. Wall, "A New Solution to an Old Problem, 11 Religious Studies 
15, no. 4 (Dec. 1979): 519-22. 
158Anglin, Free Will and the Christian Faith, 141-2. 
"'See Ward, Rational Theology, 207, Langford, Providence, 118-120, van den 
Brink, Almighty God, 251-2, and Br(immer, Speaking, 142-4. 
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he makes a habit of it then he turns the beloved into an automaton and finds 
himself alone, which is not the sort of relationship he wants. God cannot prevent 
all the evil in the world and still maintain 'the conditions of fellowship 
intended by his first order desire. 
Yet, two objections may be raised against this view. First of all, it may be 
asked why God did not create only those whom he knew would love and trust him? 
Why did God create those whom he knew would do evil and those who would be 
damned? The risk or personal fellowship model claims that this was not possible 
for God to do. As was discussed in the previous chapter it does not matter 
whether the proponent of the risk model affirms present knowledge or simple 
foreknowledge since divine risk is not eliminated by knowledge but only by 
foreordination. If one affirms present knowledge then God did not know, for·a 
fact, when he decided to create that we would commit moral evils. God did not 
foreknow that we would actually sin, only that it was possible. 160 But even if 
one holds that God has sirople foreknowledge or timeless knowledge of what 
creatures with libertarian freedom will do it does not eliminate divine risk. 
Hick says that foreknowledge makes God ultimately responsible for sin since God 
chose to create a being whom he foreknew would freely sin. 161 This, however, is 
a misunderstanding of foreknowledge. According to simple foreknowledge (or 
timeless knowledge) God decides to create this particular type of world and then 
atemporally learns what will happen in this world. God did not know prior to his 
decision to create what would happen in this ·world. Once God becomes aware of 
what will actually happen in this world he cannot make events "deoccur" such that 
what does actually happen does not actually happen. Not only is this incoherent, 
it also falsifies God's foreknowledge. So long as one affirms the fellowship 
model divine risk remains whatever view of foreknowledge one takes. According to 
both simple foreknowledge and presentism the present world is something of a 
160Wall, "A New Solution to an Old Problem," provides one of the best 
discussions of this view (though he overvalues human freedom). 
161Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 66, 69. 
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divine adventure or experiment the results of which were not foreknown when God 
decided to create. This allows the risk model to say that this world could have 
been better than it is and that God is not responsible for failing to create only 
those beings he knew would ever love him. 
Secondly, it may be objected that God should at least intervene to remove moral 
monsters such as Hitler. But this assumes a rather individualistic understanding 
of human life. The Hitler's, Stalin's and Idi Amin's of the world do not act 
alone neither do they develop alone. Their personal development and their 
horrendous actions arise out of complex social frameworks. Hence, it is not 
simply a matter of God removing a single individual and thereby correcting the 
problern. 162 This is why, I believe, God destroys so much of the human race in 
the Genesis flood story. One does not put a halt to the Holocaust or the 
massacres in Rwanda merely by preventing one individual from harming others. If 
God is going to intervene to prevent such terrible evils then God is going to 
have to radically alter the conditions of the project. It is not self-evident 
that the elimination of such tyrants would mean that no one else would take their 
place. Given the web of social relationships God cannot prevent such moral 
monsters from arising without abandoning the type of project he established. 
Again, we can only hold God accountable for what he does intentionally. We may 
hold God responsible for creating the sort of world where such evils are 
possible--even though it seemed unlikely from the outset. But we cannot hold God 
responsible for the particular acts of moral evil since God does not specifically 
intend them. Though God permits them under the conditions of the project he does 
not intend them. But if God is love and does not want us to commit moral evils 
and has no purpose for them, is there pointless evil? 
6.4.3.2 ·Gratuitous Evil 
162See Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 137-9 and Wall, "A New Solution to an Old 
Problem, " 518. 
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The distinction between permission and intention (6.1.4) and the discussion of 
the ways in which God's will may be thwarted (6.1.7) laid the framework for 
claiming that at least some evil is pointless : 163 Saying that some evil is 
gratuitous does not mean that it fails to fit into any purpose of God whatsoever. 
Rather, God adopts certain overall ·strategies and policies by which he seeks to 
accomplish his project. The overarching structures of creation are purposed by 
God but not every single detail that occurs within them. Within general 
providence it makes sense to say that God intends an overall purpose for the 
creation and that God does not specifically intend each and every action within 
the creation. Thus, God does not have a specific divine purpose for each and 
every occurrence of evil. Some evil is simply pointless since it does not serve 
to achieve any greater good. The "greater good 11 of establishing the conditions 
of fellowship between God and creatures does not mean that gratuitous evil has 
a point. Rather, the possibility of gratuitous evil has a point but its actuality 
does not. 164 That is, God has a reason for not preventing gratuitous evil--the 
nature of the divine project--but there is no point for the specific occurrence 
of gratuitous evil. 
It is generally agreed that some evils are justified for some greater good. 
Furthermore, it is generally agreed that for certain goods to be possible it must 
also be possible that certain evils could obtain. How can one be brave1 for 
example, if cowardice is not possible? Moreover, it is also generally agreed that 
theodicists have not shown that each and every·evil either serves a greater good 
or that their possibility is logically necessary. When a two-month-old child 
contracts a painful bone cancer for which there is no cure, only endless 
suffering until death, it is pointless evil. The Holocaust is pointless evil. The 
rape and dismemberment of a young girl is pointless evil. The accident causing 
the death of my brother was a tragedy. God does not have a specific purpose in 
163The best work on gratuitous evil is Peterson's Evil and the Christian God. 
See also.Hasker, 11 The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil." 
164See van den Brink, Almighty God, 251-2. 
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mind for these. Some may wish to claim that God intends such suffering in order 
to teach the parents something, or the Jews something, or the young girl 
something. Indeed, numerous well-meaning belieVers attempt to comfort the 
suffering with standard responses regarding God's intentions for the 
sufferer . 165 Did God want the Holocaust in order to teach us a lesson? Is such 
pedagogy justifiable? In the case of my brother's death some Christians informed 
me after my conversion that his death was ordained for the purpose of bringing 
me to Christ. My immediate question was: God killed my non-Christian brother so 
that I would become a Christian? But without middle knowledge God could not have 
known this would.happen. This would mean that God goes around killing people and 
causing disasters in the hopes that some may then repent and confess Christ. The 
model of general sovereignty does not allow for each and every such evil to be 
explained this way since God is only responsible for the structures within which 
we operate and for those specific acts in history God elects to do. 
Some may wish to make the more modest claim that God uses, rather than causes, 
these evils in order to stimulate people to repentance and love. But does God 
always succeed in this? Even in the church I see a fair number of people who 
become embittered towards God--though they seldom say so publicly! They typically 
lead lives of quiet resignation or secretly hate God. In my view, God may seek 
to bring something good out of tragedy, but there are no guarantees. God is 
working in the lives of those who love God to redeem even evil situations and 
bring forth something good (Rom. 8:28). But contrary to specific sovereignty, the 
God of general sovereignty cannot ensure that people who are suffering will 
respond positively to his redemptive love. Given the fellowship model of 
providence where God does not force his will on us it is possible that we thwart 
God~ s redemptive activity regarding suffering in our llves. Considering the 
personal aspects of the divine-human relationship, God cannot guarantee that a 
165For two works which offer real life situations in which the standard 
answers qf exhaustive sovereignty are used, but Ultimately rejected, see Philip 
Yancy, Where is God When it Hurts? (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1977) and Penny 
Giesbrecht, Where is God When a Child Suffers? (Hannibal, MO: Hannibal Books, 
1988). 
308 
greater good will arise out of each and every occurrence of evil . 166 
6.4.3.3 Natural Evil 
What is the relationship between the risk model of providence and natural evil? 
It depends upon the reason one gives for diseases, hurricanes and the like. If 
one believes that God creates a world where air currents and water vapor bring 
needed rain but cannot in the same system prevent these elements from sometimes 
forming hurricanes then God takes the risk that people will suffer from them and 
may turn away from his love. 167 Water sustains us but we can also drown in it. 
Lightning brings essential nitrogen to the soil but it may also strike us causing 
injury or death. Certain genetic traits make us resistant to malaria but the same 
genes make us susceptible to other diseases . 168 The risk of human suffering 
simply is not avoidable in the world as we know it. If one believes that all 
natural evils are the result of either God's punishment on human sin or the 
product of demonic forces then God takes the risk that in creating such a world 
these evils may eventuate. 169 Even if one attributes natural evils to human or 
166See Basinger, "Human Freedom and Divine Providence," 505. 
167Bartholomew, God of Chance, points out that randomness in nature can lead 
to the advancement of life as well as deformity. With the concept of chance the 
sufferer is relieved of guilt or the burden of divine calling. I do not know 
whether God could have made a different natural environment where hurricanes and 
earthquakes were impossible while still providing the needed air and water 
movements. We do know that in the present system this is not physically possible. 
Some believe that heaven will be such a hedonic paradise. Although the scriptures 
describes a place of incredible delight with some dramatic changes from what we 
presently experience, I am not sure precisely what the new heaven and earth will 
be like. 
"'Peterson, Evil and the Christian God, 111 maintains that for God to 
eliminate the ill effects of good natural resources would be to eliminate the 
natural order all together. Others go beyond this claiming that natural evil is 
necessary for our growth as persons. For a critique of this claim see Gijsbert 
van den Brink, "Natural Evil and Eschatology, 11 ed. van den Brink et. al. 
Christian Faith and Philosophical Theology (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 
1992), 39-55. 
169Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil. 58, suggests that it is "logically 
possible" that demonic forces are to blame for natural evils. Others, however, 
go further and use this idea in developing a theodicy. See Anglin, Free Will and 
the Christian Faith, 147-9 and Gregory Boyd, Letters From a Skeptic (Wheaton, IL: 
Victor, 1994), 35-7. Boyd is elaborating this thes.is in connection with a risk 
taking God into a two volume work forthcoming from InterVarsity Press. 
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demonic sin it still implies that God took the risk of creating the context in 
which such evil and the suffering it brings could arise. 
My intention here is not to provide a theodicy for natural evils but only to 
highlight the risks God takes in light of them. If God creates a world in which 
humans have a great deal of say regarding government policies, food distribution 1 
agricultural practices, where people decide to live, etc., then possibilities 
arise for human suffering which God did not intend. For instance, the policies 
of the Ethiopian government were largely to blame for the famine of the 1980's. 
Many thousands of people suffered and died because of human decisions. The same 
sort of thing has recurred countless times throughout history. Moreover, there 
is enough food on the planet to feed everyone but it is not well distributed. In 
this God depends upon us to care for one another. If we do not care for others 
then suffering which God did not intend may come about. We make choices, 
individually and corporately, about how to spend our resources. A good deal of 
relief from diseases and even natural disasters could be accomplished if we chose 
to spend them on such enterprises. That we often do not and at times even blame 
God when we suffer from them is the risk God takes in establishing this sort of 
world. If we cut down the rain forests or spray pesticides on our food we may 
bring on ourselves devastation and disease that God never wanted us to 
experience. These are choices that we make and God works with us, attempting to 
redeem the situation, but the risk of suffering is there nonetheless. 
Again, there is no divine guarantee that we shall respond to the Spirit's 
prompting in response to natural evils. Anglin, however, is quite optimistic when 
he claims that 11 for every one person who chooses to respond to the evil by 
rejecting God, there are a hundred who choose to respond by leading better 
lives. 11170 Though I often observe people sending aid in response to a natural 
disaster. I am not at all sure that Anglin's claim is correct (especially when 
diseases are involved) . Regardless, it still implies risk for God since people 
17
'Anglin, Free Will and the Christian Faith, 153. 
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do not have to respond positively to these situations. 
6.4.3.4 Jesus is God's Answer to Evil 
God's policy decision to permit gratuitous moral and natural evil means that God 
takes the risk that his project may not go exactly as he would like in every 
detail. In the two chapters surveying the biblical narrative it was observed that 
things did not always go the way God desired and those experiencing suffering did 
not always respond with confidence in God. God is not in exhaustive control of 
the world but neither does God stand impotent before it. 171 God seeks to convey 
his powerful love to us in various ways and faithfully works with us, soliciting 
our trusting response. God's definitive way of addressing evil is the cross of 
Christ. We know where God stands in relation to sin and suffering on the basis 
of the cross and resurrection of Jesus. God fights against them, not by playing 
their game, but by opening up new possibilities for life. This seems weak and 
foolish to us for we want a display of brute force against evil. But God chooses, 
instead, to bear the full force of evil. God brought redemption (good) out of a 
most horrendous evil. God himself became involved in our struggle and suffering 
in order to overcome suffering and evil. Jesus, human and divine, experiences our 
troubles and death yet remained powerful in love. Through the resurrection he 
completes the victory over suffering and evil. The resurrection is our sign of 
hope that the future will bring a transformation of our present situation. The 
resurrection is a promise that suffering and death do not have the last word--
they cannot ultimately separate us from the love of God in Christ (Rom. 8:35-7). 
God is victorious over evil but not in the way we want. We would rather God 
simply change the natural order and remove the possibility of moral evil, making 
our lives free from suffering. We do not really want God to transform our hearts 
so that we share his values and love. We would rather God remove the possibility 
of suffering than work with us through it for it is not the sort of help we 
desire . . 
171The impotency of God is stressed by Rabbi Harold Kushner, When Bad Things 
Happen to Good People (New York: Schocken, 1981) as well as in the "fellow 
sufferer who understands of process philosophy. 
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This must not be construed to mean that God never heals, liberates or establishes 
justice. But it does mean that we do not see it as much as we wish. We look 
forward to a time when God's sovereignty will be more fully manifested de facto 
against the forces of evil and suffering. In this respect we are no different 
from the biblical characters. Israel remembered God's mighty hand which delivered 
them from bondage and hoped for a future where they would again experience such 
liberation (e. g., Jud. 6:13) . 172 So too, the church remembers the power of the 
resurrection and hopes for the time when all will be renewed in glory. The memory 
of biblical faith helps us cope with suffering for several reasons. First, we may 
count on and experience the comforting presence of a God who was unafraid of 
sharing our plight in Jesus. Secondly, we do see in the world from time to time 
signs of God's provisional liberating power. These give us, thirdly, both the 
confidence that God will continue his work and the courage to persist in our 
efforts to be God's fellow laborers in the struggle for shalom. The witness of 
God as both suffering and powerful love gives us hope for a future where God is 
victorious over all evil. 
God has not given up on us as is clearly manifested in the cross. Despite our sin 
God perseveres. Writes Barth 
God's mercy does not act in such a way as to overpower and blot out 
its object. God does not take the place of the creature in such a 
way as to annihilate it. . (God' mercy] is so powerful that it 
can wait, allowing us to continue. The abyss in the heart of God is 
so deep that in it the other, the reality distinct from God, can be 
contained in all its wretchedness. i 73 
God does not destroy us but seeks to transform us through redemptive love. God 
is working to bring good out of evil. God is not causing the evil for Jesus 
stands against it.· In the light of Jesus we have no doubt that God intends our 
172The following is indebted to Guthrie, 11 Human Suffering, Human Liberation, 
and the Sovereignty of God," 33. 
173Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2.1, 411. 
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wellbeing. God is not causing our suffering but seeking to bring something 
redemptive even out of terrible suffering. But God's efforts do not meet with 
success apart from us since God has sovereignly chosen not to do it without us. 
Repeatedly in the biblical narrative God called on people to trust him in the 
face of suffering (e. g. Hab. 2:4). God desires to be known as a God of goodness, 
wisdom and justice who is ever present with us. Yet, he may be experienced by us 
as a bumbling, absent deity who is silent before his suffering creatures. The 
risk was: will anyone have confidence that God is wise and loving in working this 
way? Would anyone trust God and choose to follow him down a path that seems to 
us one of weakness and foolishness? 
6.4.3.5 Questioning God's Wisdom 
Despite God's faithful track record, biblical characters such as Moses (Ex. 5:2~-
3) and Habakkuk (1:2-4, 12-17) confronted God with their anger and 
disappointment. Moses blamed God for the oppression getting worse while Habakkuk 
railed against God for not doing anything about the terrible injustices in the 
land. These complaints were taken seriously by God since their concerns became 
God's concerns, but God did not always answer such questions in the way they were 
asked. People of faith may, at times, find reason to call the divine wisdom into 
question. In the church, however, we are usually taught not to question God. 
Rather, we are instructed to acquiesce to the divine will. The biblical witness 
is that we may question God and may, at times, even prevail such that God alters 
his plans to take our concerns into account. The lament tradition should be part 
of our worship. It is not an iromature faith. True, in Jesus we have God's clear-
cut answer to sin and evil--redemptive love--but even this does not exclude all 
room for questioning whether the world manifests the divine wisdom. 
Some, such as David Hume, brashly suggest that the world must be the product of 
either an infant deity who knows no better or of a deity in old-age who simply 
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cannot do what needs to be done."' The fictional character Ivan Karamazov asks 
whether this world--this project in which God takes risks--is worth the price. 
He tells of a little girl abused by her parents and cries to "dear, kind God to 
protect her. . Do you understand why this infamy must be and is permitted? 
Without it, I am told, man could not have known good and evil. Why should he know 
that diabolical good and evil when it costs so much?" 175 Ivan sees no justice 
in the world and certainly no God of justice. Consequently, he claims that God's 
experiment is too costly, it is not worth the price of all the suffering, and so 
he desires to return his ticket for admission to God. Ivan's brother, the monk 
Alyosha, does not find faith in God easy in light of Ivan's descriptions of human 
evil but he sees in Jesus reason to trust God. We may know that God loves us but 
there is still room to question the wisdom of creating this sort of world. 
The skeptic may be confident that God was wrong to establish this type of project 
yet the skeptic faces some serious questions. Davis writes: "Of course it is 
possible that if I knew all relevant facts I would create a world very different 
to this one. But it is also possible that I would create a world as much like 
this one as I could. I just don't know enough to say, and neither does anyone 
else, in my opinion." 176 In evaluating God's policy decision~ do not know all 
the relevant facts so how can we justifiably claim it was a bad decision? 
Moreover, since God is striving to achieve his purposes this means that the 
project is not yet complete--the results are not yet in. The cost-effectiveness 
of the policy cannot be made until the eschaton. Although these points deflect 
the critic's charge we do not arrive at indubitable certainty. Instead, we are 
faced with the decision whether or not to trust in the God of Jesus Christ. God 
has demonstrated his love towards us in Jesus. If he does not convince us of 
174David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith 
(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), 169. 
175Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, tr. Constance Garnett (New 
York: Random House, 1950), 287. 
116Davis, Logic and the Nature of God, 108. 
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God's concern for us, what can? What then are we to do with our questions? We may 
pray to God the way Moses, Habakkuk and even Jesus did. They took God seriously 
and contended with God against God and God took them seriously even if he did not 
always do precisely what they requested. In such a relationship, we acknowledge 
that we still trust in God and that we have not given up. We are, after all, 
still talking to God so a relationship remains. Our faith in God has a solid 
basis in Jesus and we have good reason to be confident that the redemptive work 
God has begun he will finish. We hope for what God will accomplish in the future 
in bringing about new and greater things. 177 In love we seek to follow the path 
177The nature of "heaven 11 and the question whether both moral and natural 
evil will by divine decree immediately cease to exist in such a state raise a 
number of significant problems such as why God does not now or did not originally 
create such a state. George B. Wall, 11 Heaven and a Wholly Good God," Personalist 
58 (1977) : 352-7 and "Other Worlds and the Comparison of Value," Sophia 18 (Ju:\.y 
1979): 10-19, explores these questions without resolving them. 
Those who affirm a compatibilistic definition of human .freedom sometimes make the 
accusation that proponents of libertarian freedom are committed to believing 
that we will be able to sin in heaven. The compatibilist does not have this 
problem since God will then ensure that all of our desires are only righteous 
desires. The problem for the compatibilist is to explain why God gives us 
compatibilistic freedom in this life and why God did not originally create us 
with only righteous desires . 
Is the possibility of sin removed somehow? If so, is it removed instantaneously 
or progressively? In the eschaton will we continue to develop and renew our minds 
in the likeness of Christ? Will the process of sanctification go on? Will the 
presence of God so change us that'. we have no further need of process and 
transformation? Will we all instantaneously arrive at Christlikeness in our 
individual and social lives? David Brown, 11 No Heaven Without Purgatory, 11 
Religious Studies 21 (Dec. 1985): 447-456, argues that the traditional doctrine 
of ·purgatory is necessary since God always desires a free response involving 
complete self-acceptance from the individual and this requires a temporal 
purgatory for its complete achievement. Will heaven involve the abolition of 
human freedom so that we are not permitted to sin or will it involve a process 
of transformation resulting in the confirmation of our character? Gary R. 
Habermas and J. P. Moreland, Immortality: The Other Side of Death (Nashville: 
Thomas Nelson, 1992), 150-1, suggest that the glorification process involves the 
free choice to attain the state where we are either unable to sin or consistently 
able not to sin. Perhaps our material freedom becomes so confirmed and pervasive 
that we freely never use our formal freedom to sin. Even should it possible to 
sin in the eschaton it may be that the effects will not then be so deleterious 
due to the work of Christ and the ministry of the Spirit in our lives. 
Will all natural evil and suffering be automatically removed or will our ability 
to cope with it and our acceptance of God's help be such that its negative 
effects are greatly lessened? At the least it would seem that there cannot be any 
natural evil which would result in the destruction of or irredeemable impairment 
of those.in heaven. All such issues direct themselves to the divine wisdom: was 
God wise to create and govern the world the way he has? I am not exactly sure 
what heaven will be like nor do I understand why God delays bringing about the 
new heaven and earth. Admittedly, these issues need to be more fully explored. 
315 
Jesus has blazed. It is God's desire that, despite our experience of suffering 
and evil, we will respond to his love in faith, hope and love. 
6.4.4 Conclusion to Evil 
The logic of love defense provides a·way of understanding the structures in which 
suffering and evil could come about in God's creational project even though he 
never intended them. The structure of love coupled with general sovereignty 
yields the conclusion that there is gratuitous evil. Terrible events happen which 
God does not specifically want to occur and this was a risk God took in 
establishing these structures. Regarding natural evil it may be said that 
whichever way one wishes to explain its origin it involves God in the risk that 
it may hamper human trust and love in the divine-human relationship. In the face 
of both moral and natural evil Jesus stands fundamentally opposed to them artd 
seeks to overcome them by suffering and resurrection. Moreover, God continues to 
work to redeem the evil situation. God is not yet finished and so long as God is 
working their is hope that the future will be different from what we presently 
experience. Although this approach does not remove all ambiguity regarding 
suffering and evil there is, in light of the cross and resurrection, reason to 
trust God, hope for the future and respond in love to God. 
6.5 Prayar 
6.5.1 Introduction 
Prayer has many forms including praise, - confession, intercession and 
contemplation. Though all of these are connected to the doctrine of providence, 
one sort of prayer is especially significant regarding divine risk: impetratory 
prayer--getting something because one requests it. Does God ever respond to us 
and do something because we ask for it? Interestingly, different understandings 
of God give rise to different views on the role of such prayers. The models of 
specific.and general sovereignty generate different understandings of prayer so 
the two models will again be compared and contrasted on this topic. Before doing 
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so, however, it should be noted that the problem of reconciling petitionary 
prayer with the attributes of God is quite old. In 233 A. D. Ambrose sent Origen 
some questions which a lady named Tatiana had asked him. "First, if God foreknows 
what will come to be and if it must happen, then prayer is in vain. Second, if 
everything happens according to God's will and if what He wills is fixed and no 
one of the things He wills can be changed, then prayer is in vain. "178 In short, 
does foreknowledge or foreordination render prayer useless? In his reply Origen 
says that God's foreknowledge does not rule out God's responding to our prayers 
and he rejects the notion that God foreordains all that comes to pass. Having 
already dealt with the subject of foreknowledge and prayer (chapter 5) I will 
concentrate on the relationship between the two types of divine sovereignty and 
prayer. 
6.5.2 The No-Risk Model and Prayer 
Proponents of specific sovereignty may rightly claim that prayers of praise, 
confession and petition play a significant role in our lives. God has ordained 
that we should, at a particular time and place, praise God, confess our sins or 
make a request. Each and every such prayer is precisely what God intended it to 
be. Regarding prayers of petition it may be said that God not only decrees what 
will happen after the prayer but also the very prayers themselves as the means 
by which God will bring the results about. Calvin says that petitionary prayer 
is not superfluous even though God is asked to provide things which he has 
decreed from all eternity to provide because God not only ordains goals, he also 
ordains the means to accomplish these goals. 179 Helm agrees saying that for the 
no-risk model: ''Intercessory prayer is not one means of settling God's mind on 
a course of action, but one of the ways in which the already settled mind of God 
1780rigen, On Prayer, in tr. 
Martyrdom, Prayer and Selected Works, 
Paulist, 1979), 92. 
179Calvin, Institutes, 1.17. 3. 
Rowan Greer, Origen: An Exhortation to 
Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: 
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effects what he has decreed. 11180 Suppose, for example, that God has eternally 
decreed that Mary should be converted on July 28, 1999. Suppose further that God 
desires to regenerate her only after my prayer for her salvation on July 27. Can 
I place her salvation in jeopardy if I decide not to pray for her on the 27'th? 
Not at all, because according to ·specific sovereignty God's will cannot be 
thwarted in the least detail. Consequently, God can guarantee that I will pray 
on the 27'th and that he will on the 28'th give Mary the grace by'which she will 
inevitably believe. God not only decrees her salvation but also my praying for 
her the day before. Thus, petitionary prayers are meaningful in the sense that 
God wills them a.s the means through which he brings about what he desires. 
But what about impetratory prayers? Does it make sense for proponents of specific 
sovereignty to claim that God grants something because of or in response to the 
request made? Helm says that even if the impetratory prayer is divinely decreed 
it may be said that "God answers because men pray. "181 Storms agrees saying, 
11 Divine sovereignty does not preempt prayer, nor does prayer render God's choice 
contingent. The God who is pleased to ordain the salvation of sinners, based 
solely on his good pleasure, is no less pleased to ordain that he will save them 
in response to the prayers of others. 11182 
But what does it mean for the God of specific sovereignty to "respond" or to do 
something "because" he was so requested? It cannot mean that because of the 
request, God did something which God was not otherwise going to do. Both Storms 
and Helm are clear that there is no contingency in God. But if there is no divine 
contingency then how should their remarks be understood? I suggest that what they 
mean, or should mean, is something like the following. To say that God 11 responds" 
to the petitioner means that God, who ordained the specific request by that 
180Helm, Providence, 159. 
181Helm, "Prayer and Providence," 110. 
182Storms, "Prayer and Evangelism, " 224. 
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particular petitioner, ordained to fulfill that request after it was requested. 
That is, for God to respond means simply that God first decided to have someone 
pray a particular request and then decided to do what was requested after the 
person made it. Obviously, this is not normally what we mean by the word response 
since God is "responding" in terms of his own decrees. The "God who hears" 
prayers is the God who hears himself speaking through second causes. Furthermore, 
to say that God does something "because" of what the creature requests sounds as 
though God is in this respect dependent upon the petitioner. Writes Storms: "from 
the human perspective, it may rightly be said that God's will ... is dependent 
upon me and my prayers, as long as it is understood that God, by an infallible 
decree, has secured and guaranteed my prayers ~s an instrument. 11183 Hence, it 
is only from a 11 human perspective" or anthropomorphism that God may be thought 
to be dependent. In actuality, however, God is not dependent upon our prayers, 
rather, our prayers are dependent upon God decreeing them. Thus, God may be said 
to do X "because• we prayed only in the sense that God had always decreed that 
God was going to do X after we prayed the prayer he also decreed. In this respect 
Jonathan Edwards put it correctly when he said, "speaking after the manner of 
men, God is sometimes represented as if he were moved and persuaded by the 
prayers of his people; yet it is not to be thought that God is properly moved or 
made willing by our prayers .... he is self-moved .. God has been pleased 
to constitute prayer to be antecedent to the bestowment of mercy; and he is 
pleased to bestow mercy in consequence of prayer, as though he were prevailed 
upon by prayer. "184 
Hence, the God of specific sovereignty is not actually prevailed upon by prayer. 
God, in fact, never responds to us or does anything because of our prayers as 
this would imply contingency in God. In this model it is difficult to make sense 
of the biblical statement "you have not because you ask not" (James 4:2) because 
183S~orms, nprayer and Evangelism," 228. 
184Edwards, 11 The Most High a Prayer-Hearing God~" Works of Jonathan Edwards, 
vol. 2, 115-6 (emphasis mine). 
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if the God of specific sovereignty wanted you to have it then he would ensure 
that you asked for it. If God's will is never thwarted in any detail then we can 
never fail to receive something from God because we failed to ask for it. 
Moreover, James says that we sometimes petition God from wrong motives and so we 
do not receive (4:3). But if the God of specific sovereignty desires to give us 
something we can rest assured that he will get us to ask properly since there is 
no risk that God's desires will be frustrated in any way. Consequently, 
proponents of specific sovereignty may rightfully claim that petitionary prayer 
is justified because God has decreed that he would perform a certain action after 
the request is made. Moreover, in this model it makes sense to say that God has 
ordained such prayers for therapeutic benefit to those who pray as well as to 
those who are aware that others are praying for them. But proponents of the no-
risk model of sovereignty cannot legitimately claim that God responds to o~r 
prayers or does something because we prayed: there is no place for irnpetratory 
prayer in this model. 
6.5.3 The Risk Model and Prayer 
The situation regarding impetratory prayer is quite different, however, in the 
risk model where God enters into genuine personal relations with us. According 
to the fellowship model God is genuinely responsive to us. For instance, God 
removed certain plagues at the request of Moses (Ex. 8:13, 31). When God told 
Moses that he was going to destroy the people and start over again with Moses, 
Moses gave God reasons why he should not follow through with this plan and God 
changed his mind from his proposed plan to accommodate Moses' desires (Ex. 32: 11-
14). When God announced to king Hezekiah through the prophet Isaiah that he would 
die very soon Hezekiah prayed and gave God reasons why he should let him live 
longer. Because of his prayer God sent Isaiah back to Hezekiah to inform him that 
God had changed his mind and would grant his request (2 Kings 20:1-6). If Moses 
and Hezekiah had not prayed to God about these matters biblical history would 
have been different. To modify James' statement: they had because they asked. In 
this model it is quite possible for us to miss a blessing which God desires to 
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give because we fail to ask for it (James 4:2-3). 
Our prayers make a difference to God because of 'the personal relationship God 
enters into with us. God chooses to make himself dependent upon us for certain 
things. It is God's sovereign choice to establish this sort of relationship, it 
is not forced on God by us. In Exodus 32:10 God asked Moses to leave him alone 
so that the divine anger may grow against the people. Furthermore, God repeatedly 
instructs Jeremiah not to pray for the people (7:16; 11:14; 14:11; and 15:1). Why 
would God say such things if Moses and Jeremiah did not have an impact on the 
divine life? James says that the prayers of righteous people make a difference 
(5:16). The prayers of God's people make a difference not only in the lives of 
the people but also in God's life. God takes our prayers seriously and weaves 
them into purposes and actions for the world. God desires a deep personal 
relationship with us and this requires genuine dialogue rather than monologue. 
The fellowship of love God desires entails a give-and-take relationship where God 
gives and receives from us. 
Some object to this claiming that we have no business advising God who possesses 
vastly superior wisdom. Is it not the epitome of hubris to think we can counsel 
an omniscient God who already knows all the data? 1es Such remarks may arise out 
of sense of humility and a desire to be still before God. Though this has its 
place in the spiritual life the biblical record is more than a call to silence. 
It also calls us to make our requests known to God (Phil. 4:6; 1 Jn. 5:14-5) and 
to ask what we will in Jesus' name (Jn. 14:13-4). Abraham, Moses, Elijah and 
Jesus reasoned with God and did not always acquiesce in God's presence.i86 
185Margaret Falls-Corbitt and F. Michael McLain answer this by affirming that 
God chooses to respect our privacy in such a way that prayer becomes genuine 
disclosure of that which God would not otherwise know. See their "God and 
Privacy<" Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 3 (July 1992): 369-386. 
i 860i;l the importance of presenting reasons to God in biblical prayers see 
Patrick D. Miller, "Prayer as Persuasion: The Rhetoric and Intention of Prayer," 
Word and World 13, no. 4 (1993): 356-362 which is reprinted in his They Cried to 
the Lord: The Form and Theology of Biblical Prayer (Minneapolis, Fortress, 1994). 
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Rather they dialogued with God in order to determine together what the future 
would be. God wants this sort of conversation not because we have anything 
stupendous to advise God, but simply because God decides to make our concerns 
his concerns. God wants us to be his partners, not because he needs our wisdom, 
but because he wants ~ fellowship. It is the person making the request which 
makes the difference to God. The request is important because God is interested 
in us. God loves us and takes our concerns to heart just because they are our 
concerns. This is the nature of a personal, loving relationship. 187 The 
relationship is not one of domination or manipulation but of participation and 
cooperation where we become "colaborers with God" (1 Cor. 3:9). Again, it did not 
have to be this way. It is so only because God wanted a reciprocal relationship 
of love and elected to make dialogical prayer an important element in such a 
relationship. 
In chapter three (sect. 7 and 11) several biblical texts were examined to show 
that God may be prevailed upon. God makes himself open to us and the future is 
open in some respects because God elects not to decide everything apart from our 
input. 188 Biblical characters prayed boldly because they believed their prayers 
could change things, even God's mind. They understood that they were working with 
God to determine the future. World conditions may appear to us as fixed but they 
are not ultimate and in impetratory prayer we show that we believe things can be 
different. God has open routes into the future and he desires that we participate 
with him in determining which ones shall be taken. This should not be construed, 
187Very helpful on prayer as a vital element in a personal relationship with 
God are the following: Terence Fretheim, "Prayer in the Old Testament: Creating 
Space in the World for God," and Paul Sponheim, "The God of Prayer,• both in ed. 
Paul Sponheim, A Primer on Prayer (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988); Vincent 
Briimmer, What Are We Doing When We Pray?; Samuel E. Balentine, Prayer in the 
Hebrew Bible: The Drama of Divine-Human Dialogue, overtures to Biblical Theology, 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993); A. van de Beek, Why?, 316-332; and Richard Foster, 
Prayer: Finding the Heart's True Home (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). 
188Paul Helm caricatures this view of prayer as one where God functions like 
an old-fashioned switch board operator putting calls through if the line is open. 
He believes this view of prayer makes it a force which controls God. See his 
"Asking God," Themelios 12, no. 1 (1986): 24. 
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however, to mean that we get whatever we want. What is being claimed is that we 
may prevail with God since God genuinely takes our desires into account. Yet, God 
may also prevail with us, getting us to change our minds and pursue a course of 
action which we did not initially think best. in this regard prayer provides a 
resource for God to work in the world. 189 When we turn to God in prayer we open 
a window of opportunity for the Spirit's work in our lives, creating new 
possibilities for God to carry out his project. Dialogical prayer affects both 
parties so the situation is now different than it was prior to the prayer. 
Our failure to practice impetratory prayer means that certain things which God 
wishes to do for us may not be possible because we do not ask. In the words of 
Peter Baelz: "our asking in faith may make it possible for God to do something 
which he could not have done without our asking. "190 Consequently, if God's 
bringing about a certain state of affairs is contingent and our requesting God 
for it is contingent then God is taking a risk that some particular good may not 
come about. It might be objected that God, being omnibenevolent, must always act 
to bring about the most valuable state of affairs whether he is asked to do so 
or not. 191 God must, it is claimed, always act to help without being asked in 
order to maximize goodness. Two points may be made in response. First of all, it 
is not clear whether it is coherent to claim that there is a most valuable state 
of affairs . 192 God has multiple options for action dependent upon what those in 
189See especially Fretheim, 11 Prayer in ·the Old Testament, 11 and Tupper, 
Scandalous Providence, 274-280. 
190Peter R. Baelz, Prayer and Providence: A Background Study (New York: 
Seabury, 1968), 118. 
1910n this debate see Eleonore Stump, 11 Petitionary Prayer," American 
Philosophical Quarterly 16 (April, 1979): 81-91; David Basinger, "Why Petition 
an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Wholly Good God?" Religious Studies 19 (1983): 25-41; 
Joshua Hoffman, "On Petitionary Prayer, 11 Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 1 (Jan. 
1985): 21-9; Stump, "Hoffman on Petitionary Prayer," Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 
1 (Jan. 1985): 30-7; Michael J. Murray and Kurt Meyers, "Ask and it Will be Given 
to You,·• Religious Studies 30, no. 3 (1994): 311-330; David Basinger, 
"Peti tionary Prayer: A Response to Murray and Meyers, 11 Religious Studies 31, no. 
4 (1995): 475-484; Ward, Divine Action, 159-166; and Briimmer, What Are We Doing 
When We Pray?, 47, 55-9. 
192See Ward, Divine Action, 158 and Lucas, Freedom and Grace, 37-40. 
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fellowship with him decide to do. Secondly, if what God holds as "most valuable" 
is the personal relationship with us then God will not want to do everything for 
us without our asking as this would lead to a breakdown of the type of 
relationship God desires to have with us. 
Another problem might be raised at this juncture. What if we prayed for something 
which God did not believe was in our best interest, might God grant it anyway? 
Would God open himself up to the requests of finite and even sinful creatures? 
In my opinion, God has at times done so. God allowed Aaron to do the public 
speaking for Moses even though God wanted Moses to do it (Ex. 4:14) and God 
allowed the people a king even though he said this was not the best for them (1 
Sam. 8). God fulfilled these requests, I believe, in the hope that the people 
would mature in their relationship with him. Parents often face the same sort Of 
problem. For instance, a child may want some item which the parent knows the 
child will not use wisely. The parent may go ahead and give the child the item 
in the hope that the child will learn from this mistake. In this sense, of 
course, the parent (or God) has the long-term best interest of the child in mind. 
Impetratory prayer is significant not only for our own individual lives it is 
also important for the lives of other people who make up the community of faith. 
There are numerous biblical references to Christians praying for one another and 
injunctions for us to pray for one another (e. g. 2 Cor. 9:14, 13:7; 2 Thes. 
1:11, 3:1; Heb. 13:18; James 5:14). Impetratory prayer matters: Jesus wanted his 
disciples to pray with him and for him in Gethsemane. The body of believers, by 
praying for one another, helps to shape the future of the community. 193 
Apparently, what God decides to do for others is sometimes dependent upon my 
prayers. That is, God might sometimes refrain from acting beneficially in one 
193See Balentine, Prayer, 272-295 and Miller, They Cried to the Lord, 325-7. 
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person's life because others have failed to pray. 194 This may not sound fair to 
those of us in the West with our high value on individualism but God values 
corrununity and desires that it be fostered, in part, by our concern for one other 
and by manifesting this concern in intercessory prayer for others. This is one 
means that God uses to build a community of fellowship and mutual concern. 
Moreover, as Ward argues: 
Our actions usually involve others, so that our good acts help 
others and our evil acts harm them. It is not sensible to complain, 
that, if I fail to pull my neighbor out of a ditch when I could 
easily do so, God is responsible for leaving him there. It is no 
more sensible to complain that, if I fail to pray for my neighbor 
when I could easily do so, God is responsible for not doing what my 
prayer might have effected. . . Our request may make it possible 
for him to help them in ways which otherwise would have been 
constrained by the structures of the natural order . 195 
Thus, God takes the risk that at times he may want to do something for us or 
someone else, yet may not do it because we fail to ask for ourselves or for 
others. In the fellowship model it is not possible to say, as in the specific 
sovereignty view, that God gets precisely what he desires in each and every 
situation. Yet, overall, God is responsible for establishing the conditions for 
this sort of relationship. God took the risk that we might not ask for ourselves 
or intercede on behalf of others and so things might not go exactly the way God 
desired. This does not mean, however, that God cannot act unilaterally in earthly 
194David Basinger, a proponent of the risk model, disagrees with me on this 
point. See his "Practical Implications, 11 Clark Pinnock, et. al. The Openness of 
God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 161. For discussion of this 
debate see the references in note 180. Paul Helm, Providence, 159, believes the 
risk model of prayer makes us responsible for Auschwitz (he prefers to place the 
responsibility on God's shoulders). 
195Ward, Divine Action, 166. 
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affairs for God can and does do so. 196 Yet, God has decided to seek a personal 
relationship with us and works to build a community of believers who love one 
another. In this sort of project it becomes possible to affirm that we have not 
because we ask not. God genuinely responds to our petitions and sometimes acts 
because of our impetratory prayers; 
6.6 Divine Guidance 
6.6.1 The No-Risk View of Divine Guidance 
Though the question about the ways in which God guides his people is important 
it will not be addressed here.'" Instead, as with the other topics discussed 
thus far, only the relation between divine guidance and risk will be examined. 
Following the pattern established so far, the no-risk view of guidance will be 
examined before the risk model. 
According to the no-risk view of providence God always has something specific he 
intends for us to accomplish. In each and every situation God has a definite act 
in mind which fulfills part of his exhaustive plan. God has a master blueprint 
196Regarding why sometimes intervenes but not always see the helpful 
discussions by Ward, Divine Action, 134-153 and Tupper, Scandalous Providence. 
In my opinion, God is much more active than we can ever identify, his work goes 
largely unseen--like an iceberg. Nevertheless, God does at times intervene. 
Gordon Kaufman, Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1968), 302-3, criticizes this idea since, he believes, it 
implies: (1) that God was incompetent in creating the world if he has to 
intervene in it; (2) that God plays favorites because he does not do the same for 
everyone. Others ridicule a personal God who intervenes by labeling such a God 
a 11 magician" or 11 spook." However, as Kirkpatrick, Together Bound, 90-2, argues 
a God who answers prayer is a God who intervenes. Moreover, what Kaufman and 
others really want is a uniform code of egalitarian relations which God must 
follow. Some people simply cannot stand that God might be unfair by their 
standards. They would rather have an impersonal principle, manageable by human 
ideals, than a personal God who gets involved with us. 
"'Two helpful works on the means by which God guides are: Garry Friesen, 
Decision Making and the Will of God: A Biblical Alternative to the Traditional 
View, Critical Concern Book (Portland: Multnomah Press, 1980) and Derek Tidball, 
liow'"boes·God Guide? (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1991). Both authors propose the 
"wisdom model" with which I agree. However, both authors also seem to affirm 
exhaustive divine sovereignty where God's will is never thwarted yet, also affirm 
that God has no exhaustive blueprint for our lives. Given the emphasis in their 
books on the way of wisdom it would seem that they should not affirm specific 
sovereignty. 
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which he ensures is carried out in exacting detail. For instance, if God wants 
Bob and Susan to marry then God brings it about, through second causes of course, 
that they are married. God has a specific will for whether I should be married 
and, if so, God also has a particular person selected for me to marry. God has 
a specific will for our lives concerning issues of vocation, where to live, how 
many children to have, what sort of education to pursue, where to go on vacation, 
what clothes to purchase, etc. God's exhaustive sovereignty is comprehensive, 
nothing is overlooked. There is no decision too insignificant for God's concern 
and sovereign control. Also1 there is no circumstance so unimportant that God 
does not have it planned. Every specific thing that happens to us is part of the 
blueprint. For specific sovereignty, it will be remembered, there are no such 
things as chance events or accidents. So each and every circumstance serves as 
God's mouthpiece identifying part of the divine plan. 198 
Moreover, according to the no-risk model we can never fail to be led by the 
Spirit. Whatever guidance God wishes to bestow on us at any particular time is 
infallibly given to us and understood by us in precisely the way God intends us 
to understand it. Our interpretation of divine providence in our lives at any 
moment is precisely the interpretation God intends us to have. This does not 
mean, however, that ~are never confused about the leading of the Spirit. It 
only means that if we are confused it is because God intends for us to be 
confused at that particular time in our lives. If we do not clearly perceive 
where God is guiding us we may rest assured that God does not intend for us to 
grasp his direction at that particular moment. We may hope that God will see fit 
to remove the confusion in the future. 
Furthermore, for the no-risk model ~ can never fail to align ourselves with the 
divine plan since God's blueprint is infallibly carried out in every detail. It 
is inappropriate to ask whether we are following God's guidance since we cannot 
198Hence, the great interest by some Christians in interpreting circumstances 
as "open and closed doors" and the search for divine "signs." 
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but follow it. It is not a question of whether or not we submit to God's leading 
for God's leading is never thwarted or frustrated in the least detail. Otherwise, 
God would in some sense be dependent or conti'ngent upon us to follow his 
guidance."' Clearly, the no-risk model cannot allow that God's exhaustive plan 
would fail to be fulfilled in the least detail for God is in no way dependent 
upon us for our following his direction. For instance, if Susan wonders whether 
God wants her to write a novel she can.not but fail to receive and follow the 
precise guidance God intends for her at that particular time. If God wants her 
to write it then God ensures that she is so guided and that she, in fact, does 
it. 
6.6.2 The Risk View of Divine Guidance 
According to the fellowship model of sovereignty God does not have a blueprint 
which we are to follow. God has a goal for our lives but there are numerous open 
routes to its achievement. Having said this a qualification must immediately be 
given. Just because there is no exhaustive divine plan for every single decision 
we want to make does not mean that God never desires a specific individual to do 
some particular act. After all, God requested certain people in the Bible to 
perform specific acts (e.g., God asked Gideon to tear down the alter of Baal, 
Jud. 6:25). Yet, for most of us there is no such specific guidance. The will of 
God for our lives is not a list of activities regarding vocation, marriage and 
the like. Rather, it is God's desire that we become a lover of God and others as 
was exemplified in God's way in Jesus. "When people talk about God's leading," 
says van de Beek, "it is usually not rooted in the way of Christ, but in a 
general concept of onmipotence and protection. 11200 The way of Jesus is a way of 
life not concerned about blueprints but about being the kind of person God 
desires. God's major goal is to renew us in the likeness of Jesus (with all the 
attending individual and social implications) . In this sense it could be said 
l 99A ·fair number of writers ori. divine guidance fail to see this. 
'°'van de Beek, Why?, 49. 
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that God has a specific will for each and every situation: to live as Jesus 
would. This is not, however, what people usually have in mind when they seek 
specific divine guidance. It is God's desire that' we enter into a give-and-take 
relationship of love and this is not accomplished by God forcing his blueprint 
on us. Rather, God wants to go through life with us, making decisions together. 
Together we decide how the actual course of my life shall go. God's will for my 
life is not a list of specific activities but a personal relationship and in such 
a relationship God does not dominate over us with his blueprint for our lives. 
Rather, as lover and friend God works with us wherever we go and whatever we do. 
To a large extent our future is open and we are to determine what it shall be in 
dialogue with God. God does not simply turn us loose to do whatever we please. 
Rather, we are to seek God's wisdom for our lives (James 1:5). For example, there 
may be a variety of vocations available to me with which God is pleased and there 
usually will not be one that is the "best" or 11 perfect" in comparison to the 
others. I am free to make my choice in consultation with God. In my opinion, God 
is concerned about which vocation I select but is much more concerned about how 
I live my life in that vocation. Whatever vocation I choose God wants me to do 
it Christianly. 
Furthermore, according to the relational model explored in this thesis there are 
"chance" happenings and genuine accidents which God did not specifically intend. 
God has granted humans significant freedom such that we may do things to others 
which God does not intend us to do. An employer, for instance, may harass and 
fire Jane without good reason. Jane should not view this circumstance as a "sign 11 
that God's will for her life has changed. She may, however, be confident that no 
matter what others do to her God is working in her life to redeem the situation. 
Since most circumstances we experience in life, such as being in a train accident 
or meeting an old friend on the street corner, are brought about by human freedom 
we should not attribute them to God. God is resourceful to work with us in any 
and every situation but God is not causing all our circumstances as this would 
imply a great deal of manipulation of humans. God has sovereignly chosen not to 
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practice that sort of providence as his normal way of dealing with us. Though God 
can (even unilaterally) bring certain circumstances about, God normally works 
with us in whatever circumstances we experience.· Hence, according to the risk 
model of providence Christians should not attempt to read all circumstances as 
signs of God's will for their lives. 201 King Saul, for example, made this 
mistake when he had David trapped for he said that "God has given him into my 
hand" (1 Sam. 23:7). That God had done no such thing is made shown in the fact 
that David escaped. Furthermore, when the murderers of Saul's son told David that 
God had avenged David of Saul, David rejected their interpretation and had them 
killed (2 Sam. 4:8-12). In the no-risk model of providence texts such as these 
are problematic because misinterpretation of what God is doing is not meaningful 
for specific sovereignty since everything that happens not only is specifically 
decreed by God, but so is its interpretation or misinterpretation. In the risk 
model, however, it is possible to mistake a divine action and misconstrue 
circumstances. 
Regarding the leading of the Spirit, the risk model implies that we may or may 
not fail to understand the Spirit's direction. We may not understand what God 
expects of us in a particular instance. We may not accurately grasp the divine 
wisdom God attempts to give us for some problem. God will do all he can to help 
us but since God is dependent upon us for some things there is no guarantee that 
we will properly appropriate the divine wisdom. Moreover, even though we might 
correctly understand the Spirit's leading we might fail to carry it out. Suppose 
that God is guiding me to spend more time with my children. I may or may not get 
God's leading straight and even if I understand it I may or may not do it. The 
deeper our personal relationship with God develops, however, the better we 
experience his love which enables us to both better understand how we should live 
and give ourselves in loving service to God. In so doing we follow his leading. 
'"John Boykin, The Gospel of Coincidence: Is God in Control? (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Zondervan, 1986), critiques the common assumption that all circumstances are 
God's doing. 
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6.7 Conclusion to chapter six 
This chapter has developed the theme of divine sovereignty in light of the 
particular sort of project God freely chose to est"ablish. It was God's sovereign 
grace which brought about a creation in which it was possible for creatures to 
enter into personal relations of fellowship with God. In the fellowship model God 
does not exhaustively control every event that happens. God grants humans "space" 
in order that we may freely respond to the divine love with our own love. God 
desires genuine give-and-take relations with us. Consequently, God restrains the 
use of all of his power so as not to overwhelm us. In such a relationship God has 
established the conditions within which certain of God's desires may be thwarted. 
Yet, even in the face of some defeats God does not give up on us but works in 
various ways to achieve the fulfillment of the divine project. All this is in 
contrast to the no-risk model of sovereignty where absolutely everything happens 
according to what God specifically intends to happen. The risk and no-risk models 
were compared and contrasted to see how each model would explicate the doctrines 
of salvation, suffering and evil, impetratory prayer and divine guidance. It was 
seen that certain claims could be made within one model which were incompatible 
with the other model. Overall, one of the key issues which arose in the course 
of the discussion is whether or not God ever makes himself dependent upon us in 
any respect. That is, is there any contingency in God? Does God ever respond or 
react to us because of what we do? The fellowship model of providence answers yes 
to these questions while the specific sovereignty model does not. Although the 
manipulative view of sovereignty provides God with great security since God takes 
no risks, it denies certain understandings of our fellowship with God assumed by 
most Christians as an integral part of their piety. I have sought to defend these 
common practices as well as provide a theological framework for understanding 
what a personal relationship with God involves. 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the biblical, theological, philosophical and practical 
issues surrounding the model of a risk-taking God. It has been argued that this 
model meets the three criteria outlined in chapter two: consonance with the 
tradition, especially the Bible; conceptual intelligibility; and adequacy to the 
demands of life. Chapters three and four discussed a good number of texts 
commonly either overlooked or given a different interpretation by the model of 
the non risk-taking God. It was seen that the scriptures depict God in dynamic 
give-and-take relationships with his creatures. God has sovereignly decided not 
to control everything which happens. Rather, God is sensitive to us and has 
decided to be responsive to us and be conditioned by us. This is the watershed 
issue between the risk and no-risk views of providence. According to the risk 
view God adapts his strategies to take account of our decisions. There is no 
eternal blueprint by which all things happen exactly as God desires. 
Although this understanding of providence does break with certain elements of the 
Western Christian tradition, it is in continuity with others. The tradition has 
continually affirmed both the personhood of God and that God enters into personal 
relationships with humans, yet the ·tradition has not sufficiently articulated 
providence in light of what is entailed in personal relationships. Hence, the 
model of a God who, in some respects, is conditioned by his creatures is a God 
who takes risks in working out the divine· project. The notion of divine 
conditionality has often been rejected in the tradition while simultaneously 
affirming the personal and loving nature of God's relationship to us. The 
fellowship model defended in this thesis addresses this problem and so it may be 
claimed that the risk model does greater justice to the heart of tradition: God 
in personal relationship with us. 
Chapters five and six discussed the conceptual intelligibility of the proposed 
model. It was claimed that the risk model better articulates the type of 
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sovereignty God has actually decided to exercise in history, a sovereignty 
connected to the nature of God as loving, wise, free, faithful and almighty. This 
is the God who takes the risk that we might not respond to his love yet who is 
extremely resourceful and competent in his wisdom and the manifestation of his 
powerful love. God does not give up on us, even in our sin, but comes to us in 
the person of Jesus to win back our trust and love. Since Jesus manifests the 
real nature of God, there is no conflict between the type of providence he 
displayed and that of the godhead. The God who comes to us in history is a God 
who relates, adapts, responds, and loves us. This is what God is actually like. 
This is a God who is able to meet the challenges we face in life and work to 
bring good out of our evil. Chapter six examined how the risk model of providence 
is adequate to the demands of life. God is working to bring about a future which 
redeems us from sin and suffering. The God who takes the risk of love provides 
a coherent model of God in relation to human suffering: God is opposed to it. 
Since God stands against suffering and sin there is no need to posit a "secret 11 
intention in God which takes precedence over his revealed intentions. There is 
no question about God's intentions towards us for he loves us and desires our 
best. Thus, when things do not go as God desires we may share God's sense of 
outrage--there is a place for lament in the Christian life. 
But there is more than lament in the Christian life, there is also hope because 
God is working to redeem his entire creation. God has the wisdom, power, love and 
perseverance necessary to meet the challenges ahead. God is competent and 
resourceful in working with us. We are called to have confidence in the way God 
seeks to carry out his project. According to the fellowship model of providence 
God elicits our participation in his project. This understanding of divine 
sovereignty deeply affects our views concerning salvation, suffering and evil, 
prayer, . and di vine guidance. God has sovereignly decided to make some of his 
actions dependent upon our requests and actions. This is part of what it means 
for God to take risks. 
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Although the risk model of providence meets the three criteria, it has not been 
claimed to have been "provedR in any hard sense of the term. A cumulative case 
has been set forth with enough evidence to warrant a hearing for the model but 
there is much more that needs to be said in order to respond to all the questions 
it poses for the various doctrines and life-applications of the Christian faith. 
Doctrines are interconnected and so are our applications of them. A change in a 
key model means more changes elsewhere and these must be examined. But that takes 
more time than is permitted here. There is yet more to be written about the God 
who takes risks. 
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